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Tag: icbc pain and suffering

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Patellafemoral Pain Syndrome

Reasons for judgment were released yesterday (Fortin v. Cousins) by the BC Supreme Court awarding a Plaintiff just over $300,000 in damages as a result of a 2004 BC Car Crash.
The Plaintiff’s main injury involved his knees and was described by his orthopaedic surgeon as follows:
In the motor vehicle accident of March 28, 2004, Mr. Fortin’s principal injury for which there are ongoing symptoms is contusion of the right and left knees.  It is the writer’s opinion that Mr. Fortin must have sustained anterior blunt trauma to the right and left knees.  He presents with ongoing symptoms consistent with patellofemoral degeneration.

Currently, the discomfort in the right and left knees related to presumed chondromalacia patellae (post traumatic), is not impairing Mr. Fortin in his work.  He obviously is very happy about his present employment.  He has aspirations to, at some time, own his own company and not have to do hands on work.  It is the writer’s opinion that if Mr. Fortin continues in his current occupation long term as a pipefitter, he will experience progressive problems with the right and left knee.

I reviewed with Mr. Fortin the job requirements of a pipefitter in stainless steel.  The requirements are obviously quite rigorous and all his co-workers have musculoskeletal complaints related to the occupation.

The writer does not anticipate there will be spontaneous improvement in the complaints referable to the right and left knee.  Currently, Mr. Fortin is following instructions with regard to the protection of his knees throughout the course of his activities as a pipefitter.

The long term prognosis is guarded if Mr. Fortin remains in precisely his current role as a pipefitter.  One could anticipate that in 10 to 20 years in this particular occupation, he might become disabled for (sic) continuing on.  At the present time there are no operative interventions which would prolong the life of either the right or the left knee.  Mr. Fortin is already making plans to attempt to advance to a supervisory position and eventually, to be an independent contractor of a pipefitting company.  Were Mr. Fortin to follow this career path, it is in the writer’s opinion that his knees would not be a barrier to his future employment.

In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) at $70,000 Mr. Justice Harvey noted the following:

49] The purpose of non-pecuniary damage awards is “to compensate the plaintiff for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”: Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023 at ¶134; see also Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 260-265; and Kuskis v. Hon Tin, 2008 BCSC 862 at ¶135.  While each award must be made with reference to the particular circumstances and facts of the case, other cases may serve as guides to assist the court in arriving at an award that is just and fair to both parties: Kuskis at ¶136.

[50] Russell J. discussed this process in Hoang v. Smith Industries Ltd. et al., 2009 BCSC 275 at ¶33:

There are a number of factors that courts must take into account when assessing this type of claim.  Justice Kirkpatrick, writing for the majority, in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 19, outlines the factors to consider, at para. 46:

The inexhaustive list of common factors cited in Boyd [Boyd v. Harris, 2004 BCCA 146] that influence an award of non-pecuniary damages includes:

(a)        age of the plaintiff;

(b)        nature of the injury;

(c)        severity and duration of pain;

(d)        disability;

(e)        emotional suffering; and

(f)        loss or impairment of life;

I would add the following factors, although they may arguably be subsumed in the above list:

(g)        impairment of family, marital and social relationships;

(h)        impairment of physical and mental abilities;

(i)         loss of lifestyle; and

(j)         the plaintiff’s stoicism (as a factor that should not, generally speaking, penalize the plaintiff: Giang v. Clayton, [2005] B.C.J. No. 163, 2005 BCCA 54 (B.C. C.A.))

[51] Here, Mr. Fortin has suffered significant injuries as a result of a horrific accident.  Happily, with the exception of the problem with his knees, which is permanent, his other complaints resolved over time.  Approximately one year following the accident, Mr. Fortin’s other injuries had resolved and no longer were interfering with either his employment or his enjoyment of life.

[52] His knee symptoms, although mild at present, will create ongoing problems for him both in his vocational and recreational pursuits.  The more he is obliged to work “on the tools”, the greater the interference with both.

[53] Counsel for the plaintiff suggests an award of $90,000 to $100,000 for non-pecuniary loss.  Counsel for the defendant distinguishes the authorities relied upon for the plaintiff and suggests, instead, a range of $30,000 to $45,000, noting, amongst other things, that there has been no surgery to the plaintiff’s knees nor is it anticipated that such will occur in the future.

[54] Both counsel cited Gernitz v. Mowat, 1992 CarswellBC 2460 (S.C.) [Gernitz], presumably because the facts there were remarkably similar to the facts in this case but for the plaintiff’s age.  In Gernitz, the award for non-pecuniary loss was $35,000.  Counsel agreed that grossing up the award from 1992 to present day value results in an award of approximately $47,000.

[55] The major distinguishing factor in Gernitz was the age of the plaintiff who was 56 at the time of trial.  Here the plaintiff is 27 and will be subject to a much longer period of pain and restriction in his social pursuits.  Accordingly, having regard to all of the authorities cited by counsel on the question of non-pecuniary damages, I award the sum of $70,000 under this heading of loss.

ICBC Pain and Suffering Round-Up

With the Canucks losing game 6 and the series to the Blackhawks I figured its a fitting time to write about Pain and Suffering Claims in BC.
In the first case, Chan v. Kao, the Plaintiff suffered a left shoulder injury as a result of a 2006 motor vehicle collision.   Mr. Justice Verhoeven had credibility concerns with respect to some aspects of the Plaintiff’s testimony.  Despite this he concluded that “I have no difficulty in finding that Mr. Chan did in fact injure his left shoulder in the motor vehicle accident“.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss (damages for pain and suffering) at $22,000 the court summarized his injuries and prognosis as follows:
[65]            I accept that Mr. Chan has continued to have shoulder problems and pain since the accident.  The extent to which this has affected his work is impossible to gauge, in view of the unreliability of his evidence.  It seems likely that Mr. Chan has worked at various times and places since the accident, but has chosen not to testify about that work…

72]            In summary, I accept that the plaintiff’s left shoulder was injured in the motor vehicle accident, and that he continues to suffer, to some extent, from shoulder difficulties initially caused by the accident.  The evidence as to the extent to which the ongoing shoulder problem causes the plaintiff ongoing difficulty and disability with respect to his ability to work is subject to considerable doubt, due to the unreliability of the plaintiff’s evidence in this respect, and the lack of corroborating evidence.

[73]            While Dr. Lui’s prognosis of permanent disability is overly pessimistic, both orthopaedic surgeons are of the view that there are ongoing problems in the shoulder which require treatment.  In my view, treatment options have not been adequately explored.

In addition to referencing several cases dealing with pain and suffering values in BC for shoulder injuries this claim is worth reviewing to see how Mr. Justice Verhoeven dealt with his concerns regarding the credibility of certain aspects of the Plaintiff’s evidence.

The second ICBC Pain and Suffering Claim released today (Mattu v. Fust) involved a 2004 collision.  The Plaintiff was 39 years old at the time.  His vehicle was rear-ended with enough force to push it into the vehicle ahead of him.

The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries leading to chronic pain and headaches.  The court found that the effects of these would likely be permanent.  Madam Justice Brown summarized the medical evidence of the Plaintiff’s treating family physician as follows:

 

[31]            Dr. Parhar has been Mr. Mattu’s family physician since April 2004. He provided three reports to the court. In his first report of November 1, 2004, he diagnosed Mr. Mattu with paracervical, parathoracic and paralumbar muscle strain, left shoulder strain and muscle tension headaches.  He had received ice, heat, rest, exercises, massage therapy, kinesiology, acupuncture, herbal medicine and medications: anti-inflamatories, analgesics and muscle relaxants.  With respect to prognosis and recommendations, Dr. Parhar was impressed by Mr. Mattu’s motivation to recover and try different treatments, but was concerned that he may be trying too many modalities.  He recommended limiting treatment to massage and physiotherapy and increasing active modalities such as swimming and exercises.  He anticipated further treatment and improvement.

[32]            In his report of May 26, 2006, Dr. Parhar found that Mr. Mattu continued to have decreased range of motion in the cervical spine, tenderness in the paracervical and paralumbar regions.  He found muscle spasm in the paracervical and paralumbar regions.  His diagnosis remained the same.  His prognosis for full recovery had worsened.  Mr. Mattu had tried a variety of treatments with minimal success.  Dr. Parhar’s recommendations were unchanged, but he thought that Mr. Mattu’s condition had plateaued.

[33]            In his final report of September 16, 2008, Dr. Parhar considered the MRIs of Mr. Mattu’s spine taken September 19, 2006, and July 28, 2008, and concluded that Mr. Mattu’s injuries included cervical and thoracic disc herniations.  He said: “… it is unclear if the cervical and thoracic disc herniations were caused by the motor vehicle accident … but certainly, this motor vehicle accident made these spinal lesions symptomatic.”  He commented on Mr. Mattu’s efforts to recover: “… pursued many more modalities of treatment than most patients would have. Despite all of these modalities his pain symptoms persist.”  He concluded that the prognosis for a full recovery was poor, that Mr. Mattu’s condition had plateaued and further improvement in his functioning or symptomatology was unlikely  

In awarding $60,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss injuries and their effect on the Plaintiff’s life the court accepted the family physicians evidence and stated as follows  

[60]            I found the evidence of Dr. Parhar to be very helpful.  Dr. Parhar has seen Mr. Mattu regularly since shortly after the accident.  I accept his opinion that Mr. Mattu suffered paracervical, parathoracic and paralumbar muscle strain, left shoulder strain and muscle tension headaches from the accident; that his condition has plateaued; and that it is unlikely there will be further improvement.  I also accept the opinions of Drs. Parhar, Hershler and Hunt that the accident likely caused the disc herniations in Mr. Mattu’s back to become symptomatic.  Mr. Mattu will continue to need chiropractic treatment from time to time and would benefit from a personal trainer.

[61]            I have considered the cases which counsel have provided to me.  In my view, an appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss is $60,000.

$40,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for TMJ, Hip Injury and STI's

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court (Pavlovic v. Shields) awarding a Plaintiff just over $134,000 in total damages as a result of injuries sustained in 2 separate motor vehicle collisions.
The first collision was in 2006 and the second in 2007.  Both were rear-end crashes and the Plaintiff was faultless in both collisions.  Often in ICBC Injury Claims involving multiple collisions where fault is not at issue damages are assessed on a global basis and that is what occurred in this case.
Mr. Justice Rice found that the Plaintiff had pre-existing back and shoulder pain before these accidents that that even without these accidents the Plaintiff would have continued to have pain in these areas.  The Court made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries and awarded $40,000 for her non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering / loss of enjoyment of life):

[59]            In this case, the plaintiff had back and shoulder pain pre-dating both accidents.  This is a “crumbling skull” situation.  It is more probable than not that the plaintiff would have experienced ongoing problems with back pain, for which she had already seen a Dr. Ansel Chu on several occasions in 2003.  The plaintiff claims these injuries were fully resolved, and relies on Dr. Chu’s report of August 14, 2003, in which he states that the plaintiff had had good relief from pain following a series of trigger point injections.  However, Dr. Chu does not state that her injuries had resolved, merely that she was “doing quite well” and that she could make a further appointment with him if the pain flared up again.  That the plaintiff made no further appointments is likely explained by the fact that she went to Europe for an extended period shortly after her last appointment with Dr. Chu. 

[60]            The evidence from Dr. Petrovic’s report is that only two permanent injuries from the accidents are likely: the TMJ and the right hip.  He would defer to the experts on those and has a guarded prognosis for the remainder of her injuries.  Dr. Epstein testified that the TMJ injury is likely to improve with continued treatment.  Dr. Smit was of the opinion that the right hip would require surgery.   

[61]            I accept that the plaintiff had no pre-existing hip or jaw complaints and that these are her principal injuries.  The hip may require surgery and her jaw will require ongoing management and treatment.  The defendants are fully liable for these injuries.  Her other injuries – the neck, shoulder and back pain – are likely to improve over the next year.   The effects of the concussion resolved nine months after the accident.  Taking these factors into account, I consider an award of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages appropriate in the circumstances, the bulk of which reflects the injuries to the jaw and hip, discounted by 20% to reflect the plaintiff’s pre-existing chronic back pain, for a total of $40,000.

Mr. Justice Rice also did a good job explaining 2 legal principles which often arise in ICBC Injury Claims – the ‘thin-skull’ principle vs. the ‘crumbling skull’ principle.  He summarized these as follows:

[54]            The defendant does not go so far as to deny that the accident caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.  The concern is as to the extent.  The issue is whether this is a “thin skull” or a “crumbling skull” situation.  Both address the circumstances of a pre-existing condition and its effect upon the accident victim.  The law is that the defendant need not compensate the plaintiff for any debilitating effects of a pre-existing condition if the plaintiff would have experienced them regardless of the accident: Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at para. 35, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235.  The court requires “a measurable risk” or “a real or substantial possibility and not speculation” that the pre-existing condition would have manifested in the future regardless of the plaintiff’s negligence.  The measurable risk need not be proven on a balance of probabilities, but given weight according to the probability of its occurrence: Athey v. Leonati, at para. 27.

[55]            The injury is deemed “thin skull” when there is a pre-existing condition that is not active or symptomatic at the time of the accident, and that is unlikely to become active but for the accident.  If the injury is proven to be of a thin skull nature, then the defendant is liable for all the plaintiff’s injuries resulting from the accident. 

[56]            A “crumbling skull” injury is also one where there is a pre-existing condition, but one which is active or likely to become active regardless of the accident.  If the injury is proven to be of a crumbling skull nature, then the plaintiff is liable only to the extent that the accident caused an aggravation to the pre-existing condition.

$40,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded in ICBC Injury Claim Involivng Soft Tissue Injuries

I am in trial this week and am a little short on time so this ICBC Injury Law update will be a little light on my desired level of analysis. 
Reasons for judgement were released today (Lai v. Wang) compensating a Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a 2004 motor vehicle collision in Vancouver, BC.
In this ICBC Claim the Court found that the Plaintiff sustained various soft tissue injuries which plateaued after several months leaving the Plaintiff with occasional pain.  The Court’s key findings and assessment of damages can be found at paragraphs 34-38 which I reproduce for your convenience:

[34]            I am of the view that the plaintiff has suffered significant, but not disabling, pain, which should largely be compensated in damages for loss of enjoyment of life.  I expect it will continue for some time into the future on an annoying, but not disabling basis, but that he will likely recover as Dr. Fenton suggests.  The cases which seem to me to offer the best guidance are Hubbard v. Saunders, 2008 BCSC 486, and Jackson v. Gow, 2001 BCSC 54.  I am of the view that $40,000 is an appropriate amount for these damages.  I should add that there was some evidence of pre-accident complaints of pain requiring treatment.  I do not think it was demonstrated that any of those problems were aggravated in a sense that required them to be taken into account.

[35]            I do not accept the mathematics offered by the plaintiff for past income loss.  I accept that the plaintiff may have lost some work due to pain while he worked at the Face Shop, but do not accept that he was disabled in relation to the jobs he chose to do.  I estimate the actual interference with work he was available for and willing to do at $1000.

[36]            With respect to loss of future earning capacity, I accept that the injuries the plaintiff suffered may affect his income earning capacity on the basis outlined in Palmer v. Goodall, [1991] 53 B.C.L.R. (2d) 44 (C.A.):

…Because it is impairment that is being redressed, even a plaintiff who is apparently going to be able to earn as much as he could have earned if not injured or who, with retraining, on the balance of probabilities will be able to do so, is entitled to some compensation for the impairment.  He is entitled to it because for the rest of his life some occupations will be closed to him and it is impossible to say that over his working life the impairment will not harm his income ability.

[37]            Mr. Lai is not disabled from the kind of work he has chosen in the past to do, and the kind of work he expects to qualify for in the future.  He does, nevertheless, have a level of pain that Dr. Condon considers chronic and Dr. Fenton believes will ultimately resolve, particularly if the plaintiff works through the pain in the short term.  I think it likely that the plaintiff will ultimately reach a point where he is only occasionally troubled by pain.  When that may be is unknowable.  In the meantime, although the plaintiff is unlikely, in any event, to work in fields imposing significant physical demands, he will suffer a loss of capacity to do such work, for which he is entitled to some compensation.  I fix those damages at $25,000.

[38]            The plaintiff is entitled to special claimed damages for sums expended to date, which I gather are agreed at $5193.  I do not think the plaintiff can be faulted for the amounts spent in trying to obtain relief from the consequences of the accident to the date of trial.  I am not satisfied that the $1200 for the Taiwan airplane ticket is justified and deny that claim.  I accept that the plaintiff will require occasional prescriptions and therapy in the future, although such an award should be modest.  I allow $1000 for this.  I reject, as speculative, the pulse therapy suggested by Dr. Condon.

Can Jaywalkers Injured by a Vehicle Seek Pain and Suffering in an ICBC Claim?

If you are jaywalking and are injured in a BC Car Accident, can you make a claim for pain and suffering?  The answer is it depends on the circumstances.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court illustrating the principle that simply because someone is in breach of the law at the time of a car crash they can still succeed in advancing a negligence claim (a claim for pain and suffering and other damages against another party).
In today’s case (Lemesurier v. McConnachie) the Plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a vehicle as she was crossing Victoria Street in Trail, BC.  At the time she was jaywalking.  For this she was found at fault for the collision.   However, the court also found that the motorist that struck the Plaintiff at fault concluding that the motorist was not driving with appropriate caution at the time of the collision.  The court made the following analyisis in finding the jaywalker 60% at fault for the crash and the motorist 40% at fault:

[21]            Where, however, there are circumstances known to a motor vehicle operator, that render questionable the presumption that the rules of the road will be respected by pedestrians, the exercise of due care is not met by behaving in accordance with the presumption.  One cannot be deemed to presume facts at odds with known circumstances.  “Due care” on the night of this accident included the known, and (by the plaintiff), specifically observed circumstance that there were pedestrians about and, that given the nature of the event, they might not be taking all due care for their own safety.  This required an extra degree of caution in the circumstances.  The plaintiff acknowledged this herself in turning into the centre lane to avoid pedestrians.

[22]            The question then becomes whether the plaintiff has proved that the plaintiff’s want of due care, applying s. 181, contributed to the collision.  Liston v. Streiger, CA 18770, CA19363 Vancouver Registry (June 25, 1996) is a case in which the Court of Appeal apportioned negligence 60-40 against a pedestrian who was struck in Penticton during the “Peach Festival” in a somewhat comparable atmosphere, in that the exercise of due care included adjusting ones’ driving habits to accommodate the possibility of careless behaviour by pedestrians.  There the facts, as found by the trial judge and accepted by the Court of Appeal, included the plaintiff “running barefoot across a busy street at night, in a poorly lit area in a state of intoxication… she glanced into the curb lane and proceeded to run into it … .”

[23]            The defendant’s position is that apart from any discussion of legal presumptions and duties, the effect of the evidence is that the plaintiff simply ran into the defendant’s car in circumstances where the defendant had no opportunity to avoid striking her.  The widths of the lanes established in evidence suggest that the distance from the curb to the point of impact is not great and could be traversed in a matter of seconds by a person who was running.  The defence submits that the plaintiff’s evidence that she simply did not see the defendant until she was upon her may be attributed to the probability that the plaintiff was running.

[24]            The useful evidence is, again, that of the defence witness Ms. Howes.  Apart from establishing that the collision occurred while the traffic signals were against the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was not in the crosswalk, Ms. Howes’ evidence is that she saw a large group of people crossing the road from her vantage in the intersection.  Some were running.  Her evidence is that the plaintiff was among the last of that group attempting to cross.  Ms. Howes saw shadows crossing the road and had enough time to form the impression that someone was going to be hit because approaching cars were not slowing down.

[25]            I accept that Ms. Howes probably saw the plaintiff running.  It may well be, as the defence assets that she ran right in front of the car leaving the defendant very little time to react to her specific presence.  This does not, however, explain how the defendant could approach the intersection without slowing or without the utmost caution given that a large group of people had proceeded to cross moments before contrary to the traffic signal.  The effect of Ms. Howes’ evidence, which I accept, is that the presence of people on the road was manifest, and that the defendant should have been alert to that fact.  She should not, in view of the circumstances, have been “surprised” by pedestrians behaving as the plaintiff did.

[26]            I am of the view that the plaintiff should bear the larger portion of the responsibility for what happened to her.  With respect to the division of liability, I find it difficult to distinguish the relative degrees of responsibility here from those established in Liston (supra).  Accordingly, I divide responsibility for what occurred 60% to the plaintiff and 40% to the defendant.

This case goes to show that simply because one party is breaking the law at the time of a BC car crash another party can still be (partially or wholly) responsible.  Each case turns on its own circumstances and a breach of a law of one party will not excuse careless driving by another when it comes to the law of negligence (the law that governs ICBC claims for pain and suffering).

Small Claims Court Awards $10,000 for 4 month Soft Tissue Injury ICBC Claim

 (Image created by and used with permission of High Impact)
I usually focus my ICBC case law reports on cases from the BC Supreme Court and BC Court of Appeal but reasons for judgement were recently released from the Provincial Court of BC (commonly referred to as Small Claims Court) which caught my eye.
The Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end crash in May 2005.  From the judgement it appears to me to be a claim that fit ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact criteria (LVI) where ICBC takes the position that no compensable tort claim exists. 
The Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained little damage.  The evidence presented by the Plaintiff, her husband and her doctor was ‘fairly consistent’ and the court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered a ‘whiplash injury’ to her neck and back.
The court made the following findings “I accept that there is a four month injury from start to finish with approximately two months off work.  On those facts, it is my standard view and backed up by a number of cases, which oddly enough comes in directly between what the claimant puts forward way up at the upper end and what the defendant puts forward way down at the lower end, my view of this has been throughout coming towards the figure of $10,000 and that is the figure that I do award“.
The Plaintiff was also awarded her lost wages and special damages (out of pocket accident related expenses).
This judgement was only 3 pages long which is unusual for an ICBC personal injury case and makes for very easy reading.  I can’t find this judgment on the BC Provincial Court website but will post a link to the judgement if it becomes published.  This case shows how well suited the Provincial Court can be in some circumstances in dealing with ICBC injury claims involving minimal injuries which resolve quickly.

Pain and Suffering for Dislocated Shoulder / Elbow and Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released today awarding damages as a result of injuries and loss from a 2002 BC motor vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff was a passenger.  He was involved in a single vehicle accident.  The collision was significant and is described at paragraph 2 of the reasons for judgment as follows:
                The thirty-two year old plaintiff was travelling from Prince Rupert to Terrace as passenger with three children in a car driven by the defendant, Crystal Caroline Bird (“Bird”), when Bird lost control of the vehicle after encountering ice on the highway.  The vehicle, a 1998 Toyota van owned by Bird, crossed the centre line of the highway and rolled twenty feet down an embankment, flipping over before it landed.  According to Wilson, he lost consciousness briefly in the accident and felt pain in his shoulder, elbow and left knee immediately.  He bled from his head, having hit the window.  His back hurt.  A passing driver was hailed and managed to open the passenger door.  Wilson got out of the vehicle and sat, waiting for the ambulance.  The vehicle was very significantly damaged.
The Plaintiff sustained some fairly serious injuries and these, along with their recovery, are summarized well at paragraph 31 of the judgement which I reproduce below:
The plaintiff suffered a dislocated right shoulder, dislocated left elbow, contusion and sprain of the left knee, mild sprain of the cervical spine, and multiple contusions and bruises in the motor vehicle accident of November 30, 2002.  I accept Dr. Kokan’s assessment that the plaintiff’s left knee was not dislocated in the accident but was probably sprained and has fully recovered.  The right shoulder had largely resolved by August 2003 but remains vulnerable to re-injury.  The left elbow has been the greatest problem, heightened by the lengthy wait for surgery.  The plaintiff has lost about ten percent of the movement in this elbow and has residual tenderness.  The incapacity is, however, mild and the plaintiff still has a good range of motion in the elbow.  The left knee had largely resolved to its pre-accident state by June 2005.  It is difficult to ascribe continuing lower back pain to the accident.  I conclude that there was some accerbation of the historical back pain in the accident but do not find that continuing problems can be attributed to the accident.  The plaintiff’s scalp laceration and facial abrasions have healed.
In awarding $85,000 for the Plaintiff’s Pain and Suffering the court made the following observations:
[34]            Wilson’s injuries here are more significant that in either Thorp or Foreman.  The plaintiff required two surgeries for the left elbow dislocation (including a closed reduction) and a closed reduction of the dislocated right shoulder, among other injuries described above.  Wilson has greater permanent restriction in movement of the left elbow than did the plaintiff in Thorp and still has nagging pain.  He is stoical about the continuing pain and discomfort.  Although I do not find that the permanent elbow restriction hinders recreational activity, the plaintiff’s right shoulder injury caused pain when swimming until June 2005.  The plaintiff suffered while he waited for surgery between 2003-2006.  I assess non-pecuniary damages at $85,000.