Adding to this site’s soft tissue injury damage archives, reasons for judgement were released earlier this year by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing damages for chronic moderate soft tissue injuries imposed on a pre-existing condition.
In the recent case (Graydon v. Harris) the 65 year old plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was struck by a large industrial garbage truck. The Defendant was found fully at fault for the collision. The Plaintiff suffered from pre-existing neck pain and headaches due to a degenerating spine. The Collision resulted in soft tissue injuries which aggravated these issues. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
 Based upon the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff is a very stoic and hardworking man who has suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to his neck, lower back and shoulders as a result of the October 25, 2007 accident. I also find that, at the time of the October 25, 2007 accident, the plaintiff was suffering from pre-existing neck pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine. That is why Dr. Koelink was continuing to prescribe Tylenol 3 for him. The soft tissue injuries suffered during the October 25, 2007 accident exacerbated his pre-existing condition.
 Despite some inconsistencies in his evidence, I find that the plaintiff’s injuries have had and will have a lasting effect on his work life and, to a lesser degree, on his home and recreational life. He continues to be able to work but not without pain and discomfort. He continues to have headaches which flare up when he is welding.
 He is able to travel both for vacation and work without adverse effects with the exception of occasional numbness in his left leg after sitting for prolonged periods of time. However, as Dr. Craig testified, that discomfort can be eased by changing position.
 The plaintiff was suffering from pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine well before the October 25, 2007 accident. In my view, there is at least a 25% chance that the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition would have interfered with his work and other activities had the October 25, 2007 accident not occurred.
 After considering all of the plaintiff’s circumstances, the principles set out in Stapley and the cases provided by counsel, and after applying a 25% contingency in respect of the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition, I find that an award of $60,000 for non-pecuniary damages is appropriate.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a common injury sustained in a motor vehicle collision; the onset of symptoms in pre-existing but otherwise asymptomatic spinal degeneration.
In this week’s case (Johnson v. Kitchener) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first in 2007 where he was rear-ended by a tractor trailer, the second in 2008 which aggravated in the injuries from the first crash. Prior to the first collision the Plaintiff had “significant degeneration” in his neck and less severe degeneration in the rest of his spine. Despite this condition the Plaintiff was asymptomatic. The collisions caused this condition to become painful. The court found that while the neck symptoms likely would have developed at some point in time absent the collision, the back would have remained asymptomatic absent trauma. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 (prior to making a modest deduction for the likelihood of neck symptoms in any event) Madam Justice Gerow provided the following reasons:
 In my view, the evidence establishes the probable cause of Mr. Johnson’s ongoing neck, upper back and lower back pain is that the injuries he sustained in the 2007 accident, and the 2008 accident to a lesser extent, exacerbated his pre-existing asymptomatic degenerative disc disease. While there was risk to the degenerative disc disease in his neck becoming symptomatic, the medical evidence was that the lower back would likely not have become symptomatic absent some trauma.
 Dr. Travlos’ evidence was that he did not know exactly when the neck would become symptomatic and could not give an opinion regarding the severity of any symptoms. It is clear from the expert evidence that the 2007 accident caused a serious injury to the neck which has caused pain and suffering sooner, more frequently and to a notably greater degree.
 It is apparent from the evidence that Mr. Johnson has returned to his sporting activities and he has a strong work ethic. He is not a man to sit around and he continues to be active despite the pain it causes him. Mr. Johnson’s evidence is that he will continue to work at Ocean Concrete until he finds something more suitable despite the increase in symptoms he has from the physical aspects of the job. As well, he will continue to engage in whatever sports he can, knowing he will pay for it.
 Mr. Johnson’s evidence is consistent with the medical opinions. For example, Dr. Froh’s opinion is that Mr. Johnson will not harm himself with high demand activities; however, it will likely result in increased pain and symptoms.
 In my opinion, Mr. Johnson’s neck symptoms fall within the crumbling skull rule enunciated in Athey, and any award must reflect that. However, I am of the view, the defendants are liable for his lower back symptoms even though they may be more than severe than expected due to his pre-existing condition. The evidence of the experts is that many individuals have degeneration in their spines without any symptoms and that the degeneration in Mr. Johnson’s lower back was similar to other individuals of his age. There is no evidence that his lower back would have become symptomatic absent the 2007 accident. Accordingly I have concluded that his lower back symptoms fall within the thin skull rule enunciated in Athey. ..
 Having considered the extent of the injuries, the fact that the symptoms are ongoing five years after the accident with little improvement, the guarded prognosis for full recovery, as well as the authorities I was provided, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages would be $90,000 if the accidents were the only cause of Mr. Johnson’s ongoing symptoms. However, given the evidence that Mr. Johnson was likely to have suffered some neck symptoms from his degenerative condition within 3 to 10 years, that award should be reduced by 10% to $81,000.
One of the recognized objections to the introduction of expert opinion evidence in a personal injury trial relates to the opinion relying on novel or untested scientific theory. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal addressing this objection and taking a practical view of the benefits of experts providing opinions based on their years of experience in a clinical setting.
In last week’s case (Cassells v. Ladolcetta) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision. He suffered from a pre-existing condition, namely psoriatic arthritis. The Plaintiff presented evidence that this condition was aggravated due to the trauma of the collision. This evidence was accepted at trial and damages were assessed accordingly.
The Defendant appealed arguing the medical opinion was based on novel science. The BC Court of Appeal disagreed finding the foundation for an expert opinion can be laid based on clinical experience. In dismissing the Appeal the Court provide the following reasons:
 The defendants challenged reliance on Dr. Gladman’s evidence on essentially the same basis at trial as they do now. Their contention was and remains that her opinion was based on what they say is novel science: no scientific data established, beyond mere speculation, that her “theory” was valid. They say that at most the theory is an unproven hypothesis. They cite the criteria for evaluating the soundness of novel science found in R. v. Mohan,  2 S.C.R. 9, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 402, as drawn from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), and discussed in Taylor v. Liong, 2007 BCSC 231,  7 W.W.R. 50.
 The judge said the criteria pertain to the admissibility of expert evidence. Admissibility requires the weighing of threshold reliability. No issue had been taken with the admissibility of Dr. Gladman’s opinion which it was evident is consistent with a widely held belief in the scientific community. Quoting from R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 175, 123 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (C.A.), aff’d  3 S.C.R. 866, to the effect the threshold test of reliability must adapt to changing circumstances, the judge said that, in the face of studies that did reflect a wide provisional acceptance of Dr. Gladman’s hypothesis, the lack of a conclusive study should not be fatal to either the admissibility or the weight of her opinion.
 Unlike instances where, as in Taylor, the opinion of an expert which is shown to be no more than uncertain theory has been ruled inadmissible, here, as the judge said, Dr. Gladman expressed her opinion on the basis of what she said she had seen in response to trauma among her patients with psoriatic arthritis. What is said to be the inconclusive literature she referenced was, as the judge said, not the only foundation for the opinion she held. It was an opinion based on thirty years of her experience.
 The judge reached the ultimate conclusion he did concerning the aggravation of the respondent’s psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis relying on the evidence of the various physicians whose opinions he had to consider. Dr. Gladman’s opinion on the effect of trauma on psoriatic arthritis is consistent with the other opinion evidence which the judge found acceptable, as well as with the evidence of the respondent’s medical condition and, for that matter, the deterioration in his life after the accident. I do not consider there to be any sound basis on which it can now be said the judge made an overriding and palpable error in concluding the respondent’s psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis were aggravated by trauma and stress attributable to the accident by relying on Dr. Gladman’s opinion.
(UPDATE August 8, 2012 – The below judgement was modified in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Court of Appeal. In short, the Court held the 40% damage reduction was not justified by the evidence and substituted a 20% damage reduction. The BCCA’s reasons can be found here).
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for serious injuries following a BC motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Bouchard v. Brown Bros. Motor Lease Canada Ltd.) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 rear-end collision. He was faced in an awkward position when his vehicle was struck and he sustained injuries. Fault for the crash was admitted focussing the trial on assessing damages.
Although there was competing medical evidence, the Court ultimately found the collision was a cause of a L4-5 disc herniation which required bilateral discectomies and foraminotimies at the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels of the spine.
The Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain continued and he ultimately was diagnosed with a chronic pain syndrome. The Court accepted that the Plaintiff would likely not work in his profession again. In assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $160,000 Mr. Justice Pearlman provided the following comments:
 I find that the motor vehicle accident was a significant factor contributing to the herniation of the plaintiff’s disc at L4-L5, and the development of the plaintiff’s symptoms of severe and disabling lower back pain, and that there is a substantial connection between Mr. Bouchard’s low back injuries and the motor vehicle accident….
 The assessment of non-pecuniary damages depends upon the particular circumstances of the plaintiff in each case. The factors that the court must consider include the plaintiff’s age, the nature of his injury, the severity and duration of pain, disability, emotional suffering, impairment of marital and social relationships, impairment of physical and mental abilities, and loss of lifestyle:Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 at para. 46, leave to appeal ref’d 2006 CarswellBC 2598 (S.C.C.). Here, I find that the appropriate award for Mr. Bouchard in all of the circumstances is $160,000.
This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of causation and indivisible injuries set out at paragraphs 97-117 of the reasons for judgement. The Court found that while the collision was a cause of the injury, that there was “a very significant risk” that the Plaintiff’s back problems would have developed even absent the collision and the damages were reduced by 40% to take this risk into account.
Lastly, this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the adverse inference principle. Following the Plaintiff’s surgery the Plaintiff obtained and exchanged copies of the relevant medical records. The Plaintiff called various expert witnesses to support the case but the treating surgeon was not called. The Defence asked the Court to draw an adverse inference. Mr. Justice Pearlman refused to do so and provided the following helpful reasons:
 Here, there has been full disclosure of Dr. Heran’s consultation reports and his operative procedure report. Those records were available to the defendant when Dr. Hepburn prepared his second report of October 27, 2009. It was open to the defendants to interview and call Dr. Heran if they chose to do so. Furthermore, in my view, Dr. Hunt, whose practice is devoted to the treatment of patients with chronic pain, and who was directly involved in the ongoing testing, management, and treatment of the plaintiff’s symptoms from October 2008 through May 2010, was in a better position than Dr. Heran to provide an opinion on the extent of the plaintiff’s disability and his requirements for future care. Finally, I also take into account the explanation of counsel for the plaintiff that obtaining an expert report from Dr. Heran would have put Mr. Bouchard to additional expense, and would have involved yet another review of all of the reports and clinical records of those doctors who did testify at trial. For all of these reasons, I decline to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiff.
Adding to this site’s archives of chronic pain cases, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic pain syndrome.
In last week’s case (Perry v. Perry) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle collisions. She suffered from pre-existing health problems including PTSD and chronic pain. She was injured in both collisions and this aggravated her pre-existing difficulties and caused new ones. Ultimately she was diagnosed with a Chronic Pain Syndrome with a poor prognosis. In assessing her non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $85,000 Mr. Justice Melnick made the following findings:
41] Ms. Perry is a person who had had a number of challenging health issues prior to the first accident. Those issues included PTSD, which related to her childhood abuse, and problems with her feet and legs. She sometimes suffered from depressive episodes and had a history of alcohol and heroin abuse. She had multiple areas of pain that she experienced at least as far back as 2003. I conclude that, prior to the first accident, she was a person of some fragility with respect to both her physical and emotional health, likely the seeds of which were sown by her tragic childhood and exacerbated by her alcohol and drug use.
 That said, Ms. Perry, in the few years prior to the accident, had made real progress by putting her addictions behind her and, to a certain extent at least, engaging in life through education, volunteer work and a small amount of employment. She was, however, what I would describe as a “thin-skull” case: more at risk for emotional and psychological trauma than a normal person without Ms. Perry’s medical history would be: Athey v. Leonati,  3 S.C.R. 458. See also: Hussack v. School District No. 33 (Chilliwack), 2009 BCSC 852 at para. 143; . Thus, while the average otherwise healthy individual involved in the same type of accidents that Ms. Perry experienced may have suffered similar physical injury, that person would not be at the same risk of suffering the same psychological damage as Ms. Perry.
 I am satisfied that Ms. Perry suffers from chronic pain, which is largely attributed to the first accident, and to a minor extent to the second accident. She was not without pain and physical problems before these accidents and the defendants are not responsible for the extent to which those symptoms were already symptomatic: Athey at para. 35…
 Ms. Perry has several health issues, a large portion of which are attributable to these two accidents. Taking into account, as I have, that some of her current health situation is attributable to her past medical problems, I asses her overall non-pecuniary damages at $85,000. The seriousness of Ms. Perry’s injuries and her guarded prognosis are more in line with the authorities suggested by counsel for Ms. Perry.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $240,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss sustained in a BC motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision. She was not at fault for the crash. She sustained physical injuries which included a disk protrusion in her neck. She also suffered from a pre-existing psychiatric illness (bipolar disorder) which was significantly aggravated as a result of her crash. The Court assessed the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $90,000. In doing so Mr. Justice Willcock provided the following reasons:
 I accept the evidence of (the Plaintiff’s) treating physicians that she sustained injury to the musculoligamentous structures of her right neck and shoulder area and that she now suffers from a disk protrusion at the C5-C6 level that may become increasingly symptomatic. Dr. Sahjpaul, the witness most qualified to address the cause and effect of the disc protrusion believes the MRI suggests some cord compression but is not convinced that the plaintiff’s symptoms are entirely, or even significantly a result of that cord compression. I accept his conclusion that the plaintiff has neck pain and right shoulder and arm pain and weakness which is a combination of a soft tissue injury and some irritation of the nerve root at the C5-6 level. I further accept his conclusion that the motor vehicle accident was causative of the plaintiff’s symptoms.
 I find that since the accident she has suffered mechanical neck, shoulder, mid-back, and low back pain, weakness, and tenderness. Despite that pain and weakness, she has demonstrated on examination by her physicians that she has relatively normal range of motion. Only minimal back muscle wasting has been noted.
 (the Plaintiff) perceives that her persistent back pain limits her ability to engage in tasks that require prolonged static or awkward positioning, including twisting, reaching, or stooping. It is noted, however, that (the Plaintiff) has difficulty with self-assessment and is prone to overestimate the extent of her disability.
 I accept the opinion of Dr. Adrian that (the Plaintiff) will probably continue to experience difficulty performing activities that place physical forces on the structures involving her neck and back, but find that (the Plaintiff) is limited as much by psychological as by physical symptoms. While her pain has been chronic there is some indication that with therapy the psychological component of her symptoms is at least temporarily improving.
 I accept the evidence of Dr. Adrian and Dr. Sahjpaul that there is a risk that the C5-6 disc will cause increasing pain over time. (The Plaintiff) may require surgical intervention as a result of the obvious and problematic C5-6 herniation seen on the MRI…
 The accident in this case has had a significant effect on (the Plaintiff’s) life. I am satisfied on the evidence that she suffered from a significant bipolar affective disorder that required monitoring and medication prior to the motor vehicle accident but that that disorder was significantly exacerbated to the point that she became significantly disabled by her illness from 2006 to 2009. While she is under reasonable control at the moment, her significant depressive and manic episodes have made her more prone to relapse. In addition, she has a physical injury that continues to trouble her and a disk protrusion that may become more symptomatic in the future. Taking into account the likelihood that she would to some extent have suffered from increasing symptoms of bipolar disorder, I am of the view that non-pecuniary damages should be set at $90,000.
In addition to the above, the decision is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s comments about the expert psychiatrist retained by the Defendant. The Defendants argued that any worsening of the Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder was not a result of the collision, rather it could be better explained by “chronic family stresses, non-compliance with treatment, and pregnancy“. In support of this argument the Defendant’s relied on Dr. Solomons, a psychiatrist retained by the Defence. Mr. Justice Willcock rejected this argument and in doing so provided the following criticism of Dr. Solomons opinions:
Further, there is no reason, in my view, to regard stressors other than the car accident as more compelling or predominant. Dr. Solomons, in reaching that conclusion, ignored clear evidence of the significance of the accident. He erroneously concluded that (the Plaintiff) had not described the traumatic effect of the accident and its emotional consequences to her physicians, or sought psychiatric help. In cross-examination Dr. Solomons acknowledged deficiencies in his review of the records and misunderstanding of (the Plaintiff’s) history and treatment. While he expressly describes pregnancy as a factor contributing to the increase in symptoms of bipolar illness he does not consider the fact that (the Plaintiff’s) one specific worry during the pregnancy was the possibility of a miscarriage or birth defect due to the motor vehicle accident… I reject most of Dr. Solomons’ opinion
Just last month the BC Supreme court criticized another psychiatrist retained by defence counsel in injury litigation. Since medico-legal experts generally enjoy immunity from lawsuits if they are careless in expressing their opinions, judicial criticism is a welcome development which can help keep privately retained expert witnesses in-line.
As I’ve previously written, a common occurrence after a car crash is the onset of pain in a pre-existing but asymptomatic condition. When this occurs it is no defence for the at-fault party to argue that the pre-existing condition is more responsible for the symptoms than the crash. This principle was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Neumann v. Eskoy) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in 2006. The Defendant admitted fault. The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
Prior to the crash the Plaintiff has osteoarthritis in his hip and asymptomatic degenerative changes in his spine. After the crash these conditions became painful and the Plaintiff went on to develop a chronic-pain syndrome. The Defendant hired a doctor who gave evidence that the car crash was not the main cause of the Plaintiff’s chronic pain, rather it was mostly the fault of the pre-existing degenerative changes.
The Defence lawyer then argued that the Plaintiff’s compensation should be relatively modest to account for this pre-existing condition. Mr. Justice Brooke disagreed and went on to award the Plaintiff $90,000 in non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for his chronic pain syndrome. In doing so the Court provided the following useful comments:
 I also refer to the decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal in B.P.B. v. M.M.B., 2009 BCCA 365 where Mr. Justice Chaisson, at paragraphs 42 and 43, says this:
 In my view, the trial judge in this case failed to determine whether the plaintiff’s injury was divisible or indivisible. She appears not to have distinguished “between causation as the source of the loss and the rules for the assessment of damages in tort” as mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in para. 78 of Blackwater. The liability question is whether the conduct of the defendant caused injury. The assessment of damages requires a determination whether the injury derived from multiple sources and whether it is divisible. If it is, responsibility is allocated to the individual sources of the injury.
 It the injury is indivisible, the court must consider the possible application of the thin skull or crumbling skull rules in the context of the victim’s original condition. If the crumbling skull rule applies, it forms part of returning the victim to his or her original condition and the tortfeasor is not responsible for events that caused the crumbled skull. Absent the application of the crumbling skull rule, where the injury is indivisible, all torfeasors who caused or contributed to the injury are 100% liable for the damages sustained by the victim.
See also the decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Bradley v. Groves, 2010 BCCA 361, which was decided after the trial of this action.
 I am satisfied that before the accident and despite the asymptomatic degenerative conditions, the plaintiff was not only functioning adequately, but also at a very high physical level. But for the accident and the injury sustained to his neck, the plaintiff would not have sustained the chronic pain syndrome from which he now suffers. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s long and commendable work history was interrupted by the injury sustained by him in the accident, and that despite the plaintiff’s best efforts he continues to suffer from chronic pain which is moderated somewhat by medication. I am also satisfied that the medication itself has an adverse aspect in addition to its therapeutic effect in that the plaintiff now suffers from sleep apnea and fatigue. Pain and fatigue on a continuing or chronic basis can and do dramatically impair the quality of life and the enjoyment of life. The work that Mr. Newmann now does is well paying and secure, but Mr. Newmann worries that he may not be able to continue indefinitely. Worry is burdensome and can also impair the enjoyment of life. I find that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $90,000.
Quite often when people are injured in a car crash and experience pain they have X-rays or other diagnostic images taken of the painful areas. Often times these studies show arthritis or other degenerative changes which didn’t pose any problems before the accident.
A common defence tactic is to argue that these degenerative changes would have become painful around the time of the accident in any event and therefore the person is entitled to less compensation. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with (and rejecting) such a defence.
In today’s case (Eblaghie v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured when she was crossing the street in a marked crosswalk and was struck by the Defendant’s car. Fault was admitted by the driver. The Court found that the Plaintiff suffered ‘mechanical back pain…a soft tissue injury that affected the cervical spine” and also right knee “tear in the medial meniscus and patellofemoral derangement“.
The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s symptoms would have manifested even without the car crash because of underlying degenerative changes. Mr. Justice Stewart outright rejected this argument holding as follows:
 I find as a fact that Dr. Regan is more likely than not correct when he says, in effect, that degenerative changes in the plaintiff’s spine were present as of February 27, 2007 but if they were asymptomatic – and I find as a fact that they were – then the onset, consistency and persistence of her pain and discomfort must lead to the conclusion that as a result of the defendant’s negligence that which had been asymptomatic became symptomatic. The only other alternative is that we are in the presence of a remarkable coincidence. And I reject that alternative as being so unlikely that it must be ignored. In the result, the defendant’s negligence on February 27, 2007 is the head and source of pain and discomfort in the neck and low back that plague the plaintiff to this very day.
The Court found that the Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain were likely going to continue and awarded $60,000 for her non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).
The Court also had some critical comments to make with respect to the expert witness that testified for the Defendant. The Defendant relied on Dr. Leith, whose opinion differed from the Plaintiff’s experts with respect to the cause of some of her symptoms. Mr. Justice Stewart rejected Dr. Leith’s evidence and in doing so made the following critical comments:
 I must speak to the evidence of the orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Leith called to testify by the defendant.
 Dr. Leith’s evidence appears before me at Exhibit 13 Tab 2. In addition, he testified before me.
 I found this witness’s evidence unhelpful. There were a number of problems with his evidence and for this trier of fact the cumulative effect of these problems was such that I am not prepared to rely on Dr. Leith’s evidence on any point that actually matters.
 I will give a few examples of the problems I encountered.
 Dr. Leith’s simply dismissing out of hand the thought that overuse of the left knee as the plaintiff protected the right knee could result in damage to the left knee with resulting pain and discomfort is not “in harmony with human experience” (Cahoon v. Brideaux, 2010 BCCA 228, para. 4). Deciding which evidence to rely upon is not simply a matter of counting heads, but – as noted above – it is a fact that two of the doctors who testified before me in effect say that Dr. Leith is simply wrong. For this trier of fact common human experience and the opinions of the two doctors noted above carry the day.
When a Plaintiff suffers injuries by the fault of another but the evidence establishes that the person would have likely suffered the same symptoms of pain because of a pre-existing condition the Plaintiff’s award of damages can be reduced to reflect this reality. This principle of personal injury law is known as the “crumbling skull” doctrine. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In this week’s case (Booth v. Gartner) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC car crash. The Defendant struck the Plaintiff’s vehicle when he entered an intersection against a red light. ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the Defendant but disputed the extent of the accident related injuries.
At trial Mr. Justice Cole found that the accident caused a variety of injuries. One of the most significant was low back pain which continued to the time of trial. The Plaintiff did not have back pain before the car crash however she had severe pre-existing (although asymptomatic) facet arthritis in her low back. The accident caused this condition to become painful. The Court was persuaded that this condition had a likelihood of developing pain in the future even without the accident. As a result of this finding the Court reduced the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages by 25%. In reaching this result Mr. Justice Cole reasoned as follows:
 I accept Dr. Vallentyne’s opinion that the degeneration in her lower back is severe at two levels and it is likely she would have been troubled by lower back pain and stiffness at some time in the future, absent Accident #2. However, I am also satisfied that although the degeneration is pre-existing, there was symptomatic acceleration of the facet arthritis as a result of Accident #2…
 The CT scan of September 20, 2008, according to Dr. Vallentyne, “showed severe bilateral degeneration of the facet joints at the L4-5-S1 levels in addition to a minor 3 mm L4-5 degenerative anterolisthesis”.
 According to Dr. Vallentyne, degenerative changes take years to develop and he found it was probable that the plaintiff had degenerative changes of her lower lumbar facet joints prior to the 2007 motor vehicle accident. He concluded that “[g]iven that the degeneration is severe at two levels, it is likely that Ms. Booth would have been troubled by low back pain and stiffness at sometime in the future absent the 2007 MVA.”
 I am satisfied that there is a measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, and I must take that into account in reducing the overall award.
 The principle to be applied is found in Zaruk v. Simpson et al., 2003 BCSC 1748, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 43 [Zaruk]. There the plaintiff had suffered a soft-tissue injury but some of her symptoms by the time of trial were consistent with degenerative changes. The Court was not satisfied that the general condition would have become symptomatic between the date of the accident and the date of trial, but concluded at para. 40, that there was a measurable risk that it would have become symptomatic in the future:
 However, application of the crumbling skull doctrine may not result in the same reduction for past losses as future losses. Past losses must be assessed on the basis of a balance of probabilities. “Once the burden of proof is met, causation must be accepted as a certainty,” [Athey v. Leonati,  3 S.C.R. 458] ¶ 30). But for the assessment of future losses, “[a] future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation,” (Athey ¶ 27)
 The Court then reduced non-pecuniary damages by 15% and future care damages by 20%.
 Because the plaintiff’s degenerative condition was described by Dr. Vallentyne as “severe bilateral degeneration”, I am of the view that a large deduction is appropriate in this case and I find an appropriate deduction for non-pecuniary damages is 25% and for future care damages, 30%.
As I previously wrote, a great discussion of this area of the law was also provided in a recent case (Gohringer v. Hernandez-Lazo) where Madam Justice Russell summarized the law as follows:
 In a crumbling skull situation, as in this case, the plaintiff has a pre-existing condition which is active, or likely to become active. The pre-existing condition “does not have to be manifest or disabling at the time of the tort to be within the ambit of the crumbling skull rule”: Barnes at para. 89, citing A. (T.W.N.) v. Clarke, 2003 BCCA 670, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 62. In crumbling skull situations, the defendant is only liable for damages caused by the accident and responsible for returning the plaintiff to their original position. As Major J. stated in Athey: the defendant is liable for the additional damage but not the pre-existing damage: at para. 35. The defendant is therefore not liable for the effects of the pre-existing condition that the plaintiff would have experienced in any event: A. (T.W.N.) at para. 52. If there is a “measurable risk” that the pre-existing condition would have impacted the plaintiff in the future then, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, a court can take this into account in awarding damages: at para. 35.
 In addition, the defendant claims an independent intervening event, subsequent to the Accident, also had significant impact on the plaintiff. An independent intervening event is an unrelated event, such as disease or a non-tortious accident, that occurs after the plaintiff is injured. The impact of such events is taken into account in the same manner as pre-existing conditions: Barnes at para. 96. Thus, the plaintiff is only entitled to damages which flow from the difference between his or her original position and their “injured position”: Athey at para. 32. If the unrelated event would have impacted the plaintiff’s original position adversely, the “net loss” attributable to the accident at issue will not be as great and damages will be reduced proportionately: Barnes at para. 96.
 I note that our Court of Appeal has stated that a reduction in damages to reflect the impact of independent intervening events or pre-existing conditions applies equally to non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages: A. (T.W.N.) at paras. 36-37; Barnes at para. 90.