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Tag: Mr. Justice Hinkson

$200,000 and $50,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessments for Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver REgistry, assessing damages for carbon monoxide poisoning that aggravated pre-existing brain abnormalities.
In today’s case (Edwards v. Parkinson’s Heating Ltd.) the Plaintiffs were a married couple who were exposed to carbon monoxide emissions from their living room fireplace.  The Court found that this exposure was caused by a Defendant’s negligent servicing of the fireplace.
Both Plaintiff’s had pre-existing brain abnormalities but the Court found the poisoning aggravated these.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $200,000 and $50,000 for the Plaintiffs Mr. Justice Hinkson provided the following reasons:

[466]     A summary of my key findings is as follows:

  1. Kenorah owed the plaintiffs a duty of care with respect to the 2008 reinstallation of the fireplace. Parkinson’s owed the plaintiffs duties of care with respect to both the 2008 reinstallation and the subsequent servicing of the fireplace;
  2. The standard of care for installing and servicing the fireplace required the following:

(a)   Reasonably inspect the fireplace to ensure it was:

(i)   operating in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications (per s. 57 of the Gas Safety Regulations); and

(ii)  was venting in a safe and proper manner (per s. 57 of the Gas Safety Regulations);

(b)   Reasonably test for CO emissions using a suitable CO detector;

(c)   Repair or remediate any defects or problems that would interfere with the safe operation and venting of the fireplace.

  1. Kenorah did not breach the standard of care with respect to the 2008 reinstallation. Parkinson’s breached the standard of care with respect to subsequent servicing of the fireplace. The breaches occurred on February 10, 2009, and November 13, 2009;
  2. As a result of Parkinson’s breach that occurred on November 13, 2009, the plaintiffs were exposed to CO in their residence, from that date until January 4, 2010, at levels above 50 ppm but less that 1000 ppm;
  3. Prior to the CO exposure, Dr. Pinel had brain abnormalities, which included hippocampal atrophy and white matter changes. He also had behavioural and cognitive problems, such as forgetfulness, fatigue, and mild depression;
  4. Prior to the CO exposure, Ms. Edwards had brain abnormalities, which included hippocampal atrophy and white matter changes. She also had anxiety, depression, and mood disorders, and cognitive problems involving verbal and visual learning.
  5. As a result of the CO exposure, both Dr. Pinel’s and Ms. Edwards’s hippocampal atrophies were accelerated. The CO exposure caused Dr. Pinel’s depression to worsen, and Ms. Edwards’s depression, anxiety, and mood disorders to worsen.

[467]     The damages awarded to the plaintiffs are as follows:

a. Non-pecuniary damages (Ms. Edwards) $  50,000.00
b. Non-pecuniary damages (Dr. Pinel) $ 200,000.00
c. Special damages $5,792.00
d. Cost of care $ 53,000.00
e. HCCRA award $ 2,624,57

$75,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Chronic, Disabling Pre-Existing Condition

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Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a collision which aggravated long-standing pre-existing health complications.
In today’s case (Cheema v. Khan) the Plaintiff was disabled since 2003 due to arthritis and depression.  She was involved in a 2012 collision that the Defendants admitted fault for.  The collision aggravated her pre-existing issues.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Chief Justice Hinkson provided the following reasons:

[103]     There is no question that Ms. Cheema was unemployable after 2003. She had been on long-term disability from employment as a linen worker since 2004 due to rheumatoid arthritis and major depressive disorder. She was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis in the 1990s. The pain was in her neck initially, followed by bilateral hand pain since 2000. Her rheumatoid arthritis affected her hands, wrists, feet, ankles and shoulders. In the month preceding the Collision, the plaintiff had a flare up of her rheumatoid arthritis. Since 2000, the plaintiff had also suffered from longstanding, severe and chronic major depressive disorder, chronic anxiety and panic attacks leading up to the Collision.

[104]     I am unable to accept the plaintiff’s submission that her condition prior to the Collision was stable. She suffered from severe rheumatoid arthritis, Morton’s neuromas and a severe major depressive disorder prior to the Collision, and these conditions compromised her ability to ambulate, cook, clean and perform other household activities. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s severe rheumatoid arthritis and severe depression waxed and waned prior to the Collision, but overall were worsening, and would have continued to worsen even if she had not been involved in the Collision.

[105]     I find, however, that the Collision caused an aggravation of her pre-Collision neck, back and shoulder pain and headaches, and likely had a negative effect on the symptoms arising from her rheumatoid arthritis.

[106]     I conclude that the plaintiff’s neck, back and shoulder pain and headaches were worsened by the Collision and that without the accident she would not have suffered from those difficulties as much as she has for the four years that have followed the Collision.

[107]     I accept the evidence of Dr. Shuckett that stress has a negative effect on someone suffering from rheumatoid arthritis, and has had such an effect on the plaintiff and accelerated the progress of her disease.

[108]     I am also persuaded that the Collision had a negative effect on the plaintiff’s psychiatric state that has resulted in a downward spiralling effect causing the plaintiff to brood about her physical condition and limit her activities, in turn worsening her depression, in turn compromising her participation in certain activities and so on…

[133]     I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $75,000.

BC Chief Justice – Indivisible Injury Assessment Applies for Charter Damages as Well

Written by admin on . Posted in Damages for Charter Breaches.

Today the Chief Justice of the BC Supreme Court published reasons for judgement finding that the ‘indivisible injury’ assessment that developed under tort law is equally applicable when damages are being assessed for a Charter breach.
In today’s case (Henry v. British Columbia) the Court awarded the Plaintiff over $8 million in damages for a wrongful conviction and some 27 years of incarceration.  Prior to trial the Plaintiff settled with other Defendants.  The Province sought to have those settlements deducted from the awarded damages arguing they all covered a single indivisible harm.  Chief Justice Hinkson agreed and in ordering that the principles of ‘indivisible injury’ assessment apply to Charter damages provided the following reasons:

[33]        The plaintiff alleged that but for the separate actions or inactions of the City employees and provincial Crown counsel, he would not have been convicted and incarcerated for almost 27 years, and that but for the action or inaction of Canada he would have been released far sooner than he was.

[34]        In tort law, where there are multiple causes of injuries, the Court must determine whether the injuries are divisible or indivisible when assessing whether double recovery principles will apply: Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 and E.D.G. v. Hammer, 2003 SCC 52. I see no reason why such an approach is not equally applicable to an award of Charter damages.

[35]        While the allegations against the Settling Defendants and non-settling defendants were based upon different allegations of fault, the relief sought was essentially the same: compensation for a wrongful conviction and some 27 years of incarceration. I find that the results alleged to have occurred from the causes of action pleaded against the City and the Province were indivisible.

[36]        While the ambit of the compensation sought from the City defendants and the Province was broader than that sought from Canada, the compensation sought from Canada was in large measure subsumed in the award the plaintiff recovered against the Province. Thus, these claims are also indivisible.

[37]        I am mindful of the fact that the plaintiff was obliged to proceed to trial by all of the original defendants and obliged by the Province to proceed to judgment before recovering any damages from it. The Alberta Court of Appeal in Bedard rejected that factor as a basis for not deducting settlement proceeds from damages awarded at trial. At para. 13, the Court confirmed the prevailing principle that the plaintiff cannot receive more in damages than the court awarded at trial.

[38]        In Hogarth v. Rocky Mountain Slate Inc., 2013 ABCA 57, leave to appeal ref’d [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 160, the point was made even more starkly:

[164]    The effect of Bedard is that the risk of a Pierringer agreement falls on the plaintiff. If it settles and “under-recovers” from the settling defendant, it will not be able to make up that shortfall from the non-settling defendants. On the other hand, if it “over-recovers” from the settling defendant (as in Bedard) it will not be allowed to keep the windfall.

[39]        I conclude that Hogarth correctly summarizes the effect of the decisions in Dos Santos and Bedard. In the result, I find that at least some of the settlement funds paid by the Settling Defendants to the plaintiff must be deducted from the damages that I have found the plaintiff is owed by the Province.  

$65,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for "Persistent Myofascial Pain"

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic back injury.
In today’s case (Cirillo v. Mai) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2012 collision where her vehicle was struck and pushed into oncoming traffic where she was struck a second time.  The Plaintiff suffered a chronic back injury with symptoms continuing at the time of trial and expected to likely persist into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $65,000 Mr. Justice Hinkson provided the following reasons:

[41]         Dr. Khalfan commented in her report of April 20, 2016 that:

a)       The plaintiff’s diagnosis at that time was persistent myofascial pain as a result of the Collision.

b)       The plaintiff’s range of motion in her spine was good, other than her spinal extension, which demonstrated significant impairments.

c)       The plaintiff had first received trigger point injection treatment on January 26, 2016. Other than experiencing some short-term flare-ups in pain for after treatment, the plaintiff responded well to the injections, and reported 50% improvement in her pain by the fifth treatment.

d)       By the sixth trigger point injection on April 12, 2016, the plaintiff had plateaued with that treatment, and decided to pursue ultrasound-guided injection treatment, which would require a series of diagnostic tests.

e)       Because the plaintiff responded well to trigger point injections, Dr. Khalfan was optimistic that the plaintiff would continue to experience improvement with ultrasound-guided injection treatment. Dr. Khalfan expected that the plaintiff would experience appreciable improvement of her symptoms in the future, but was unable to predict with precision the degree to which the plaintiff would recover.

f)        Given the fact that the plaintiff has experienced pain for years after the Collision, it is unlikely that she will experience full recovery of all symptoms. Dr. Khalfan opined that it was likely that the plaintiff would have ongoing pain well into the future and possibly indefinitely.

g)       Dr. Khalfan recommended a focused strengthening and stabilizing exercise program as a possible management tool for mitigating the plaintiff’s limitations and pain…

[92]         The authorities relied upon by the plaintiff are all cases where the injured parties suffered from chronic pain. Although I accept that Ms. Cirillo continues to experience back pain, I am unable to accept that it rises to the level of chronic pain as that term is used in the cases that she relies upon. While she may experience the improvement in her pain that is hoped for by Dr. Khalfan, I do not regard that as likely. I consider that the injuries and ongoing difficulties that she experiences are more consistent with the difficulties described in the awards cited by the defendant, with the exception of the loss of her ability to participate in the sport that she pursued with such devotion and considerable success before the Collisions.

[93]          As I have already found, it is unlikely that she would have been able to continue with her level of activity in the sport for much longer than she did, but the choice to do so was taken from her by her injuries from the Collisions, and this, in my view, elevates her damages from the range that can be derived from the cases relied upon by the defendant. I therefore assess her non-pecuniary damages at $65,000.

ICBC Claims and Requests for "Particulars"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 3, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 111 Comments on ICBC Claims and Requests for "Particulars"


When suing for compensation in an ICBC claim the BC Supreme Court Rules contain various ways to force disclosure of information.  From requiring the exchange of relevant documents, permitting the parties to attend an examination for discovery and even forcing an ‘independent medical exam’ in certain circumstances there are many tools which can be used to learn about your opponents case.
One further tool is the request for “particulars“.  If a party to a lawsuit is not clear what the other side is formally putting in issue they can ask for clarification by making a demand for particulars under Rule 3-7(23) of the Rules of Court.  There are, however, limits to the use of this Rule and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court.
In this week’s case (Yousofi v. Phillips) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  He sued for damages seeking compensation for, amongst other things, past and future wage loss, past and future medical expenses, past and future disability and out of pocket expenses.  ICBC’s lawyer demanded that the Plaintiff provide particulars of these claims.  The Plaintiff refused arguing that this was an inappropriate request.  Mr. Justice Hinkson agreed with the Plaintiff and in dismissing the Defence motion made the following useful comments about the limited use requests for particulars should have in ICBC injury claims:

The entitlement of a party to particulars…is discussed by Mr. Justice Joyce in Delaney & Friends Cartoon Productions Ltd. v. Radical Entertainment Inc. et al, 2005 BCSC 371, beginning at paragraph 9.

[4] In that case, His Lordship makes the point that:

Particulars are provided to disclose what the pleader intends to prove. How that party intends to prove the material facts and particulars is a matter of evidence. The pleading party is not required to, and indeed, is not entitled to set out in the pleadings the evidence that he or she intends to adduce at trial to prove the facts that have been pleaded.

[5] In David et al v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada et al, 2004 BCSC 1306, Mr. Justice Cohen considered the distinction between the material facts and evidence and referred to an earlier decision of Mr. Justice Joyce when he was a master of this court, Firestone v. Smith, [1991] B.C.J. No. 2660 (S.C.)(QL), where Master Joyce said at paragraph 11:

In my view the concern raised by the plaintiff at this stage is that he does not know but would like to know now what precise evidence the defendant may lead in support of his allegations of fact. In my respectful opinion the plaintiff is not entitled to ascertain the evidentiary basis of the defendant’s case by way of this demand for particulars.

[6] Turning to the notice of motion for particulars, the particulars sought at a relatively late juncture following examinations for discovery include a request for further and better particulars with respect to:

(a)      The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Loss of Enjoyment of Life

In my view, that is an inappropriate request for particulars and is a matter that can and should be pursued by way of examination for discovery. In my view, it is not necessary to provide particulars with respect to that head of damage.

(b)      The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Physical Disability

The injuries alleged by the plaintiff have been set out in the statement of claim and the extent of his disability arising therefrom is not a matter that is required as an item of pleadings. It, too, should be pursued by examination for discovery.

(c)      The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Loss of Earnings

Insofar as the past loss of earnings is concerned, this is information that can be identified and quantified and should be provided by the plaintiff to the defendant. It is not, in my view, appropriate that it be provided as particulars, but I am satisfied it should be provided in some fashion to the defendant, and I am going to direct that the plaintiff quantify his claim for past loss of earnings and provide that information to the defendant.

Insofar as prospective loss of earnings is concerned, I am not satisfied that that is a matter that can be necessarily particularized, and I leave it to the defendant to pursue that through examinations for discovery.

(d)      The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Loss of Earning Capacity

Like the prospective loss of earnings, I do not consider this to be an appropriate subject matter for particulars, and it is a matter that can be pursued by way of examination for discovery.

(e)      The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Loss of Opportunity to Earn Income

This is a head that is hard to distinguish from past and prospective loss of earning capacity. To the extent there is any difference, in my view it should be treated the same as the request for particulars of past and prospective loss of earning capacity.

(f)       The Plaintiff’s Past and Prospective Loss of Housekeeping Capacity

This is another matter that in my view does not warrant particularization in the pleadings. It can be pursued through examinations for discovery.

(g)      The Trust Award on Behalf of the Plaintiff’s Friends and Family

This, too, is not a matter that, in my view, should be dealt with by way of particulars, with this exception:  The individual or individuals for whom a trust award is claimed should be identified in the statement of claim where the trust award is advanced.

(h)      The Plaintiff’s Special Damages

These are matters that should be identified by the plaintiff for the defendant, but not as particulars of the pleadings.

BC Injury Claims and Document Disclosure – Can a Court Order a Plaintiff to "Consent"?

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on BC Injury Claims and Document Disclosure – Can a Court Order a Plaintiff to "Consent"?

Important reasons for judgement came to my attention today dealing with discovery of documents in BC Injury Litigation.
The BC Supreme Court Rules require parties to give discovery of relevant documents in their possession or control.  Often times there are relevant documents that are not in the Plaintiff’s possession or control but the Plaintiff has the ability to easily get these documents.  (For example medical records documenting accident related injuries.)  Such records are commonly referred to as “Third Party Records”.
When a Defendant requests Third Party Records Plaintiff’s often consent, obtain the documents, and then exchange a copy of the relevant records.  When the parties don’t consent a Court Motion can be brought.
With this background in mind today’s case dealt with an important topic; when a motion for Third Party Records is brought can the Court order that the Plaintiff sign authorizations to allow the Defendant to get the records directly?  Mr. Justice Hinkson held that such a shortcut is not allowed under the Rules of Court.
In today’s case (Stead v. Brown) the Defendant “brought an application to require the plaintiff to execute consent forms for the production of the records of some ten doctors, three hospitals, two groups of physiotherapists, WorkSafeBC, the Ministry of Housing, and Service Canada“.
The Plaintiff opposed the application on the basis that the Court lacked the power to make such an order.  Mr. Justice Hinkson agreed and held that even if the requests were relevant a Court could not compel disclosure in this fashion, instead the Defendant would have to follow the procedure set out in Rule 26(11) of the BC Supreme Court Rules.
In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Hinkson was referred to the BC Court of Appeal decision Peel Financial Holdings Ltd. v. Western Delta Lands where the BC High Court held that “The Supreme Court judge cited no authority fo rhis power to compel a party to consent, and no authority for such a power was provided to us.  As I jhave said, a consent given pursuant to an order is a contradiciton in terms“.
Mr. Justice Hinkson went on to find that while there was another case (Lewis v. Frye) which held that a Supreme Court judge could compel a party to sign an authorization, that decision was wrong.  Specifically Mr. Justice Hinkson held as follows:
Regrettably the decision of the Court of Appeal in Peel Financial Holdings Ltd. was not considered which Hood J. and I am persuaded that the binding nature of that authority if considered would have altered the conclusion reached by him had the authority been brought to his attention.
I conclude that the plaintiff in this case cannot be ordered to execute authorizations for the release of records in the (hands) of third parties.  The mechanism that must be pursued in order to obtain the hospital and doctors’ records is pursuant to Rule 26(11) of the Rules of Court.
This decision is important because it clarifies the procedures that must be used when Defendants in Injury Lawsuits wish to obtain the records in the hands of Third Parties and the Plaintiff does not consent.  Time will tell whether the New Rules of Court which soon come into force will effect this reasoning.

I Want a Jury Trial, Wait a Minute, No I Don't

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Jury Trials. 50 Comments on I Want a Jury Trial, Wait a Minute, No I Don't

Reasons for judgement were transcribed yesterday and released on the BC Court’s website dealing with an interesting issue, specifically can a party who elected trial by jury change their mind once the trial starts.
In this case (Chapelski v. Bhatt) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2004 BC Car Crash.  In the course of the lawsuit the defence lawyer filed a Jury Notice and paid the Jury Fees.  On the first day of Trial the Jury was empaneled and the Plaintiff’s lawyer made his opening statement.  The next day the Defence Lawyer advised the Court that he intended to proceed with the trial without the Jury.
Mr. Justice Hinkson ruled that once the Jury was empanelled it was too late for the Defendant to re-elect the mode of trial to that of Judge alone and that the Defendant would have to continue to pay the Jury Fees for the duration of the trial.
Mr. Justice Hinkson’s reasoning was set out in paragraphs 17-20 which I reproduce below:

[17] The reference by Williams J. to Rule 39(26) is significant.  Based upon his reasoning, a party who has served a Notice Requiring Trial by Jury can elect not to proceed with that mode of trial at least until the required jury fees are paid.  But that reasoning does not address a point in time past the point of payment of the required fees.  The reasoning implies that once the point has been passed “the issue of whether a trial is going to be heard by a jury would be conclusively settled”.

[18] I do not take the reference by Williams J., to “late in the day”, to extend past the empanelment of the jury nor the commencement of trial, nor do I accept that it should.  Once empanelled, a civil jury are the triers of fact.

[19] I conclude that absent misconduct of a party, a witness, or a juror once a civil trial has begun without the consent of the opposing party, it is not open to a party who has filed a Notice Requiring Trial by Jury pay the required fees pursuant thereto and participate in the selection of the jury to opt out thereafter for trial by judge alone.

[20] To permit such a re-election smacks a forum shopping and cannot be permitted.  I need not and I do not decide if a jury on a civil trial can be discharged absent misconduct of a party, a witness, or a juror once a civil trial has begun even with the consent of all parties.