More on the Scope of the Implied Undertaking of Confidentiality
An important and developing area of law in BC relates to the implied undertaking of confidentiality. When a lawsuit for damages is brought in the BC Supreme Court, the parties are required to make disclosure of certain relevant documents even if such disclosure is harmful to their interests.
In order to strike a balance between fulsome disclosure and privacy rights, the Courts have developed a rule known as the “implied undertaking of confidentiality” which prohibits a party who receives this forced disclosure from making use of the documents/information outside of the lawsuit without consent of the other parties or a court order. Reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention (thanks to Dan Michaluk) clarifying that the implied undertaking even covers documents obtained from the Crown by a party charged with a criminal offence.
While the recent case (R. v. Basi) is a criminal case it is relevant for personal injury lawsuits. Often times a Defendant in a civil lawsuit faces criminal consequences prior to a civil action. In the course of the initial prosecution relevant documents are produced. Many of these documents are equally relevant in a subsequent civil lawsuit. In clarifying that the implied undertaking extends to these documents precluding their automatic use in subsequent civil proceedings Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:
 If Bennett J.’s statement left any doubt about the existence of an implied undertaking rule in British Columbia, I would affirm that an accused who receives disclosure material pursuant to the Crown’s Stinchcombe obligations, or to a court order, does so subject to an implied undertaking not to disclose its contents for any purpose other than making full answer and defence in the proceeding.
 The basis for this implied undertaking is in the sound policy reasons expressed in Wagg and Taylor and also discussed in the Martin report, all referred to above. As recognized in the civil context in Goodman v. Rossi (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 359 (C.A.) at 367-368 referring to Lindsey v. Le Suer (1913), 29 O.L.R. 648 (C.A.), the undertaking flows as a necessary implication from the limited purpose for which the recipient has been given access to the documents.
 I am aware that the Court in Wagg was reluctant to lay down a rule in the criminal context that could have significant consequences in other types of litigation. However, I am satisfied this concern does not present a barrier in British Columbia in light of the jurisprudence of this Court and the recognition by our Court of Appeal that the practice in this province is not make use ofStinchcombe material for collateral purposes.
 As a result, I am satisfied that because the proceeding is over for which the disclosure was provided, the respondents are not entitled to make any further use of the material that remains subject to the undertaking.
I am having a difficult time reconciling this decision with the recent case of Cochrane v. Heir which indicates that Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i) would automatically force a litigant to list relevant documents in a civil suit notwithstanding the implied undertaking of confidentiality. I suspect the Court of Appeal will eventually be asked to weigh in on this issue. In the meantime parties to a lawsuit can simply take a common sense approach in agreeing to consent orders to set aside the implied undertaking of confidentiality if it applies to otherwise relevant and clearly producible documents.