When fault for a crash is admitted in a formal lawsuit the Court has discretion to allow withdrawal of the admission in appropriate circumstances. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal documenting one such instance.
In today’s case (Sidhu v. Hothi) the Plaintiffs alleged they were involved in a collision caused by the Defendant. They sued for damages and ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the defendant. In the course of the lawsuit a witness was interviewed who provided a statement indicating the Plaintiffs may not have been in the vehicle at all. ICBC sought to withdraw the admission of fault. The plaintiffs opposed arguing it was too late to do so. The BC Court of Appeal disagreed and in finding withdrawal was appropriate provided the following reasons:
 Turning, then, to what I regard as the real issue in this case – whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that most of the Hamilton factors weighed in favour of the defendants – I would suggest it would be preferable to frame items 3‑8 of the Hamilton test not as conditions that must be met, but as factors that should be considered in determining what result is in the interests of justice. Thus I would reframe items 3‑8 as follows:
(a) whether the admission was made inadvertently, hastily, or without knowledge of the facts;
(b) whether the “fact” admitted was or was not within the knowledge of the party making the admission;
(c) where the admission is one of fact, whether it is or may be untrue;
(d) whether and to what extent the withdrawal of the admission would prejudice a party; and
(e) whether there has been delay in the application to withdraw the admission and any reason offered for such delay.
I have omitted item 6 of the original list (that the fact admitted be one of mixed fact and law), since in most cases, including Hamilton itself, this has been held to be irrelevant provided a triable issue is raised (see alsoNesbitt (B.C.S.C.) at para. 56.)
 The decision as to what is in the interests of justice involves a considerable degree of discretion, and as noted in Goundar v. Nguyen 2013 BCCA 251, this court should generally not interfere with such a decision unless the judge erred in principle. In my view, the chambers judge correctly weighed the “delay” factor against the fact that the admission was made without knowledge of the evidence; that the insurer’s failure to appreciate the significance of Mr. Hothi’s witness statement was a simple oversight; that witnesses to the accident are still available; and most importantly, that if the application were dismissed, the plaintiffs might be perpetrating a fraud on the defendants and on the court. In my opinion, this possibility is one that would be very difficult to countenance. Further, allowing the application will ensure that the plaintiffs’ claim will be heard on the merits – an overarching objective referred to in Rule 1-3 of the new Supreme Court Civil Rules.
 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.