Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that a second Court ordered defense medical exam is inappropriate solely in anticipation of an event which may not occur.
In the recent case (Litt v. Guo) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and sued for damages. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff consented to a defence medical exam with a physician that addressed the Plaintiff’s injuries. As trial neared the Defense applied for a further exam with a new physician arguing that the initial report was dated and further that “the plaintiff might file a newer report” and the Defendant wished to respond to this anticipated development. In noting that both arguments were insufficient for a Court ordered second defense medical exam Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons:
 The second ground raised by the defendants, and the ground that Mr. McHale referred to as the primary basis supporting the application for another IME by a different specialist, is that the most recent report of Dr. Bishop will be two years old at the date of trial in October 2014. The defendants fear that the plaintiff might file a newer report before the August 4 deadline for delivery of such reports, and the defendants say they would then be at a disadvantage because the plaintiffs will have a fresher report, a report based on a more recent assessment of the plaintiff.
 The defendants submit that they would wish to put before the Court the best evidence, the evidence of an examination of the plaintiff at a time more recent than October 2012. There are, in my respectful view, two weaknesses with that submission. The first is that it anticipates what has not yet occurred. If the plaintiff does submit a report prepared by one of her experts based on a recent examination of the plaintiff and if something new comes out of that report, then presumably Dr. Bishop could be invited to comment on it and the defendants would be in a position to file a rebuttal report. There is nothing in the record before me to suggest that he would not be able to comment on such a report or that there would be a need for further examination should he, in fact, be faced with such a report.
 The second weakness is that passage of time alone is not a basis for ordering a second medical examination of a plaintiff. Dr. Bishop’s report is very clear in terms of his diagnosis, prognosis and his description of the pattern of symptoms Ms. Litt will experience into the future. He describes a likely aggravation of symptoms on activity, which it seems is exactly what is reflected in the medical reports which initially led to this application.
 In short, despite Mr. McHale’s able submissions, I cannot find that a further examination is necessary to ensure reasonable equality of the parties in preparing for this trial.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing document relevancy issues in a disputed brain injury claim.
In today’s case (Mackinnon v. Rabeco Holdings (1989) Ltd.) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 vehicle collision. He sued for damages alleging that “he sustained a brain injury…as a result of the accident which caused or contributed to an increase in the frequency and severity of his pre-accident sexually aberrant behaviour culminating ultimately in a criminal conviction“.
Prior to the collision “the plaintiff took clandestine photos of a woman. The incident was reported to police in Langley who investigated, but no charges were laid.”. In a post collision incident, the Plaintiff plead guilty to “surreptitiously unlawfully observing or recording for a sexual purpose a person in circumstances that give rise to an expectation of privacy contrary to s.162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code”.
The Defendant sought production of police materials from these incidents arguing the documents were relevant given the allegations in the lawsuit. Master Harper agreed and ordered production. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 The plaintiff will attempt to prove at trial that the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident caused or contributed to the escalation of his sexual proclivities. That fact, if found by the trier of fact, is material. The defendants seek to obtain evidence as to the timeline of the escalation in the Plaintiff’s sexually aberrant behaviour and compare his behaviour pre- and post-accident…
 Because the defendants are not seeking production of the videos and photographs themselves (sensibly, in my view because I would not have ordered their production), secondary documents which refer to the nature of the images and the dates on which they were made are a reasonable substitute for those original documents. I find that certain specific documents in the possession of the RCMP with respect to the 2009 incident should be produced. These are: the incident report; any statements made by the plaintiff to the RCMP and the investigating police officer’s notes, with identifying information of the victims to be redacted.
 I find that certain specific documents in the possession of the RCMP with respect to the June 25, 2012 incident should be produced. These are: the Narrative Report to Crown Counsel; the notes of the investigating police officer or officers and any statements made by the plaintiff to the RCMP.
 The video catalogue was referred to by Crown Counsel as being made by someone other than Crown Counsel. There is no evidence as to who that someone is. It is possible that the video catalogue was not made by the RCMP and is not in the possession of the RCMP. There is no evidence before me in this application that the video catalogue is in the possession of the RCMP and no evidence from which I can draw an inference that the video catalogue is probably in the possession of the RCMP. Therefore, I dismiss that part of the application.
 As stated above, counsel for the Defendants is not seeking disclosure of the videos and photos themselves. Any identifying information of the victims will be redacted.
While the BC Supreme Court does have the ability to compel a Plaintiff to attend a defence medical exam a proper evidentiary foundation must be established before the Court will be prepared to exercise this power. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dismissing an application due in part to a lack of evidence from the proposed physician.
In last week’s case (Rathgeber v. Freeman) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages and also sought Part 7 benefits from ICBC. ICBC sent the Plaintiff to an independent medical exam with an orthopedic surgeon who provided a report addressing the Plaintiff’s injuries. Some four years later the tort claim was still ongoing and the Defendant brought an application for a further exam with the same physician. The Court dismissed this noting that the previous exam covered tort issues and even if there was a change of circumstances making a further report necessary there was nothing in the evidence justifying a further physical examination. In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:
 In some respects, Dr. Kousaie’s November 9, 2009 report “resembles” a report in a tort claim. The doctor sets out his qualifications, for example, as well as facts and assumptions. He includes details of the accident, the plaintiff’s recreational history and comments on the possibility of academic impairment. He indicates that the examination involved a comprehensive physical examination. Those aspects of the report appear to be more consistent with a comprehensive report prepared to address the plaintiff’s complaints in a tort action.
 On the other hand, the report is now four years old and while Dr. Kousaie makes reference to the neck injury, he appears to have focused on low back pain as the plaintiff’s major complaint at the time of his 2009 assessment. Dr. Kousaie’s review of the then available imaging and x-rays did not indicate any trauma to the spine although some minor disc bulges were noted in the lumbar area.
 More recent assessments, and that of Dr. Twist in particular, suggest an increasing focus on the neck injury and indeed the CT scan referred to earlier shows a small circumferential disc bulge in the cervical spine, a condition not evident at the time of Dr. Kousaie’s first examination.
 Taking a holistic view of the circumstances, Dr. Kousaie’s 2009 report is comprehensive and to some extent addresses issues more relevant to a tort claim than a Part 7 claim. The results of the CT scan and the shift in focus to the plaintiff’s neck injury, however, are issues which the defence may need to address. There is, however, nothing in the evidence before me to show why a further examination, rather than a review of the available materials by Dr. Kousaie or some other qualified specialist, is necessary to achieve reasonable equality with respect to medical evidence. While I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that the proposed examiner should, in all cases, provide an affidavit with respect to the necessity for a further examination, such an affidavit would have been of significant assistance to me in this case.
 On the basis of the material before me, the application is dismissed.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dismissing an application for an independent medical exam noting the Defendant’s could have obtained the sought information through the discovery process.
In this week’s case (Foster v. Chandel) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision. The Plaintiff agreed to attend a Defense medical exam. Subsequent to this the Defendant requested a second exam with a psychiatrist. The Defendant argued that this was necessary because “the plaintiff is taking the maximum dosage of anti-depressant medication; has been seen by a psychiatrist (but not for treatment); and is suggested [by her family doctor] to be suffering from a mood disorder related to chronic pain.“.
Master Bouck dismissed the application noting all of this could be explored through the discovery process. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
 There is no evidence from any medically-trained person suggesting that a psychiatric examination is necessary or useful to either diagnose or treat the plaintiff. The plaintiff is taking medication in the dosage recommended by physicians with no suggestion of prescription abuse. The emotional symptoms are said by the medical experts to emanate from the plaintiff’s physical pain, not from any alleged psychiatric condition or disorder.
 The defendants submit that the psychiatric examination may reveal other causes for the plaintiff’s anxiety and depression. It may also reveal the nature and extent of these conditions.
 Such information can be sought at the plaintiff’s examination for discovery. A psychiatric examination should not be ordered simply to allow the defendants to ask the same questions asked in discovery but in a different manner and venue.
 The nature and extent of the plaintiff’s pain disorder and resulting symptoms is revealed in the records and reports of the treating physicians. There is no evidence to suggest that a psychiatrist could offer a “better” diagnosis or prognosis on that condition.
 The facts of this case have many parallels to those discussed in Wocknitz v. Donaldson, 2010 BCSC 1991. As in that case, the defendants do not have the necessary evidentiary foundation to support an order for “this particularly invasive form of examination”: para. 20.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing court orders for late defence medical exams.
In this week’s case (Jackson v. Yusishen) the Defendant brought an application for a ‘responsive’ functional capacity evaluation. Mr. Justice Barrow dismissed the application finding that on the facts before him the evidentiary burden for a late exam were not met. Despite this result the Court provided the following interesting comments addressing that a late defense medical exam may be justified in exceptional circumstances:
 There are three rules engaged by this application. The Rules of Court distinguish between new or fresh expert reports and responsive reports. Rule 11‑6(3) provides that, unless the court otherwise orders, expert reports other than responsive reports must be served on all parties of record at least 84 days before the scheduled trial date.
 Rule 11‑6(4) deals with responsive reports and provides that such reports must be served on every party of record at least 42 days before the trial date.
 The third rule engaged by this application is Rule 7‑6, which provides that the court may order a person submit to an examination by a medical practitioner or another appropriately qualified person. An order under Rule 7‑6(1) is discretionary. While there are a host of factors that should be considered when exercising the discretion conferred by that rule, one of the factors might broadly be taken to be whether the examination sought will advance the litigation, in the sense of potentially yielding relevant evidence touching on a material issue.
 In the context of a personal injury action, meeting that evidentiary threshold where the object of the examination is the eventual production of a fresh or new expert report will not usually be difficult. On the other hand, where the time limited for serving fresh or new expert reports has passed, and thus the only purpose of an independent medical examination is in furtherance of the production of a responsive expert report, the evidentiary burden will generally be more difficult to meet…
 Although the evidentiary burden has not been met in this case, I acknowledge that, on occasion, there may be circumstances which might justify the ordering of an independent medical examination, otherwise than in support of the preparation of a responsive report. It may be that, in some cases, the court may anticipate or at least allow for the possibility that a fresh opinion would be exceptionally admissible, notwithstanding that the 84‑day deadline has passed. Although not framed that way in Luedecke, the issue may have arisen at trial after the production of the report that the master ordered. In this case, however, there is no basis to conclude that an independent medical examination is necessary to level the playing field.
As previously discussed, the law sets a heavy burden when a party seeks a second examination for discovery in a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court. There is a distinction, however, between a second discovery and a continuation of an incomplete one. This distinction was discussed in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In this week’s case (Li v. Oneil) the Plaintiff was examined for discovery at which various requests for further information were made. When the Defendant sought to schedule a continuation of the discovery the Plaintiff opposed arguing the heavy burden for a further discovery was not met. Master Muir granted the application noting the distinction between concluding an incomplete discovery based on outstanding requests and a genuine further examination. The Court provided the following reasons:
 The application before me, despite being framed as an application for a further discovery, was in reality an application that the examination of the plaintiff continue, both in accordance with R. 7-2(22) and generally, based on production of new material such as the list of special damages, medical records and employment records. In support, he relies on the decisions in Cowan v. Davies, 2008 BCSC 1239, and Dhami v. Bath, 2012 BCSC 2077…
 I am of the view that the examination for discovery was adjourned as contemplated by these rules. Thus, the defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery regarding questions left on the record and I am of the view that logically extends to questions based on documents requested at the discovery and subsequently produced.
 As the examination for discovery was not concluded, the heavy onus required to justify a further discovery referred to in Sutherland v. Lucas is not engaged. Given the extensive document production since the examination for discovery was conducted, I am also of the view that the defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery based on the new material, whether or not it was produced in accordance with a request left on the record.
 If this was an application for a second examination for discovery I would come to a similar conclusion.
 On a review of the listing of documents produced by the plaintiff since her examination for discovery as set out in the defendant’s notice of application, it is clear that many are documents that could prove or disprove a material fact and that they were in existence prior to her examination for discovery and as such required to be produced under rules 7-1(1) and 7-1(9).
 The defendant submits that is sufficient to constitute a failure to make full and frank disclosure as contemplated in Sutherland v. Lucas and is such as to warrant a second discovery.
 I agree. In my view it does not behoove a party to fail to make complete document disclosure prior to an examination for discovery and then to take the position that the examination cannot be continued when proper disclosure is made.
 Thus, in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the defendant did not conclude its discovery and thus the heavy onus referred to in Sutherland v. Lucas does not apply. The defendant is entitled to continue its examination for discovery on the new matters, but is not entitled to examine on matters covered on the first day of examination for discovery.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a further examination for discovery of a party due to “overly-frequent interventions, inappropriate objections, and an under-prepared witness“.
In this week’s case (CP v. RBC Life Insurance Company) the Plaintiff was suing for disability insurance coverage she had in place with the Defendant. In the course of the lawsuit the plaintiff examined a representative of the Defendant and the discovery was “at times disruptive, or event fractious“. The Plaintiff adjourned the discovery before using her full 7 hours. The Plaintiff sought an order allowing her to reschedule the examination and seeking to exceed the 7 hour cap. In finding this was appropriate Master Baker provided the following sensible comments addressing the conduct of discoveries under the new rules of court:
 Ms. Hayman adjourned in part due, she says, to the frequent interruptions and interventions by Ms. Carmichael. She argues that many of the interruptions were in and of themselves improper and that, for example, questions that were objected to should be answered by court direction. But perhaps more concerning to Ms. Hayman is that, she says, it was practically impossible to establish “a flow” to the examination which is, after all, in the nature of a cross-examination.
 I have reviewed the 170 pages of the transcript of the two examination intervals. There are comments, objections, interventions, questions, or the like by Ms. Carmichael on 116 of the pages. It must be said that many are typical of an examination and benign; advice to Ms. Edizel, for example, to speak up, or confirmation to Ms. Hayman that the defense does have the proffered document. But the sheer number of recorded comments and interventions lend support to Ms. Hayman’s submission…
 I worry that there is a trend to more oppositional examinations for discovery and that more and more will, inevitably, result in applications such as this. While the court is always available to apply the Rules of Court and decide on procedural issues, the process for examinations for discovery never intended this level of supervision. I agree with N. Smith J. that the court should generally discourage a question by question approach that, essentially, subsidizes counsel’s fundamental duty to conduct an appropriate discovery, on the one hand, or to permit one (including its broad and wide-ranging nature, often), on the other.
 Rule 7-2(1)(a) inevitably increases the responsibilities in that regard. With a seven-hour limitation, examining counsel is obviously required to be efficient, focussed, and effective in conducting his or her examination. Opposing counsel, on the other hand, is obliged to restrict his or her objections and not consume that valuable time with unnecessary objections or interventions. Quite the contrary: if one thinks strategically, why not allow one’s opponent to use the examining time with irrelevant or non-productive questions? Tedious as they may seem, they would offer an excellent response to any application for increased examination time.
 But that choice would be entirely left to the examinee’s counsel. In the main, it is for him or her to avoid intruding on the examiner’s time unless clearly justified.
 There is a parallel obligation on the actual examinee; with the restriction on examination time comes a heightened responsibility to inform oneself in advance of the examination, so that the time can be used fruitfully and the discovery process serve its purpose. In this case Ms. Edizel had a particularly clear obligation in that regard. She was not the case manager or supervisor during the operative times of C.P.’s claim management; both of those individuals, as I’ve said, have left RBC. It was therefore incumbent on Ms. Edizel to redouble her efforts to examine the file and its history and to inform herself as much as possible. Both Ms. Wadhwani and Ms. Rhodes were apparently unwilling to talk to anyone about C.P.’s claim. The best source of information (other than the file entries themselves, one supposes) were therefore denied Ms. Edizel. I can understand, then, her inability to answer some (perhaps many) questions, but on the whole I am not satisfied that she met her obligation to inform herself as much as reasonably possible in advance of her examination. As a consequence, Rule 7-2(22) applies:
In order to comply with subrule (18) or (19), a person being examined for discovery may be required to inform himself or herself and the examination may be adjourned for that purpose.
 The combination, then, of overly-frequent interventions, inappropriate objections, and an under-prepared witness requires that Ms. Edizel be further examined. I will not restrict that examination to outstanding requests. Moreover, her attendance for further examination in British Columbia will be at the expense of the defendant (subject, obviously, to any future rulings on costs). Ms. Hayman will be permitted a further four hours for examination as requested.
I’ve previously discussed the difficulty ICBC has trying to withhold documents in a personal injury lawsuit based on their ‘investigative’ responsibilities. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further addressing this topic.
In this week’s case (Spenst v. Reemeyer) the Plaintiff alleged injury s a result of a motor vehicle/pedestrian incident which occurred in 2010. In the course of the lawsuit ICBC denied liability on behalf of the motorist. ICBC refused to produce two ‘investigative reports’ they commissioned arguing these were protected by litigation privilege. Master Caldwell found the evidence ICBC produced in support of their claim fell short of the mark to obtain the protection of privilege and ordered production of the documents. After summarizing the legal principles involved Master Caldwell provided the following reasons:
 In short, the determination as to whether litigation is contemplated as a reasonable prospect is not merely subjective and arbitrary but rather must be objective and based upon reasonable information obtained by appropriate investigation.
 What does the evidence before me reveal when viewed in the light of the above tests?
 First, I have absolutely no evidence from that adjuster who apparently had conduct of the file for the first 18 months. I am not told whether or not any investigations were undertaken during that time as to either the issue of liability or the extent of damages. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted, and defence counsel did not dispute, that no denial of liability was ever communicated to the plaintiff prior to the delivery of the Response to Civil Claim.
 Second, Ms. Roach notes that the plaintiff retained counsel. Plaintiffs have a right to obtain legal advice, including legal advice regarding their rights and responsibilities arising out of motor vehicle or personal injury matters. Consultation with counsel is not a direct or even reasonable guarantee that one is on the road to active litigation; the involvement of counsel may well enhance the possibility of resolution short of trial.
 Third, Ms. Roach says that she only handles claims that are being litigated or are likely to be litigated and thus she determined that since the file was transferred to her it would be litigated. Strangely however, Ms. Roach, in her own correspondence of May 8, 2012 (the day she commissioned the investigations/reports) wrote to plaintiff’s counsel:
To minimize costs, I will work with you to conclude this matter as quickly as possible. If it is determined that your client is entitled to compensation, I will be prepared to release settlement funds only when the entire claim, including taxable costs and disbursements, has been resolved and the necessary release documentation completed. I look forward to working with you on this matter.
 At the time Ms. Roach wrote this conciliatory letter referencing concluding the matter, entitlement to compensation and settlement funds in response to a similarly conciliatory letter of introduction from plaintiff’s counsel, action had not yet been commenced, no position on liability had been taken and there is no evidence that any substantive investigation or even basic inquiry had been undertaken regarding any aspect of the plaintiff’s claim. The mere arbitrary assertion that this file is likely to go to litigation because this adjuster handles only litigation files and she had decided it would go to litigation is not objectively defensible on the evidence before me.
 Fourth, Ms. Roach says that the end of the limitation period was approaching and, by implication, litigation would have to be commenced. What this assertion fails to recognize is that there is a significant difference between the commencement of an action in order to protect against the expiry of a limitation period and the active conduct of litigation. In her May 8 correspondence, Ms. Roach expressly confirmed that her letter was not “a waiver or extension of any applicable limitation”. In order for any legitimate, even-handed settlement discussions to take place, as invited by her letter, it was necessary for plaintiff’s counsel to preserve the plaintiff’s right to claim at law for her alleged injuries in the event that negotiations failed.
 Counsel for the defendant advised in submissions that the investigative reports were obtained not on the issue of liability but rather on the issue of quantum of damages. There was no evidence in the material to support that submission and counsel failed to indicate why that distinction would make a material difference in regard to the investigation/dominant purpose assessment.
 The evidence before me fails to objectively establish to any certainty that the reports which were commissioned and which are sought by the plaintiff were commissioned for any purpose other than for basic investigation of the plaintiff’s claim. There is no evidence to indicate that the adjusters had undertaken any type of earlier investigation to determine whether there was a reasonable, objective basis upon which liability should be denied or quantum questioned. The reports are ordered produced forthwith.
While the BC Supreme Court can order a Plaintiff to undergo an independent medical exam to allow the opposing party to obtain a ‘responsive’ report, a clear evidentiary foundation must exist in order for such an application to succeed. Unreported reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In the recent case (Becker v. Zetzos) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. In support of his claim he served a report from a physiatrist. As trial neared the Defendant sought an order requiring the Plaintiff to undergo an independent exam with an orthopedic surgeon for a ‘responsive’ report. This application was brought after the expiry of the 84 day deadline for conventional expert reports to be served.
In support of the application the orthopedic surgeon provided an an affidavit stating as follows:
In order for me to assist the court and properly prepare a rebuttal to the expert report of Dr. Giantomaso I must physically examine the Plaintiff and ask him the usual questions that a doctor would ask in order to elicit any information upon which to ground my expert rebuttal report. I could not give a proper rebuttal opinion report of the Plaintiff which assist the court and opines on the movement, functioning, diagnosis, prognosis, distribution of symptoms, recommendations, suitability for work, and etiology of the Plaintiff without physically examining the Plaintiff and where appropriate palpating the Plaintiff.
In finding this evidence falls short of the mark, Master McCallum provided the following reasons:
 In this case I say the evidentiary threshold has not been crossed. Dr. Dommisse’s letter is simply saying that he cannot give a proper rebuttal opinion report to assist the court without examining the plaintiff. In support of that position he goes through what seems to me to be simply a description of the work he would do if he were preparing a report in the first instance.
 He has Dr. Giantomaso’s report. He doe snot say, as he could have, what there is about that report that would lead him to think that he himself needs to examine the plaintiff. The defendant has not met the evidentiary threshold to support the request for a physical examination of the plaintiff prior to preparation of a rebuttal report.
To my knowledge this decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.
The BC Court of Appeal had an opportunity to address this issue and the short answer is yes.
In this week’s case (Goundar v. Nguyen) the Plaintiff was injured in a multi-vehicle collision. The Plaintiff sued two motorists and ICBC initially denied fault on behalf of both. As the lawsuit progressed the Defendant’s lawyer ‘inadvertently’ agreed to admit liability on behalf of one Defendant in exchange for a discontinuance against the second Defendant. This deal was agreed to and an amended Response was filed. Subsequently a Court order was obtained setting aside the admission of liability accepting that it was agreed to inadvertently by defence counsel.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the liability agreement superseded the Court’s jurisdiction to set aside the admission. The BC Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the Court retained the discretion to set the admission aside. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
 I have already concluded that Rule 7-7(5) applies to withdrawing an admission even if it arose from an agreement, and determined that the agreement in issue in this case does not purport to attempt to oust the application of the Supreme Court Civil Rules and, in particular, the rule governing the withdrawal of an admission made in a pleading. The fact of the agreement and the conduct of the parties relying on it is a factor that can, to the extent necessary, be taken into account in the balancing of prejudice as part of answering the ultimate question whether the interests of justice require permitting the admission to be withdrawn.
 In the result, I am satisfied that the chambers judge adopted the correct test in deciding the issue before her.
 Allowing the withdrawal of an admission is a discretionary matter. Deference is owed to the chambers judge, unless the judge erred in principle in the exercise of her discretion. Here I see no such error. The judge found there to be a triable issue. She concluded that the admission had been made inadvertently. She balanced any prejudice arising from the proposed withdrawal of the admission. She addressed the extent to which a prejudice could be compensated by costs. I would not interfere with the exercise of the chambers judge’s discretion.