BC Courts have heard many ICBC claims involving PTSD and Chronic Pain Syndrome. In reasons for judgement released this week Mr. Justice Cullen heard and dismissed a PTSD claim and Chronic Pain Syndrome claim as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
In 2004 the Plaintiff, who was a passenger in her boyfriend’s vehicle, was involved in a collision where her vehicle rear-ended the vehicle in front of her. The accident occurred on Nanaimo Street in Vancouver, BC. She advanced a tort claim against her boyfriend who was deemed to be the at-fault driver (a tort claim is the legal term used to describe a civil action, such as an ICBC claim for damages against an at fault driver).
ICBC, on the boyfriend’s behalf, admitted fault but disputed the alleged injuries. The Plaintiff claimed to suffer from soft tissue injuries to her neck and back, a myofacial pain syndrome and/or a pain disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
As in alsmost all ICBC claims involving alleged chronic pain, the court heard from a number of expert witnesses including the Plaintiff’s family doctor, a physiotherapist, a physiatrist (rehabilitaiton specialist) a psychologist and an orthopaedic surgeon. The orthopaedic surgeon was a defence witness who conducted an ‘independent medical exam’ of the Plaintiff pursuant to the BC Rules of Court.
In the Plaintiff’s case evidence was led that she suffered from a ‘myofacial pain syndrome’ which was described as ‘a central nervous system disorder with peripheral manifestations of muscle tightness and soreness to palpation over areas called trigger points…areas in the muscles that are rich in nerve endings’.
A psychologist testified that the Plaintiff suffered from a Post Traumatic Pain Disorder (PTSD) and also that she suffered from ‘many symptoms of a pain disorder’.
The orthopaedic surgeon, who is often used by ICBC, testified that the Plaintiff suffered from soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper back and shoulders, along with some cuts and bruises. He dismissed the connection of the Plaintiff’s low back complaints to the accident by stating “There is a basic premise in medicine that if a site has been traumatized, that site becomes symptomatic immediately, right after the MVA or certainly within the first few days after the MVA”. He then testified that his physical examination of the Plaintiff was ‘completely normal’ and he regarded any soft tissue injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as resolved.
In the end the court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for PTSD and Chronic Pain Disorder and found that the Plaintiff suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper back and shoulder. The court also found that the Plaintiff’s low back symptoms which developed 3 months post accident were causally connected to the accident either through compensatory back pain of through myofacial pain syndrome. The court also found that the Plaintiff suffered from anxiety as a result of the accident and awarded $35,000 for pain and suffering, $560 for past out of pocket expenses and a further $700 to permit the Plaintiff to attend further counselling sessions with her pscyhologist to treat her anxiety.
This judgement is worth a quick read if you are advancing an ICBC claim involving chronic pain or PTSD to see some of the factors courts look at when weighing competing medical evidence. The judgement seems to be a compromise between the competing evidence accepting that the Plaintiff’s injuries, while not PTSD or Chronic Pain Syndrome, were not resolved by the time of trial. When considering settling an ICBC claim it is good to become familiar with how courts treat similar injuries and what the various outcomes at trial can be.
Do you have questions about an ICBC claim involving PTSD or Chronic Pain that you want to discuss with an ICBC Claims Lawyer? If so, click here to contact ICBC Claims Lawyer Erik Magraken for a free consultation.
Tag: icbc claims lawyer
BC Courts have heard many ICBC claims involving PTSD and Chronic Pain Syndrome. In reasons for judgement released this week Mr. Justice Cullen heard and dismissed a PTSD claim and Chronic Pain Syndrome claim as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
In highly anticipated reasons for judgement released today, following a 4 week trial in late 2007, Mr. Justice Maczko awarded a severely injured Plaintiff over $1,000,000 in compensation as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
The issues to be decided at trial were liability (who was at fault) and quantum (the value of the injuries) as a result of a significant accident which occurred in West Vancouver, BC in 2004.
The Plaintiff, who was 26 years old at the time, was standing in a roadway in West Vancouver when he was struck by a Hummer SUV driven by the Defendant. The Plaintiff sustained serious injuries including a traumatic brain injury, scalp wound, bilateral wrist and jaw fractures, the loss of several teeth, and soft tissue injuries to the neck and back. The traumatic brain injury was the most significant of these in terms of the Plaintiff’s employability and need for future medical care.
In the end the court found the Defendant entirely at fault an awarded over $1,000,000 in damages to the Plaintiff.
Addressing the issue of liability at paragraph of 127 of the judgement, the court held as follows:
 The Hummer travelled too quickly for the existing conditions. Mr. Samieian was negligent in moving his vehicle too quickly and travelling around the cube van when his view of his path was obscured. It is more likely that the accident arose from driver error than from a complete failure of all controls on the Hummer. It is unlikely that steering, braking and acceleration all malfunctioned at once, and without leaving anything detectable on inspection after the accident.
 As a result, the defendants are entirely responsible for the accident and for the losses it caused Mr. Dikey.
As is often the case in ICBC claims involving brain injuries, the court heard from numerous expert physicians including neurologists, a neuropsychologist, and a Physiatrist (physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist).
In the end the court made the following findings regarding the Plaintiff’s injuries:
 In summary, Mr. Dikey suffered many injuries as a result of the accident. The most significant injury in terms of functioning was the traumatic brain injury. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the injury was moderate when it occurred, but this is of little assistance in determining the long-term impact of the injury.
 Mr. Dikey’s continuing cognitive problems include significant limitations with memory, planning, organizing, attention, concentration, awareness, judgement, decision-making, language, reasoning, abstract thinking, mental flexibility, and calculations. He forgets to eat and take his medications regularly, and forgets appointments. He also suffers depression, isolation and limited social support and interactions. He has minimal initiation and motivation.
 Mr. Dikey suffered serious head and jaw injuries. Dr. Goldstein recommends investigating jaw reconstruction, likely requiring refracturing the jaw on both sides, and tooth replacement. Mr. Dikey and his family were undecided for several years about whether to pursue that treatment, owing to the risk of damage to a facial nerve. The evidence suggests that the risk is small and any damage that might occur would probably be temporary.
 Mr. Dikey suffered two broken wrists. His left wrist healed appropriately, but the right wrist did not. He does not have pain-free full range of motion of his right wrist owing to the way the fracture healed. The suggested surgery will give him a very good chance of increased range of motion without pain.
 Mr. Dikey suffered injury to his right knee. The recommended surgery for his right knee would have a good likelihood of relieving his right knee pain.
 Mr. Dikey has continuing pain from his soft tissue injury to his neck and back. His cuts and bruises have healed, but he has a visible scar on his forehead and in his scalp. His primary complaint is of headaches, which can be so bad at times that they lead to vomiting. They are his most frequent and significant cause of pain.
The court summarized the profound effects of the injuries as follows:
 Mr. Dikey’s life has changed profoundly as a consequence of the accident. He is unlikely to work, and has lost the self-esteem, enjoyment and income that is available from work. While he retains the ability to walk and talk and engage in the activities of daily living, his cognitive problems are such that he will require some assistance for the rest of his life. His most significant loss is the loss of cognitive abilities. He also suffers severe headaches. He has chronic pain in the neck. His pain and the lost function of his right wrist are likely to improve following surgery. He will likely have on-going problems with his neck and back.
In the end damages were assessed as follows:
$215,000 for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering)
$500,000 for lost future earning capacity
$350,000 for cost of future care
If you have questions about an ICBC claim or a brain injury claim that you would like to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer feel free to contact Erik Magraken for a free consultation.
In reasons for judgement released today, Mr. Justice Wilson awarded a total of $180,995.90 plus Court Costs in compensation to a young man who was injured as a passenger in a 2004 motor vehicle collision in Ucluelet, BC.
The Plaintiff was a back seat passenger. His vehicle left the road and hit a tree.
The court made its findings of fact addressing injuries at Paragraph 26 of the judgement where the court held that:
 In the result, then, I conclude that Mr. Thorp sustained a minor injury to his wrist which had cleared up within two weeks. I also conclude that he sustained a posterolateral dislocation of the right elbow. Although Mr. Thorp did well in his recovery in the initial period, he continues to have some restriction on range of motion and ongoing discomfort, particularly in performing physical activities. Although the pain may be due to the calcification in the elbow which might go away over time, he can expect to have that for a considerable period of time. I accept the opinion of Mr. Vanderboer that Mr. Thorp does have pain-related limitations in the strength of his right arm, and his endurance and tolerance for activity. I thus accept Mr. Vanderboer’s opinion that he is not physically capable of manual labour-type occupations, and the opinion of Dr. Gutmanis that if he chose to pursue more physical work, he would have greater likelihood of the development of post traumatic arthritis. I also accept Mr. Thorp’s evidence that, as a result of the ongoing pain, he has restricted many of his previous physical activities.
The court did a great job reviewing applicable case law addressing loss of future earning capacity at paragraphs 53-68 of the reasons for judgement. This was necessary because the Plaintiff was a young man with a potentially permanent elbow injury. The effects of this closed the door to certain employmnet opportunities thus giving rise to a claim for future wage loss. After applying the facts to the law Mr. Justice Wilson awarded a total of $50,000 for Loss of Future Earning Capacity.
Damages of $50,000 were awarded for Pain and Suffering and a further $80,000 was awarded for past wage loss.
This is one of the few recent BC court cases addressing fair compensation for non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering) for a dislocated elbow. The difficulty the lawyers had finding similar elbow injury cases to help guide the court is acknowledged at paragraph 29 of the judgement. If you are engaged in settlement negotiations with ICBC for pain and suffering for an elbow injury this case is worth a quick read.
Do you have questions you would like answerd by an ICBC Claims Lawyer regarding an elbow injury? Click here to contact Erik Magraken for a free consultation to discuss your claim.
In written reasons for judgement released today, a Plaintiff who was injured in a 2003 single vehicle accident was awarded a total of $229,890 for his injuries and losses.
The Plaintiff, who was 18 at the time, was the centre passenger in a pick-up truck that lost control. The accident was significant. The truck “crossed a cattle guard and then hit loose gravel. The Driver lost control and the truck slid off the embankment. It rolled a number of times and apparently flipped end over end once. In ended up lying on its right side.”
For a time, the Plaintiff lost consciousness. He suffered a concussion and for a while suffered symptoms of headaches, light headedness, imbalance and tinnitus (ringing in the ears.) These symptoms resolved by the time of trial. He also had a neck injury which largely resolved and a shoulder injury which fully resolved by the time of trial.
The Plaintiff’s main injury by the time of trial was chronic low back pain.
4 doctors testified on the Plaintiff’s behalf. His family doctor painted a positive picture of the Plaintiff.
A specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation (physiatrist) testified that the Plaintiff suffered from a soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine (neck and low back).
A rheumatologist testified that the Plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain and that this pain “would have a significant negative influence upon his ability to compete in the workforce in the area of strenuous laboring jobs.”
A specialist in occupational medicine testified that the Plaintiff had not recovered from the soft tissue injuries to his back and that “it is unlikely the Plaintiff will have full resolution of his back injuries“.
The defence had the Plaintiff assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon. This is a common choice of ICBC for their ‘independent medical exams” when dealing with soft tissue injuries. The doctor hired by the defence testified that one of the factors leading to the Plaintiff’s ongoing complaints was ‘psychosocial factors‘ and that he would ‘strongly recommend that the plaintiff be assessed by a psychiatrist“.
The court preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s physicians and stated that “I conclude there is little, if anything, in (the defence doctors) report that would detract from the evidence from the other medical personnel or the lay witness evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s present condition“.
In the end, damages were assessed as follows:
Past Wage Loss
Future Wage Loss
Cost of Future Care
You’ve been injured in an accident. You don’t feel comfortable with how things have progressed with ICBC in your settlement negotiations so you decide to hire a lawyer. You find a qualified ICBC claims lawyer and off you go. You assume, reasobly so, that the lawyer is acting for you and not ICBC, right? Not always…
Lawyers typically have many clients. Many ICBC claims lawyers work both sides of the fence, that is, they represent injured people in advancing ICBC claims on some files and on other files they represent ICBC in defending against ICBC injury claims. Other lawyers restrict their practice to one side or the other.
Many people see lawyers working both sides of the fence as an inherent conflict of interest. They want their lawyer to represent injured people only, not insurance companies. Others like the idea that their lawyer also represents ICBC sometimes because perhaps such a lawyer has better insight into the defence tactics used by ICBC.
The problem, and the reason why I write this post, is that sometimes the potential conflict of interest is much worse than simply having a lawyer who works both sides of the fence. It is a problem of a lack of informed consent.
ICBC has contracted with many law-firms in BC for services in the defence of motor vehicle accident claims. ICBC requires some of these firms to sign an agreement called the Strategic Alliance Agreement (SAA).
Under the SAA, law firms whose lawyers are retained to act for ICBC are not permitted, when representing a plaintiff on another file, to sue ICBC for bad faith or to seek punative, aggravated or exemplary damages against ICBC.
Specifically, the SAA states that “ICBC may impose penatlies against the firm…..(where) the firm, or any member of the legal team, in the performance of the legal services, fails to act in the best interests of ICBC or ICBC’s insureds…”
Also, that “members of the legal firms team will not directly or inderectly: commence or participate in claims or actions, or counsel or assist others in bringing claims or actions against ICBC which include allegations of bad faith, or claims for punitive, aggravated or exemplary damages.”
What a conflict of interest!
The Law Society of BC (the institution that governs lawyers in BC) has held that it is ok for a lawyer who represents ICBC and who is bound by the terms of the SAA to also act against ICBC in another claim. HOWEVER, clients need to be advised about this potential conflict of interest. Sepcifcially, “A lawyer (bound by the SAA) may properly act against ICBC for clients whose cases fall outside of the restrictions. However, a lawyer acting in these circumstances MUST ADVISE THESE CLIENTS OF THE LAWYER’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ICBC AND THE IMLICATIONS OF THE RESTRICTIONS THE LAWYER IS UNDER.
It is all about informed consent. There is nothing wrong in hiring a lawyer to represent you who has signed the SAA but you are entitled to know about these restrictions. If you know about these restricitons you may not want to hire such a lawyer and instead retain an icbc claims lawyer who is not bound by any contractual restrictions with ICBC. Ask your lawyer if he signed the SAA, you may be surprised by the answer.
If your lawyer signed the SAA and did not tell you this up front, you were deprived of an opprotunity to make an informed decision. If this occurred you may want to ask yourself why your lawyer kept this information from you…?
Do you need to speak with an ICBC Claims Lawyer? Contact Erik Magraken for a free consulation.
One of the benefits of having a crown corporation monopoly insurer (ICBC) in BC is that they must file annual reports accessible to members of the public. These annual reports can be found on-line and contain volumes of information regarding ICBC and their financial status.
One of the most interesting facts published annually by ICBC is the amount of money they pay ‘expert physicians’ who do work on ICBC’s behalf. This information is known to most ICBC claims lawyers and I thought some of my readers would be interested in this data as well.
As of the writing of this post the 2007 annual report is not available but the 2006 report is. Below is a list of some of the physicians who billed significant amounts to ICBC for their services in 2006. I will be sure to publish the highlight physician billings from ICBC’s 2007 report once available.
Dr. Kevein Favero (Orthopedic Surgeon, Langley, BC): $245,483
Dr. N. K. Reebye (Physical Medecine and Rebabilitation, New Westminster): $275,336
Dr. Peter M. Rees (Neurologist, Burnaby): $225,330
Dr. J. F Schweigel (Orthopedic Surgeon) : $796,012
Dr. D. M. Laidlow: (Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Westbank) $101,539
Dr. Robert W. McGraw: (Orthopedic Surgoen, Vancouver) $253,240
Dr. T O’Farrell: (Orthopedic Surgoen, Kelowna) $111,162
Dr. James Warren: (Orthopedic Surgoen, Victoria) $87,207
Dr. O. M. Sovio: (Orthopedic Surgeon, Abbotsford) $203,892
Dr. H. Davis: (Psychiatrist, Vancouver) $113,950
Dr. Marc Boyle (Orthopaedic Surgeon, North Vancouver) $287,860
Dr. Paul Bishop (Vancouver, BC) $321,137
Dr. Mark Crossman (Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Vancouver) $111,441
Dr. I. G. Dommisse (Orhopaedic Surgoen, New Westminster) $194,612
Dr. H. E. Hawk (Orthopedic Surgeon, Vancouver) $336,650
I have blogged several times with respect to ICBC’s LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Defence with a view towards educating BC vehcicle collision victims that ICBC’s LVI Policy is not the law, rather it is an internal policy geared towards saving ICBC money.
ICBC’s LVI policy, when used in the defence of an injury claim, is often rejected by BC courts. The LVI policy has one fatal flaw, assuming that the amount of vehicle damage (or lack therof) is related to the severity or possibility of sustaining injury.
This week reasons for judgement were published in which the ICBC defence lawyer ran the LVI Defence. Mr. Justice Macaulay rejected this defence and in doing so used the best language I have yet come across as an ICBC claims lawyer in explaining the flaw in the LVI Program’s logic. At Paragraph’s 3-4 the court summaries the evidence led by the ICBC defence lawyer as follows:
 According to Jiang, a line of traffic was stopped waiting for the left-turn signal. When the light changed, the line started to move. Jiang testified that the Lubick vehicle stopped when the light changed to yellow and he was not able to stop before hitting it. He said the vehicles “barely touched” and that the impact was “very light, just a little boom”.
 The evidence of the ICBC estimator confirms that the impact was relatively minimal. The Lubick vehicle sustained cosmetic damage to the rear bumper.
Mr. Justice Macaulay then goes on to dismiss the logic behind the LVI policy in very strong words. At paragraphs 5-6 of the judgement the court takes the following very harsh view of the so called LVI Defence:
 The Courts have long debunked as myth the suggestion that low impact can be directly correlated with lack of compensable injury. In Gordon v. Palmer,  B.C.J. No. 474 (S.C.), Thackray J., as he then was, made the following comments that are still apposite today:
I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is a philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.
He goes on to point out that the presence and extent of injuries are determined on the evidence, not with “extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process”. In particular, he noted that there was no evidence to substantiate the defence theory in the case before him. Similarly, there is no evidence to substantiate the defence contention that Lubick could not have sustained any injury here because the vehicle impact was slight.
 I am satisfied that Lubick sustained an injury in the collision in spite of the low impact.
Do you have questions about an LVI claim denial? If so feel free to contact the author of this article for a no-obligation consultation.
In lenghty reasons for judgement released today, Mr. Justice Metzger found that injuries sustained in 3 seperate motor vehicle collisions had little impact on the Plaintiff’s functioning having regard to her MS related difficulties.
The only issue at trial was the value of the Plaintiff;s damages, fault for the accidents was admitted by the various defendants. The Plaintiff was diagnosed with MS about 5 months after the first of these 3 car accidents.
The Plaintiff sought a total of $223,550 in damages as a result of the collisions. The Plaintiff did not allege that the collisions played a role in the causation or aggravation of MS, rather that the impact of the accident related injuries on her functioning having regard to her MS was significant.
After over 3 weeks of evidence the trial judge concluded that the collisions caused soft tissue injuries (also referred to as connective tissue injuries) and that these were not particulalry significant.
Addressing the first collision the court concluded as follows:
The evidence is that the plaintiff’s injuries from accident #1 healed in their natural course and their effects were eventually overwhelmed or subsumed by the plaintiff’s unrelated progressive MS symptoms and disability. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering decreased over a five-month period, ending in August 2003.
The plaintiff did not adduce evidence of a compounding or synergistic effect between her MS and her accident related soft tissue injuries.
On a review of the usual contradictory cases presented by opposing parties, I am satisfied the plaintiff is entitled to $8,500 in non-pecuniary damages for accident #1
Addressing the second collision the court found that
I find that the maximum duration the soft tissue injuries could be reasonably attributed to the motor vehicle accident of January 25, 2005 is from that date until May 3, 2006, when the MS relapse overwhelmed all other concerns. After that point, even if there were residual symptoms, their significance was “miniscule” or unrelated and not attributable to the negligence of the defendant.
From April 1, 2005 to May 3, 2006, the plaintiff’s function was quite high as she was able to maintain a satisfactory level of performance at Royal Roads University. As the plaintiff’s friend Tiffany Young testified, the plaintiff was able to meet with her for coffee, to play scrabble and go on walks, even though she had ongoing low back or other soft tissue injury symptoms. Other friends confirmed Ms. Jacobs’ attendance at dinners, movies and concerts.
It is not clear how many of the plaintiff’s MS symptoms were confused with the soft tissue injury symptoms. The lay witnesses were not in a position to distinguish between the pre-existing symptoms and those that came after accident #2. None of the lay witnesses suggested that the plaintiff did not have an energetic and high degree of function at least until the May 3, 2006 MS relapse. Each described what could reasonably be expected to accompany mild, nagging soft tissue injuries. The plaintiff coped despite these nagging and disruptive symptoms.
Having considered the collection of competing authorities with respect to appropriate non-pecuniary damages, I am satisfied the plaintiff is entitled to $23,500 as a result of the January 25, 2005 collision.
Lastly, the court found that there was “no objective evidence of injury” as a result of the third collision. THe court awarded $1,500 for pain and suffering as a result of that collision.
The Plaintiff’s total award was $36,116. Addressing the central issue in the case the court found that
There is no evidence of a compounding or synergistic effect between the accidents and the MS beyond the temporary and minor reference made by Dr. Devonshire while the plaintiff was undergoing a period of chemotherapy. The plaintiff remained employed and active at all material times until the disabling MS relapse.
Damages are therefore segregated on the basis of three separate accidents with no overlapping injuries and no interplay between the MS and the motor vehicle accidents.
Do you have questions about this case or a similar ICBC case that you would like to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer? If so feel free to contact the author.
A frequent question I encounter as a British Columbia personal injury lawyer is “when should I go back to work?” or “If I go back to work now will I hurt my ICBC claim?”.
The short answer is that going back to work rarely hurts an ICBC claim. Working is a good thing. Plaintiffs in personal injury claims have a duty to mitigate their damages. This means that they are required to take reasonable steps to minimize their losses as a result of an accident.
Keeping in mind the duty to minimize losses, the question of returning to work is best directed at a physician. The answer it seems, comes down to “Hurt vs. Harm“. Returning to work can be unreasonable if doing so aggravates accident related injuries. That is, if the physical or psychological demands of a job actually aggravate accident related injuries then returning to work is typically not recommended. If, on the other hand, working with your injuries causes pain but your physician tells you to work through the pain as best you can tolerate then returning to work (or at least trying to) seems like a sensible option.
A personal injury claim should never motivate a person to miss time from work. Unreasonably missing time from work can actually hurt a claim. Returning to work while still injured, if medically approved, not only demonstrates a good work ethic but can also fulfill a legal duty to “mitigate damages” and that certainly does not hurt a claim.
Do you have questions about a wage-loss claim? You can click here to contact the author for advice.
In reasons for judgment released today, the Honourable Madam Justice Loo stated that the jury’s verdict in a case involving serious injuries including concussion, neck and back injuries, depression and a chronic pain disorder, was ‘inordinately low’ and not supported by the evidene.
The plaintiff was a 28 year old corrections officer who sustained serious injuries in an October, 2003 motor vehicle collision when his vehicle was struck by a semi-tractor trailer that ran a red light.
The jury heard 10 days of evidence. During this time a series of unusual developments occurred (the details of which could be found in Madame Justice Loo’s judgment at paragraphs 12-16) which include a juror getting discharged as a result of an anxiety attack, a juror getting discharged for unusual behaviour which caused him to be hospitalized and the jury discussing the case prematruely and against an express caution from the trial judge not to do so.
After hearing all the evidence the jury awarded $32,550 for past income loss, $17,673.86 for special damages, $30,000 for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, $75,000 for future loss of earning capacity and $28,205 for future care costs.
Madame Justice Loo felt compelled to take the unusual step of commenting on the jury’s verdict and did so in detail. This was apparently done with a view towards assisting the British Columbia Court of Appeal in a judgment that very likely will be appealed. After pointing out that this jury spent no more than 2.5 hours in deliberations, Madame Justice Loo held that ‘no jury reviewing all of the evidence as a whole could have reached such a verdict’.