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Tag: Section 20 Insurance Vehicle Act

BC Court of Appeal Denies Severe Injury Claim Because Teenaged Plaintiff "Ought to Have Known" Vehicle Driven Without Consent

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Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Court of Appeal denying a Plaintiff access to a pool of money intended to compensate people injured at the hands of uninsured motorists.
In the recent case (Schoenhalz v. ICBC) the Plaintiff, who was 17 at the time, was badly injured while riding as a passenger in a vehicle involved in a 2007 collision.  The Plaintiff suffered spinal fractures, various burns to her body, dental injuries and a pelvic fracture.  The driver of the vehicle was found to be negligent and damages of $282,992 were assessed.
The Court found, however, that the driver of the vehicle was not operating it with either the express or implied consent of the owner.  Accordingly the lawsuit against the vehicle owner was dismissed.    The driver was 15 years of age at the time and did not have a license.  The Court concluded that “at the time of the accident (the Plaintiff) knew that (the driver) was age 15 and did not have a driver’s license.”.
ICBC denied coverage to the Plaintiff and the current lawsuit was commenced.   As discussed several years ago, a Plaintiff cannot access section 20 uninsured motorist funds if they “at the time of the accident as a result of which the bodily injury, death or loss of or damage to property was suffered, was an operator of, or a passenger in or on, a vehicle that the person knew or ought to have known was being operated without the consent of the owner, and, in the case of a leased motor vehicle, the lessee.”
A similar exclusion exists if a Plaintiff seeks to access their own Underinsured Motorist Protection coverage.  Section 148(4)(c) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation lets ICBC off the hook in circumstances where the Plaintiff ” is an operator of, or a passenger in or on, a vehicle that the insured knew or ought to have known was being operated without the consent of the owner.”
In finding ICBC was right to deny coverage the BC Court of Appeal noted as follows:

[44]         Having canvassed counsel on this line of cases and on the “adult activity” line most recently considered in Nespolon v. Alford (1998) 110 O.A.C. 108, lve. to app. dism’d.[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 452, I do not find it necessary to consider them further in this case. Both lines concern the law of negligence as applied to young persons – but this is not the context before us. As I read s. 91, this case is concerned only with whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s place ought to have known Ms. Reeves was driving without the owner’s consent. In my opinion, a reasonable person would (as the trial judge here acknowledged) have known this; and even if one took into account the plaintiff’s age and experience, the test would also be met. As Mr. Brown submits, the plaintiff, age 17, had a driver’s license and was aware Ms. Reeves was too young to be licensed and that the owner’s permission was needed to drive the Camaro.

[45]         The trial judge reasoned that while it would not be reasonable for an adult to assume that Luke “was able to give [the girls] Steven’s permission when he directed them to take the car”, it had been reasonable for an “incredibly young” 17-year-old girl to have believed he would. With respect, it seems to me that the trial judge here erred in applying a largely subjective standard in the face of statutory wording that has long connoted a well-understood objective standard. With respect, a reasonable person “ought to have known”, and indeed would have known, that neither Steven Hammond nor his mother was consenting to the Camaro being driven by an unlicensed 15-year-old. I agree with counsel for ICBC that as a matter of public policy, there is no rationale for holding the plaintiff to a lower standard in relation to her decision to become the passenger of Ms. Reeves.

[46]         In my opinion, if Ms. Schoenhalz did not “know” that the car was being driven without the owner’s consent, she “ought to have known” that this was the case. I would allow the appeal and set aside the order granted by the trial judge in this proceeding.

 

The Dry Judgement Blues – Knowledge of lack of Registered Owner Consent

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Knowingly riding in a vehicle involved in a collision where the at fault driver does not have the owner’s consent can lead to legal headaches when it comes to being compensated for injuries.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, dealing with such a potential scenario.
In this week’s case (Schoenhalz v. Reeves) the Plaintiff was badly injured while riding as a passenger in a vehicle involved in a 2007 collision.  The Plaintiff suffered spinal fractures, various burns to her body, dental injuries and a pelvic fracture.  Damages of $282,992 were assessed.
The driver of the vehicle was found to be at fault.  The Court found, however, that the driver of the vehicle was not operating it with either the express or implied consent of the owner.  Accordingly the lawsuit against the vehicle owner was dismissed.    The driver was 15 years of age at the time and did not have a license.  The Court concluded that “at the time of the accident (the Plaintiff) knew that (the driver) was age 15 and did not have a driver’s license.”.
Why does this matter?  While this judgement did not get into collections issues such a finding could be problematic.
Typically a 15 year old uninsured motorist would have no means to satisfy a quarter million dollar judgement.  This leaves the issue of insurance.  In ‘no consent‘ situations ICBC treats the collision as uninsured leaving an injured plaintiff with only the ability to collect damages under either section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act or under their own Underinsured Motorist Protection plan (UMP).
While the above insurace plans often are valuable in satisfying an uninsured judgement, there are exceptions as to who can access these.  One such exclusion deals with knowingly being in a vehicle without driver consent.  A Plaintiff cannot access section 20 uninsured motorist funds if they “at the time of the accident as a result of which the bodily injury, death or loss of or damage to property was suffered, was an operator of, or a passenger in or on, a vehicle that the person knew or ought to have known was being operated without the consent of the owner, and, in the case of a leased motor vehicle, the lessee.”
A similar exclusion exists if a Plaintiff seeks to access their own UMP coverage.  Section 148(4)(c) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation lets ICBC off the hook in circumstances where the Plaintiff ” is an operator of, or a passenger in or on, a vehicle that the insured knew or ought to have known was being operated without the consent of the owner.”
When seeking to collect the judgement from ICBC such a judicial finding may cause ICBC to deny payment on the basis that a person “ought to know” that an owner likely is not providing consent to an unlicensed individual operating the vehicle.  This area of law has received scarce judicial commentary but these coverage exclusions should serve as a stark reminder to individuals considering taking a ride with an unlicensed driver.
 

Employer Paid Sick Leave Benefits Non-Deductible in ICBC Uninsured Motorist Claim

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(Update December 3, 2013 – the below decision was upheld in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Court of Appeal)
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Last year the BC Supreme Court found that employer paid wage replacement benefits are non-deductible in ICBC hit and run claims.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering this issue in the context of an uninsured ICBC Claim.
In this week’s case (Jordan v. Lowe) the Plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist.  He successfully sued for damages.  When seeking to collect damages from ICBC pursuant to section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act ICBC argued they could deduct from the judgement the amount of sick leave benefits the Plaintiff collected from his employer.  Mr. Justice Willcock dismissed this argument finding these benefits did not have an element of insurance to them thereby not making them deductible   The Court provided the following reasons:
[20]         ICBC suggests the amendment to the Regulation, the addition of the words “compensation similar to benefits” to the definition of an insured claim, signalled the legislature’s intention to expand the definition.  I agree that must necessarily be so.  ICBC further suggests the expansion brought into the definition of an insured claim benefits that are not paid pursuant to insurance and the definition no longer necessarily imports an element of insurance.  With respect to the able submissions of counsel, I cannot agree.
[21]         When it enacted the most recent amendments to the Regulation, the legislature must be taken to have been aware of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lopez.  The conclusion in Lopez that the definition necessarily imports an element of insurance was founded upon the presence of the subheading to Regulation 106(1), “Exclusion of other insured loss”, and to the fact that the Regulation itself describes what are considered to be “insured claims”.  While the legislature has expanded the definition of what constitutes compensation or a benefit, it has not removed or varied the subheading of the Regulation in question and has not excluded from ICBC’s liability anything other than “insured claims”.
[22]         There was some discussion in Lopez with respect to what constitutes a “benefit” under the applicable section.  The amendment to the Regulation addresses that discussion and, in my view, may be applicable in some circumstances where there is some doubt with respect to what compensation in the nature of insurance is deductible.  It does not, however, remove or vary the requirement described in Lopez that the compensation must have an element of insurance to it.
[23]         For reasons set out in Loeppky, which I adopt and follow, I find payment of sick leave benefits to police officers employed by the City of Vancouver Police Department pursuant to their collective agreement do not have about them an element of insurance.  They are clearly benefits or compensation similar to benefits, but that alone does not suffice to cause them to fall within s. 103 of the Regulation.  ICBC is not entitled to deduct them from its liability to satisfy the plaintiff in relation to his claim against the designated defendant, Mr. Lowe.

Employer Paid Wage Replacement Benefits Non-Deductible in Hit and Run Claims

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Section 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation permits ICBC to reduce compensation by any amount paid by another “insured claim” in claims for injuries caused by unidentified motorists or uninsured motorists under section 24 and section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act .  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether wage loss benefits paid by an employer are an ‘insured claim‘.  In short the Court held that they are not.
In last week’s case (Loeppky v. ICBC) the Plaintiff, a police officer, was injured in a hit and run collision.  ICBC accepted the crash was caused through the fault of an unidentified motorist.  The Plaintiff sought compensation for his damages including past wage loss.  During his time away from work his employer paid him wage replacement benefits.  ICBC argued these payments were an ‘insured claim‘ and therefore had to be deducted from his ICBC claim.  Madam Justice Grey disagreed and refused to make the deduction.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[83] In my view, Mr. Loeppky’s wage replacement benefits do not constitute an “insured claim” under s. 106 of the Regulation, and therefore may not be deducted from Mr. Loeppky’s award.

[84] In Arklie v. Haskell (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 458, 25 C.C.L.I. 277 (B.C.C.A.), McLachlin J.A., writing for the court at para. 26, held that a sum of money advanced by an employer to an employee that had to be repaid in the event of any recovery did not qualify as a benefit under the predecessor of s. 106.

[85] More generally, in Lopez v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1993), 26 B.C.A.C. 142, 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 157, Hollinrake J.A., writing for the court at para. 21, held that an “insured claim” for the purposes of the Regulations must still import at least some element of insurance. He went on conclude that payments made by reason of a contract of employment, without some evidence that they originate from an insurer, do not possess such an element of insurance.

[86] The sum of $6,804.77 was paid to Mr. Loeppky under the collective agreement between the Vancouver Police Union and the Vancouver Police Board. Under the terms of that agreement Mr. Loeppky must repay that amount if he recovers it in this action. There is no evidence that the payments originated from an insurer. Thus, it is not an insured claim under s. 106 and the defendant is not entitled to deduct it from any award.

ICBC Not Limited to 30 Days in Participating in "Uninsured Vehicle" Actions

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Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the purpose of (and ICBC’s obligations under) the “uninsured vehicle” provisions of BC’s Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act provides a pool of $200,000 of available compensation from ICBC for damages caused by uninsured motorists.   When a claimant sues an uninsured motorist and is in a default judgement position they cannot access this pool of money from ICBC unless the corporation is given 30 days notice of this development to allow ICBC to take control of the defence of the litigation.
In last week’s case (Shapiro v. Dailey) the BC Court of Appeal had the opportunity to discuss this time limit and ICBC’s ability to intervene in a lawsuit even beyond this time.
In Shaprio the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  She sued for damages.  In the course of the lawsuit ICBC took the position that the Defendant was insured but was in breach of insurance.  ICBC defended the lawsuit as a statutory Third Party.  At trial the Plaintiff was awarded $1.4 million in damages.
ICBC appealed and in doing so they changed their view of the Defendant’s situation now claiming the Defendant was an uninsured motorist.  The Plaintiff objected arguing ICBC could not take this position now as it was beyond the 30 day limit set out in section 20(6) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.   The Court of Appeal disagreed and found ICBC could advance this position even beyond the 30 day limit.  In reaching this result Madam Justice Smith provided the following comments on the purpose of the uninsured vehicle provisions:

[18] …In my view s. 20(6) speaks to the obligations of claimants before they can compel ICBC to compensate them under this section. Specifically, s. 20(6) requires a claimant to notify ICBC where a defendant has defaulted on his obligations (by failing to appear to the action after being served, consenting to a judgment against him, or failing to take a necessary step in the action that would permit a claimant to take default proceedings) before it can demand compensation from ICBC under this provision. The purpose of the section is to give ICBC 30 days following notice of the defendant’s default in which to intervene in order to rectify the defendant’s failure or action, and thereby protect its interests. If ICBC fails to intervene within that period, the claimant may then enforce payment under this section.

[19] As I read the provisions, whether or not ICBC intervenes in an action pursuant to s. 20, it has 30 days from notice of a defendant’s default before it can be compelled to compensate a plaintiff on a judgment. Section 20(6) does not limit ICBC to 30 days in which to intervene in an action. The 30-day period refers to the period of time after notice of a defendant’s default in which ICBC can intervene, if it so chooses, before it can be compelled to make payment to the plaintiff. Nowhere does the Act specify when ICBC can or must intervene. In short, these provisions address the issue of when a plaintiff can compel payment from ICBC upon the default of a defendant. The policy behind them is to give ICBC time to intervene in the action before it may be compelled to compensate a plaintiff under this provision…

[27] In the result, I am of the view that ss. 20(6) and (7) of the Act do not preclude ICBC from appearing to an action under those provisions after it has previously intervened in the action at trial under s. 21 of the Act. Accordingly, I would dismiss the application.

ICBC Uninsured Motorist Claims and the Deductibility of WCB Benefits

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If a person is injured by the actions of an uninsured motorist in BC they can seek compensation directly from ICBC under section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
There are certain limitations to section 20 claims and one of these was that ICBC could deduct Workers Compensation Benefits.  This changed by the new section 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation which came into force on June 1, 2007.  The new regulation changed the definition of an ‘insured claim‘ that ICBC could deduct as follows:

106 (1)  In this section, “insured claim” means any benefit, compensation similar to benefits, right to indemnity or claim to indemnity accruing to a person entitled to benefits, compensation or indemnity or to the personal representative or guardian of the person, and includes a benefit, compensation, right or claim

(a) under the Workers Compensation Act or a similar law or plan of another jurisdiction, unless

(i)  the insured elects not to claim compensation under section 10 (2) of the Workers Compensation Act and the insured is not entitled to compensation under section 10 (5) of that Act, or

(ii)  the Workers Compensation Board pursues its right of subrogation under section 10 (6) of the Workers Compensation Act

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether ICBC could deduct WCB benefits paid when a crash occurred prior to June 1, 2007 but the uninsured claim against ICBC was still on-going after the new Regulation came into force.  In short the Court held that the date of the crash itself does not decide the issue, rather the date that the section 20 claim against ICBC is crystallized does.
In this week’s case (Hicks v. Bieberbach Estate) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  The opposing motorist was operating a stolen vehicle and was killed in the collision.  Motorists in stolen vehicles are deemed to be uninsured motorists by ICBC.  The Plaintiff initially obtained some compensation from WCB.  The Plaintiff then re-elected his route of compensation and brought a tort claim (apparently with WCB’s approval) against the uninsured motorist’s estate.
ICBC took the position that all the funds paid by WCB were non-recoverable as the crash happened prior to June 1, 2007.  Madam Justice Adair disagreed and found that since the CL-42 (the statutory declaration claimiants need to sign to seek section 20 benefits from ICBC) was not signed until after June 1, 2007 the new regulation applied and ICBC could not deduct the WCB payments from their section 20 obligations.  In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons:

[44]         A claimant who is injured by an insured driver and who wishes to make an application to ICBC for damages must do so in the prescribed form:  s. 20(2).  The form prescribed is a statutory declaration, where an applicant must verify facts as if under oath or on affirmation.  I do not see anything in s. 20 to suggest that ICBC “may pay” without having fundamental facts relevant to the claimant’s claim verified by solemn declaration,  as prescribed by the legislation.  On the contrary, the clear implication of s. 20(9) is that it is necessary for a claimant to submit a declaration in Form CL-42 before ICBC “may” pay.  The significance of the word “may pay” (rather than “must pay”) is that, even when a claimant has complied with s. 20 and the regulations, ICBC is notobligated to pay:  see Buxton v. Tang, at para. 7.

[45]         In my view, ICBC’s correspondence dated February 7, 2007, indicates that ICBC requires plaintiff’s counsel to comply with the service and default requirements of s. 20 (see in particular ss. 20(5)(b), (6) and (7)), and, more generally, indicates that ICBC expected Roy Hicks to comply with the section and the regulations before any amount would be paid to him.  This is entirely consistent with s. 20(9).  One of the requirements was that Mr. Hicks complete and submit a CL-42.  Unlike s. 24 of the Act, which requires a claimant to give ICBC notice of a claim within 6 months after the accident but does not specify any form in which the notice must be given, s. 20 specifies the form of notice of a claim, but does not fix a deadline…

[52]         In my opinion, in this case and reading s. 20 as a whole, ICBC was not in a position where it at least “may” pay, until Roy Hicks submitted his CL-42 statutory declaration.  That was the final step Mr. Hicks needed to complete (since service of the writ and defence of the claim by ICBC had been addressed in the fall of 2007) as claimant.  Since the CL-42 statutory declaration was submitted in February 2008, s. 106 of the New Regulation applies…

[54]         In summary, the question posed on the special case is:

Does the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia have the legal authority to deduct Workers’ Compensation Board benefits paid to the Plaintiff from any amount to be paid to the Plaintiff for damages, as a result of settlement or judgment in this matter, taking into account Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231 and regulation 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act Regulations, or the predecessor to these sections which were repealed on June 1, 2007?

My answer is no.  Section 106 of the New Regulation applies in respect of the plaintiff’s claim.

ICBC Claims, Uninsured Motorists, and the Definition of "Highway"

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Did you know that if you are injured in BC by a motorist who does not have any insurance at all you can still seek coverage of your tort claim directly from ICBC?  The reason you can do this is because of Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act which requires ICBC to pay the damages directly when an uninsured motorist negligently injures others.
There are limits to ICBC’s liability under this section, and one such limitation is that the collision has to occur on a ‘highway‘.  If the crash does not occur on a ‘highway‘ then ICBC does not need to pay damages under section 20.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George registry, dealing with exception.
In today’s case (Pierre v. Miller) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  The collision took place on Finlay Forest Service Road, a fairly remote road in British Columbia.   The Defendant was not insured and ICBC defended the case directly by the authority given to them under section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.    ICBC’s lawyer brought a motion for a declaration that Finlay Forest Service Road is not a highway.
Mr. Justice Meiklem agreed with ICBC finding that the road was “a forest service road” and therefore not a highway and ordered that ICBC did not have to pay the Plaintiff anything for his injuries under section 20.
In reaching this conclusion the Court gave the following summary of the definition of “Highway” for the purpose of Uninsured Motorist Claims:

[3]             In order for ICBC to be liable to pay a claim under the provisions of the s. 20 of the IMV Act, the claim must arise out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle on a highway in British Columbia.  This follows from the definition of “claimant” and “uninsured motorist” in s. 20 of the IMV Act.  “Highway” is defined in the IMV Act as meaning a highway as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996. c. 318 (“MVA”).  The MVA definition of highway is:

“highway” includes

(a) every highway within the meaning of the Transportation Act,

(b) every road, street, lane or right of way designed or intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles, and

(c) every private place or passageway to which the public, for the purpose of the parking or servicing of vehicles, has access or is invited,

but does not include an industrial road;

[4]             The MVA also defines “industrial road” as follows:

“industrial road” means industrial road as defined in the Industrial Roads Act, and includes a forest service road as defined in the Forest Act and land designated as a development road under section 8 (1) of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act;

[5]             The definition of an industrial road in the Industrial Roads Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 189 is not applicable in this case but the Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157 definition of forest service road which is part of the definition of an industrial road in the MVA is in issue.  The Forest Act defines a “forest service road” as follows:

“forest service road” means a road on Crown land that

(a) is declared a forest service road under section 115 (5),

(b) is constructed or maintained by the minister under section 121,

(c) was a forest service road under this definition as it was immediately before the coming into force of this paragraph, or

(d) meets prescribed requirements;

[6]             The motor vehicle accident in this case occurred on a road known and marked as the Finlay Forest Service Road.  The applicant ICBC argues that the Finlay Forest Service Road falls within the Forest Act definition because it is declared to be a forest service road and because it was constructed or maintained by the Minister of Forests.  The respondent plaintiff argues that the Finlay Forest Service Road is a highway by way of public expenditure to which s. 42 of the Transportation Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 44 applies and also because it is used by the general public for the passage of vehicles.  Alternatively the plaintiff argues that if the Finlay Forest Service Road is a forest service road it does not satisfy the definition under the IMV Act because it is a Community Use Forest Service Road rather than an Industrial Use Forest Service Road, it is not primarily for the transportation of natural resources or machinery materials or personal and it is not maintained by the Ministry of Forests and Range.

[7]             Another statutory provision of interest although not directly helpful in characterizing the Finlay Forest Service Road is s. 56 of the Transportation Act which enables the Lieutenant Governor and Council, with the consent of the Minister of Transportation and Highways and Minister of Forests and Range to order that a forest service road cease to be a forest service road and become an arterial highway or a rural highway.  There is no evidence that this has occurred in this case.

ICBC Uninsured Motorist Claims and the Health Care Costs Recovery Act

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Further to my previous posts on the Health Care Costs Recovery Act, I recently had the opportunity to scrutinize the Act’s application to Uninsured Motorist Claims under Section 20 of the BC Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  It was a a bit of a lengthy exercise so I thought I would share my findings for the benefit of anyone else researching this topic.
A representative of the Government familiar with the HCCRA told me that the BC Government’s initial position when the HCCRA came into force was that it applied to BC Car Crash cases where the Defendant is uninsured and in cases where the Defendant is in breach of their insurance.  In my recent experience suing Defendants who were in breach of their insurance the Government required notice about the claim but did not require recovery of health care costs.  (Please note I am not speaking on behalf of the BC Government here, I am simply highlighting my past experiences with this act, so if you are prosecuting such a claim please satisfy yourself whether or not the Act applies).
Where a Defendant is Uninsured at the time of the crash (as opposed to in breach of their insurance) the HCCRA appears to apply at first glance.
Section 24 of the Health Care Costs Recovery Act holds in part that:

(1) Subject to this section, this Act applies in relation to any personal injury suffered by a beneficiary, whether before or after this subsection comes into force….

(3) This Act does not apply in relation to health care services that are provided or are to be provided to a beneficiary in relation to

(a) personal injury or death arising out of a wrongdoer’s use or operation of a motor vehicle if the wrongdoer has, when the injury is caused, coverage under the plan, as those terms are defined in the Insurance (Vehicle) Act,

So on strict reading the HCCRA appears to apply to BC Car Crash Cases where a Defendant motorist is uninsured because in these circumstances the “wrongdoer” does not have “coverage under the plan“.  If a Plaintiff sues a Defendant in these circumstances the Government’s claim arguably should be advanced.  Practically speaking, however, Plaintiff’s rarely recover anything from Uninsured Defendants and instead take advantage of the Benefit available under section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.

Specifically, Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act permits people injured by Uninsured Motorists in BC to apply to ICBC for ‘payment of damages to which he or she claims to be entitled to’.
If you dig a little deeper ICBC appears to be under no obligation to pay HCCRA damages in a settlement or judgement in Section 20 Claims because of the Deductions set out in section 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation which holds that “No amount shall be paid by (ICBC) under section 20…of the Act in respect of that part of a claim that is paid or payable as an insured claim“.
For the purpose of s. 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation “insured claim” means “any benefit, compensation similar to benefits, right to indemnity or claim to indemnity accruing to a person entitled to benefits, compensation or indemnity...”
It is hard to imagine a successful argument holding that the right to Government Paid Health Care under MSP is not a ‘benefit‘ as used in the above definition of ‘insured claim‘.  So, in summary, while the Health Care Costs Recovery Act appears to be triggered in tort claims against Uninsured Motorists, ICBC appears to not have to pay any portion of such a claim when a Plaintiff applies for benefits to ICBC under s. 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act because of the deduction they are entitled to under s. 106 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation.  Clear as mud folks?