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Tag: Section 148.1 Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation

CPP Children's Benefits Not Deductible From ICBC UMP Compensation


While ICBC can deduct Canada Pension Plan disability benefits from an UMP Claim, can the same be done for additional “Children’s Benefits” paid by the CPP?   Arbitrator Yule addressed this question in an UMP Arbitration Decision that was recently provided to me.  In short Arbitrator Yule held that Children’s Benefits are non-deductible.
In the unpublished decision (H v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was awarded damages following a jury trial.  The Plaintiff applied for payment under his own UMP Coverage as the at-fault motorist was underinsured.  While the parties largely agreed on the deductibility of past CPP benefits from ICBC’s payment obligations, they could not agree on whether the additional CPP funds the Plaintiff received as “Children’s Benefits” were deductible.  In finding that they were not Arbitrator Yule provided the following reasons:
37.  In one sense it may well be thought that it must be a “benefit” to the Claimant to receive money (which must be paid to him in these circumstances) under a statutory scheme (the CPP) which imposes no constraint on his use of the monies.  On the other hand, it seems to me the underlying rationale for the payment of the disabled cobtributor’s child’s benefit is the expectation that the money will be used by the recipient in a general way in the partial discharge of the recipient’s legal duty to support and maintain the children who are entitled to the benefits.  In this sense, I think the benefit or right is that of the child and not of the parent or custodial person.  It is significant that the benefits payable under Division A of Part II of the CPP, one is described as “a disability pension” (what the Claimant receives on account of his own disability) and another – the benefit at issue – is described as “a disabled contributor’s child’s benefit” [emphasis added].  It is difficult to transform what the statutory CPP scheme describes as “a child’s benefit” into the parent’s/custodial person’s benefit for the purpose of s. 148.1(1)(i).  At least here where the monies are payable under another statutory scheme, I think “benefit: or “right” in s. (f.2) should be guided by the description of the benefitin the statory scheme, and where the statutory scheme itself defines the benefit as the child’s beneift, it shoudl be considered to be the child’s benefit.  This interpretation also  maintains consistency with the construction of ss. (f.2) where I have concluded that the entitlement to the child’s benefit is that of the child.
38.  Accordingly I conclude that the children’s benefits paid to the Claimant are not deductible from his UMP Compensation.
Like many UMP Cases, This decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Contributory Negligence Finding Does Not Reduce Deductions in ICBC UMP Claim


In my ongoing efforts to summarize historic UMP Arbitration decisions, I have recently been provided a 2005 arbitration award dealing with several issues including the deduction of CPP benefits in circumstances where a Plaintiff was found contributorily negligent.
In the 2005 case (H v. ICBC) the Claimant was injured in a 1996 collision.  His claim proceeded to trial and his damages were assessed at just over $316,000 by the Jury.  The Plaintiff was also found 10% contributorily negligent for failing to wear a seat belt.
The Defendant was underinsured and the Plaintiff applied under his own UMP Coverage for payment of damages.  The Plaintiff had received CPP disability benefits of just over $65,000.  ICBC sought to deduct the whole of this amount from the Plaintiff’s UMP claim.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that only 90% of the past payments should be deductible in keeping with the Jury’s finding.
Arbitrator Yule disagreed with the Plaintiff finding CPP benefit deduction can’t be reduced due to a contributory negligence finding.  In coming to this conclusion Arbitrator Yule provided the following reasons:
8…Section 148.1(5) provides that an award of UMP compensation shall not exceed the amount of damages awarded, “minus the sum of the applicable deductible amounts”.  As noted previously, one of the deductible amounts is an amount to which the insured is entitled under the Canada Pension Plan.  On its plain wording, the full amount of the disability benefits to which the Claimant is entitled under the Canada Pension Plan are to be deducted from his UMP Claim.  There is nothing in the wording of the UMP Regulations to suggest that deductible amounts are to be reduced in accordance with the percentage recovery of the Claimant.  As the Respondent correctly argues, Part 7 payments, which a re also a deductible amount, are deducted in full regardless of the percentage recovery of a Claimant.
Like many UMP Cases, This decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Future LTD Benefits Not Deducted in ICBC UMP Claim Due to Payment Suspension Clause

In my ongoing efforts to summarize UMP Arbitration decisions, a stack of historic UMP cases have recently been provided to me by colleagues in the Plaintiff bar which I will post as time permits.  To this end, below is a summary of a useful 1999 decision addressing the deductibility of future Long Term Disability Benefits in an UMP Claim.
In the 1999 decision (M. v. ICBC) the Claimant was severely injured in a 1993 collision.   The Claimant and ICBC came to a mediated settlement valuing the claim at $1.2 million.  The Defendant was under-insured and an arbitration was held to determine what amounts were deductible from the Claimant’s UMP coverage.
The Claimant had a private policy of insurance with Canada Life.   They had paid over $70,000 in LTD benefits.  It was agreed that these were deductible.   ICBC argued that these payments would continue and the present value of future payments had to be deducted from the settlement amount.
Arbitrator Yule disagreed due to a ‘payment suspension‘ clause in the LTD contract.  In not deducting future LTD payments from Canada Life Arbitrator Yule provided the following reasons:
79.  …The critical provision regarding what is payable in the subrogation provision is the term that says “if a lump sum payment is made under judgment or settlement for loss of future income or for future period or lump sum benefits which would otherwise be payable under this policy, no further benefits will be paid under this policy until such time as the monthly or periodic benefits which would otherwise be payable under this policy equal the amount received in the lump sum”…
81. …One looks to the ICBC Regulations and, in this case, the definition of deductible amount.  One item to be deducted is an amount “payable to the insured under any benefit”.  One then looks to the Canada Life Policy to see whether the future disability benefits will be payable in the sense that they are going to be paid.  In this case, the result of the payment of the UMP Claim is that the future Canada Life benefits will not be paid because of the integration provisions of the Policy.  In my view, then, the future Canada Life benefits are not payable and do not constitute a deductible amount.
Like many UMP Cases, This decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

ICBC Underinsured Motorist Claims: The "No Consent" Restriction

In my continued efforts to publicly summarize ICBC UMP Arbitration Decisions, reasons for judgement recently have been provided to me dealing with the restriction on ICBC UMP Coverage in circumstances where a vehicle occupant is injured through the negligence of a motorist who did not have the vehicle owner’s consent to operate.
In the unreported 2003 UMP Decision (D v. ICBC) the Claimant was injured in a 1998 collision.  He was the occupant of a vehicle driven by MV.   MV did not have the registered owner’s consent to operate the vehicle.  MV was given permission to drive by J who was the registered owner’s son.  J initially obtained the vehicle with the owner’s consent.  J did not have the owner’s permission to allow others to operate her vehicle.
The claims arising from the crash exceeded the damages available under section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  The Claimant applied to have his excess damages paid under his own Underinsured Motorist Protection coverage with ICBC.   ICBC argued that UMP coverage was forfeited because the Claimant was a passenger in a vehicle that he “knew or ought to have known was being operated without the consent of the owner” contrary to section 148.1(3)(b) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation.
Arbitrator Yule agreed that given the facts of the case the Claimant should have known that consent was absent.  In finding the Claimant was not entitled to coverage Arbitrator Yule provided the following reasons:
28….Whether (the owner) consented, however, is a different question from the one raised in this case, namely whether a passenger such as Mr. D knew or ought to have known that (the owner) would not consent to the use of her vehicle in these circumstances.  There may well be circumstances in which an original borrower, who is aware of restrictions on the use of the borrowed vehicle put in place by the owner, allows another to drive without ever communicating those restrictions.  If there were nothing else about the surrounding circumstances to cause a driver or passenger to question the owner’s consent to the driver’s operation of the car, the driver and passenger would be entitled to full insurance protection.  A similar concept of reasonable belief by a driver i the consent of a vehicle owner applies in the extension of third party liability coverage under a driver’s certificate (Regulation s. 49(1)(c)) and under an owner’s certificate (Regulation, s. 65(1)(f))….The question is whether there is sufficient evidence from the totality of the circumstances such that, if he had considered the matter, a reasonable person in Mr. D’s circumstances ought to have known that (the owner) would not consent to the use of her vehicle int he circumstances prevailing the evening…
32…Where the vehicle is not stolen, and the original borrower remains in possession of and an occupant in the vehicle, and where constraints regarding use are known to the original borrower and not disclosed to others in the vehicle, the burden of establishing facts that a passenger ought to have known the owner would not consent should be onerous, even before taking into account that s. 148.1(3)(b) is an exclusion from coverage.
33.  In my view the Respondent has met the burden in this case…
The Reasons go on to highlight the specific facts indicating why a lack of consent should have been known in the circumstances.
This decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.  Also, if anyone has an UMP decision from prior to 2007 and you’d like to have it added to this database please don’t hesitate to contact me.

FCA and Tort Claim Limits Under ICBC's Underinsured Motorist Protection


An ICBC UMP decision has recently been provided to me dealing with the amount of coverage available under UMP when a claimant has the right to advance a tort claim and a Family Compensation Act claim arising from the same collision.
This decision was released well before the 2007 amendment requiring UMP Arbitration decisions to be published publicly on ICBC’s website.  I summarize the decison to add it to this public and searchable UMP Claims Database.
In the 1996 case, (CCK v. ICBC) the Claimant was severely injured in a collision.  She suffered a spinal cord injury rendering her a paraplegic.  Her mother was killed in the same collision.  The at-fault motorist was underinsured for all of the civil claims flowing from the crash.  The Claimant was entitled to damages not only for her own injuries but also as a beneficiary under the Family Compensation Act for the death of her mother.
The arbitrator had to decide whether the Claimant could access $1 million in UMP Coverage in her tort claim along with an additional $1 million in coverage for her FCA claim or whether both claims were covered by a single limit.  Arbitrator Schmitt provided the following reasons:
If CCK had been injured but had not lost her Mother, she would, of course, under section 148.1(2) be entitled to compensation under UMP coverage.  In this case she was insured and she lost her Mother so she is an insured under not one but two of the definitions.  What ICBC is arguing is that she is entitled to UMP coverage for her injuries and loss of her Mother but only under her own million dollars coverage…
In the case of CCK, she happens to be insured under two different definitions and she will be entitled to the benefits of her UMP coverage for both her claims up to the $1,000,000 limit…
The Mother’s estate is likewise entitled to the benefit of UMP coverage up to $1,000,000 but the Mother’s estate claims do not include the claims of survivors under the Family Compensation Act which belong specifically to those survivors…
The estate’s coverage is available to cover claims by the estate itself which may be advanced under the Estate Administration Act.  Insofar as CCK or her grandmother may be entitled to receive some or all of the proceeds of the estate as a beneficiary they may directly benefit from such coverage.  Otherwise CCK is entitled to the benefit of her own UMP coverage of $1 million with respect to her claim for personal injuries and her claim for damages under the Family Compensation Act.
This case should be contrasted with a subsequent Court of Appeal decision in 2007 (Lougheed v. Co-operators General Insurance Company)  which upheld the following trial judgement reasons finding that the ‘insured‘ in an FCA claim brought following a collision is the personal representative of the estate of the deceased and that all beneficiaries of such an FCA claim are subject to the representative’s single policy limit:

[85]  The issue, then, is how one ought to read the definition of “insured” in s. 148.1(1)(c), bearing in mind the scope of coverage granted by s. 148.1(2).  But for his death, Mr. Lougheed would have received UMP coverage by operation of s. 148.1(1)(a).  As a result of his death, the “insured” is “a person who…is entitled to maintain an action” because of Mr. Lougheed’s death.  The “action” refers to the family compensation claim that may be commenced under the FCA by the personal representative on behalf of all of the beneficiaries, or by the beneficiaries if it is not commenced by the personal representative.  In either case, however, the action must be treated as though it had been brought by the personal representative.  It is a single cause of action brought on behalf of all of Mr. Lougheed’s beneficiaries.

[86]  It follows, in my view, that the “insured” in s. 148.1(1)(c) must be the personal representative, who is the individual entitled, either directly or indirectly, to maintain a family compensation action as a result of the death of the primary insured, Mr. Lougheed.  That interpretation is consistent with the grant of coverage provision, which limits the recovery of benefits to those otherwise accruing to the deceased insured.

[87]  In the result, the UMP coverage limit is not $1 million for each beneficiary of a family compensation action, but $1 million for the beneficiaries of the action as a whole.  The plaintiffs, all beneficiaries, are entitled collectively to the $1 million of UMP coverage that would otherwise have been available to the deceased, Mr. Lougheed.

More on ICBC UMP Deductions: Costs, Disbursements and MSP Payments

In my on-going efforts to create a searchable UMP Claims Database, reasons for judgement were recently released addressing the deductibility of previous payments for Costs, Disbursements and ICBC paid MSP treatments in an UMP proceeding.  In short the MSP payments were found to be deductible under UMP while the costs and disbursements payments were not.

In the recent case (X v. ICBC) the Claimant was a personal injury lawyer.  He was involved in a 2004 collision.  He initially sued for damages.  The lawsuit was disposed of for payment of the underinsured defendant’s policy limits of $200,000 plus costs and disbursements with the parties agreeing have the value of the claim being privately arbitrated.

The Claimant alleged that he suffered a mild traumatic brain injury and sought damages “well over $1 million“.  This claim was largely rejected with the arbitrator assessing damages at just over $276,000.  The parties agreed that the $200,000 previous payment was deductible but could not agree whether the additional $22,575 ICBC paid for costs and disbursements were deductible from the UMP assessment.  Arbitrator Boskovich held that it was not and provided the following reasons:

538.  The codified applicable deductible amounts are very clear and not one of them contemplates a deduction for the costs and disbursements associated with a payment made:

  • pursuant to Section 20 or Section 24;
  • paid or payable under a Part VII;
  • paid by the underinsured motorist as damages;
  • paid or payable under a certificate, policy or plan of insurance providing third party legal liability indemnity to the underinsured motorist;
  • paid or payable under vehicle insurance, wherever issued and in effect, providing undersinsured motorist protection for the same occurrence for which the underinsured motorist for protection is provided under this section;
  • paid or payable to the insured under any benefit or right or claim to indemnity; and
  • paid or able to be paid by any other person who is legally liable for the insured’s damages.

539.  On their own, the costs and disbursements paid do not fall under a payment of any “benefit or right or claim to indemnity”.

540.  I do not find the $23,575.17 paid by the Respondent for the costs and disbursements associated with the underlying tort claim to be an applicable deductible amount pursuant to the UMP Regulation.

ICBC went on to argue that the MSP payments they made under the Claimant’s Part 7 Benefit plan were deductible from the damage assessment.  Arbitrator Boskovich agreed and provided the following reasons:

544.  The payments made by ICBC to the Medical Services Plan of British Columbia for the various medical visits listed are payments made pursuant to Part VII as medical benefits and are a codified applicable deductible amount pursuant to Section 148.1(1)(c).  There will be a deduction of $551.36 for these payments.

Future CPP Benefits and ICBC UMP Deductions

Last year an arbitration award was released addressing the deduction of future CPP benefits from an ICBC UMP Claim.
In last year’s case (ME v. ICBC) the 32 year old Claimant was severely injured in a 1997 motor vehicle collision.   She suffered serious brain trauma and as a result “was left functioning at a Grade 7 level in terms of her academics“.  Despite her long term injury the “very ambitious” claimant re-entered the workforce and by the time of her arbitration she had secured full time employment.  Prior to this the Claimant had received CPP benefits totally$78,542.94.  These benefits were terminated with the Plaintiff’s return to work.  It was agreed that ICBC could deduct this prior to paying out on the Claimant’s UMP Claim.
The parties could not agree as to how much more ICBC could deduct given the possibility of future CPP payments.  ICBC argued that the present day value of future CPP benefits should deducted, namely $135,652.  Arbitrator Boskovich found that while such a deduction would be unreasonable a modest deduction should apply to address the reality that the Plaintiff may at some point in the future receive CPP benefits.  Arbitrator Boskovitch reduced ICBC’s UMP payment by just over $20,000 to take this risk into account.  In doing so the following reasons were provided:
102.  I agree with Counsel that the standard of proof to be applied to future hypothetical events is simple probability and not the balance of probabilities.  That being said it remains that the probability, possibility or chance that a future event may occur, in this case the Claimant applying for and receiving CPP disability benefits in relation to her accident injuries, must be a real and substantial one.
103.  In addressing whether or not there is a real and substantial possibility of the Claimant receiving CPP disability benefits in the future one has to consider the relative likelihood of both positive and negative contingencies that might affect the Claimant’s ability to work and the anticipated course with respect to her accident injuries/disabilities…
116.  It has been 13 years since the accident.  2010 will be the first full year of employment the Claimant has maintained since the accident.  To assume the Claimant’s accident injuries, in particular, her very serious brain injury and deficits are going to have no impact on her ability to work to age 65 is unreasonable.
117.  However, it does not automatically mean that the impact translates into a real and substantial risk that the Claimant will face a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability such that she is not substantially gainfully employable as defined in the CPP Legislation.
118.  That is not to say there is no risk whatsoever.  I cannot ignore the concerns outlined by the Claimant’s Mother.  As well, I cannot ignore the evidence of Dr. LeBlanc.  It may be difficult for the Claimant to find jobs over the course of her working life.  Such jobs must have structured routine, few distractions and no multi-tasking.  Her cognitive issues may be aggravated in unfamiliar and stressful situations.
119.  Having regard to all of the evidence, I believe there is a 15% chance or possibility that the Claimant will apply for and receive disability benefits from CPP in connection with her accident injuries.
120.  The parties agree that the present day value of the CPP disability payments to the Claimant’s age 65 is $135,652.00 and, in this regard, the appropriate contingency deduction to be made pursuant to Regulation 148.1(1)(f) is $20,347.80
For more on this topic you can click here to read my summary of the 2008 UMP Arbitration Award in SPW v. ICBC.

Maternity Leave EI Benefits Not Deductible in ICBC UMP Claims


Since ICBC’s Underinsured Motorist Protection coverage is a “fund of last resort” there are many deductions ICBC is entitled to take advantage of before paying funds out to Claimants.  These deductions, however, do have limits and this was demonstrated in an UMP Arbitration Determination released last year.
In last year’s claim (Undisclosed v. ICBC) the three claimants were awarded damages after receiving injuries from an underinsured motorist in Washington State.   One of the Claimant’s damages included $95,000 for past income loss.  ICBC argued that $65,000 should be deducted from this assessment for EI benefits that the Claimant was or would be entitled to as a result of section 148.1(f.1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation.
Arbitrator Camp rejected ICBC’s argument and reduced the amount by a much more modest $3,034 figure which was the sum the Claimant actually received from EI.   In refusing to make the greater reduction advanced by ICBC Arbitrator Camp noted that EI Maternity Benefits are not deductible in UMP Claims finding as follows:
57.  Other than pure speculation as to future EI benefits, some of which may indeed be predicated on maternity which is completely unrelated to the underlying facts and circumstances giving rise to the UMP award and therefore to any issue of deductibility, ICBC has led no evidence pertaining to the deductibility of EI benefits.  I therefore find that ICBC has not met the onus of proving any amount to be deducted with respect to future EI benefits.

Out of Province Quantum Awards Not Binding in ICBC UMP Proceedings


In my continued efforts to create a searchable UMP Claims database, I summarize a 2009 UMP Decision addressing whether ICBC could re-litigate quantum of damages after the issue was already decided in an out of Province trial.  In short the Arbitrator held that trial verdicts addressing liability are binding for UMP coverage purposes but awards addressing quantum are not binding as these need to apply the law of British Columbia.
In the recent case (Undisclosed v. ICBC) the Claimants were badly injured in a 1996 collision in Washington State.  The at fault driver had only $200,000 of insurance coverage.  The injured parties were each insured with $1 million of Underinsured Motorist Protection with ICBC.  They sued the ICBC insured driver in Washington State and were awarded global damages of $9.1 million with 5 of the 6 Claimants’ individual awards exceeding $1 Million.
The Claimants and ICBC could not agree on the amount of UMP Benefits payable and submitted the issue to arbitration.  The arbitrator was asked to decide if the quantum award from Washington State was binding (less applicable deductions) or if the issue could be re-litigated.  In finding that the Washington State jury award addressing damages was not binding Arbitrator Camp provided the following reasons:
21.  On the facts of this case ICBC concedes the claimants have satisfied all of the prerequisite requirements laid down for UMP coverage.  Hence, it is conceded that the Washington jury verdict established liability on the underinsured motorist, resolved issues of contributory negligence and established that the damages attributable to the fault of the underinsured motorist exceeded the insurance limits and assets available to compensate the claimants.  Put another way, it is conceded that the Washington jury verdict determined that the claimants are “insureds” and (the at fault motorist) is an “underinsured motorist” for the purposes of the UMP scheme.
22.  In the majority of cases, in my experience, the parties (ICBC and the claimants) agree that the prerequisites for UMP coverage have been satisfied and the parties arrive at a settlement pertaining to UMP compensation.  Where the parties cannot agree, ICBC can follow one of two courses of action.  ICBC can either require that the claimant(s) proceed to a tort trial to determine the prerequisites necessary for UMP arbitration, or they can agree that those prerequisites have been met and proceed to an UMP arbitration by consent.
23.  In this case, the evidence satisfies me that ICBC required a tort trial to determine the prerequisites necessary for UMP arbitration.  The claimants chose Washington State as the most favourable jurisdiction to proceed with the tort trial, for good and valid reasons which are not germane to the arbitration issue before me…
28.  Section 148.2(6)(a) relating to the legal entitlement to UMP coverage is relatively straightforward.  It says that where an accident for which UMP compensation is being sought occurs in another jurisdiction, the law of the place where the injury or death was suffered shall be applied to determine whether the claimants are legally entitled to recover UMP compensation and if a difference arises as to that legal entitlement, that difference shall be arbitrated under the Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia.  It is section 148.2(6)(b) relating to the measure of any damages and the assessment of the amount of UMP compensation payable that is at the nub of this arbitration…
33.  Turning to my interpretation of s. 148.2(6), I find that the section is properly interpreted to mean that issues of legal entitlement shall be determined by Washington law in this case and that the issues pertinent to quantum of damages shall be determined by the law of British Columbia.  I am fortified in coming to this interpretation because of the linkage between s. 148.2(6) and s. 148.1(5).  Section 148.1(5) constitutes a limiting provision and the limitation only works or works much better if the interpretation of s. 148.2(6)(b) is interpreted such that the issues pertaining to the quantum of damages shall be determined by the law of British Columbia.

CPP Benefits Deductions in UMP Claims Discussed – The Likelihood of Payment Test

Section 148.1 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation requires “an amount to which an insured is entitled to under the Canada Pension Plan” to be deducted from UMP claims.  Continuing in my efforts to summarize ICBC UMP decisions, reasons were released addressing this deduction following a serious injury caused by an uninsured motorist.
In SPW v. ICBC the Claimant suffered various injures due the carelessness of an uninsured motorist.  Following arbitration the Claimant’s diminished earning capacity (future wage loss) was assessed at $575,000.  The Claimant was receiving CPP disability payments and if these were continued to be received the present value of the future payments equalled $123,500.  Arbitrator Boskovich had to determine what amount of these benefits should be deducted pursuant to section 148.1.  In deducting 50% of these benefits the Arbitrator provided the following reasons:
165.  In order to determine if future payments should be considered as “applicable deductible amounts” under the Regulations the law is quite settled that there has to be some evidentiary foundation to determine likelihood of the continuance and certainty of such future payments.  The onus of proof that these payments will continue is on the Respondent (ICBC).  While the evidence given with respect to payments having been received in the past is of assistance, it does not provide conclusive evidence that the payments will continue in the future.
166.  That being said, having regard to the submissions delivered by counsel and the admissions made by the Claimant and his counsel and my own findings that the Claimant does have some residual earning capacity, which may or may not translate into income depending on what the Claimant does vocationally, I find there is a 50% contingency of the likelihood that his CPP payments will continue in the future and in this regard 50% of the net present value of the future payments should be deducted from the award.
This case is also worth reviewing for the assessment of non-pecuniary damages for the Claimant’s serious injuries.  In assessing this loss at $175,000 the Arbitrator made the following findings:

23  ….he had suffered multiple injuries, including a complex pelvic fracture with separation of the symphysis pubis and fracture of the right sacrum, a left tibiofibular fracture, a fractured right humeral shaft, fracture of his left second rib, as well as a large laceration to his right thigh and multiple cuts and abrasions.
74.  …those injuries have impacted his ability to walk, his gait and balance and have resulted in neck and lower back pain.  He has been left with chronic discomfort, restricted mobility and reduced ability to participate in physical activities.  I find that his present disability is entirely related to the motor vehicle accident…
77.  After considering the authorities submitted I find, having regard to the horrific circumstances of this accident, the nature of the injuries, the ongoing pain and the residual permanent disability which has resulted in a devastating change in the Claimant’s quality of life, that he is entitled to non-pecuniary damages of $175,000.