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Tag: Mr. Justice Metzger

New Rules Caselaw Update: Costs and "Substantial Success" in the BC Supreme Court


The New BC Supreme Court Rule 14-1(9) states that a successful party in a proceeding “must be awarded” costs unless the court otherwise orders.  The former Rule 57(9) dealt with this issue although it had slightly different wording.
Today reasons for judgement were released, for what I believe is the first time, dealing with and interpreting the new rule.
In today’s case (Aschenbrenner v. Yahemich) the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for trespass, nuisance, defamation and other matters.  Ultimately they succeeded in some of their claims and were awarded just over $5,500 in total damages.  The Plaintiffs applied for an order of costs.  The Defendant opposed arguing that the costs award would be worth more than the awarded damages.
Ultimately Mr. Justice Metzger sided with the Plaintiffs and awarded them most of their costs.  In doing so the Court adopted authorities developed under the former rules.  Mr. Justice Metzger provided the following reasons discussing when a party is entitled to costs under Rule 14-1(9):

[12] Rule 14-1(9) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules states that:

(9)        Subject to subrule (12), costs of a proceeding must be awarded to the successful party unless the court otherwise orders.

[13] While the Rule itself does not include the term “substantial success” under the former Rule 57(9), it was held to be a necessary and sufficient condition for an award of costs under Rule 57(9) that success in the outcome of the trial be “substantial”: see Gold v. Gold, 82 B.C.L.R. (2d) 180, 32 B.C.A.C. 287.

[14] In Fotheringham v. Fotheringham, 2001 BCSC 1321 at para. 18, 108 A.C.W.S. (3d) 786, appeal to C.A. refused, 2002 BCCA 454, 172 B.C.A.C. 179, Bouck J. stated that a trial judge has absolute and unfettered discretion with respect to costs, but it ought not to be exercised against a successful party except for some good reason in connection with the case.

[15] Mr. Justice Bouck canvassed the factors to be considered with respect to Rule 57(9), and at para. 45 stated:

[45] Gold now seems to say that substantial success in an action should be decided by the trial judge looking at the various matters in dispute and weighing their relative importance. The words “substantial success” are not defined. For want of a better measure, since success, a passing grade, is around 50% or better, substantial success is about 75% or better. That does not mean a court must descend into a meticulous mathematical examination of the matters in dispute and assign a percentage to each matter. Rather, it is meant to serve as a rough and ready guide when looked at all the disputed matters globally.

[16] Mr. Justice Bouck then sets out a four step inquiry to determine whether or not to award costs after a trial at para. 46:

1.         First, by focusing on the “matters in dispute” at the trial. These may or may not include “issues” explicitly mentioned in the pleadings.

2.         Second, by assessing the weight or importance of those “matters” to the parties.

3.         Third, by doing a global determination with respect to all the matters in dispute and determining which party “substantially succeeded,” overall and therefore won the event.

4.         Fourth, where one party “substantially succeeded,” a consideration of whether there are reasons to “otherwise order” that the winning party be deprived of his or her costs and each side then bear their own costs.

(See also: Citta Construction v. Elizabeth Lane Holdings Ltd., 2004 BCSC 280, 129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 46 at para. 7.)

[17] Substantial success is not determined by counting up the number of issues and allocating success on each, or by comparing the dollar amounts, but by assessing success in the major issues of substance (Cohen v. Cohen, 1995 Carswell 608, 15 R.F.L. (4th) 84 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 4; Reilly v. Reilly, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1244 (S.C.); Rattenbury v. Rattenbury, 2001 BCSC 593, [2001] B.C.J. No. 889 at paras. 22-24, 33). Substantial success means success on 75% of the matters globally taking into account the weight of the issues and their importance to the parties. A court should compare the pleadings and the submissions with the actual results obtained by the parties (Rattenbury at para. 24.).

[18] In cases where one party achieves substantial success, the courts may award a portion of the substantially successful party’s costs. For example, in Newstone v. Newstone, [1994] B.C.J. No. 139, 2 R.F.L. (4th) 129 (C.A.), an award of one-half costs to a party was upheld where “[s]uccess, if it could be called that, lay more with the wife than with the husband …” One-half costs were also upheld in Rolls v. Rolls, [1996] B.C.J. No. 292, 20 R.F.L. (4th) 232 (C.A.), on the ground that such an award would not create an imbalanced judgment as much as would a full award. InCohen v. Cohen, a spouse was awarded 75% of her costs after success on her reapportionment claim, which was the largest and most time-consuming issue.

[19] The four step test identified by Bouck J. applies not only to matrimonial cases, but also to all types of cases where Rule 14-1(10) has application (Chaster (Guardian ad litem of) v. LeBlanc, 2008 BCSC 47, 164 A.C.W.S. (3d) 43 at para. 34).

[20] Where success is divided such that there is no substantially successful party, the parties may have to bear their own costs (Mari v. Mari, 2001 BCSC 1848, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2979).

[21] On a global view of the outcome of this litigation I find that the plaintiffs were substantially successful.

BC Personal Injury Claims Round Up

On Friday two more cases were released by the BC Supreme Court dealing with non-pecuniary damages which  I summarize below to add to this Pain and Suffering database.
The first case (Macki v. Gruber) dealt with a bus accident.   The Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a Greyhound bus in Duncan, BC.  Liability was contested but the Greyhound bus driver was found 100% at fault for the accident.  Paragraphs 1-60 of the case deal with the issue of fault and are worth reviewing for Mr. Justice Metzger’s discussion of credibility.  In finding the Defendant at fault the Court found that he was “careless” and that he “lied” and his evidence was rejected in all areas that it was in “conflict with the testimony of any other witness“.
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries, the most serious of which neck pain, headaches and upper back pain.  She was diagnosed with a chronic pain syndrome.  Mr. Justice Metzger assessed her non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 and in doing summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries and their effect on her life as follows:

[144] I find the chronic pain has made Ms. Mackie reclusive and morose. She has gone from a “bubbly, fun-loving, outgoing, social, interesting” person, to someone who is  anti-social, with bouts of depression and sadness. From the evidence of the plaintiff and Ms. Garnett, I find that the plaintiff defines herself as a very hardworking woman, but that the chronic pain prevents her exhibiting her previous commitment to work.

[145] This loss of enjoyment of life and identity is given considerable weight.

[146] I am satisfied the plaintiff is resilient and stoic by nature, and I do not doubt the extent of her pain and suffering. She has endured a regime of injections in order to retain some of her employment capacity. Plaintiffs are not to receive a lesser damage award because of their stoicism.

[147] I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s injuries and ongoing limitations are more like those cited in the plaintiff’s authorities and therefore I award her $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

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In the second case released on Friday (Dhillon v. Ashton) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate rear-end collisions.  Both claims were heard at the same time and fault was admitted leaving the court to deal with the sole issue of damages.

Madam Justice Ross found that the Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries in each of the 2 accidents.  She awarded non-pecuniary damages in total of $25,000 for both collisions.

In assessing an award of $15,000 for non-pecuniary damages for the first accident the Court summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:

[60]         I find that Mr. Dhillon suffered soft tissue injury to his neck, right shoulder and low back in the First MVA. He suffered from headaches arising from this injury, but these resolved in a relatively short period of time. The injury to the right shoulder had essentially resolved by mid-May 2005. I find, consistent with Dr. Sandhu’s report that Mr. Dhillon was unable to work as a result of his injuries from the time of the First MVA to mid-May 2005 and then continued to suffer partial disability at work until July 2005. By July 2005 he was able to return to work without limitation. I find that his injuries from the First MVA were essentially resolved by October 2005, except for intermittent pain, consistent with Dr. Sandhu’s report. From October 2005 until the time of the First Workplace Accident, Mr. Dhillon required the use of pain medication for low back pain that was the consequence of both his prior condition and lingering consequences of the First MVA.

[61]         In the result, I find that Mr. Dhillon suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injury from the First MVA with the symptoms most significant in the first three months following the injury; with some ongoing problems for the next five months and intermittent pain thereafter. I find the appropriate amount for non-pecuniary damages for the First MVA to be $15,000.00.

In assessing non-pecuniary damages of $10,000 for the second accident Madam Justice Ross summarized the injuries it caused as follows:

[64]         I find that Mr. Dhillon suffered soft tissue injuries in the Second MVA that resulted in an exacerbation of his injuries to his neck, shoulder, and low back. He had returned to work following the Second Workplace Accident before the Second MVA, but was not able to work after this accident. He required physiotherapy, chiropractic treatment and pain medication for both the continuing injuries from the Workplace Accidents, an apparent recurrence or continuation of the right side back problem first noted in 2000, and the Second MVA. Mr. Dhillon was able to return to work part-time in November 2006 and full-time in January 2007. He requires some accommodation from his employer in terms of his duties. He continues to experience pain and requires medication to control his pain. I find that the Second MVA plays some role, albeit a minimal one, in Mr. Dhillon’s continuing symptoms, the other more significant contributors being the original complaint of low back pain, and the two Workplace Accidents.

[65]         In the circumstances, I find that $10,000.00 is an appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss for the Second MVA