Skip to main content

Tag: sufficient reason

Claim That Settled Day Before Trial for Under $25,000 Reasonably Brought in Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, (Gonopolsky v. Hammerson) deciding if a case which settled the day before trail for an amount in the Small Claims Court jurisdiction was reasonably brought in Supreme Court.  The decision was relevant as the Plaintiff’s entitled to Supreme Court Costs rested on the outcome.
In finding there was “sufficient reason” to commence the proceedings in Supreme Court Mr. Justice Brown provided the following reasons:

[36]         Considering the nature of the injuries, and the effects on homemaking and employment, I find there was a substantial possibility the damages could exceed $25,000.

[37]         Further, the plaintiff submits other sufficient reasons to commence action in Supreme Court were the insurer’s denial of coverage because the forces were insufficient to cause injury; and because the plaintiff was allegedly a worker, which if proven and given the defendant was, would see the action statute barred pursuant to s. 10(1) of the WCA.

[38]         Addressing reasons for commencing action in Supreme Court, plaintiff’s counsel states in her affidavit, sworn September 10, 2015, at paras. 8 and 9 as follows:

8.         On November 5, 2012, I received a phone call from [the ICBC adjuster who] confirmed to me at that time that ICBC’s position was that [the plaintiff] was working at the time of the Collision, and that they would require a WCAT determination on that issue.

9.         On December 14, 2012, our office filled the Notice of Civil Claim commencing this action. At the time of filing, I was of the view that examinations for discovery would be necessary because of ICBC’s position regarding worker-worker issue. Based on the medical-legal reports of Dr. Sawhney, I was also of the view that there was a real and substantial chance that [the plaintiff’s] claim was worth in excess of $25,000.

[39]         As for the WCAT issue, the defendant argued it was not complicated and could have been determined in Provincial Court. As for the basics on that matter, I understand the plaintiff was working as a cleaner at the time. The driver was on her way to work. The plaintiff’s position was that she was going to be dropped off downtown and that she was not on the way to work that day. The defendant pointed out the plaintiff was not yet legally eligible to work in Canada and, accordingly, argued the plaintiff could not recover a wage loss in the first place, making WCAT issues moot. That could be argued at trial, had it got there. As it was, the defendant never withdrew the defence before trial and when the action was commenced, the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to know how that defence would play out.

[40]         The defendant’s position that the impact’s velocity was too low to cause an injury somewhat further complicated the case, would likely call for examinations for discovery, and at some juncture might entail an engineer’s opinion. It is unlikely the defendant would invest capital in that line of defence for this case, but it is reasonable to say the plaintiff’s burden on causation would be somewhat heavier than in a case where the force of the accident is not really in issue, which weigh in favour of a trial in this court.

[41]         Ultimately, the $22,500 settled figure compensated only non-pecuniary damages.

[42]         As similarly noted in Spencer at para. 24, the defendant’s positions effectively increased the complexity of the claim and the plaintiff’s need for counsel. “By denying liability, causation and that the plaintiff suffered any loss, the plaintiff would have been required to prove these elements at trial.” Further, at para. 25, “In taking the position that this was a low velocity impact claim the defendants created the situation giving rise to this motion. Their pleadings raised a multitude of issues in their defence. Those issues raised complex questions of fact and law. It is unlikely that a layperson could address them competently.” WCAT issues are sometimes simple. But for the plaintiff, it raised questions of mixed fact and law that raised another redoubt the plaintiff had to overcome.

[43]         The gap between the $25,000 threshold for small claims actions and the $22,500 settled on for non-pecuniary damages is not very wide, unlike the large gaps seen in some cases. A host of factors influence a settlement, but the amount settled here is at least within shouting distance of $25,000. Although that somewhat suggests the initial decision to bring action in the Supreme Court was reasonably defensible, standing alone, that is not sufficient reason.

[44]         In summary, the plaintiff has met the burden of proof required, albeit not by a large margin, but I am satisfied on balance that considering the potential damages that could be awarded for the plaintiff’s claim and the complications raised by the minimal damage and worker-worker defence, the plaintiff had sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

[45]         The plaintiff is entitled to costs of the action and of the application at Scale B.

Plaintiff Denied Costs for Having No Sufficient Reason to Sue in the Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.

One of the more difficult fact patterns to predict the outcome of is when will a Plaintiff be granted costs when they sue in the BC Supreme Court but are awarded damages below $25,000 (the monetary jurisdiction of the Provincial Court in BC).  You can click here to read archived decisions addressing this.  Adding to these, reasons for judgement were released this week considering such a scenario.
In this week’s case (Akbari v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision caused by an unidentified motorist.  He successfully sued ICBC and was awarded damages of just over $13,000.  Following this the Plaintiff sought costs of $17,000.  Madam Justice Baker denied this finding the Plaintiff had no sufficient reason to sue in Supreme Court. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[16]         I am not persuaded that there was sufficient reason to bring this action in Supreme Court.  As the plaintiff submits, the issue of liability was the primary issue at trial.  The Provincial Court is an entirely appropriate forum for determining that issue, the outcome of which largely depended on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
[17]         Ms. Berry of ICBC had no personal knowledge of the circumstances of the accident.  I can surmise that questions put to her on discovery may have related to contact by ICBC representatives with one of the plaintiff’s witnesses, Mr. Nahun Chinchilla, whose testimony I rejected at trial as incredible and unreliable.  Mr. Chinchilla voluntarily contacted both the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel and so far as I am aware, volunteered to be interviewed by plaintiff’s counsel prior to trial, so it was not necessary to utilize the Supreme Court Rules to compel his cooperation.
[18]         I am not persuaded that any documents and witness statements provided by the defendant to the plaintiff during the course of pre-trial preparation would not have been supplied by the defendant whether the action had been brought in Supreme Court or in Provincial Court.
[19]         I am not persuaded that there was any reasonable prospect that the plaintiff’s total damages would exceed $25,000.  The special damages and past loss of income were known.  The only head of damages involving uncertainty was non-pecuniary damages. The only medical evidence presented at trial was a report from Mr. Akbari’s family doctor, dated June 2, 2011.  In my view, it should have been obvious to the plaintiff and his counsel, after considering that report, that an award in the range of $25,000 was highly unlikely.
[20]         The report and the opinions expressed in it were sufficiently non-controversial that Dr. Rai was not required to attend for cross-examination.  In Dr. Rai’s opinion, Mr. Akbari suffered soft tissue injuries – described by Dr. Rai as “tendonious strain” affecting Mr. Akbari’s left calf, knee and thigh – from which he had recovered in 8 to 10 weeks.  Mr. Akbari was off work for two weeks, but it was during the Christmas holidays and he had planned to take some vacation during that period in any event.  The injuries caused little disruption to Mr. Akbari, only temporarily interfering with his participation in pick-up soccer games, and his weight-lifting routine at the gym.
[21]         In the plaintiff’s written submissions regarding costs, it was suggested that the concluding paragraph of my trial Reasons, in which I stated that I was not aware of any reason why the plaintiff should not have his costs on Scale B, was a determination of the issue.  That is not correct.  Unless a defendant invokes Rule 14-1, a plaintiff is normally entitled to costs.  Once the Rule is invoked, then the court must consider whether there was sufficient reason to bring the proceeding in the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff shall have disbursements only. 

LVI Defence, Liability Denial and Language Barriers Create Sufficient Reason to Sue in Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

While the BC Supreme Court Rules generally deprive a Plaintiff of costs who bring an action to trial that could have been brought in small claims court the BC Court of Appeal clarified that having ‘sufficient reason’ to sue in the BC Supreme Court is not limited to quantum of damages alone.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering some such other factors.
In this week’s case (Bae v. Vasquez) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2010 rear-end collision.  The Plaintiff suffered relatively minor soft tissue injuries.  She sued in the BC Supreme Court and was awarded damages of just over $12,000.  ICBC argued she should not be awarded costs as the action could have been brought in small claims court.  Madam Justice Baker disagreed finding that ICBC’s initial denial of liability, LVI Defence and the Plaintiff’s language barriers were all reasons justifying bringing the action in the Supreme Court.  In awarding costs the Court provided the following reasons:
[69]         I am satisfied that this case had neither legal nor factual complexities that made the Supreme Court a necessary venue.  I have already referred to the fact that a jury trial was not an option in any case; and there will be no need to enforce the judgment outside of the province.
[70]         In some cases, the fact that the plaintiff had difficulty with the English language; and therefore would have difficulty pursuing the claim without the assistance of counsel, has been held to be sufficient reason to proceed in Supreme Court, where the possibility of recovering costs makes it easier for a plaintiff to find counsel willing to act.
[71]         Plaintiff’s counsel submits also that in this case, the defendant denied liability for the accident in the Response to Civil Claim.  Plaintiff’s counsel has advised the Court that prior to the action being commenced, the defendant’s insurer had indicated:
…that due to the “minimal nature of the impact forces involved in the collision”…the Plaintiff had not sustained any “compensable injury”.
[72]         The defendant did not admit liability until January 30, 2012 and even at that date, continued to maintain that the plaintiff had suffered no injury, loss, damage or expense as a result of the accident.
[73]         Plaintiff’s counsel submits that because the defendant was maintaining that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident, an examination for discovery of the defendant was necessary and that procedure would not have been available to the plaintiff in Provincial Court.  Counsel pointed out that at the plaintiff’s examination for discovery in July 2011, she was asked questions pertaining to liability, including whether she had consumed alcohol or drugs prior to the accident; whether she was familiar with the location where the accident happened; whether her vehicle had been properly maintained and was in proper working order and whether she had a valid driver’s licence at the time.
[74]         It was not until August 18, 2011 – after both the plaintiff and defendant had been examined for discovery – that defendant’s counsel wrote to plaintiff’s counsel suggesting that the action should be heard in Provincial Court and seeking the plaintiff’s consent to transfer the action to that court.  Plaintiff’s counsel replied on September 21, 2011 indicating that if the trial could be heard in Provincial Court in the same time frame as the trial date set in Supreme Court – March 2012 – then the plaintiff would consider the request for a transfer.  Defendant’s counsel was asked to make inquiries to determine when the trial could be heard if transferred to Provincial Court.  No reply was received.
[75]         Ms. Bae testified at trial with the assistance of an interpreter.  She had been examined for discovery without an interpreter and at trial indicated she had misunderstood some of the questions asked of her.  Ms. Bae is not an assertive individual and I am satisfied she would have had considerable difficulty pursuing this action without the assistance of counsel.  Of course, parties may be and often are represented by counsel in Provincial Court, but the unavailability of costs makes it more difficult to find representation.  There was a denial of liability in circumstances where normally liability would be admitted and it was reasonable for the plaintiff to wish to examine the defendant for discovery on the issue of liability – a procedure unavailable in Provincial Court.
[76]         Taking all of these factors into account, I am of the view that there was sufficient reason for the plaintiff to bring her action in Supreme Court.  I award the plaintiff costs, the costs to be governed by Rule 15-1(15).

Plaintiff Awarded $9,500 Costs Despite $4,000 Damage Assessement

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 15.


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, with the “curious result” of costs recovery at over double the amount of assessed damages.
In last week’s case (Kargbo v. Chand) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision.  ICBC disputed both fault and injury.  At trial the Plaintiff’s claim was accepted and modest damages of $4,000 were awarded.  The Plaintiff sought her costs.  ICBC opposed arguing the Plaintiff did not have sufficient reason to sue in Supreme Court.
Earlier this year the BC Court of Appeal made it clear that more than the value of an ICBC Claim can be considered in deciding whether there is sufficient reason to sue in the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Williams went on to canvass factors other than value and concluded that the Plaintiff was entitled to $9,500 in costs under Rule 15-1(15).  The Court provided the following reasons:

[9] The problem ultimately reduces to this: If the Court determines that the plaintiff had sufficient reason for commencing or proceeding in the Supreme Court, she should be entitled to recover costs in accordance with Rule 15-1(15). If the Court finds that there was not sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in this Court, then she is not entitled to recover her costs.

[10] In Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, the Court of Appeal clarified that the issue has to be analyzed as at the point in time that the plaintiff initiated the action; there is no ongoing obligation to assess the quantum of claim.

[11] I have been provided with a number of decisions where judges of this Court have assessed the circumstances of cases to decide whether or not an order for costs is warranted. Obviously, the plaintiff bears the onus of establishing that there was sufficient reason for filing in the Supreme Court. It is not simply a matter of assessing the anticipated value of the claim. A number of factors have been identified in the cases as being relevant to the issue. These include the following (the list is not intended to be exhaustive):

1.         the legal or factual complexity of the case;

2.         the need for discovery of documents and examinations for discovery;

3.         the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia;

4.         a bona fide preference for a jury trial;

5.         access to the summary trial procedure available in Supreme Court; and

6.         the need for the plaintiff to have legal counsel, in light of the defendant’s denial of liability, dispute as to causation, injury or loss and allegations of contributory negligence, pre-existing conditions, previous causes and a failure to mitigate.

[12] In the present case, liability was denied and in the circumstances could reasonably have been expected to represent a challenge to prove. As well, the issue of damages had the real potential of being a problem. The plaintiff had a history of prior accidents and had been hospitalized shortly after the accident in question for matters not related to the accident. She was also injured in another more serious accident some several months after the accident at bar. It was the sort of case that a self-represented plaintiff would find daunting no doubt.

[13] Taking those considerations into account, it is my view that this plaintiff had sufficient reason for bringing her proceeding in the Supreme Court.

[14] As a parenthetical observation, it is true that a party such as this plaintiff could elect to pursue the claim in the Provincial Court with legal counsel, although the prospect of incurring the expense to do so without any right to recover court costs is a legitimate factor to consider. As well, where the plaintiff elects to bring suit in the Supreme Court, she runs the real risk of an adverse costs outcome if the action is unsuccessful.

[15] In the circumstances, it is my view that the plaintiff should be entitled to costs in accordance with the Rules of Court. I recognize that might appear to produce a curious result in that the award of costs is substantially greater than the damages that she recovered. However, if the matter is considered fairly and objectively and the relevant rule applied, that result follows.

[16] There is no question that the policy which underpins Rule 14-1(1) is to encourage parties with claims of modest value to bring their action in the Provincial Court, and to provide for a penalty against one who does not. That is consistent with the concept of proportionality which is a foundational consideration of the Court’s Rules.

[17] The clear default position will be that, with respect to claims where the award is less than $25,000, the plaintiff will not be entitled to an award of costs. Nevertheless, there will be situations where there is sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court. It will be for the Court to examine the circumstances of each particular case to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason.

For more cases addressing sufficient reasons to sue in Supreme Court you can click here to access my archived posts on this topic.

More on Costs and Sufficient Reason to Sue in the BC Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.


Earlier this year the BC Court of Appeal provided much needed clarity to the factors Courts can consider when deciding whether a Plaintiff has sufficient reasons to sue in the Supreme Court when considering costs consequences following trial.   Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal further addressing this topic finding that while the Court can consider other issues, the value of the claim will be one of the most important factors.
In today’s case (Gehlen v. Rana) the Plaintiff was injured when she was a passenger involved in a rear-end car crash.  The Defendant admitted fault for the crash but denied liability to the Plaintiff claiming that the Plaintiff “was not present in the vehicle at the time of the accident“.  The Defendant made a formal offer to settle the Plaintiff’s claim for $22,000 plus disbursements.  The Plaintiff rejected this offer and went to trial.  After trial the Jury awarded the Plaintiff total damages of just over $13,000.
Despite this result the trial judge awarded the Plaintiff costs and found the Plaintiff has sufficient reason to sue in the Supreme Court.  The BC Court of Appeal found this was in error and in doing so provided these reasons addressing the issue of “sufficient reason” to sue in the BC Supreme Court in a personal injury claim:

[35] In Gradek, the Court interpreted the meaning of “sufficient reason” in Rule 57(10).  The Court acknowledged that the procedures available in the Small Claims Court will, in most cases, “enable the parties to proceed in a cost-efficient manner to a just result” (para. 18).

[36] The Court ultimately concluded that “sufficient reason” was not intended by the Legislature to be limited to the quantum as assessed at the outset of the claim.  However, the Court stated, at paras. 16 and 20:

[16]      The words “sufficient reason” are not defined in the Rules of Court.  In their ordinary and grammatical sense, they do not suggest a specific limitation in terms of application, although it is clear that “any reason” will not do.  The reason has to be “sufficient”, but there is nothing in the Rule to suggest that it has to be connected solely to the quantum of the claim.  On the other hand, the words do not connote the exercise of a discretion, with its attendant deferential standard of review.  That point was made by this Court in Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 72 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 13:  …

…

[20]      I accept that the narrow interpretation of the words “sufficient reason” advocated by the appellant would provide greater certainty to litigants in knowing the consequences of proceeding in Supreme Court where the matter falls within the Small Claims monetary limit.  But I agree with the trial judge that if the Legislature had intended to limit the scope of the words “sufficient reason” to the extent suggested by the appellant, it could readily have done so.  While I am satisfied that the words, “sufficient reason” should not be interpreted in an expansive manner, but with restraint, I am also satisfied that they must be read in such a way that a trial judge is not forced to deny a party costs where he is satisfied, as here, that justice can only be achieved as between the parties by an award of costs to the successful party.

[37] As I understand the import of Gradek, it is that likely quantum, while perhaps the most important factor for determination of sufficient reason, is not the only factor that may be taken into account.  The Court in Gradek also accepted that there may be other circumstances that justify bringing an action in the Supreme Court despite the fact that the likely quantum will not exceed the Small Claims amount.  Thus, in Gradek the Court accepted the trial judge’s finding that Mr. Gradek, due to language difficulties, required the assistance of counsel and it would be unjust to require him to bring his claim in the Small Claims Court where he would be denied costs that would partially offset the expense of retaining counsel (para. 18).  However, it is clear from Gradekthat the burden is on the plaintiff to establish eligible circumstances that are persuasive and compelling to justify “sufficient reason”.

[38] In the case at bar, the plaintiff reiterated before us the 12 reasons submitted to the trial judge to establish sufficient reason to commence the action in the Supreme Court.  However, eight of those reasons were circumstances that arose after the commencement of the action and were thus irrelevant to the analysis (the defendant’s offer to settle; the defendant’s failure to apply to move the action to the Small Claims Court; the defendant’s denial of liability for the plaintiff’s injury; the insurer’s characterization of the collision as low impact; the exchange of 60 documents; the defendant’s motion for a Rule 66 hearing and eventual removal; a Rule 28 examination of a witness; and the absence of expert evidence tendered by the defendant).

[39] The strongest reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court related to the plaintiff’s alleged injuries, but that must be closely examined in light of her pre-existing condition.  While minor impacts do not necessarily preclude serious injuries, it must have been apparent to the plaintiff that after this minor collision her pre-existing condition was only modestly aggravated and would not attract a significant award of damages.

[40] In my opinion, the plaintiff has not identified a compelling circumstance that meets the sufficient reason test in Rule 57(10) as interpreted by Gradek.

[41] In my view, this was a case where it was plain and obvious at all material times that this was a proper action to be tried in the Small Claims Court.

Costs and Sufficient Reason to Sue in the Supreme Court: Clarity from the BCCA

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.


Welcome reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing when a Plaintiff has ‘sufficient reason‘ for suing in the BC Supreme Court.  In short the top BC Court ruled that trial judges can look beyond the value of a claim when addressing this topic.  This issue is important because generally a Plaintiff who succeeds in a Supreme Court lawsuit but is awarded below $25,000 (the current monetary jurisdiction of the BC Provincial Court) will be deprived of costs unless they have ‘sufficient reason‘ for suing in the Supreme Court.
In today’s case (Gradek v. DaimlerChryster Financial) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  His lawsuit was successful and he was awarded damages of just over $9,000.  The trial judge also awarded costs of $6,600.  In doing so the trial judge made the following useful findings when individuals sue an insured defendant:

[42]      The plaintiff is who he is.  As such, he would have had extraordinary difficulty presenting a case on his own.  While the defendant, represented by the insurer, suggested that in Provincial Court it might, at times, be represented by an adjuster, in my view, whether the defendant was represented by an adjuster or a lawyer the plaintiff would have been outmatched.

[43]      In my opinion the plaintiff required counsel to obtain a just result. Costs are not awarded in Provincial Court.  [Emphasis added.]

ICBC Appealed this order arguing that a court can only look at the likely value of a claim when deciding whether there is sufficient reason to sue in the BC Supreme Court.  The Court of Appeal disagreed and dismissed the appeal.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons addressing the scope of ‘sufficient reasons‘ under Rule 14-1(10) of the Civil Rules:

[16]        The words “sufficient reason” are not defined in the Rules of Court.  In their ordinary and grammatical sense, they do not suggest a specific limitation in terms of application, although it is clear that “any reason” will not do.  The reason has to be “sufficient”, but there is nothing in the Rule to suggest that it has to be connected solely to the quantum of the claim.  On the other hand, the words do not connote the exercise of a discretion, with its attendant deferential standard of review.  That point was made by this Court in Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 72 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 13:

[13]      At the outset, I observe that the application of Rule 57(10) does not involve an exercise of discretion.  For a plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to recover more than disbursements, the court must make a finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court.

[17]        In support of its position, the appellant relies on the nature and purpose of the legislative scheme which, he submits, reflect an intention on the part of the Legislature to confine the meaning of the words “sufficient reason” to reasons relating only to quantum as assessed at the outset of the claim.  In that respect, it is common ground that the primary purpose of denying costs in the Supreme Court to those with monetary claims of $25,000 or less is to encourage claimants to bring their claims in Small Claims Court, with its simplified procedures and greater accessibility to judicial dispute resolution.  Litigating in the Supreme Court when the amount of money involved is relatively small can be prohibitive for both the “winner” and the “loser”.

[18]        I am in general agreement with the appellant’s submission in its factum (at para. 33) that the object of the small claims procedures set out in the Small Claims Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 430 and Rules, B.C. Reg. 261/93 is “to provide parties, and lay litigants, in particular with an easily understandable, flexible, and less costly alternative to the Supreme Court”.  I am also prepared to accept that, in most cases, the pre-trial procedures, including pre-trial disclosure of documents and expert reports, mediation services, settlement conferences and recovery of such reasonable expenses as interpreter fees, provided in the Provincial Court, will enable the parties to proceed in a cost-efficient manner to a just result.  But, that will not always be the case.  In this instance, for example, the trial judge was satisfied that Mr. Gradek’s circumstances required the assistance of counsel to obtain a just resolution of his claim.  It is implicit in his reasons that he considered that it would be unjust to find that Mr. Gradek require counsel to properly present his claim, on the one hand, and to deny him costs which would partially offset the expense of retaining counsel, on the other.  It was on this basis, in part, that he found there was “sufficient reason” within the meaning of Rule 57(10) to bring the action in the Supreme Court with its attendant relief for the successful party in costs.

[19]        Without endorsing all of the factors relied on by the trial judge as constituting “sufficient reason” in this case, I am satisfied that there may be circumstances which may constitute sufficient reason for bringing an action in the Supreme Court, thereby triggering its costs provisions, despite the fact that it is apparent from the outset that the award will fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the Provincial Court.  It is open to a defendant who believes that the claim should not have been brought in the Supreme Court to apply under s. 15 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 443, to have the matter transferred to the Provincial Court.  Alternatively, if the matter proceeds in the Supreme Court, it is open to the defendant to ask that a successful plaintiff be denied costs on the basis that there was not sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court in the first instance.

[20]        I accept that the narrow interpretation of the words “sufficient reason” advocated by the appellant would provide greater certainty to litigants in knowing the consequences of proceeding in Supreme Court where the matter falls within the Small Claims monetary limit.  But I agree with the trial judge that if the Legislature had intended to limit the scope of the words “sufficient reason” to the extent suggested by the appellant, it could readily have done so.  While I am satisfied that the words, “sufficient reason” should not be interpreted in an expansive manner, but with restraint, I am also satisfied that they must be read in such a way that a trial judge is not forced to deny a party costs where he is satisfied, as here, that justice can only be achieved as between the parties by an award of costs to the successful party.