Tag: psychological injury

Non-Pecuniary Damage Awards Discussed for Chronic Pain with Pre-Existing Depression


Pre-existing medical difficulties can and do play a role in the process of awarding a Plaintiff damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life (non-pecuniary damages).  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing this area of law.
In today’s case (Beaudry v. Kishigweb) the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by a 1/2 ton pick-up truck.  Fault was admitted for the crash.   The Plaintiff sustained a variety of soft tissue injuries affecting her neck, upper back and lower back.  These went on to cause chronic pain and headaches and the Plaintiff never fully recovered from the consequences of her injuries.
Prior to the accident the Plaintiff suffered from some medical difficulties and these included a chronic low grade depression.  Her pre-accident health made her more vulnerable to having a poor outcome following the accident.  The Defendant, who basically conceded that the Plaintiff did suffer from chronic pain as a result of the collision, argued that “whether or not the Plaintiff was a vulnerable individual (as a result of pre-existing conditions), she cannot be put back to a better position than she would have been had the accident not occurred“.
The Court went on to find that the accident did cause chronic pain which was not resolved at the time of trial.  The Court further found that the chronic pain would continue into the future, however, it would not prevent the Plaintiff from working full time or from carrying out her household responsibilities.  In awarding the Plaintiff $85,000 for her non-pecuniary damages Mr. Justice Rice made the following comments about damages for non-pecuniary loss for chronic pain with pre-existing difficulties:

[25]         The difficulty of assessing damages for soft-tissue injuries where the plaintiff has a complicated psychological and behavioural background is described in Rod v. Greco, 2003 BCSC 935, at para. 35:

As to physical injuries, because of the mechanics of the motor vehicle accident [the plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended] some must have been sustained by the plaintiff.  However, the complex psychological and behavioural history both pre and post accident outlined above made it difficult to identify them with any precision.

[34]         With the virtual admission by the defendants that the plaintiff now suffers from chronic pain, I must first of all decide what the condition of the plaintiff was just before the accident.  Clearly she was not in the best of shape and that must be taken into account.  She was susceptible to pain and worse, depression, some of which could be said was the result of lifestyle mistakes made in the past.  Having recovered from most of those, I agree that it is not fair to reduce what she would otherwise receive simply on the basis of a greater susceptibility because of her past.  On the other hand, to the extent that those past experiences would have revisited her earlier in life than is normal, account must be taken of that too.

[35]         Considering the whole of the evidence, I find that, indeed, the plaintiff suffers chronic pain as a result of the collision.  I award her $85,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

$220,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for "Psychotic Disorder"

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, awarding a Plaintiff damages for serious injuries and losses as a result of a 2001 Car Accident in Mission, BC.
What was interesting about this case (Polovnikoff v. Banks) was the very unique injuries the Plaintiff suffered as a result of this collision.  Madam Justice Bruce found that the Plaintiff sustained a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and a Psychotic Disorder as a result of this crash.  While accident related brain injury cases are not all that uncommon it is quite rare to see a claim with an alleged accident related psychotic disorder to proceed to trial.
Madam Justice Bruce awarded $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) for the Plaintiff’s brain injury and related cognitive deficits.  In doing so she noted that the Plaintiff suffered from a ‘persistent cognitive impairment with predominant problems with his attention, concentration, ability to hold information, and being in the present with memory difficulties, short term and longer term memory problems‘.
The court then assessed the Plaintiff’s psychotic disorder separately and in valuing this non-pecuniary loss at $220,000 the court noted the following:

[377] Superimposed upon the plaintiff’s cognitive impairment is a completely disabling psychotic disorder. The plaintiff’s mental state has significantly interfered with his ability to function normally in every aspect of his life. His psychotic features adversely affect his ability to think and reason, impair his judgment, cause him to neglect personal hygiene, enhance the adverse impact of his cognitive impairments, including his ability to concentrate and short and long term memory, and make him apathetic about his life and others around him. The plaintiff is plagued by sleeplessness, anxiety, irritability, aggressive or violent feelings, lack of insight, verbal and physical inhibition, and recklessness. Mr. Stanus concluded that the plaintiff was completely unemployable in a competitive market due to his psychotic disorder.

[378] Clearly the plaintiff has undergone a catastrophic loss of enjoyment of life. While there is some doubt about how successful Festival Foods was as a going concern, it is apparent from both the plaintiff’s testimony and the collateral witnesses called by the plaintiff that he really enjoyed running the company and that he had significant skills and talents that have been lost entirely as a result of this disabling mental illness. The plaintiff requires constant supervision and is unable to carry out the simplest tasks. He no longer pays any attention to his physical care and hygiene and has lost interest in all of his pre-accident physical and recreational activities. Based on these factors I award the plaintiff $220,000 for non-pecuniary damages arising out of the psychotic disorder.

Madam Justice Bruce then went on to reduce this award significantly to $68,200 to account for the many other factors that played a potential role in the development of a psychotic disorder in the absence of this accident.  This made for a lengthy judgement almost 500 paragraphs in length.  Below are the highlights of the courts discussion reducing the award for damages for the Plaintiff’s psychotic disorder:

C.        Reductions from Non-Pecuniary Damage Award for Psychotic Disorder

[379] This award must be reduced by 2% to reflect the small but measurable risk that the plaintiff’s alcohol consumption may have led to the psychotic disorder regardless of the July 2001 accident. This award must be reduced a further 45% to reflect the adverse impact of alcohol consumption on the progression of his psychotic disorder and the involvement of alcohol addiction in the symptoms that are currently a part of the plaintiff’s clinical presentation.

[380] Turning to the other accidents and subsequent events, it is apparent from the medical reports of Dr. Hunt and the clinical notes of Dr. Yokoyama that the December 2000 accident was the beginning of the plaintiff’s emotional distress albeit his major psychiatric symptoms appeared after the 2001 accident. Both Dr. Gopinath and Dr. Hunt attribute the plaintiff’s “superimposed psychological and psychiatric disturbances” to the injuries he suffered in both the December 2000 and the July 2001 accidents. Only Dr. Smith ruled out any causal relationship between any of the other accidents and the plaintiff’s current psychiatric illness: December 31, 2008 report at p. 19. This accident also appears to be the most seriously disabling for the plaintiff next to the July 2001 accident. Thus I would allocate to this accident 10% responsibility for the damages awarded to the plaintiff for the mental illness he suffers from.

[381] The accident witnessed by the plaintiff in January 2002 caused him to have a panic attack and increased his anxiety level for a brief period. The clinical notes of Dr. Yokoyama indicate the anxiety was improving after only a few days. In addition, this is clearly a non-tortious cause that does not reduce the defendants’ liability. The accident that occurred on October 21, 2002 was also fairly minor and nothing in Dr. Yokoyama’s clinical records indicates the plaintiff suffered any lasting emotional trauma as a result of this event. Accordingly, I attribute no responsibility for loss to the defendant in that case.

[382] The plaintiff was involved in an accident on September 24, 2003. He was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his father when this accident occurred. The van driven by Mr. Polovnikoff became hooked to the rear of a truck and this caused the van to be swung in a circular motion causing damage to the front bumper and two broken windows. When Dr. Hunt saw the plaintiff on November 27, 2003, he was confused, irrational, and having abnormal mental thoughts. The plaintiff disclosed that he was too frightened to drive or be a passenger in a vehicle because of the possibility of another accident. Dr. Hunt was so concerned about the plaintiff’s mental stability that he considered having him committed to hospital for acute psychiatric care.

[383] While the plaintiff appeared much more disturbed than in previous assessments, Dr. Hunt had already seen psychiatric problems developing in June 2003 before this accident had occurred. In addition, there is no follow up visit with Dr. Yokoyama, which was unusual for plaintiff, to indicate that this state of high anxiety continued for an extended period. Indeed, the next visit to Dr. Yokoyama was on February 24, 2004 after another accident had occurred. Thus, although it is apparent this accident caused some deterioration in the plaintiff’s condition, I am unable to find that it was either substantial or long term in its effect. The accident on February 18, 2004, which Dr. Yokoyama concluded had aggravated the plaintiff’s agitation level, was also short lived in effect. During the next visit to Dr. Yokoyama on March 17, 2004 there is no reference to any aggravation of his ongoing concussion symptoms. Thus I reduce the award for both these events by a nominal 2%.

[384] The accident on May 30, 2004 in the parking lot of the Astoria hotel seemed significant to Ms. Lustado. She considered this to be a turning point in their relationship because of the noticeable deterioration in the plaintiff’s emotional demeanour. Dr. Yokoyama’s clinical notes on June 2, 2004 indicate that the plaintiff developed anxiety and tension after this accident in addition to an aggravation of his soft tissue injuries. On August 30, 2004 there is also a reference in Dr. Yokoyama’s clinical records to “regression – post concussion syndrome” which I interpret as some deterioration in the plaintiff’s mental state. Accordingly, I reduce the award by 5% to reflect the damage caused by this defendant’s negligence.

[385] The accidents that occurred on November 18, 2004, March 22, 2005, and November 29, 2006 do not appear to have aggravated to any measurable degree the psychotic disorder suffered by the plaintiff. By November 2004 his symptoms were well developed and the visits with Dr. Yokoyama after these accidents indicate the major concern in each case was an aggravation of the soft tissue injuries.

[386] Finally, the plaintiff was involved in an assault in or about July 2006 which I find exacerbated his emotional problems and led to deterioration in his mental health. Dr. Gopinath reported that following this assault the plaintiff was clearly more paranoid in general and in regard to the police in particular. Dr. Gopinath believed the plaintiff had been “badly shaken up” by this experience and developed symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. He was having sleep difficulties, waking up with nightmares, and panic attacks. Dr. Gopinath’s December 16, 2008 report also features this assault as significant in the plaintiff’s clinical presentation and he acknowledged in his testimony that the plaintiff’s psychotic symptoms worsened after this event. It was also partly due to this assault that Mr. Polovnikoff moved his son and Ms. Lustado to Keremeos. They wanted to get away from the police and the other stressors in the plaintiff’s life.

[387] While this event is significant, it must be acknowledged that the plaintiff’s psychotic symptoms were well entrenched at this time and his inability to function normally in all aspects of his life had already been a reality for some time. Dr. Gopinath had observed severe psychotic symptoms as early as October 2005 when the plaintiff first came to him for treatment. Accordingly, I find the award should be reduced by a further 5% as a result of this tortious intervening event.

[388] In summary, the non-pecuniary award arising from the psychiatric illness suffered by the plaintiff in the amount of $220,000 must be reduced by a total of 69%. The reduced award is therefore $68,200. The total award for non-pecuniary damages is $118,200 ($50,000 plus $68,200).

$1,284,279 Awarded for Traumatic 'Complex Somatoform Disorder'

Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff nearly $1.3 million in damages as a result of a 2002 motor vehicle collision which occurred at UBC.
The Plaintiff was a pedestrian at the time.  She was struck while walking in a marked crosswalk on a dark and rainy evening.  Both fault and quantum (value of the ICBC claim) were at issue at trial.
The court found that the defendant driver was 100% responsible for the collision.  At paragraph 8 Madam Justice BJ Brown noted that
[8]                In my view, (the Defendant) is 100% responsible for the accident.  She was driving in, not through, the crosswalk, in the course of completing a U-turn, looking for a parking space.  She was aware that at that time of night it is quite common for there to be pedestrians about, that there are still students attending classes.  Indeed, she was picking her husband up from teaching a class. 
The Plaintiff was a PhD student looking to earn her degree in chemistry at the tine.  The court found that she suffered some significant injuries which are summarized at paragraph 69 of the judgement:
[69]            (the Plaintiff’s) condition, a complex somatoform disorder (a combination of a pain disorder, somatoform disorder NOS (organically unexplained fatigue) and conversion disorder (psychogenic neurological deficits)), was caused by the motor vehicle accident.  It developed over the days and weeks following the accident, as (the Plaintiff) complained of bizarre, non-organic complaints, such as, on March 19, 2002, speaking in a barely audible whisper and being hypersensitive to exam; on April 17, feeling exquisitely tender; and by May 30 when she saw Dr. Spacey, demonstrating many non-physiological findings, such as a vibration which respects the midline (a test performed by Dr. Spacey which should have been felt all across the forehead, but which Dr. Samuel felt only to mid-way across the forehead) and total body weakness for three weeks which Dr. Spacey thought to be “highly functional in nature”.  Her complaints exceeded the physical signs. 
The court assessed damages as follows:

(i)

Non-pecuniary damages

$   100,000.00

(ii)

Loss of income/capacity:

Future:

Past:

 

$1,000,000.00

$   150,000.00

(iii)

Cost of future care

$     25,000.00

(iv)

Loss of housekeeping capacity

$     15,000.00

(v)

Special damages

$       4,279.53

In noting that $1,000,000 was appropriate in loss of earning capacity, the court noted that ‘chronic conversion disorder, such as demonstrated by (the Plaintiff), usually evolved into a chronic illness.  Despite treatment, the majority of these patients fail to return to work.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that (the Plaintiff) will earn any significant amount of the course of her lifetime.’
This case is worth reviewing for anyone advancing a contested pscyhological injury claim with ICBC as it gives insight into the complexity involved in prosecuting such cases.

ICBC, Chronic Pain, and Fair Settlement

With the exception of experienced BC injury lawyers, most people advancing ICBC claims need to do extensive research to determine fair value for pain and suffering in an ICBC injury claim. One of the best ways to go about this is to look at BC court cases for similar injuries and see just how much, or how little, our courts award for pain and suffering for various injuries.
If you are advancing an ICBC chronic pain case, reasons for judgement were released today that are worth reviewing.
The Plaintiff was involved in a two vehicle accident on January 9, 2006. He stopped his vehicle for a cyclist who was crossing in a marked crosswalk. Shortly afterwards the Plaintiff was rear-ended by a Jeep Cherokee. The impact was significant causing ‘substantial damage’ to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.
The Plaintiff reported several injuries as a result of this rear-end crash including left shoulder pain, dizziness, headaches, neck and back pain, and numbness to his left arm.
The Plaintiff’s family doctor referred him to an orthopaedic specialist who stated that the Plaintiff “has had some soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine….he does not require any special investigation as he has no neurological defecits. I would encourage him to return to work
Shortly after this time the Plaintiff switched family physicians. His new treating doctor diagnsosed major depression and soft tissue injury to the neck, shoulder and back. Specifically she diagnosed
a left anterior supraspinatus tear and multiple soft tissue injuries of the neck and back, possible muscle spasm, strains, contusions, cervical facet syndrome and discogenic pain…..(and) two other medical conditions, major depression and peptic ulcers, since the MVA in January 2006. I believe these two conditions were precipitated by the chronic pain and stress caused by the accident.
She went on to state that:
(the Plaintiff) has not been able to return to work, his function remains partially impaired and his level of activity is significantly reduced. His chronic pain and his depression symptoms have significantly restricted his ability to perform a range of daily living activities on ongoing basis such as personal self care, meal preparation, basic housework, daily shopping and use of transportation.
The court also heard from an ‘independent medical examiner’ who stated that “permanent disability is not anticpiated as a result of the accident.’ and that ‘the only objective finding (of injury) was that of restricted movement of the cervical spine. All complaints otherwise were of a subjective nature.’
This doctor made some interesting comments about chronic pain, namely that:
Many authors who have studied chronic pain syndromes have demonstrated that patients have been shown to have beliefs and expectations of chronic pain which are critical cognitive facilitators or impediments to the recovery process. The attribution of blame may be an unrecognized factor co-related to pain behaviour, mood disturbance, and poor response to treatment. It is unlikely that (the Plaintiff) is going to change his perceptions of pain until the issues are resolved for him.
The court made it’s key findings at paragraphs 24 and 25 where Justice Rice stated:

[24] I accept that as a result of the motor vehicle accident Mr. Niloufari suffered moderate strains to his neck and back which have caused him substantial pain and suffering over the two years and several months since the accident. I find these injuries have disabled him from any activities, including his work. As it stands now, more than two years have passed since the date of the accident with little hint of improvement in his pain and suffering or capacity to work.

[25] I am satisfied that the plaintiff suffers chronic pain with both physical and psychological components. I am not entirely satisfied that he has done his best to mitigate his loss by exercising and seeking psychiatric and/or psychological advice and treatment. I am not satisfied based on the medical evidence, that Mr. Niloufari should expect to be permanently disabled or disabled at all after a few years from now with diligent attention to his rehabilitation. I would expect him to gradually recover, as Dr. Hill suggested, over the next three or four years, with the expectation he could return to work in a limited capacity within one year.

The court awarded damages for pain and suffering, lost pass of income, loss of future earning capacity, special damages and cost of future care.
The non-pecuniary damage award (pain and suffering) was $63,000.
This case is worth reading for anyone advancing and ICBC injury claim seeking damages for ‘loss of earning capacity’ for Justice Rice’s summary of the law on this topic at paragraphs 75-84 of the judgment.

Mild Trauamtic Brain Injury (MTBI) Claim Dismissed by BC Supreme Court

In a striking example of how complex brain injury litigation can be, lengthy reasons for judgment were released today dismissing a Plaintiff’s claim that 2 accidents caused/contributed to a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI).
The trial lasted over 30 days of court time spanning between November, 2006 – July 2007. The reasons for judgement give insight into just how complex the brain injury trial was. The reasons are well over 300 paragraphs long.
The Plaintiff was involved in 2 accidents. She sued for both and the trials for both claims were heard at the same time. The first accident happened in 2001 in Abbotsford BC when the Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a driver who failed to stop at a stop sign. Liability (fault) for this accident was admitted by the defence lawyer. The second accident happened in 2005 when the Plaintiff’s vehicle changed lanes and collided with the defendant vehicle who was pulling out from a parking lot. Liability was denied and the trial judge found the defendant was solely responsible for the accident.
With the determination of fault out of the way the court had to decide what injuries the Plaintiff suffered in both these crashes and their value. The Plaintiff said she suffered from a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in the first accident and this injury was made worse in the second accident. This allegation was hotly contested by the defence lawyers.
The court heard from numerous witnesses including over 10 doctors. It is very common for ICBC brain injury claims to include opposing medical evidence and numerous ‘lay witnesses’ who give evidence of changes in a Plaintiff’s level of functioning after the accident. ICBC claims lawyers often refer to these witnesses as before and after’ witnesses.
The expert medical evidence included
1. The Plaintiff’s GP who diagnosed a ‘closed head injury
2. A Physiatrist who diagnosed ‘a head injury that has resulted in some brain dysfunction‘ along with ‘soft tissue aches and pains
3. A psychiatrist who treated the Plaintiff since 2002 who diagnosed ‘impairments…as a result of the accidents‘ and a ‘significant concussive injury in both accidents (which have gone on to become) a post-concussion syndrome, now persistent type…a personality change due to MTBI….a pain disorder that relates to (the Plaintiff’s) headaches and other chronic pain complaints…a post-trauma seizure disorder‘ He concluded that the Plaintiff ‘will continue to have significant disruption of her life and her ability to work is permanently compramised’.
4. A neuropsychologist who accepted the diagnosis of ‘closed head injury, possible seizure activity, chronic pain and post-concussive syndrome.’ He performed numerous tests and concluded that the Plaintiff ‘was suffering from psychological turmoil which was sufficiently severe to affect her score on neuropsychological tests’ and lastly that ‘the pattern of neurological test results was consistent with diffuse brain injury attributed as likely being caused by the car accident‘.
5. A urologist
6. A psychologist who saw the Plaintiff regularly since 2003
7. a Neurologist from the University of Colorado School of Medicine who diagnosed a ‘concussion with amnesia in the first accident and that she subsequently developed post-concussion syndrome’.
8. Another physiatrist who assessed the Plaintiff after the second accident and ‘attributed (her) symptoms after the first accident to post-concussive syndrome’. He also diagnosed various soft tissue injuries.
9. A psychologist who assessed the Plaintiff in 2006 who stated that ‘the plaintiff suffered from a brain injury based personality change arising from a frontal-lobe related impairment and emotional disturbance reactive to the trauma of the accidents
10. An orthopaedic surgeon who was hired by the defence lawyer. His opinion differed largely from most of the previous experts and gave evidence that:

Based on my assessment of Ms. Abma on May 9, 2003, she presented as an extremely symptom focused individual whose clinical examination strongly suggested a significant non-organic component to her various musculoskeletal/neurologic complaints. I base this latter opinion, that Ms. Abma has significant nonorganic illness, on the following findings:

1. Multiple areas of complaint.

2. No reported pain free interval.

3. Failure of all treatment modalities to date.

4. Significant pain behaviour and reaction on clinical examination.

5. Multiple areas of non-anatomic pain.

6. Regional numbness affecting her right arm.

7. Abnormal pain diagram.

All of these factors would suggest that there is a significant psychological social component influencing the reporting scenario and duration of Ms. Abma’s multiple musculoskeletal/neurologic complaints. In addition, Ms. Abma’s clinical records indicate that she suffered from anxiety/depression preceding her November 2001 motor vehicle accident, both of which can negatively influence an individual’s pain experience and their self perception of disability.

11. A Psychiatrist hired by the defence lawyer who noted that ‘there is no objective evidence to support the fact that this woman suffered any type of concussion or brain injury.’
12. An otolaryngolgist hired by the defence lawyer who ‘concludes that the plaintiff suffered a mild/modest neck sprain in the first motor vehicle accident classified as whiplash-associated disorder (WAD) Type 1. He considers that this may have re-activated the neck sprain from her 1996 motor vehicle accidents which demonstrated that her complaints continued for more than three years. Dr. Sinanan states “but for that factor, recovery from a Grade 1 WAD Type neck sprain usually is within six to eight weeks, 12 weeks at most
13. Lastly the court heard from a neurologist also hired by the defence lawyer and it was ‘uncontested’ that this doctor is the ‘foremost epilepsy expert in the Province of BC’. he concluded that the Plaintiff did not have a brain injury.
After all of this the court sided largely with the defence medical evidence. The key findings were made starting at paragraph 308 where the court held that:

[308] The most persuasive view of the plaintiff’s post-accident experience is described by Drs. Anton and Smith. Dr. Anton suggests that the plaintiff is suffering psychological injuries. Dr. Smith is also of a similar view: adjustment disorder with anxiety, which does not result from injuries sustained in either of the accidents, but arising from her belief that she is cognitively impaired as a result of the accident.

[309] I am not finding that the plaintiff is acting dishonestly. She believes that she is suffering from a brain injury. She is relying on the information she has been provided by her treating physicians. She has not proven on a balance of probabilities that she suffered a brain injury in the first accident. I find it much more likely that the psychological difficulties, including the cognitive, emotional and behavioural problems which the plaintiff has experienced, arose from her reaction to the brain injury diagnosis made by Dr. Ancill in April 2002. I do not accept the plaintiff’s assertion that all of her symptoms had their “genesis” in the motor vehicle accidents.

[310] Ultimately, I find that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the first accident are the physical injuries and to some extent the depression described in the evidence. The plaintiff suffered the following injuries as a result of the first motor vehicle accident on November 14, 2001:

1. aggravation of previous soft tissue injuries to her neck, back, shoulders and hips;

2. a contusion to the area above her left knee; and

3. some depression and anxiety (exclusive of that related to the diagnosis of a brain injury) attributable to the pain of her injuries.

As a result of this finding the court largely dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims for loss of income past and future, future care needs, and her in-trust claims for voluntary services provided by her family.
Ultimately little more than compensation for pain and suffering for soft tissue injuries was awarded.
As an ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer, one of the highlights of this case for me was found at paragraph 204 of this judgement where the court discussed its view of some of the neuropsychological test results.  These tests, which can be used to see if a pattern of cognitive defecits are consistent with brain injury, have some built in ‘fail-safes’ in them.  These measures are built in to help the neuropsychologist gauge whether the patient is applying their best effort.  In other words, these built in to see if the Plaintiff may be faking the injury.
In this case the “Fake Bad Scale‘ disclosed some ‘suspicious results‘.  The various doctors placed varying levels of importance on this fact.  Madam Justice Gropper made her views quite clear at paragraph 304 where she stated that “If the testing is invalid it does not mean there is something wrong with the test,; it suggests that there is something suspicious about how the individual is responding to the testing and whether she is applying her best effort to it.  It is a factor to be considered, not simply ignored.’
This case, while perhaps lengthy and difficult to read through, is worth reviewing for anyone involved in an ICBC claim alleging Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. This is one of the most aggresively litigated injuries and this case shows just how involved these trials can be, not just from the medical side of things but from the involvement of ‘before and after’ witnesses and many intimate details of a Plaintiff’s life.
Do you have questions about this case or an ICBC claim involving Mild Traumatic Brain Injury?  Do you need advice from an ICBC claims lawyer?  If so click here to arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC Claims Lawyer Erik Magraken (services provided for ICBC injury claims throughout BC!)

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ERIK
MAGRAKEN

Personal Injury Lawyer

When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.

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