Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic low back soft tissue injury.
In the recent case (Hatch v. Kumar) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear end collision in 2010. She sustained soft tissue injuries to her low back and sacroiliac region. These continued to pose problems by the time of trial and were expected to last into the future albeit with a chance of improvement. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:
 Ms. Hatch continues to have back pain. She finds it particularly bothersome after physical exercise and towards the end of the work week. She continues to undergo physiotherapy and take pain medication. She tries to keep active, but is unable to participate in the vigorous activities she used to enjoy. Rather, she continues with yoga and core strengthening exercises and physical activities on a more limited basis.
 All of the medical experts agree there is a chance that Ms. Hatch may recover from her symptoms, and it is unlikely that she will get worse. The experts all agree, however, that a full recovery is not certain, and the longer she continues to have symptoms the less likely it is that they will fully resolve.
 It is now more than three years since the Accident. Ms. Hatch has reached a plateau in her recovery. Both Ms. Hatch and Dr. Van Niekerk testified that her condition has not improved since September 2012. This lack of improvement is one factor that the physicians agree makes it less likely that her injuries will completely resolve over time. The fact that her injuries persist today is another factor that makes it less likely that they will completely resolve over time. The evidence indicates that Ms. Hatch has followed the advice of her physicians at all times. As such, there is no mitigation issue.
 In short, Ms. Hatch faces an unknown future with regard to her low back pain and sacroiliac soft tissue injury. The pain is an ongoing accompaniment to both work and recreational activities, and also limits her ability to do household chores. The limitation on her recreational activities is particularly significant given her previous history of athletic pursuits. ..
 As I discussed previously, the award of non-pecuniary damages will be assessed based on the unique facts and circumstances of each particular case. However, while each case is different in some respects, I find the authorities cited by Ms. Hatch closer to the facts and circumstances of this case than those comparators cited by Mr. Kumar.
 Taking all of the evidence into account, I award Ms. Hatch $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
Tag: Mr. Justice Savage
Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic low back soft tissue injury.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing damages for a complex pelvic and knee fracture.
In this week’s case (Farand v. Seidel) the Plaintiff was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle while she was crossing a street in a marked pedestrian crosswalk. Although the Defendant disputed liability he was found fully liable for the collision.
The Plaintiff suffered a tibial plateau fracture along with complicated pelvic injuries. The Plaintiff was left with long term complications which affected her ability to work full time hours on a consistent basis. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $130,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:
 Ms. Farand was struck by Mr. Seidel’s pickup truck and landed on the road surface in front of Mr. Seidel’s truck. She was not run over by the truck. Ms. Kriez was able to estimate where Ms. Farand lay on the pavement. She noted that Ms. Farand’s position on the pavement showed an unnatural posture. Passersby called 9-11.
 Ms. Farand was taken to the hospital by ambulance. Imaging at the hospital showed a tibial plateau fracture and a lateral compression pelvis fracture, inferior and superior rami fractures, and an undisplaced sacral fracture. Open reduction and internal fixation of the right tibial plateau fracture was done on August 9, 2009. Imaging shows a metal plate fixed with six metal screws. The pelvis fractures were treated conservatively.
 Ms. Farand was hospitalized for 12 days. She was released from hospital, moving with the aid of a wheel chair. She was also provided with crutches. By December 2009 she used crutches without the wheel chair. She was anxious to return to work and worked a few partial days in November and December 2009, although she was able to do this work from home. She was put on a gradual return to work program. Her timesheets indicate the hours she worked.
 Ms. Farand suffered and continues to suffer from ongoing neck and back pain. She was diagnosed by Dr. Esmail with musculoligamentous injuries to her cervical spine, with likely injuries to the zygaphophyseal joints as well as injuries to the facets of the mid-thoracic spine. Dr. Esmail diagnosed her with soft tissue injuries of the lumbar spine and injury to the sacroiliac joints of the lumbar spine. These injuries result in chronic pain, which interferes with activities of daily living and is aggravated by her favouring her right leg.
 Ms. Farand has undergone various treatments, including physiotherapy and massage. She has not regained quadriceps bulk, particularly in the right leg. Dr. Esmail opines that she is at greater risk for developing osteoarthritis in the right knee and will likely need knee replacement surgery in 15-20 years. He is uncertain whether she has meniscal tear or detached meniscus, which cannot be identified by doing an MRI but could be diagnosed with arthroscopic surgery. If she has these problems with her meniscus, then those time frames may be accelerated…
 In my opinion the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $130,000, which award I so make.
Remember grade school math problems? You needed to not just give your teacher the answer but also show your work. The conclusion without the supporting paper-trail wouldn’t pass muster in Grade 5. The same is true with medical opinions in BC injury trials. It is not enough for a doctor to relate injuries to a collision, the physician must explain the factual basis underlying their opinion. Failure to do so can result in a Court placing little weight on a physicians opinions. This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released recently by the BC Supreme Court.
In the recent case (Perry v. Vargas) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision. She sued for damages claiming long-standing injuries with disabling consequences. The Court accepted the Plaintiff was indeed injured but disagreed with the Plaintiff’s assertion of long-standing disability being related to the crash.
In the course of the trial the Plaintiff introduced evidence from her treating physician supporting her position. The Court struggled in giving “much weight” to the physician’s opinion, however, noting that the physician provided “no insight into the reasons for (her) conclusion“. In addressing the lack of reasoning underlying the opinion Mr. Justice Savage provided the following criticism:
 I find it difficult to give much weight to Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion with respect to causation. Most of the report appears to simply reiterate what she has been told by others. She was not in fact treating Ms. Perry for the complaints until the passing of Dr. Condon. She only did one physical examination. In the report she does not address any of the intervening events.
 In my opinion there is another more fundamental problem with Dr. Tesiorowski’s report. There is no reasoning linking the current complaints with the December 4, 2006 Accident. That is, she states a conclusion as quoted above but provides no insight into the reasons for that conclusion. I examine this matter in greater detail below…
 The report of Dr. Tesiorowski has another important failing. It refers to a history gained from Ms. Perry and others and then simply states a conclusion. To be useful an opinion must be more than a conclusory assertion on causation. In Montreal Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (1908), 41 S.C.R. 116 at 132, Idington J. said “I refuse to accept unless absolutely necessary the mere ipse dixit of any expert when presented for my acceptance merely as an act of faith, and without the aid of such reasons as his reasoning power, or means of, and result of the use of means of, observations may have developed”.
 The same kind of concern is noted by Binnie J., speaking for the court in R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51 at para. 56,  2 S.C.R. 600. The opinion must assist the trier of fact to form an independent conclusion by “an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith”:
56 In Mohan , Sopinka J. held that the expert evidence in question had to be more than merely helpful. He required that the expert opinion be necessary “in the sense that it provide information, which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury, … the evidence must be necessary to enable the trier of fact to appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature” (p. 23). In Béland , supra , McIntyre J., speaking about the inadmissibility of a polygraph test, cited at p. 415 Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrates,  S.C. 34 (Scotland Ct. Sess.) , at p. 40, on the role of expert witnesses where Lord Cooper said:
Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. [Emphasis added.]
The purpose of expert evidence is thus to assist the trier of fact by providing special knowledge that the ordinary person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact. What is asked of the trier of fact is an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith.
 As there is no reasoning linking the facts referenced in the medical report with the conclusory assertion on causation, I am unable to form an independent conclusion from this opinion. To accept the opinion would simply be a leap of faith, applying the logical fallacy of ipse dixit, in this context, “because she said it”.
 For all of these reasons Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion is of little assistance to the court.
Rule 11-7(6) discusses the circumstances when the BC Supreme Court can allow expert evidence to be introduced at trial which does not otherwise comply with the Rules of Court. Reasons for judgement were released last week addressing this section. In short the Court held that allowing non-compliant expert evidence to be introduced in the interests of justice is a discretion that “must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way“.
In the recent case (Perry v. Vargas) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision. On the last business day before trial the Plaintiff served a ‘supplementary report’ from her expert which bolstered the experts previous views, clarified statements made in the previous report, and lastly critiqued the defence medico-legal report.s
The Plaintiff argued the late report ought to be admitted as a ‘supplementary report’ pursuant to Rule 11-6(6) or in the alternative the Court should exercise its discretion to allow the non-compliant report in through Rule 11-7(6). Mr. Justice Savage rejected both of these arguments and in doing so provided the following reasons:
 Rules 11-6(6) (a party’s own expert) and 11-6(5) (a jointly appointed expert) are cognate provisions designed to deal with circumstances where an expert’s opinion “changes in a material way”. Rule 11-6(6) contains an election. In the case of one’s own expert, a party must determine whether it still seeks to rely on the expert report notwithstanding the material change. If it does so, the party must promptly serve a supplementary report.
 Rule 11-6(6) was not intended to allow experts to add either fresh opinions or bolster reasons upon reviewing for the first time or further reviewing material under the guise of there being a material change in their opinion. To provide otherwise would surely defeat the purpose of the notice provisions contained in Rules 11-6(3) and 11-6(4) and the requirement of R. 11-7(1)…
 Rule 11-7(6)(b) focuses on whether there is prejudice to the party against whom the evidence is sought to be tendered. Of course there are cases where reports are delivered a few days late where there is no prejudice. This is not such a case. Delivering a new expert report without any notice well outside of business hours on a Friday evening before a trial commencing Monday morning places the opposing party in obvious difficulties. In my view there is some prejudice to the defendants given the untimely delivery of the Late Report.
 More generally, delivering expert reports on the eve of trial is antithetical to the purpose of the Rules regarding expert reports, which seek to ensure the parties have reasonable notice of expert opinions. Compliance with the Rules allows considered review of the expert opinions, the obtaining of important advice, and possible response reports. Under the former Rules, in Watchel v. Toby,  B.C.J. No. 3150, 33 M.V.R. (3d) 115, Kirkpatrick J., as she then was, excluded in its entirety a late report delivered 12 days before trial where there was insufficient time to obtain any opinion evidence to answer the report.
 Rule 11-7(6)(c) allows the court to admit expert evidence in the interests of justice. It is a separate provision so it can apply in circumstances where the relaxing provisions of Rules 11-7(6)(a) and (b) are not met. Effectively, it provides that the court retains a residual discretion to dispense with the other requirements of R. 11.
 Context here is all important. This is the second scheduled trial. There was a trial management conference with comprehensive trial briefs prepared by both counsel.
 In my view the discretion provided for in R.11-7(6)(c) must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way given the express requirements contained in Rules 11-6 and 11-7. That is, the “interests of justice” are not a reason to simply excuse or ignore the requirements of the other Rules. There must be some compelling analysis why the interests of justice require in a particular case the extraordinary step of abrogating the other requirements of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. None was provided.
 In the circumstances, the Late Report is not admissible.
As previously discussed, although a driver can sometimes be faultless after rear-ending another vehicle, such a result is rare. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with a motorist trying to escape blame following a rear end collision.
In last week’s case (Vo v. Michl) the plaintiff pulled onto Kingsway from a parked position and proceeded to to the left hand lane. At the same time the Defendant was proceeding in the same direction and saw the Plaintiff pull into his lane and brake ‘some four or five seconds’ before the vehicles impacted. The Defendant argued that he could not avoid the collision due to icy road conditions. Mr. Justice Savage rejected this argument finding the Defendant was aware of the poor road conditions well prior to the impact and should have adjusted his driving accordingly. In finding the Defendant fully liable for the impact the Court provided the following reasons:
 I accept that Mr. Vo had his left turn signal on at that point which was his evidence and is not contradicted by Mr. Michl. Mr. Michl applied the brakes but because of the road conditions did not slow appreciably before impact. The road conditions were apparent to him as he had been driving in those conditions. He knew it was icy. This is not a case, for example, of their being a patch of “black ice” in otherwise deceptively benign conditions, as was the case in Borthwick v. Campa (1989), 67 Alta. L.R. (2d) 123 (Q.B.).
 Mr. Michl was negligent in driving too quickly for the road conditions in traffic on Kingsway. There is no suggestion here that Mr. Vo’s actions in turning onto Kingsway were sudden and precipitous, as in some of the other cases referenced by the defence.
 The defendant raises s. 151(a), and 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.318, and s. 7.05(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act Regulations, B.C. Regulation 26/58. I accept the evidence of Mr. Vo that he checked the position of the westbound traffic before he made this turn from the parked position onto Kingsway, and the westbound vehicles were well back at that point. The defence has said all that could be said to support their position, however, in my opinion Mr. Michl is 100% to blame for the accident.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for various soft tissue injuries and a labral tear caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Foster v. Kindlan and Pineau) the Plaintiff claimed damages from two motor vehicle collisions, the first in 2007, the second in 2009. Fault was not at issue in either claim. These collisions caused various soft tissue injuries and a labral tear which continued to pose difficulties for the plaintiff at the time of trial and were expected to continue into the future. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:
 In this case the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to the neck, back, knee, and shoulder and a labral tear to her left hip. Prior to the 2007 Accidents she led a physically demanding lifestyle working as a fitness instructor, and had a high level of physical fitness. She was, however, transitioning out of this employment at the time of the 2007 Accident, by training for career as an LPN that would not involve fitness as part of her daily employment activity.
 Ms. Foster was not entirely asymptomatic from her 2005 Accident at the time of the 2007 Accident. It is also apparent that she has had ongoing back issues that required periodic chiropractic treatment unrelated to the 2007 Accident and 2009 Accident. She also had an earlier knee injury that required surgery. These factors affect the “original position” to which Ms. Foster must be returned by the award of damages.
 I find it unlikely that Ms. Foster will have surgery to the labral tear, based on the opinions of Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Gilbart, whose opinions are to be preferred over that of Dr. Sam. Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Gilbart have more specialized experience in this area than Dr. Sam, who is a general family physician. While Ms. Foster experiences pain during her physically demanding employment activities, she is able to take extended (one week or longer) motorcycle trips without any impairment that is apparent to her companions. The videotape evidence shows a cautious rider but not one prevented from enjoying this pursuit.
 Ms. Foster has suffered emotionally during periods where she has not been able to work. However, her emotional state has not prevented her from taking foreign holidays and motorcycle trips to the Sunshine Coast, Tofino, the East Kootenays and Idaho, and local trips to Chilliwack, Harrison Hot Springs and the Tri-cities area. Moreover, her emotional issues have had a variety of causes, including relationship issues which are admittedly unrelated to the two accidents.
 I have reviewed the cases provided by counsel. There are aspects of those cases that are helpful, but there are also differences that prevent direct application. The Defendants’ cases generally involve less seriously injured persons. Many of the cases submitted by the Plaintiff involve a prognosis for chronic daily pain. That is not the prognosis for Ms. Foster. In the circumstances, I award $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the issue of vicarious liability following an assault.
In this week’s case (Van Hartevelt v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with the Defendant R. Grewal. While there were competing versions of what occurred Mr. Justice Savage found that this Defendant pummelled the Plaintiff “with his fists…sending him to the ground” then “kicked (the Plaintiff) forcefully in the ribs as he lay on the floor“.
The Defendant was found liable and ordered to pay over $65,000 in damages including punitive damages.
The Defendant was the son of the owners of the Rani Lynn Apartments which is where the altercation took place. The Plaintiff was a tenant there. The Plaintiff also sued the owners arguing they ought to be found vicariously liable for the assault. Mr. Justice Savage agreed and found the owners jointly and severally liable (except for the punitive damage award). In doing so the Court provided the following reasons illustrating that vicarious liability can flow beyond a formal employer/employee relationship:
 I accept Mr. G. Grewal’s evidence that he did not charge family members rent while they were living at the Randi Lynn. However, he did not charge rent to Mr. R. Grewal, and at other times other relatives living at the Randi Lynn on the expectation that they would perform services for him at the apartment…
 …As a family member receiving free rent Mr. R. Grewal was beholden to the Second Named Defendants and was expected to do their bidding at the Randi Lynn…
 While it is true that independent contractors will not generally attract such liability and that employees generally will, it is not the case that the employer/employee relationship is the only one that can attract vicarious liability…
 Therefore, the main considerations in the present case are whether the relationship was sufficiently close to justify the imposition of liability, whether the tort was sufficiently connected to the assigned tasks of the tortfeasor to be regarded as the materialization of the risks created by the enterprise, and whether the imposition of liability would satisfy the policy goals outlined in Bazley. I answer all of these questions in the affirmative.
 The reason that employers are often found to be vicariously liable whereas those hiring independent contractors are not is that in the former case, the employer has created the risk and is in the best position to mitigate it. Thus, it is both efficient and fair to impose vicarious liability. In the present case, although it was not a typical employment relationship, the Second Named Defendants created the risk associated with Mr. R. Grewal, were or should have been aware of the risk, and were in the best position to mitigate this risk.
 The Second Named Defendants were aware of the violent history of Mr. R. Grewal and were aware of the recent confrontation between Mr. R. Grewal and Mr. Van Hartevelt; a confrontation that arose in the context of Mr. R. Grewal’s role as an on-site owner representative. As such, the risk of violent confrontations initiated by Mr. R. Grewal was caused by the enterprise of the Second Named Defendants and they were in a unique position to mitigate this risk. They were specifically made aware of the risk by Mr. Van Hartevelt’s letter of July 12, 2006. The fact that the Second Named Defendants did not take steps to mitigate the risk renders them blameworthy.
 There is also the assertion, albeit made by Mrs. R. Grewal, that the ‘owners’ of the building were entitled to enter Mr. Hartevelt’s suite. This was made in the presence of Mr. R. Grewal. Mr. R. Grewal, rather than correcting this misapprehension, schooled as he was in tenancy matters, remained and the events followed.
 In my opinion there is a sufficiently close relationship to justify the imposition of vicarious liability in this case.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the admission of evidence relating to diminished earning capacity in which the Court highlights the ability of lost opportunities being proven through factual, as opposed to opinion, evidence.
In this week’s case (Fabretti v. Singh) Plaintiff was employed as a Regional Vice President at an independent financial services organization. The Plaintiff was injured in a collision and advanced a claim for diminished earning capacity.
In the course of the claim the Plaintiff obtained a report from his employer’s National Sales Director who provided evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s employment opportunities. The Defendant objected to the admissibility of this report for a number of reasons. Mr. Justice Savage ultimately held that the report was not admissible as it was not written by a ‘properly qualified expert‘.
The Court noted, however, that much of the evidence could likely be admitted simply as a matter of fact (as opposed to opinion). In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 In this case, the subject matter of Mr. Andruschak’s Report is the plaintiff’s future earning capacity. However, Mr. Andruschak’s experience is properly viewed as concerning the earning possibilities for RVPs at Primerica generally; his experience is not in preparing objective reports on how such earning possibilities might manifest themselves in specific individual into the future.
 Thus, while having firsthand knowledge and experience in RVPs’ earning potential at Primerica, based on their actual earnings, which is information that may be useful to the Court, Mr. Andruschak does not offer particular expertise in the subject matter of the Report, purporting to prepare an objective estimate of future income and thus income loss for a specific person. As such, on the basis that Mr. Andruschak does not qualify as an expert, the Report cannot be admitted on that basis.
 Given my findings regarding Mr. Andruschak’s qualifications as an expert, it is unnecessary for me to canvass the defendant’s arguments regarding the Report’s formal compliance with the Rules. As I have said, however, much of the information in the report is potentially relevant and germane. I will leave it to counsel to review and discuss that matter amongst themselves. If required I will make further rulings on the proposed evidence. It may be that Mr. Andruschak’s evidence would be better presented simply viva voce with the assistance of a few graphs or charts.
It is always a welcome development when a complex area of the law is judicially drilled down to point form. Last month Mr. Justice Savage of the BC Supreme Court did so with resepect to the law of ‘diminished earning capacity‘. In last month’s case (Parker v. Lemmon) the Court provided the following useful breakdown:
 The approach to such claims is well set out in the decision of Garson J.A. in Perren v. Lalari, 2010 BCCA 140 at paras. 25-32, which I summarize as follows:
(1) A plaintiff must first prove there is a real and substantial possibility of a future event leading to an income loss before the Court will embark on an assessment of the loss;
(2) A future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation;
(3) A plaintiff may be able to prove that there is a substantial possibility of a future income loss despite having returned to his or her employment;
(4) An inability to perform an occupation that is not a realistic alternative occupation is not proof of a future loss;
(5) It is not the loss of earnings but rather the loss of earning capacity for which compensation must be made;
(6) If the plaintiff discharges the burden of proof, then there must be quantification of that loss;
(7) Two available methods of quantifying the loss are (a) an earnings approach or (b) a capital asset approach;
(8) An earnings approach will be more useful when the loss is more easily measurable;
(9) The capital asset approach will be more useful when the loss is not easily measurable.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for injuries sustained from two motor vehicle collisions.
In last week’s case (Parker v. Lemmon) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate crashes, the first occurred in late 2008 the second the following month. Fault was admitted by the Defendants for both collisions. The crashes caused an overlapping indivisible injury and damages were assessed globally.
The Plaintiff’s injuries included a Grade 2 Whiplash Associated Disorder in her upper and lower back long with her neck muscles and ligaments. This injury persisted and caused the Plaintiff a partial disability in her job as a care-aid with restrictions associated with “repetitive reaching and pulling and pushing…as well as the repetitive bending with regards to her lower back“.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:
 In considering non-pecuniary damages in this case I am also cognizant of the Supreme Court of Canada’s summary of the purpose of non-pecuniary damages as set out in Lindal v. Lindal,  2 S.C.R. 629 at p. 637:
Thus the amount of an award for non-pecuniary damage should not depend alone upon the seriousness of the injury but upon its ability to ameliorate the condition of the victim considering his or her particular situation. It therefore will not follow that in considering what part of the maximum should be awarded the gravity of the injury alone will be determinative. An appreciation of the individual’s loss is the key and the “need for solace will not necessarily correlate with the seriousness of the injury” (Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, Personal Injury Damages in Canada(1981), at p. 373). In dealing with an award of this nature it will be impossible to develop a “tariff”. An award will vary in each case “to meet the specific circumstances of the individual case” (Thornton at p. 284 of S.C.R.).
 Such awards will vary in each case to meet specific circumstances. A specific circumstance here is the plaintiff’s overall health condition. That said, I accept that her injuries have significantly impacted her enjoyment of life, including her work, family and social life…
 In Fata, the injuries were found to be such that they would not have prevented a return to full-time employment, although with discomfort. Some of the sequelae were resolved at the time of trial, although there was some lingering shoulder pain that would likely not resolve. The Court awarded $45,000 non-pecuniary damages. The factual circumstances are not in all respects similar to the case at bar, but in my view the award in Fata most appropriately approximates what is appropriate here. I note in that case the Court found that the plaintiff could have returned to work but chose not to. In this case the plaintiff did return to her former employment, which her specialist physician opined she could, but she ultimately chose to discontinue that employment and is considering retraining.
 In my opinion the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.