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Tag: subsequent medical exams

Speculation No Reason for Second Defence Medical Exam

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Speculation No Reason for Second Defence Medical Exam

Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that a second Court ordered defense medical exam is inappropriate solely in anticipation of an event which may not occur.
In the recent case (Litt v. Guo) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and sued for damages.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff consented to a defence medical exam with a physician that addressed the Plaintiff’s injuries.  As trial neared the Defense applied for a further exam with a new physician arguing that the initial report was dated and further that “the plaintiff might file a newer report” and the Defendant wished to respond to this anticipated development.  In noting that both arguments were insufficient for a Court ordered second defense medical exam Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons:

[10]         The second ground raised by the defendants, and the ground that Mr. McHale referred to as the primary basis supporting the application for another IME by a different specialist, is that the most recent report of Dr. Bishop will be two years old at the date of trial in October 2014. The defendants fear that the plaintiff might file a newer report before the August 4 deadline for delivery of such reports, and the defendants say they would then be at a disadvantage because the plaintiffs will have a fresher report, a report based on a more recent assessment of the plaintiff.

[11]         The defendants submit that they would wish to put before the Court the best evidence, the evidence of an examination of the plaintiff at a time more recent than October 2012. There are, in my respectful view, two weaknesses with that submission. The first is that it anticipates what has not yet occurred.  If the plaintiff does submit a report prepared by one of her experts based on a recent examination of the plaintiff and if something new comes out of that report, then presumably Dr. Bishop could be invited to comment on it and the defendants would be in a position to file a rebuttal report. There is nothing in the record before me to suggest that he would not be able to comment on such a report or that there would be a need for further examination should he, in fact, be faced with such a report.

[12]         The second weakness is that passage of time alone is not a basis for ordering a second medical examination of a plaintiff. Dr. Bishop’s report is very clear in terms of his diagnosis, prognosis and his description of the pattern of symptoms Ms. Litt will experience into the future. He describes a likely aggravation of symptoms on activity, which it seems is exactly what is reflected in the medical reports which initially led to this application.

[13]         In short, despite Mr. McHale’s able submissions, I cannot find that a further examination is necessary to ensure reasonable equality of the parties in preparing for this trial.

Lack of Doctor's Affidavit Thwarts Independent Medical Exam Application

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on Lack of Doctor's Affidavit Thwarts Independent Medical Exam Application

While the BC Supreme Court does have the ability to compel a Plaintiff to attend a defence medical exam a proper evidentiary foundation must be established before the Court will be prepared to exercise this power.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dismissing an application due in part to a lack of evidence from the proposed physician.
In last week’s case (Rathgeber v. Freeman) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages and also sought Part 7 benefits from ICBC.  ICBC sent the Plaintiff to an independent medical exam with an orthopedic surgeon who provided a report addressing the Plaintiff’s injuries.  Some four years later the tort claim was still ongoing and the Defendant brought an application for a further exam with the same physician.  The Court dismissed this noting that the previous exam covered tort issues and even if there was a change of circumstances making a further report necessary there was nothing in the evidence justifying a further physical examination.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:
[23]         In some respects, Dr. Kousaie’s November 9, 2009 report “resembles” a report in a tort claim. The doctor sets out his qualifications, for example, as well as facts and assumptions. He includes details of the accident, the plaintiff’s recreational history and comments on the possibility of academic impairment. He indicates that the examination involved a comprehensive physical examination. Those aspects of the report appear to be more consistent with a comprehensive report prepared to address the plaintiff’s complaints in a tort action.
[24]         On the other hand, the report is now four years old and while Dr. Kousaie makes reference to the neck injury, he appears to have focused on low back pain as the plaintiff’s major complaint at the time of his 2009 assessment. Dr. Kousaie’s review of the then available imaging and x-rays did not indicate any trauma to the spine although some minor disc bulges were noted in the lumbar area.
[25]         More recent assessments, and that of Dr. Twist in particular, suggest an increasing focus on the neck injury and indeed the CT scan referred to earlier shows a small circumferential disc bulge in the cervical spine, a condition not evident at the time of Dr. Kousaie’s first examination.
[26]         Taking a holistic view of the circumstances, Dr. Kousaie’s 2009 report is comprehensive and to some extent addresses issues more relevant to a tort claim than a Part 7 claim. The results of the CT scan and the shift in focus to the plaintiff’s neck injury, however, are issues which the defence may need to address. There is, however, nothing in the evidence before me to show why a further examination, rather than a review of the available materials by Dr. Kousaie or some other qualified specialist, is necessary to achieve reasonable equality with respect to medical evidence. While I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that the proposed examiner should, in all cases, provide an affidavit with respect to the necessity for a further examination, such an affidavit would have been of significant assistance to me in this case.
[27]         On the basis of the material before me, the application is dismissed.

An IME "Should Not Be Ordered Simply To Allow The Defendants To Ask the Same Questions Asked in Discovery"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dismissing an application for an independent medical exam noting the Defendant’s could have obtained the sought information through the discovery process.
In this week’s case (Foster v. Chandel) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision.  The Plaintiff agreed to attend a Defense medical exam.  Subsequent to this the Defendant requested a second exam with a psychiatrist.   The Defendant argued that this was necessary because “the plaintiff is taking the maximum dosage of anti-depressant medication; has been seen by a psychiatrist (but not for treatment); and is suggested [by her family doctor] to be suffering from a mood disorder related to chronic pain.“.
Master Bouck dismissed the application noting all of this could be explored through the discovery process.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[18]         There is no evidence from any medically-trained person suggesting that a psychiatric examination is necessary or useful to either diagnose or treat the plaintiff. The plaintiff is taking medication in the dosage recommended by physicians with no suggestion of prescription abuse. The emotional symptoms are said by the medical experts to emanate from the plaintiff’s physical pain, not from any alleged psychiatric condition or disorder.
[19]         The defendants submit that the psychiatric examination may reveal other causes for the plaintiff’s anxiety and depression. It may also reveal the nature and extent of these conditions.
[20]         Such information can be sought at the plaintiff’s examination for discovery. A psychiatric examination should not be ordered simply to allow the defendants to ask the same questions asked in discovery but in a different manner and venue.
[21]         The nature and extent of the plaintiff’s pain disorder and resulting symptoms is revealed in the records and reports of the treating physicians. There is no evidence to suggest that a psychiatrist could offer a “better” diagnosis or prognosis on that condition.
[22]         The facts of this case have many parallels to those discussed in Wocknitz v. Donaldson, 2010 BCSC 1991. As in that case, the defendants do not have the necessary evidentiary foundation to support an order for “this particularly invasive form of examination”: para. 20.

More on the DME Prohibition of Bolstering Previous Opinions

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

While Plaintiff’s in personal injury lawsuits sometimes have to be subjected to multiple defence medical exams (DME) one well-settled principle is that subsequent exams to bolster a previous defence opinion are not permitted.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, demonstrating this principle in action.
In last week’s case (Dillon v. Montgomery) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle collisions.  He sued for damages with both claims set for trial at the same time.   In the course of the lawsuit he agreed to attend a defence medical exam with an orthopaedic surgeon.  The examination included a neurological assessment.
The Defendant then applied for a second exam, this time with a neurologist, arguing this was necessary “to ensure reasonable equality between the parties in the preparation of a case for trial“.  Master Bouck disagreed finding a further exam was not necessary in the circumstances and amounted to an effort to “bolster” the previous opinion.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:

[17] Dr. McGraw reviews the findings contained in the neurological consult report in his own report. In additon, Dr. McGraw conducted a neurological examination.

[18] This expert’s opinion is that the plaintiff’s “back pain is of muscular origin and not related to intervertebral disc disease, arthritis of the apophyseal joints, or nerve root irritation”…

[28] In the case at bar, I determined that an examination by Dr. Moll is not necessary to put the parties on equal footing.

[29] First, there was nothing new in the medical evidence since the examination by Dr. McGraw that might justify an examination by a neurologist. The only alleged new information is the plaintiff’s ongoing complaints of tingling in his arms and legs. These complaints are of long standing and even pre-date the accidents.

[30] Second, a neurological opinion has been obtained [by the plaintiff] which negates any correlation between the plaintiff’s symptoms and the motor vehicle accidents. Indeed, Dr. Shtybel’s resident made no findings of neurological impairment whatsoever. In other words, the only purpose of an independent medical examination by a neurologist would be to prove a negative, or, perhaps bolster Dr. McGraw’s opinion. This circumstance is different than the one considered in Kim v. Lin where there had yet to be any medical opinions proferred to explain ongoing (and even worsening) accident related complaints.

[31] Finally, the fact that the plaintiff has ongoing complaints that may be considered neurological symptoms does not warrant this second examination. The defence is “not entitled to pursue every potential medical possibility” to address the plaintiff’s subjective complaints: Lowry v. Spencer, (10 December, 1990) Vancouver Registry No. B883909 as cited in Trahan v. West Coast Amusements Ltd., 2000 BCSC 691 at para. 49.

For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts summarizing the judicial application of Rule 7-6(2).

Why Physical Examination Is Not Always Necessary for a "Balanced Playing Field"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that a physical examination is not always necessary for parties to put themselves on a ‘balanced playing field‘ in a personal injury claim.
In this week’s case (De Sousa v. Bradaric) the Defendant appealed from a Master’s decision refusing to permit a second psychiatric independent medical exam of the Plaintiff.  You can click here for my original post discussing the initial applicaiton.
As previously summarized, the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 collision which allegedly caused physical and psychiatric consequences.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendants had the Plaintiff assessed by a psychiatrist of their choosing.  This psychiatrist (Dr. Davis) concluded that there was “no psychosis“.
Shortly after this the Plaintiff was admitted in hospital on multiple occasions.  She was ultimately diagnosed with “chronic paranoid schizophrenia” by her treating physicians.  These records were shared with Dr. Davis but despite the diagnosis from treating specialists he “rigidly and categorically rejected any diagnosis of a psychotic conditions“.  For this reason the Master refused to order a second examination.
In the appeal Mr. Justice Smith allowed the introduction of new evidence, specifically a further report from Dr. Davis indicating that he had a terminal illness and will not be able to participate in trial.  The Defendant’s argued that in these circumstances a further exam should be ordered.  Mr. Justice Smith found that while that could be the case, here it was not necessary because the Defendant had already received a report from their second psychiatrist who opined about the Plaintiff’s condition despite not physically examining her.   In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:

[16] The question that arises on the new evidence, given the unavailability of Dr. Davis for trial, is whether the defendant needs a new psychiatric examination to be placed on that all important equal footing. For that purpose I turn to the report of Dr. Vallance that was before the master. This is of course a report that the defendant has, can rely upon at trial, and presumably Dr. Vallance will be available to be cross-examined on it.

[17] Dr. Vallance prefaces his report by stating:

I have not personally examined Ms. De Sousa. Consequently such opinions as I offer in this report are offered only on the understanding that such opinions are significantly limited in the weight that can be given to them absent such an examination.

As a general statement, that is undoubtedly true. However, it must be reviewed in the context of this case and the issues that will be before the court on which medical opinion evidence will be necessary.

[18] Dr. Vallance states that, based on his review of the records, there is no doubt about the fact that the plaintiff now suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. So he does not suggest that he needs to conduct an independent medical examination to confirm or exclude that diagnosis.

[19] The real issue in this case is whether that condition was caused or contributed to by the accident. On that point Dr. Vallance gives a firm opinion. He states:

I believe that if her physical condition and such anxiety as she had arising from the traumata that she experienced had been significant stressors timing the onset of that first episode, then her psychotic illness would have developed sooner rather than later. I believe that her psychosis began out of the blue, as it usually does, and at an age that is usual for the appearance of a first episode.

He then says:

Such diagnoses as paranoid schizophrenia often reveal themselves slowly over time, and therefore, based on the longitudinal history rather than cross-sectional examination, earlier episodes are often diagnosed as other conditions until the full picture is revealed.

[20] Thus on the crucial causation issue, Dr. Vallance’s own report does not support the suggestion that an independent medical examination is needed to place the parties on an equal footing. Indeed he specifically questions the usefulness of a single medical examination and stresses the need to review the entire history, as he has already done, based on the records.

[21] There is also evidence before me from the plaintiff’s family physician that in light of the plaintiff’s present psychiatric condition, a further medical examination at this time will actually be harmful to her health. That prejudice to the plaintiff must, in my view, be considered, although if I thought that a further psychiatric examination was necessary to put the parties on an equal footing, I would have said that means would need to be devised to manage that risk, perhaps with the assistance of the treating psychiatrist.

[22] However, that is not the case here. It appears to me from the evidence of Dr. Vallance that the defendants are in as good a position as they are likely to be to advance their position that this severe psychiatric condition is causally unrelated to the motor vehicle accident. I am not satisfied that a further psychiatric examination will add anything to the matter or will be of any further assistance for the court.

Defendant Denied Second Medical Exam Despite Potential "Concerns" Of First Expert's Opinion

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.

(Update:  The below decision was upheld on Appeal by Mr. Justice Smith on September 29, 2011)
Although Rule 7-6(2) of the BC Supreme Court Civil Rules permits multiple court ordered medical examinations, there is a general prohibition of multiple exams to comment on the same topic.  Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this in the context of a psychiatric condition which developed following a motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (De Sousa v. Bradaric and Borthwick) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 collision which allegedly caused physical and psychiatric consequences.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendants had the Plaintiff assessed by a psychiatrist of their choosing.  This psychiatrist (Dr. Davis) concluded that there was “no psychosis“.
Shortly after this the Plaintiff was admitted in hospital on multiple occasions.  She was ultimately diagnosed with “chronic paranoid schizophrenia” by her treating physicians.  These records were shared with Dr. Davis but despite the diagnosis from treating specialists he “rigidly and categorically rejected any diagnosis of a psychotic conditions“.
In the face of this clear diagnosis from the treating physicians a second Defence Medical Exam was sought, this time with a different psychiatrist.  The Court rejected the application despite potential “concerns….with the quality or reliability” of Dr. Davis’ opinion.  In rejecting the application Master Baker provided the following helpful reasons:

[13] I am not satisfied at all that in these circumstances, with these facts and history, that a second IME is justified. It is easily as consistent in my mind that the defence now disagrees or is concerned about issues with Dr. Davis’ position and report. It is easily consistent, in my view, that the application aims to mediate or improve upon Dr. Davis’ opinions.

[14] Yes, Mr. McIvor is absolutely correct that the psychosis, if any, was at a fairly nascent stage in 2007 when Dr. Davis saw her and that it has apparently, if one takes the evidence of the plaintiff, become full-blown. Well, so be it. In my respectful view, Dr. Davis is a psychiatrist. He is an expert in psychiatric matters. He has been consulted on, I am told, many occasions. That is not denied. I would expect him to be alive to the issue. He certainly inquired of Ms. De Sousa and very soon after was advised of the psychotic overlay or potential for it and has absolutely rejected that.

[15] In all the circumstances, I just cannot see a basis for the second opinion. It is a multi-stage test, of course. There are aspects of this both counsel have properly put before the court, starting with as Mr. McIvor has pointed out the Chief Justice in Wildemann (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 244 (C.A.). It must be an exceptional case that justifies the second IME or one that is required to place the parties on equal footing. I cannot see that in this particular case. What is, I think, concerning the defence, I infer, is concerns they have with the quality or reliability of a report obtained in this specific area of expertise.










[16] The court should be concerned according to McKay v. Passmore, 2005 BCSC 570, that the matter is something that could not reasonably be seen or anticipated or dealt with at the time. Well, again, I do not see that that applies in this case. There was a previous committal for psychotic reasons. Counsel called and advised that she had been to the hospital, possibly not for psychotic reasons, possibly as I said earlier for cognitive reasons; possibly he did not have in hand the medical records. He probably did not. It sounds to me like it was on an emergency basis, but surely that should have given rise to real concerns on the part of any inquiring professional such as Dr. Davis.

[17] The passage of time alone does not justify a second IME. That is true. However, that may be qualified, I suppose, when the passage of time allows for the development of a whole new area of concern or symptomology. Certainly, as I have said already a couple of times, her psychosis has really developed and become much more obvious, apparently. However, I do not think this aspect applies because it should have been evident to a reasonable inquiry at the time that there was a real issue about this…











[21] Yes, this may be developing into a major claim, but that does not change all of the other considerations that I have applied and taken from the cases, all of which lead me to conclude that the application should be dismissed, and it is.