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Tag: independent medical exams

Conflicting Duties? Treating Doctors Duties to Their Patients and to the Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


As previously discussed, one of the biggest changes in the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules is an overhaul to the requirements for admissibility of expert opinions.  These changes have created some tension in personal injury claims.
In no area of law are expert opinions used more frequently than in personal injury lawsuits.   The opinions of treating physicians are often crucial in the success of a personal injury claim.  In fact, if a plaintiff fails to call their own doctor in support of their case the Court could draw an ‘adverse inference‘ and assume the doctor will say something negative.
One of the changes imposed by the New Rules is a requirement that experts certify that their duty is to “assist the court and not to be an advocate for any party“.  In reality, this requirement always existed although it was not specifically spelled out in the former rules.   Despite this, some treating physicians have been concerned with this new explicit requirement and refuse to provide expert opinions on the basis that they feel they are ethically required to be advocates for their patients.
Fortunately, the BC College of Physicians and Surgeons has squarely addressed this concern and informed their members that the New Rules of Court are not inconsistent with doctors duties to their patients.  Specifically, in the September 2010 issue of the College’s quarterly publication physicians were advised as follows:
The College does not view the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules to be in conflict with the Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics, including the fundamental responsibility to consider first the well being of the patient.  With respect to the duty imposed under Rule 11-2 the College has always expected physicians providing expert reports to be fair, objective, and provide opinions that are supported by available information.
This expectation applies equally to physicians whether they are appointed by the plaintiff, defence, jointly or by the Court.  Additionally, whether physicians are acting as experts in the capacity of treating physicians or independent medical experts, they still must provide balanced and objective reports.   The College does recommend that, when asked to provide an expert opinion, treating physicians discuss with their patients the physician’s duty to assist the court and not be an advocate for any party.
The truth of the matter is that treating doctors should be advocates for their patients health.  They should not be advocates for their patients personal injury claims or other legal matters.  The above clarification will hopefully assist physicians who have felt conflicted from providing opinions under the New Rules of Court.

ICBC Tort Claims, Part 7 Benefits and Multiple "Independent" Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


As I’ve previously written, ICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent’ medical exam (IME) in one of two ways.  The first is when an ‘insured’ applies for first party no-fault benefits.  Section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation gives ICBC the power to compel an IME in these circumstances.  The second is under Rule 7-6(1) of the BC Supreme Court rules which allows the court to order an independent exam to “level the playing field” in an injury lawsuit.
As a monopoly insurer ICBC often has one adjuster assigned to look after a person’s claim for no-fault benefits and at the same time look after the defendant’s interests in the Plaintiff’s tort claim.  Often times ICBC will obtain a no-fault benefits medical exam and then once a tort claim is launched seek a second exam with a different physician pursuant to the BC Supreme Court Rules.  Can ICBC do this?  The answer is sometimes yes but is highly factually dependent and reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In today’s case (Imeri v. Janczukowski) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision in 2005.  The Plaintiff and Defendant were insured with ICBC.  The same ICBC adjuster was looking after the Plaintiff’s no-fault benefits claim and acting on behalf of the defendant in the tort claim.  ICBC sent the Plaintiff for an IME with an orthopaedic surgeon (Dr. Boyle) as part of the no-fault benefits application process.  In the course of the tort claim the Defendant then sought an order sending the Plaintiff for an IME with a different orthopaedic surgeon (Dr. McGraw).  The Plaintiff opposed this motion and argued that if ICBC is entitled to a second exam it should be with the the same doctor.  Master Shaw sided with the Plaintiff.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons:

[17]        Rule 7-6(1), which is the new Rule 30, provides as follows:

Order for medical examination

(1) If the physical or mental condition of a person is in issue in an action, the court may order that the person submit to examination by a medical practitioner or other qualified person, and if the court makes an order under this subrule, the court may also make

(a) an order respecting any expenses connected with the examination, and

(b) an order that the result of the examination be put in writing and that copies be made available to interested parties of record.

[18]        In Stainer v. Plaza, 2001 BCCA 133, Finch J.A. (as he then was) said at para. 8:

… the purpose of Rule 30 is to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence.

[19]        Although the first question would be whether the defence needs an IME of an orthopaedic specialist to put the parties on an equal footing with respect to medical evidence, counsel for the plaintiff did not oppose the plaintiff attending a defence IME with an orthopaedic specialist as long as it was Dr. Boyle. The plaintiff agrees to go back to Dr. Boyle for the IME.

[20]        The plaintiff’s submission is that the plaintiff has already attended a first IME for tort purposes with Dr. Boyle and, if a further IME is appropriate, it should be a follow-up with the original expert for the defence.

[21]        In Rowe v. Kim, 2008 BCSC 1710, Master Keighley at para. 14 states:

A party seeking to have a second examination preformed by a practitioner practicing in the same speciality or discipline as a practitioner who has already examined a person faces an uphill battle: Hothi v. Grewal, [1993] 45 B.C.L.R. (3d) 394 (SC); Hamada v. Semple, [1983] B.C.J. No. 1307 (SC). Successful applicants are those who are able to demonstrate that something has happened since the first examination which could not have been foreseen or which could not, for some other reasons, have been addressed by the first examiner. It also seems to me that material filed in support of the application should indicate why a further examination by the doctor who performed the original assessment is not appropriate.

[22]        The evidence submitted in this matter does not set out why it would not be appropriate to send the plaintiff back to Dr. Boyle. There was no evidence why Dr. McGraw should be preferred over Dr. Boyle.

[23]        The plaintiff does not resist seeing Dr. Boyle. It is not necessary to find sufficient reasoning for the further examination by Dr. Boyle.

[24]        I find the February 28, 2006 report of Dr. Boyle contains opinion relevant to both the Part 7 claim and the tort claim. The defence has not provided any evidence to explain the opinion content in the report relevant to the tort claim, other than the statement of the adjuster in her letter to the plaintiff setting the appointment that the IME is for the Part 7 claim purposes. It is not known what the request or instructions to Dr. Boyle were. Based on the content of the resulting report, there is opinion relevant to the tort claim. I find the IME by Dr. Boyle on February 28, 2006 is a first examination by an orthopaedic specialist in the tort claim as well as for a Part 7 claim.

The New BC Supreme Court Rules and "Responsive" Expert Reports

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 122 Comments on The New BC Supreme Court Rules and "Responsive" Expert Reports


Important reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, interpreting and applying Rule 11-6(4) for the first time.  This rule deals with “responsive” expert opinion evidence.
Under the old Rules of Court parties could call responsive expert evidence without notice provided the evidence was truly responsive.  The new rules of court changed this and require responsive expert reports to be served 42 days ahead of the scheduled trial.
In today’s case (Wright v. Bower) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision and alleged chronic back pain as a result of the crash.  Her lawyer served expert reports addressing these injuries in compliance with the time lines set out in the rules of court.  The Defendant brought a motion to compel the Plaintiff to attend an examination with an orthopaedic surgeon in order to obtain a ‘responsive’ report.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing that an examination was not necessary for the Defendant to obtain a truly responsive report.  Mr. Justice Savage agreed with the Plaintiff and dismissed the motion.  In doing so the Court provide the following useful reasons setting the parameters for responsive expert evidence:

[12]         Rule 11-6(4) was enacted to fill a lacuna in the Rules.  Under the former Rules, Rule 40A permitted parties to call expert evidence in reply without notice at trial.  In order for such evidence to be admitted, however, it had to be truly responsive to the expert evidence of a witness called by the opposing party.

[13]         In Stainer, supra, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered Rule 40A(3) and the scope of the Court’s discretion to admit responsive evidence.  At paragraphs 16-18, Finch J.A. said:

[16]      …The admission of expert evidence is now governed by Rule 40A(3)

An expert may give oral opinion evidence of a written statement if the opinion has been delivered to every party of record at least sixty days before the expert testifies.

[17]      That rule applies equally to all parties.  In the normal course, a defendant will wish to protect his right to adduce expert evidence at trial by giving the notice required by that rule.  But the court retains a discretion to admit responsive evidence of which notice has not been given:  Pedersen v. Degelder (1985), 62 B.C.L.R. 253 (B.C.S.C.); Kroll v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7 (S.C.); and Kelly v. Kelly (1995), 20 B.C.L.R. (3d) 232 (S.C.).  In the latter case Mr. Justice Williamson said:

I would restrict, of course, as courts I think must, the practice of having opinion evidence without notice strictly to truly responsive rebuttal evidence, and I think that if that rule is carefully observed, there should be no difficulties.

[18]      That is, in my respectful view, a correct statement of the proper practice. …

[15]         Amongst other things, the parties argued before me regarding whether the new Rules have substantively changed the practice which existed under Rule 40A.  They agreed that this is an important practice point, and a case of first impression.

[16]         Rule 40A gave the Court discretion to admit responsive evidence of which notice had not been given.  Rule 11-6(4) now provides that notice must be given of responsive expert evidence (although I note that the Court retains discretion to admit expert evidence of which sufficient notice has not been given).

[17]         I would expect that, in the ordinary course, an examination would be ordered under Rule 7-6(1) where a person’s medical condition was in issue in an action, provided it was requested in a timely way.

[18]         However, at this point in time in the action, the defendants are limited to what Mr. Justice Williamson referred to in Kelly, supra, as “truly responsive rebuttal evidence”.  The application must be considered in that light; the question on this application is not one of notice, but whether the Examination should be ordered to enable the defendant to file responsive evidence.  The authorizing Rule, 7-6(1) uses the term “may”.

[19]         In Kroll v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (1995), 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7, Sanders J., as she then was, noted that “true response evidence, does not permit fresh opinion evidence to masquerade as answer to the other side’s reports”.

[20]         In C.N. Railway v. H.M.T.Q. in Right of Canada, 2002 BCSC 1669, Henderson J. considered the admissability of “reply reports” holding that only the portions of the reports that provided a critical analysis of the methodology of the opposing expert were admissible as responsive evidence.  The portions of the reports describing the authors’ own opinions on the matters in issue were not admitted.

[21]         In this case, the defendants do not explain why an examination is required in these circumstances, other than a statement by a legal assistant that counsel says such is “necessary to properly defend this action and to respond to the reports of Dr. Weckworth and Dr. O’Connor”.  Master McCallum in White v. Gait, 2003 BCSC 2023 declined to order an examination where it had not been shown why such was required to produce a responsive report.

[22]         In my opinion, the bare assertion reported to a legal assistant in this case is insufficient to support an order under Rule 7-6(1) that the plaintiff attend the Examination, when the defendants are limited to providing response reports under Rule 11-6(4).  In the circumstances, the application is dismissed.  The plaintiff is entitled to costs of the application.

Defence Medical Exams – Best Expert Not Required to "Level the Playing Field"

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on Defence Medical Exams – Best Expert Not Required to "Level the Playing Field"

(Update: November 14, 2011 – The case discussed in the below post in now publicly available.  Master Scarth’s reasons for judgement can be accessed here)
Further to my previous posts about Independent Medical Exams in BC Supreme Court Injury Claims unpublished reasons for judgement recently came to my attention (Hou v. Kirmani BCSC Vancouver Registry, 20091119) dealing with the ability for a Defendant to have an injured party undergo multiple exams where the first defence expert feels an opinion from a second expert would be of benefit.
In this recent case the Plaintiff was a pedestrian who was apparently struck by a vehicle.    She suffered “multiple injuries including traumatic brain injury“.  One of her most serious injuries was a foot and ankle injury.  She consented to attend a Defence Medical Exam with an orthopaedic surgeon.  He provided the following opinion:
(the Plaintiff) would benefit from an opinion from a foot and ankle orthopaedic surgeon, as further surgical intervetnion may be of benefit to her and this might include surgical correction of her deformity so as to allow her to bear weight and walk short distances more appropriately. …I do not feel further passive treatment for her left foot and ankle will be of any benefit to her..
The Defendant brought a motion to compel the Plaintiff to be examined by a second orthopeadic surgeon, this time one with a specialty in foot an ankle injuries.  The Plaintiff opposed arguing a further exam was not necessary.  Master Scarth agreed and dismissed the motion.  In doing so the Court made the following comments about the purpose and limitations of Defence Medical Exams:
…I am not of the view that Rule 30 is intended to allow follow-up on every issue which is raised by experts who examine the plaintiff.
Dr. Arthur was chosen, and I accept the submissions of the plainitff in this regard, with the knowledge that there were concerns regarding this plaintiff’s ankle.  Thee is, it is fair to say, nothing new since Dr. Arthur was retained, apart from his reticence to provide an opinion.  And he does not say, I do not believe, that he is not qualified to give the opinion which is missing, if it is missing.  He simply says, I think it is fair to conclude, that in the best of all worlds she would be seen by an orthopaedic surgeon with a subspeciality training.  In my view that is not the purpose of Rule 30.
As mentioned above, this is an unreported judgement but if anyone wants a copy feel free to contact me and I’ll be happy to e-mail a copy of the transcript.

ICBC Medical Exams and Secret Tape Recordings

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized.


Further to my previous post discussing the topic of taping independent medical exams, reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating that BC Courts are not very receptive to such evidence if secretly obtained.
In the 2006 case of Wong v. Wong the BC Court of Appeal made it clear that permission for a Plaintiff to record a defence medical exam will rarely be granted.  Sometimes Plaintiff’s have recorded such exams without seeking the court’s permission first.  While the secret audio recording of an independent medical exam by a participant is not necessarily a criminal offence in Canada, it is frowned upon.   One remedy a Court can exercise when presented with such evidence is to simply exclude it from trial.  Today’s case used exactly this remedy.
In today’s case (Anderson v. Dwyer) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 rear end crash.   ICBC, on behalf of the Defendant, admitted fault for the accident but disputed the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff attended a medical exam with Dr. Locht, an orthopaedic surgeon selected by ICBC.  The Plaintiff surreptitiously recorded this exam and then her lawyer tried to make use of this recording at trial.  Mr. Justice Schultes was not receptive to this and disallowed the use of this recording for cross examination purposes.  While the reasons for judgement did not have an analysis of why the Court used this remedy the following was highlighted:

[12] The plaintiff also admitted surreptitiously recording her examination by Dr. Locht, the orthopaedic surgeon who conducted an independent medical examination of her on behalf of the defendant. ( This came to light as a result of an objection by the defendant’s counsel during the cross-examination of Dr. Locht. The plaintiff’s counsel did not use the transcript any further after the objection and nothing in my analysis of Dr. Locht’s evidence turns on its use.)

[13] Her explanation for this action was that she wanted an accurate record of everything that was said during the examination and was concerned that she would not be able to recall it herself without assistance. She felt she had been treated disrespectfully by representatives of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia during a previous meeting about this litigation and, I gather, that as a result she was suspicious of how the examination would be conducted.

[14] She maintained that she did not originally intend to use the recording in the litigation but that a friend had typed it up for her shortly before the trial so that she could refresh her memory and at that point she found discrepancies between the transcript and Dr. Locht’s report. She intended it to be used during cross-examination only if “the truth wasn’t coming out” in his evidence…

[43] It was suggested to Dr. Locht that his report presented some of the plaintiff’s symptoms in a misleading way. For example, he described her as having “no sleep disorder”, although she told him that her neck pain woke her several times throughout the night. His explanation was that because she was still getting six hours of sleep per night, in total, he did not consider that she had a sleep disorder. Similarly, he described the plaintiff as being “physically capable” of continuing all work, household, and recreational activities that she could do before the accident, despite her descriptions of experiencing severe pain (and in one case nausea) after engaging in them. He explained that his determination that a person is physically able to perform an activity does not depend on whether she in fact avoids that activity because it causes her pain…

[49] With respect to the plaintiff’s general credibility, I did not find her recording of the examination by Dr. Locht, her failure to disclose potentially relevant documents, or her “hands on” involvement in this litigation to be as significant as the defendant suggested. However improper surreptitious recording of medical interviews may be, it appeared to me that this recording was a reflection of the plaintiff’s suspicious and hostile view of ICBC and of her desire to protect herself from the unfair treatment that she expected to receive from its representative, rather than of any desire to manipulate the evidence.

Given the very important role expert witnesses play in injury litigation it is fair to debate whether tape recordings should routinely be used to add greater objectivity to the IME process.  Unless and until this comes about our Court’s will continue to struggle with the use this evidence will be put to when parties choose to obtain evidence through surreptitious recording.

More on the Law of Multiple Defence Medical Exams in Injury Litigation

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 70 Comments on More on the Law of Multiple Defence Medical Exams in Injury Litigation


Further to my previous posts on this topic, the law is well settled that the BC Supreme Court can order a Plaintiff involved in an injury lawsuit to undergo multiple defence medical exams in appropriate circumstances in order to ‘level the playing field‘.
There are many reported court cases considering such applications and today reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, providing a concise summary of some of the legal principles at play when ICBC or another defendant wishes to have a Plaintiff assessed by multiple doctors.
In today’s case (Hamilton v. Pavlova) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2002 BC car crash.   The Plaintiff alleged that she suffered a mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) in the crash which affected her cognitive functioning and had been assessed by at least 14 doctors since the time of her accident.
The Plaintiff attended two independent medical exams at request of the defendants, the first with an orthopaedic surgeon and the second with a neurologist.  The neurologist provided an opinion that “there was no evidence to support a diagnosis of brain injury“.  The Defendants then requested the Plaintiff to be assessed by a psychiatrist.  The Plaintiff refused and this resulted in a court motion to force attendance.
Mr. Justice Bracken dismissed the motion finding that the defendants were seeking to “bolster the opinion (of the neurologist they chose) by providing a similar opinion from someone with perhaps a more appropriate specialty“.  Before reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Bracken provided the following very useful summary of some of the factors Courts consider in requests for multiple ‘independent’ medical exams:

[10] Rule 30(1) provides discretion to the court to order an independent medical examination, and under Rule 30(2), more than one examination may be ordered.  Counsel, in their helpful submissions, have thoroughly canvassed the relative authorities on this point.  From those authorities, certain principles emerge.  The case law is against a background of the rules of court, and in particular, the principle that the rules are designed to secure a just determination of every proceeding on the merits and to ensure full disclosure, so the rules should be given a fair and liberal interpretation to meet those objectives:  Wildemann v. Webster, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2304 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 2-3.

[11] Rule 30(2) is a discretionary rule, and the discretion must be exercised judicially.  An independent examination is granted to ensure a “reasonable equality between the parties in the preparation of a case for trial”:  Wildemann v. Webster at p. 11 from the separate concurring reasons of Chief Justice McEachern.

[12] Reasonable equality does not mean that the defendant should be able to match expert for expert or report for report:  McKay v. Passmore, 2005 BCSC 570 at para. 17, andChristopherson v. Krahn, 2002 BCSC 1356 at para. 9.

[13] A second exam will not be allowed for the purpose of attempting to bolster an earlier opinion of another expert.  That is, there must be some question or matter that could not have been dealt with at the earlier examination:  Trahan v. West Coast Amusements Ltd., 2000 BCSC 691 at para. 48, and Norsworthy v. Greene, 2009 BCSC 173 at para. 18.

[14] There is a higher standard required where the defendant seeks a second or subsequent medical exam of the plaintiff:  McKay v. Passmore, supra, at para. 17 and para. 29.

[15] The application must be timely.  That is, the proposed examination should be complete and a report available in sufficient time to comply with the rules of admissibility and to allow enough time for the plaintiff to assess and respond if necessary:  Vermeulen-Miller v. Sanders, 2007 BCSC 1258 at paras. 47-48, relying in part on Goss v. Harder, 2001 BCSC 1823.

[16] Finally, subsequent independent medical examinations should be reserved for cases where there are some exceptional circumstances:  Wildemann v. Webster, supra, at p. 3.

As previously pointed out, the BC Supreme Court Rules are being overhauled in July 2010.  Under the new rules the Court will continue to have the power to order multiple medical exams in particular circumstances but one thing that will change is that the concept of ‘proportionality’ will be introduced into the analysis. I plan to follow the law as it develops under the new rules and will report how our Courts apply the concept of proportionality to multiple defence medical exams in ICBC and other BC Personal Injury Litigation.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Late Defence Motions For Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 54 Comments on More on ICBC Injury Claims and Late Defence Motions For Medical Exams


Further to my recent post on this topic, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that ICBC may face an uphill battle when they apply for a Defence medical exam when the trial of the action is imminent.
In this week’s case (Agesen v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in 2 separate motor vehicle accidents.  The Plaintiff sued and both cases where scheduled to be heard at the same time.  In support of his case the Plaintiff served medico-legal reports from a psychiatrist, a psychologist, an occupational therapist, his GP and a vocational assessment.  The Plaintiff attended a defence medical exam with a neurosurgeon and a report was served by the Defendants.
The Defendants then requested that the Plaintiff be assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon.  The Plaintiff would not consent and a court motion was brought.  The Master who presided granted the motion and ordered the Plaintiff to be assessed by the orthopaedic surgeon.  This appointment was to take place less than one month before trial.  The Plaintiff appealed and succeeded.  In overturning the Master’s decision Madam Justice Morrison reasoned that the late application would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff.  Specifically, on the topic of timing of defence applications for medical exams the Court stated as follows:

[38]        In Benner v. Vancouver (City), Mr. Justice N. Smith refused an application for a medical examination that came three weeks before trial.  The application was three weeks before trial and the examination itself would have been less than two weeks before trial.  In paragraph 19 of his judgment, Smith J. confirmed that the purpose of Rule 30 was “to place the parties on an equal footing in their ability to obtain medical evidence in a case where injuries are alleged.”  He also referred to Rule 40A which requires service of expert opinions 60 days before trial, where a report delivered less than 60 days before trial is inadmissible unless the court were to order otherwise.  In that case, the court found that the plaintiff’s physical condition was clearly put in issue by the pleadings.  The defendants had full advantage and protection of routine production of medical records.  I find that decision is applicable to this appeal.

[39]        In dismissing the application for a medical examination at that late stage, at paragraph 35, Smith J. stated, “… the Rules of Court are intended to level the playing field as between the plaintiff and the defendant, a defendant who takes no timely steps to exercise its rights under the rules does so at its peril.”..

[45] In my view, it would be prejudicial to the plaintiff at this date to order an IME four weeks before a ten day jury trial.  That the plaintiff has serious injuries is not a surprise to the defence.  That his claim is substantial should certainly not have been a surprise.  Any advantage to the defence at this point in time would be outweighed by prejudice to the plaintiff, not only because of his problems in dealing with examinations, depositions and preparation for trial, but also because of the very real possibility that a late medical opinion could well result in plaintiff’s counsel having to seek an adjournment of this trial, in order to meet unexpected or opinion evidence that may be prejudicial to the plaintiff.  In this case, the balancing of prejudice must be in favour of the plaintiff, given the chronology of events.

As readers of this blog know the BC Supreme Court Civil Rules are being overhauled in July 2010.  Some of the biggest changes in the new Rules relate to expert evidence and you can click here to read my article discussing these changes.  The Court will continue to have the power to order multiple medical exams in particular circumstances but one thing that will change is that the concept of ‘proportionality’ will be introduced into the analysis.  I will continue to post about these decisions as the new Rules is developed in its application by the BC Supreme Court.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and the Subjective Nature of Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, highlighting an important truth in injury litigation – it is not up to ICBC’s doctors to decide if a Plaintiff’s pain complaints are legitimate, rather it is up to the Judge or Jury.
In today’s case (Sharma v. Didiuk) the Plaintiff was involved in 2004 rear end collision in Delta, British Columbia.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.   The vehicles did not suffer much damage but the Plaintiff alleged injury.
The Plaintiff’s doctor provided the following evidence with respect to her accident related injuries:
She sustained soft tissue injuries of her back, neck, and shoulders. This pain is present several times a week. It is aggravated by her work as a hairdresser. It is also aggravated by lifting or carrying. She has used Tylenol, heat, anti[?]inflammatories, physiotherapy, and massage as treatment with some variable symptoms. Her recent pregnancy also aggravated her symptoms. Ms Sharma’s pain has become chronic recurrent in nature. With regular strengthening and stretching exercises she should continue to remain functional with pain. She may require future treatments of massage, physiotherapy, and accupun[c]ture, to manage her pain. She will likely remain prone to aggravations of her pain with prolonged standing, lifting of her arms to shoulder height, and carrying.
The Defendant arranged for an ‘independent medical exam’ with orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Boyle.  Dr. Boyle disagreed with the Plaintiff’s physician with respect to the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.  Dr. Boyle provided the following evidence:

[66] In his report Dr. Boyle concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a minor myofascial strain to her cervical spine with injury to ligaments, tendons and muscles, and that medical management for this should be in the form of stretching and strengthening exercises and the use of anti-inflammatories.

[67] He also said she may have suffered a very minor strain to her lumbar spine although she was asymptomatic at the time of his examination.

[68] He concluded there was no disability associated with her function as a hairdresser from 2005 onwards and the myofascial strain that she would have suffered would have been very mild at most with a very transient and limited effect on her.

[69] In his opinion there is no disability associated with the events surrounding the motor vehicle accident and no vocational or avocational limitations to be placed on her, with no need for any passive modalities of treatment.

[70] At trial he agrees that pain is usually considered chronic after two years, and that soft tissue injury may not exhibit any objective signs. Even if the soft tissue injuries heal in three months they can still produce current pain.

[71] However, in his opinion the probability that the plaintiff has these complaints ongoing is very low.

The Court went on to accept that the Plaintiff was injured and rejected Dr. Boyle’s opinion.  In awarding the Plaintiff $30,000 for her non-pecuniary damages Mr. Justice Truscott made the following comments:

[73] I also accept that the plaintiff’s complaints of continuing pain from her soft tissue injuries have exceeded the expected time period for recovery.

[74] I conclude that Dr. Boyle is saying in his own words that he does not believe the plaintiff when she says she still has continuing pain from injuries in this motor vehicle accident, almost six years later, as he found no basis for that in his examination and in his general understanding of the effects of minor soft tissue injuries.

[75] However, the fact is that I do accept the plaintiff’s evidence when she says she is still suffering pain from soft tissue injuries that she sustained in this motor vehicle accident of April 8, 2004.

[76] I therefore reject the opinion of Dr. Boyle that she does not have any further effects from those injuries, and I will assess the plaintiff’s damages on the basis that she continues to suffer some chronic pain from these injuries caused by the motor vehicle accident….

[92] I conclude the plaintiff’s present pain is intermittent and not continuous and that it depends on what activity she carries out and for how long she carries out those activities.

[93] She was able to continue her schooling full-time after the accident and was able to continue thereafter working close to full-time or at full-time at her hairdressing employments…

[98] Here I accept that the plaintiff’s ability to continue to work full-time has been accomplished with some difficulty because of her injuries as she has to stand and reach for long periods of time which brings about pain and discomfort and exhausts her by the end of the day. Her social activities have also been curtailed.

[99] I accept the prognosis of Dr. Rayavarapu and after reviewing the cases cited by both counsel, I consider a proper award for the plaintiff for non-pecuniary damages attributable to this motor vehicle accident to be $30,000. In assessing non?pecuniary damages in this amount I have already reduced the full value of her injuries by $10,000 to account for the measurable risk of her pre-existing injuries continuing to affect her regardless of this accident.

Only an injured person truly knows the extent of their pain.  If a Defendant arranges for an independent medical exam and that doctor minimizes the extent of the injury cases such as this one serve as an important reminder that the Defence Medical Examiner is not the Judge and Jury.

ICBC Insurance Benefits, Independent Medical Exams and Witness Immunity

Written by admin on . Posted in independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 99 Comments on ICBC Insurance Benefits, Independent Medical Exams and Witness Immunity


Further to my many previous posts discussing Independent Medical Exams in the context of ICBC Injury Claims, reasons for judgement were released today highlighting a very interesting issue; the ability to sue an Independent Medical Examiner.
When a person is seeking medical benefits from ICBC under their own policy of insurance (Part 7 Benefits) ICBC has the right to send that person for a “medical examination“.  ICBC gets this power from s. 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation which holds as follows:

Medical examination

99 (1)  An insured who makes a claim under this Part shall allow a medical practitioner, dentist, physiotherapist or chiropractor selected by the corporation, at the expense of the corporation, to examine the insured as often as it requires.

(2)  The corporation is not liable to an insured who, to the prejudice of the corporation, fails to comply with this section.

When ICBC obtains a medical exam under s. 99 they often base their decision of what Part 7 benefits to pay based on the physician’s recommendations.

For a variety of reasons ICBC tends to use a handful of doctors over and over again for these independent examinations.  In turn the business of independent medical exams is quite profitable for some BC doctors.

It is not uncommon for a medical examiner to author a report to ICBC which contradicts the opinions of a person’s treating physicians.  When this happens ICBC sometimes cuts off benefits from an insured even when the treating physicians feel further funding of therapy is appropriate.  When ICBC and an insured differ as to what benefits should be paid the insured can sue ICBC and the Court’s can offer a binding resolution.  What about the independent medical examiners?  Can they be sued?  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court addressing this very interesting issue.

In today’s case (Mund v. Sovio) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff applied to ICBC for Part 7 Benefits.  In the course of processing the request for benefits ICBC sent the Plaintiff to Dr. Sovio for a medical examination under section 99.    Dr. Sovio authored an opinion which was apparently harmful to the Plaintiff’s interests in which he stated that:

a) the Plaintiff was “staying at home, not doing any exercise and appears to be content to carry on in this fashion”;

b) “there is nothing to suggest that” the Plaintiff “should be disabled to this degree” and the Plaintiff’s “medical care appears to be somewhat disjointed”;

c) “legal matters” were interfering with the Plaintiff’s case; and

d) the Plaintiff “has a history of [being] off work for an extended period of time in the past and seems content to continue with this role of disability at this time”.

After receiving this report the Plaintiff and ICBC could not agree as to what PArt 7 benefits ought to be paid.  The Plaintiff responded in a unique way, he sued Dr. Sovio directly arguing that Dr. Sovio failed to assess his injuries in “an objective, fair and even handed manner.“.

Dr. Sovio applied to dismiss the lawsuit arguing, despite any consequences the report may have had between the Plaintiff and ICBC with respect to Part 7 benefits, that he owed the Plaintiff “no duty in contract, no duty of insurer-insured good faith and no duty of care in negligence”.  Dr. Sovio went further and argued that even if there was such a duty that the lawsuit had to be dismissed because he had “witness immunity“.

Madam Justice Hyslop of the BC Supreme Court sided with Dr. Sovio’s arguments and dismissed the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.  In doing so the Court made the following critical findings:

[34] Dr. Sovio’s role and relationship with Mr. Mund cannot be greater than that of ICBC.  It is not within the power of Dr. Sovio to determine whether Mr. Mund receives Part 7 benefits.  The power and the exercise of that power is that of ICBC. ..

[37] I find that Dr. Sovio is not in a fiduciary relationship, nor in a doctor/patient relationship, nor is one created between Mr. Mund and Dr. Sovio as a result of the medical examination by Dr. Sovio of Mr. Mund…

[48] In British Columbia, ICBC may choose, pursuant to s. 99, the medical practitioner.  The sole purpose of the s. 99 examination is that the medical practitioner examine the insured.  It is entirely at the discretion of ICBC when, and if, there is an examination.  There is no requirement that the medical practitioner provide a plan of care for the insured such as the Ontario DAC.  The doctor’s opinion is not binding on anyone; neither the insured nor the insurer.  ICBC may use, for different claims, for different insureds, the same medical practitioner time and time again.  ICBC may reject the medical practitioner’s opinion in whole or in part.  It is simply not a process in which the insured participates in other than to present himself or herself to the medical practitioner designated by ICBC…

[71] In Howatt v. Klassen, 2005 CanLll 11191, Dr. Klassen was requested by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario to examine Dr. Howatt.  That was the extent of the relationship between Dr. Klassen and the plaintiff, Dr. Howatt.  The court concluded that Dr. Klassen acted as an agent and for an appointee of the college.  In dismissing Dr. Howatt’s action, the court stated:

[11]      In any event, I agree with the submission that Dr. Klassen is protected by the common law doctrine of witness immunity, which protects individuals from civil suit based on their status as witnesses or potential witnesses at judicial proceedings.  The case law establishes that this protection is absolute so that even allegations of bad faith are insufficient to exclude the application of the witness immunity doctrine.

[72] A similar situation occurred in N. (M.) v. Forberg, [2009] A.J. No. 253.  The court found a witness immunity applied to a psychologist who counselled children involved in a custody and access dispute.  In proceedings between the parents of the children, the mother of the children asked the psychologist to give an opinion.  The opinion was adverse to the plaintiff father, and the court found the psychologist owed no duty of care, no fiduciary duty to the father and concluded that witness immunity applied, stating the following at para. 57:

If professionals in the field of health care are exposed to the threat of law suits when they intervene on behalf of persons to whom they clearly owe a duty and have determined are vulnerable individuals, there will be a chilling effect on the willingness of health care providers to deliver their necessary assistance to the Court, and to be full and frank in their opinions when doing so.

[73] Similarly, Dr. Sovio, in providing assessments pursuant to s. 99, must not be exposed to the threat of lawsuits for delivering his opinion, even if those opinions or actions are contrary to those of Mr. Mund…

Dr. Sovio is not a public official, but an expert retained by ICBC.  His position is similar to that of Dr. Klassen in Howatt and Ms. Froberg. …

[79] For these reasons, Mr. Mund’s ASC is struck out and the claim dismissed for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

Court Ordered "Independent Medical Exams" and the Standard of Review – A Second Kick at the Can

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams. 49 Comments on Court Ordered "Independent Medical Exams" and the Standard of Review – A Second Kick at the Can


When a court orders a Plaintiff to attend an independent medical exam (click here to read some related posts on this topic) in an ICBC or other Injury Claim and the parties appeal what is the standard of review used in the appellate hearing?
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing this issue.
In today’s case (Barbosa v. Castillo) the Plaintiff attended an Independent Medical Exam (IME) with an Orthopaedic Surgeon chosen by the Defendant.  He gave an opinion that the plaintiff did not have a “functional problem” with respect to any neurological complaints.  The Plaintiff then served expert reports outlining  that he had nerve root irritation which negatively impacted his ability to work.
The Defence asked for a second medical exam, this time with a neurologist.  On application to Court the presiding Master rejected the motion.  The Defendant appealed the ruling.  On hearing the appeal Mr. Justice Schultes had to decide, amongst other things, what the legal test was on these types of applications.  He ruled that the appeal can be a rehearing (as opposed to requiring proof that the Master was ‘clearly wrong’) in essence giving the appellant a second kick at the can.  Specifically the Court held as follows:

[14] Before proceeding further, it is necessary to establish the applicable standard of review of the learned master’s decision.  It is well established that on purely interlocutory matters, it must be demonstrated that the master was “clearly wrong” in his or her decision. However, when the ruling raises questions that are vital to the final issue in the case, the reviewing court approaches the matter as a rehearing.  When the master’s decision deals with a question of law, the standard of review is correctness:  Abermin Corp. v. Granges Exploration Ltd., [1990] B.C.J. No. 1060 (S.C.), and Joubarne v. Sandes, 2009 BCSC 1413 at para. 14.

[15] A decision to deny a defendant the opportunity to have an independent medical examination conducted of the plaintiff can raise questions that are vital to the final issue in the case.  In Belke v. Bennett, 2006 BCSC 536, Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following helpful approach at para. 5:

If the Master’s order amounts to a refusal, whether in whole or in part, of an application to have the plaintiff submit to an independent medical examination, it may deprive the defendant of discovering evidence necessary for a full examination of the plaintiff’s claim or of a defence advanced.  It is in that sense that a decision may be said to go to an issue vital to the trial. […]  If, on the other hand, the Master’s order simply sets terms on which the independent medical examination is to be conducted or directs that such an examination not be performed by a particular professional, the defendant is not deprived of potential evidence, and the order cannot be characterized as going to an issue that may be vital to a final issue at the trial.

[16] I adopt this analysis.  I think the master’s decision in this case fell within the first situation envisioned in Belke.  Denying the defendant’s application effectively foreclosed any exploration of Dr. Hunt’s opinion, let alone any rebuttal of it, on behalf of the defendant by an expert with the specific expertise necessary to cope with the report on its own terms.

[17] If uncontradicted, Dr. Hunt’s opinion could be determinative of several of the kinds of damages claimed by the plaintiff, in particular as to the true nature and extent of his injuries and their impact on his future earning capacity.  These questions appear to be vital to several final issues.  Accordingly, I will treat this appeal as a rehearing.

Mr. Justice Schultes went onto allow the appeal and order the second defence medical exam.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful summary of the law discussing factors courts can consider in applications for multiple independent defence medical exams:

[19] Turning to the actual merits of the defendant’s application on the rehearing, an excellent summary of the applicable law in this area was provided by Madam Justice D. Smith, then a member of this court, in McKay v. Passmore, 2005 BCSC 570 at paras. 15 – 19:

15.       The principles to be followed in deciding whether the defendants have shown an adequate basis for a second IME are set out in Trahan v. West Coast Amusements Ltd.[2000] BCSC 691 (CanLII), [2000] BCSC 691, at para. 48:

The authorities establish that additional medical examinations are in the discretion of the court …  (citations omitted).

That discretion is to be exercised judicially, considering the evidence adduced.  A second examination to permit the defendant a second opinion on the same subject matter will not be allowed.  A second examination may be appropriate where there is some question which could not have been dealt with on the first examination … (Citations omitted).

That the magnitude of the loss is greater than previously known is not in and of itself sufficient to permit a second examination … (Citations omitted).

Where diagnosis is difficult and existing assessments are aged, further assessment may be required …

And in Roberge v. Canada Life Assurance Co. [2002] BCSC 1500 (CanLII), [2002] BCSC 1500 at paragraph 9:

The distinction is quite important.  Simply put, when a person in litigation makes a claim for a personal injury, the defendant is, without oversimplifying the matter, almost always entitled to a medical examination of the plaintiff.  A much higher standard is imposed when the defendant seeks a second medical examination of the plaintiff.

16.       The overriding question is whether a second medical examination is necessary to ensure reasonable equality between the parties in their preparation of a case for trial: Wildemann v. Webster [1990] CanLII 206 (BC C.A.), [1991] 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 244 (C.A.).

17.       Reasonable equality does not mean that the defendant must be able to match expert for expert or report for report.  I refer to Trahan v. West Coast Amusement Ltd. and toMacNevin v. Vroom [21 December 2004] New Westminster S072995 (S.C.).

18.       The defendants must satisfy the court that there is some question or matter that could not have been dealt with at the first examination:  Jackson v. Miller [1999] B.C.J. No. 2751 (S.C.).

19.       In considering how to exercise the discretion to grant a second IME, the court should take into account the timeliness of the application in the light of Rule 40A and the practicalities of trial preparation… [citations omitted.]