Tag: litigation privilege

ICBC Claims, Surveillance Video and Disclosure

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Court of Appeal dealing with the timing of disclosure of non-privileged video surveillance of a Plaintiff involved in a tort claim.
In this case the Plaintiff sued for damages as a result of 2 motor vehicle collisions.  The Defendants insurer retained a private investigator to conduct surveillance of the Plaintiff.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff triggered Rule 26 (which, when complied with, requires the opposing party to provide a list of documents relevant to the action).  The Defendants listed the video surveillance as non-privileged but refused to produce the tape of the Plaintiff until after her examination for discovery claiming that Rule 26(1.2) permits them to delay production of this document because the credibility of the Plaintiff was a central issue of this claim and if the supposedly damaging tape was disclosed prior to discovery that would somehow compromise the defendants ability to examine her for discovery. 
The Plaintiff applied to court for production of the tape and succeeded.  The Defendants took the case up to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and gave the following insightful reasons discussing the intent of Rule 26(2.1)

[22]            Generally speaking, the burden of proof is on the party making an application.  That burden is to the standard of a balance of probabilities.  I see no principled reason why an application under R. 26(1.2) should be treated any differently.   In this case, the appellants are the applicants seeking a postponement of production of the Investigative Report.  In my view, they have the burden of establishing the grounds for such an order on a balance of probabilities.

[23]            Both sides contend that Blank, the seminal decision on the scope of the exemption for litigation privilege, supports their respective positions that the trend in disclosure of documents favours broadening (the appellants) or restricting (the respondent) of the exemption.  With respect, I do not find these submissions offer assistance in this appeal.  The circumstances of this case do not involve a request for disclosure of a privileged document but, rather, a request to postpone production of a relevant, non-privileged document.  In my view, the issue raised in this appeal requires an inquiry into what factors might negate the mandatory production of relevant, non-privileged documents in an action…..

[37]            I am not persuaded these authorities support the appellants’ position that the common law permits the postponement of non-privileged documents in order to permit a party to challenge the credibility of the opposing party.  On the other hand, neither am I persuaded that the policy considerations relied upon by the chambers judge, namely that prior disclosure may save the cost of discoveries as well as court time, preclude trial by ambush, or advance settlement, are relevant considerations.  In my view, the scope of R. 26(1.2) must be decided by reference to the legislative intent of its drafters and a principled application of the competing rights provided by the Rules of Court to parties in an action.   

[38]            The express wording of R. 26(1.2) allows for exclusion from compliance with R. 26(1), not the postponement of its compliance.  To read in language importing a temporal factor is not, in my view, in keeping with the approach to statutory interpretation adopted in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] S.C.R. 559 at 26, where the Court endorsed the modern approach to statutory interpretation: “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.  In determining the scope of the exemption provision in R. 26(1.2), I am of the view the Court must consider only those circumstances in which valid policy concerns might support the decision to exclude (not postpone) production of a relevant, non-privileged document.  …

[45]            There has been much debate over the broad scope of the Peruvian Guano rule, which stated in Murao at para. 12 requires disclosure of “every document … which not only would be evidence upon any issue, but also which, it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may – not which must – either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the affidavit [making the demand] either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary, if it is a document which may fairly lead him to a chain of inquiry which may have either of these consequences”.  In my view, it is the extensive scope of this common law disclosure rule that created the need for reasonable limitations.  Stated in another way, it is the “slavish” application of R. 26(1) which informs the scope of R. 26 (1.2). 

[46]            The appellants seek to distinguish these decisions under R. 26(1.2) on the basis that they do not involve a key issue of credibility. They submit that, in this case, an order postponing the production of the surveillance videotapes would give them the opportunity to test the willingness of the respondent to lie about her claim.  They argue that, in the absence of such an order, the respondent might tailor her evidence to fit the scenario depicted in the videotape. 

[47]            With respect, I do not accept this argument as representing a valid purpose for an application of R. 26(1.2).  In this case, there has been no factual determination regarding the respondent’s truthfulness, or lack thereof.  This is the appellants’ theory of liability, and it is for them to establish in the course of the trial.  Nor am I persuaded that the Rules of Court were intended to be used in a manner that would displace a right of a party granted under them, in favour of creating an opportunity for an adverse party to advance their theory of a fact in issue.

[48]            The court in Bronson v. Hewitt, 2007 BCSC 1477,  52 C.P.C.(6th) 116 reached a similar conclusion in dismissing an application for the exclusion of the defendants from one another’s examination for discovery over concerns they might tailor their evidence to fit the evidence of the other.  Credibility was a key issue in that case.  Citing Sissons v. Olson (1951), 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 507 (B.C.C.A.), Goepel J. stated at para. 17 that “exclusion was only appropriate if necessary to ensure the fair and proper judicial conduct of the action.”

[49]            Another similar conclusion was reached in McGarva v. British Columbia, 2003 BCSC 909.  That case involved a damages claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the Crown by a plaintiff who had been abused while in foster care.  The plaintiff sought disclosure of similar fact evidence from the Crown.  The Crown, in turn, applied for a postponement of disclosure of that evidence in order to avoid the potential of the plaintiff tailoring her evidence to fit the similar fact evidence.  Credibility was a key issue in the action.  Madam Justice Gray declined to impose such a term on the disclosure of the relevant documents, stating that there was no basis for her to restrict the plaintiff’s receipt of this information.  In her view, the Crown’s position was not prejudiced because it would remain open to the Crown to argue, at trial, that the plaintiff had tailored her evidence to conform to any similar fact evidence disclosed to her before her examination for discovery (para. 17).

[50]            The final submission by the appellants is that, in our adversarial system, the right to cross-examination is sacrosanct and should not be trumped by disclosure.  However, this argument mischaracterizes the issue.  Rule 26(1.2) does not limit the appellants’ right to cross-examine the respondent.  The respondent’s credibility may be challenged in any number of ways, including the use of a prior inconsistent statement on cross-examination, the lack of adequate explanation for any apparent discrepancies between the respondent’s actions in the surveillance videotape and her reported disability, and by other evidence tendered at trial that might dispel the legitimacy of her claims.

[51]             In summary, I am not persuaded that R. 26(1.2) was intended for the purpose of restricting the right of a party, at an examination for discovery, to prior knowledge of all relevant and non-privileged documentation in the examining party’s possession and control, in order to permit the latter to advance its theory of the case where credibility of the former is a key issue in the litigation.  

[52]            I would dismiss the appeal and award costs of the appeal to the respondent in any event of the cause.

I should point out that this case does not address the more typical fight about the release of surveillance video in a tort claim that is supposedly privileged.  In this case it was agreed that the tape was not privileged.  This case is useful, however, because the Court of Appeal references many precedents addressing the issue of litigation privilege and the disclosure of video surveillance.

The Implied Undertaking of Confidentiality and ICBC Claims

Interesting reasons for judgement were released today dealing with the issue of whether a plaintiff in an ICBC tort claim has to produce materials from previous legal proceedings.
In this case the Plaintiff alleged injury as a result of a 2005 BC motor vehicle accident.  The Plaintiff was involved in previous legal proceedings.  The defence lawyer asked the court for production of 3 documents which were contested, specifically

(a)        a copy of the medical report of Dr. Bloch requested by Ms. (the Plaintiff;s) counsel in a pervious proceeding unrelated to this motor vehicle accident (the “Great West proceeding”);

(b)        a copy of submissions prepared by the plaintiff, dated July 11, 2005 and September 23, 2005, regarding a claim which she brought against Mr. Murray in the Surrey Registry of the Provincial Court of British Columbia;

(c)        a copy of the transcript of the plaintiff’s examination for discovery in the Great West proceeding.

The court first dealt with the issue of whether the current defendant was entitled to the plaintiff’s examination for discovery transcript from a previous legal claim.  The court reproduced paragraphs 51 and 53 of the leading Supreme Court of Canada Decision dealing with the ‘implied undertaking’ of confidentiality of examination for discovery transcripts, specifically:

 

51.       As mentioned earlier, the lawsuit against the appellant and others was settled in 2006. As a result the appellant was not required to give evidence at a civil trial; nor were her examination for discovery transcripts ever read into evidence. The transcripts remain in the hands of the parties and their lawyer. Nevertheless, the implied undertaking continues. The fact that the settlement has rendered the discovery moot does not mean the appellant’s privacy interest is also moot. The undertaking continues to bind. When an adverse party incorporates the answers or documents obtained on discovery as part of the court record at trial the undertaking is spent, but not otherwise, except by consent or court order. See Lac d’Amiante, at paras. 70 and 76; Shaw Estate v. Oldroyd, at paras. 20-22. It follows that decisions to the contrary, such as the decision of the House of Lords in Home Office v. Harman (where a narrow majority held that the implied undertaking not to disclose documents obtained on discovery continued even after the documents in question had been read aloud in open court), should not be followed in this country. The effect of the Harman decision has been reversed by a rule change in its country of origin.

53.       I would not preclude an application to vary an undertaking by a non-party on the basis of standing, although I agree with Livent Inc. v. Drabinsky that success on such an application would be unusual. What has already been said provides some illustrations of potential third party applicants. In this case the Attorney General of British Columbia, supported by the Vancouver Police, demonstrated a sufficient interest in the appellant’s transcripts to be given standing to apply. Their objective was to obtain evidence that would help explain the events under investigation, and possibly to incriminate the appellant. I think it would be quite wrong for the police to be able to take advantage of statutorily compelled testimony in civil litigation to undermine the appellant’s right to silence and the protection against self-incrimination afforded her by the criminal law. Accordingly, in my view, the present application was rightly dismissed by the chambers judge. On the other hand, a non-party engaged in other litigation with an examinee, who learns of potentially contradicting testimony by the examinee in a discovery to which that other person is not a party, would have standing to seek to obtain a modification of the implied undertaking and for the reasons given above may well succeed. Of course if the undertaking is respected by the parties to it, then non-parties will be unlikely to possess enough information to make an application for a variance in the first place that is other than a fishing expedition. But the possibility of third party applications exists, and where duly made the competing interests will have to be weighed, keeping in mind that an undertaking too readily set aside sends the [page187] message that such undertakings are unsafe to be relied upon, and will therefore not achieve their broader purpose.

The court in this case refused the defendants motion to produce the plaintiff’s previous discovery transcript and the plaintiff’s previously obtained medico-legal report holding that 

On balance, the plaintiff’s privacy interest outweighs the defendants “fishing expedition” as referred to by Binnie J.A.  I am also of the view that the same must be said of the medical report of Dr. Bloch.  That report was a document created for the previous proceeding.  There is no evidence before me to indicate that it was incorporated into the record of that proceeding, in fact I am advised that the action settled before trial.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I would expect that such report would have been created and received subjected to a claim of privilege; there is no evidence before me as to the waiver of such privilege.  The defendants’ application for production of the discovery transcript and the medical/psychiatric report is dismissed.

The court however, did order that the transcript of the plaintiff’s previous submissions in a cmall claims court action be produced holding that:

The defendants’ application for a copy of the plaintiff’s submissions in the provincial court proceeding is, however, a different matter.  That action went to trial; the plaintiff apparently made various oral submissions and representations to the court and, I assume, gave evidence.  In addition she is said to have provided written submissions dated July 11, 2005 and September 23, 2005.  In my view, any undertaking regarding those submissions was spent by their use in that proceeding.  

 

"On the Road Again…" ICBC claims and Litigation Privilege

As an ICBC claims lawyer I find myself frequently traveling throughout BC representing clients involved in ICBC claims. This week I’m back in one of my favourite destinations (particularly this time of year), sunny Kelowna, BC. The lake, the heat, what’s not to love?
I try to minimize the amount that travel interferes with business as usual, but despite my best efforts the responsibilities of life on the road do get in the way, so here is the ‘travel version’ of my reporting on recent ICBC claims…
Litigation Privilege. An ICBC claims lawyer representing his/her clients may come into the possession of privileged information. One of the most common types of privilege claimed over evidence by ICBC claims lawyers is the medico-legal report.
When a lawyer obtains a report providing an opinion as to the extent of injury caused in a BC car accident that report may very well be privileged and not disclosed to ICBC. The problem is, oftentimes a privately paid report authored by an independent physician or other hired expert may provide useful rehabilitation advice for a client. So the question is, can such a report be disclosed to the client’s treating physician to better aid in rehabilitation without waiving legal privilege and forcing disclosure to ICBC? A judgement released today seems to say that this can in fact be done.
In this case the Plaintiff had 2 claims, the first being the ‘tort claim’ meaning the claim against the motorist who injured the Plaintiff (who happens to be insured by ICBC) and a ‘part 7 claim’ meaning a claim against ICBC directly for the enforcement of any ‘no fault benefits’ that may be owing as a result of the same BC car accident.
The Plaintiff’s lawyer obtained a report that made some rehabilitation recommendations. This report was shared with the Plaintiff’s treating physician who adopted some of the recommended treatments. The ICBC defence lawyer argued that this disclosure ‘waived’ the claim for privilege. The Plaintiff lawyer disagreed. The ICBC defence lawyer made a motion asking the BC Supreme Court to order that the privately hired report be handed over to ICBC. Master Caldwell of the BC Supreme Court dismissed the motion stating that:
I am unaware of any authority which would dictate that reports which are prepared for purposes of litigation but which are provided to an individuals GP for treatment purposes lose the protection of privilege. No such authority was provided to me.
This is a great result for Plaintiff’s involved in ICBC claims and is certainly must reading for an ICBC claims Plaintiff lawyer who wishes to share a private report with a client’s treating doctor for treatment purposes.

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ERIK
MAGRAKEN

Personal Injury Lawyer

When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.

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