Skip to main content

Tag: icbc medical exams

More on BC Injury Claims and Multiple Defence Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 54 Comments on More on BC Injury Claims and Multiple Defence Medical Exams


Further to my recent post on this topic it is well settled that the BC Supreme Court can order that a Plaintiff undergo multiple defence medical exams in a Personal Injury Claim depending on the circumstances of any particular case.
There are some limitations on this and one such restriction relates to having the same injury reassessed when nothing has changed since an initial defence examination.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Bidgood v. Kostman) the Plaintiff was involved in a personal injury lawsuit.   The Plaintiff consented to being examined by an orthopaedic surgeon at the request of the Defendant.  This surgeon provided a report commenting on the Plaintiff’s injuries.   As the lawsuit progressed the Plaintiff exchanged the medical reports that she wished to rely on to the Defendants as required by the Rules of Court.  These reports commented on the Plaintiff’s chronic myofascial pain.  This prompted the Defence to seek a second medical exam, this time with a physiatrist.  The Plaintiff did not consent to this and a Court motion was brought to compel attendance.
The Defence argued that they needed the additional exam to assess the allegation of chronic myofascial pain.    Master McCallum of the BC Supreme Court rejected the motion finding that the Defendant had a proper opportunity to assess this alleged injury when they had their first defence medical exam.  Specifically Master McCallum noted the following:



[7] The authorities are clear, and there is no real dispute between counsel here. The court can order any number of reports by nominees of a party, but in this case, in order to have an additional report on this issue of myofascial or soft tissue pain, there has to be some evidence that something has changed. There is no such evidence. The diagnosis and findings of Dr. Wahl in his report are remarkably similar to the reports that he had when he saw the plaintiff. They are remarkably similar to the reports that have been delivered later, and particularly Filbey’s report. It is clear that nothing has changed in the plaintiff’s symptomology. There is no suggestion here that Dr. Wahl made a comment that she should be seen by someone else as he was unable to make findings of fact with respect to what was troubling her or could not make a diagnosis. None of that is found in Wahl’s report. It is simply the case that the defendants now wish to have the matching specialist, as Lofgren says in her affidavit, because the defendants believe that Dr. Wahl’s report may somehow not stand up to Dr. Filbey’s report.  There is no evidence of that. There is no evidence that an orthopedic surgeon could not make findings in the way he did. There is no evidence that Dr. Filbey is somehow better off to report on the findings that he made. That is simply not the case.

[8] The plaintiff may be right when she says that the defendants have an expert whose report does not favour the defendants’ case particularly, and that a further report may aid them more than Dr. Wahl’s report. This is not a case where the defendants are in a position of inequality or the defendants are prejudiced by whatever the plaintiff has done in the time between Dr. Wahl’s report and the 40A deadline. None of that occurred. The prejudice will occur if the examination by Dr. Hirsch, the further report, goes ahead because that will be, as the plaintiff says, fresh evidence on this issue to which they will feel obliged to respond. If the defendants want a rebuttal report, then the defendants are entitled to obtain one. They do not need to have the plaintiff examined to accomplish that.

[9] The application for the examination by Hirsch is dismissed. In the circumstances ?? we do not have a liability problem here, do we, so the plaintiff will get her costs in any event.

As readers of this blog know the BC Supreme Court Rules are being overhauled in July 2010.  The Court will continue to have the power to order multiple medical exams in particular circumstances but one thing that will change is that the concept of ‘proportionality’ will be introduced into the analysis.  It will be interesting to see how this principle affects the law of multiple defence medical exams in ICBC and other BC Personal Injury Litigation.

Defence Medical Exams – BCSC More Than Just A "Rubber Stamp"

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Privacy Issues, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on Defence Medical Exams – BCSC More Than Just A "Rubber Stamp"


As readers of this blog know when people sue for damages in the BC Supreme Court as a result of an Injury Claim they give up certain privacy rights.  Documents need to be disclosed to opposing counsel, examinations for discovery can be compelled, even ‘independent‘ medical exams can be ordered.
In the course of an Injury Claim Rule 30 of the BC Supreme Court Rules permits a Court to order that a Plaintiff undergo a Defence Medical Exam(DME) in order to “level the playing field“.   It is generally accepted that at least one DME will be ordered by the Court if requested in a typical personal injury claim.  Such an order, however, is not an automatic right and reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Chapman v. Magee) the Plaintiff was injured in “a reasonably nasty motor vehicle accident involving…a car and a motorcycle“.  The Injuries included a flailed chest and a broken ankle.
The Defence lawyer asked that the Plaintiff attend a defence medical exam with a respirologist and an orthopaedic surgeon.   The Plaintiff’s lawyer did not consent and a court motion was brought to compel attendance.  Master Caldwell dismissed the application finding that the materials in support were “significantly wanting“.    The Court noted that while the evidentiary burden on these applications is not high the Court is not a ‘rubber stamp‘ and some evidence needs to be tendered.  Specifically Master Caldwell stated:

There is nothing in the material where counsel opines as to the need for these reports or these examinations to be done, which, as I see the case authority, and in particular, Astels, para. 23, where the court says:

In addition to the paralegal’s affidavit, there was also in evidence a letter from counsel for the defendants to counsel for the plaintiff concerning the proposed medical examination in which counsel for the defendant said:

You will be asking the court to retrospectively decide whether or not the plaintiff was totally disabled the date the action was commenced.  Clearly medical opinion in that regard is relevant.

[5] He is opining there as counsel as to the importance and purpose of the Rule 30 examinations.  In my view, that sets out a bare minimum, and I do not want to be overly technical because it may or may not be efficient to go on that basis, but in my view there is not a scintilla of evidence here from counsel or otherwise as to the use that this information would be put to.  I can certainly speculate and it would appear from the pleadings that I could speculate as to what use it might be made, but far and away from what the minimum level is, it would be nice on these applications to have letters or some kind of material from a doctor opining as to why they need to see the person.  That certainly goes beyond what would be needed, but in my view, Astels puts down a bare minimum.

[6] And as I say, I may be being overly technical, but I do not think so.  These are not rubber-stamp applications and they cannot become rubber-stamp applications.  There must be some substance relating to what this information is going to be used for and what the focus is going to be.  And, frankly, having gone over the lunch hour and again read the letters, I can find no such supporting evidence in the material filed by the defendant.

[7] On that basis, this application for today by the defendants is dismissed.  It is dismissed without prejudice to their right to re-bring the application on proper material because I think there may be something out there and I think Rule 1(5) does say “on the merits” and it should not be just simply a technical slam-dunk there.  But the application on the basis of the material before me has to be dismissed in my respectful view.  It has to be dismissed on the basis that costs will be to the plaintiff in any event of the cause on this because the material brought by the defence simply is not adequate.  The issue of costs in subsequent application, should the defence seek to bring such an application, can be dealt with by the court that hears that application.

As with all civil procedure cases I will cross reference this with the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules.  Rule 30 is replaced with Rule 7-6 and the wording is almost identical under the new rules making precedents such as this one useful under the soon to be in place new system.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Independent Medical Exams

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

One of the most frequently litigated issues in ICBC claims is the nature and number of ‘indpendent’ medical examiners (“IME”) that Defendants are entitled to have Plaintiffs examined by.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court ordering a Plaintiff to be examined by a psychiatrist of the Defendant’s choosing.  In this case the Defendant’s need for a psychiatric IME of the Plaintiff was not seriously challenged, what was challenged was the timing.
Rule 40-A of the Supreme Court Rules deals with the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in Supreme Court trials.   Rule 40A(5) requires such expert evidence to be exchanged with the other party 60 days before it is tendered in evidence.
In today’s case the requested examination would take place less than 60 days from trial.  The Plaintiff argued that if the medical exam went ahead he would be prejudiced because the Plaintiff would have insufficient time to hire his own expert to respond to the opinion that was being sought.  This, the Plaintiff argued, would likely lead to an adjournment which would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff.
Master Tokarek of the BC Supreme Court ordered that the medical exam proceed despite the Plaintiff’s objection.  In doing so he stated that “the timing of the application, without more, is largely irrelevant”.  The key reasons are set out in paragraphs 23-27 which I set out below:

[23]            The comment about the balancing of prejudice is of some significance in the context of submissions made in the case at bar with respect to when defence counsel could or would be able to seek an IME.  Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that whenever the plaintiff would be unable to obtain expert evidence to rebut or deal with any defence IME report, an order should not be made.  Counsel indicated that his dilemma would be the same even if this application was brought in December because he would need approximately one year to get an appointment with his own expert.  The logic of that seems to be that unless defence counsel applied for the psychiatric IME a year or more in advance of the trial date, the application should be denied because plaintiff’s counsel would be in exactly the same position of not being able to get his expert to deal with it and prejudiced because of an adjournment.  I utterly reject that logic

[24]            I believe the more appropriate approach is to balance the prejudice of a potential adjournment against the prejudice to the defendant in not obtaining relevant evidence.  Here the requested IME is not with respect to an inconsequential or insignificant issue.  The defendant seeks to reasonably establish that the plaintiff’s complaints are wholly or largely unconnected to the MVA.

[25]            The balance of the authorities are similarly either distinguishable or unhelpful.  Master Barber, in the Bubra decision said:

. . . the defendant has had full opportunity to have this matter brought forward at an earlier date so that these matters could be dealt with in a reasonable way.  For their own reasons, they have not done so. 

I do not find that to be the situation here.

[26]            The last authority, the Barron case, is another decision of Master Patterson.  At paragraph 21 he said:

. . . it seems to me that it is the obligation of the defence to not sit and wait until the last minute and then scramble to bring an application like this on.

With all due respect, the timing of the application without more, is largely irrelevant.  All of the authorities relied on by the plaintiff came to the conclusion, in some fashion unknown to me, certainly not discernable from the reasons, that the timing would lead to an adjournment and that an adjournment would prejudice the plaintiff.  Apart from the Mackichan decision, there is nothing to suggest that any consideration was given to balancing the prejudice to the plaintiff against that of the defendant.

[27]            In this case, I have no evidence to conclude that there would be an adjournment or that if that was so, it would amount to a prejudice that outweighs the prejudice to the defendant in not being able to obtain material evidence going to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim.  Consequently I grant the application and order that an IME take place as requested.