$80,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Knee Injury and Chronic Pain
(Please note the below case was partially overturned on Appeal with a slight reduction in the Court’s assessed damages for cost of future care. The BC Court of Appeal judgement can be found here)
Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry (Penner v. Silk), awarding a Plaintiff just over $555,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss from a 2005 BC Car Crash.
The collision occurred while the Plaintiff was rear-ended on a highway in Langley, BC. The issue of fault was admitted at trial by ICBC leaving the court to deal with the assessment of damages.
The Plaintiff sustained a variety of soft tissue injuries that largely recovered in 6 months. His knee, however, sustained long term injury. Dr. Hirsch, a well respect specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, gave evidence that the Plaintiff suffered from “chronic knee pain caused by post-traumatic patellar tendonopathy as well as the development of patellofemoral joint syndrome.” Dr. Hirsch testified that the Plaintiff would likely be left with ongoing problems as a result of this accident related injury.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $80,00 Mr. Justice Sewell made the following findings:
 Based on the whole of the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that Mr. Penner is suffering from chronic pain in his left knee and that that chronic pain is significantly impairing his ability to function, both at work and at home. Pain is, of course, inherently subjective. Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that there is a psychological component to Mr. Penner’s pain perception and that his quality of life and perception of pain would benefit from a course of vigorous, physical exercise and psychiatric intervention. Dr. Riar and Dr. Smith agree that Mr. Penner is suffering from either adjustment disorder with depression or Major Depression. Both are of the view that he would benefit from psychiatric intervention. That intervention would probably consist of counselling with a psychologist or psychiatrist and the prescription of appropriate anti-depressant medication…
 As indicated above, my observation of Mr. Penner is that he is a driven, somewhat obsessive individual. It is my view that much of Mr. Penner’s self-esteem is wrapped in his job performance. Before the accident he was able to draw on very high levels of energy to permit himself to devote considerable energy both to work and his social and home life. It is apparent to me that the symptoms he is experiencing, whether from depression or his organic injury, have contributed directly and indirectly to a significant diminution in Mr. Penner’s energy levels. The preponderance of evidence before me satisfies me that Mr. Penner will continue to experience pain and mobility difficulties regardless of whether he avails himself of psychiatric intervention and/or a regime of physical exercise. However, I am also of the view that a combination of such treatment, exercise and lifestyle changes would result in a significant improvement in the quality of Mr. Penner’s life and a diminution of his pain perception. My view is that a necessary component of Mr. Penner’s adjustment to his altered circumstances would be for him to reduce the amount of time and energy he is devoting to his employment.
 Mr. Penner has satisfied me that the pain which he is experiencing is “real” in the sense that it is genuine and that he has honestly reported it in his evidence and to his treating physicians. I am also satisfied, and it appears to be common ground, that the psychological component of Mr. Penner’s pain was caused by the defendant’s negligent act. I am satisfied that Mr. Penner’s life has been significantly changed for the worse as a result of the defendant’s unlawful conduct. Given his present condition and, in particular, the persistent pain he experiences, the dramatic degradation of the quality of his social and family life, his loss of libido and loss of ability to engage in activities that he formerly found pleasurable, or at least significant restriction in his ability to engage in those activities, I assess non-pecuniary damages in this case at $100,000 before taking into account the reasonable prospect that Mr. Penner’s condition could be significantly improved if he acts on the recommendations made by the medical experts in this case.
 The medical evidence in this case is that a regimen of exercise coupled with psychiatric treatment would be beneficial for Mr. Penner. According to Dr. Smith such treatment would result in a very significant reduction in Mr. Penner’s perception of pain. Dr. Riar and Dr. Gouws are of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from psychiatric intervention to address his depressive symptoms. Dr. Hirsch is of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from a regimen of physical exercise. I am, however, mindful of the fact that all of the doctors agree that Mr. Penner will continue to experience symptoms and that none of the medical evidence in this case quantifies with any specificity the probability that the recommended treatments will be effective. It is also my view that psychiatric intervention and treatment of depression are somewhat problematic in terms of lasting benefits given the underlying causes of Mr. Penner’s depression. Finally, I must take into account the substantial possibility that Mr. Penner’s psychiatric problems may recur or be worsened if he loses his current employment. In his report, Dr. Smith says this:
With effective treatment Mr. Penner’s problems will improve. Without treatment he may become more dysfunctional, and if Mr. Penner for some reason loses his job his mood would likely crash as a good deal of his self- esteem is built around his work performance.
 Taking these contingencies into account, I assess Mr. Penner’s compensable non-pecuniary damages in this case at $80,000.