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Tag: Hosking v. Mahoney

Prior Expert Reports, Cross-Examination and Notice


When a Plaintiff is cross examined in the trial of a personal injury claim can opinions from medico-legal reports from prior litigation be introduced into evidence without complying with the notice requirements set out in the Rules of Court?  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court addressing this issue.
In the recent case (Hosking v. Mahoney) the Plaintiff was injured in three separate motor vehicle collisions.  The first collision was in 2000, the second in 2001 and the third in 2004.
The Plaintiff advanced claims for compensation as a result of all three collisions.  In the course of the first two claims the Plaintiff’s physician authored a medico-legal report in 2003 addressing the extent of her injuries.  The Plaintiff settled both these claims prior to her third collision.
The claim arising from the third collision did not settle and proceeded to trial.  At trial the Defendant introduced the prior medico-legal report during cross examination.  The Court allowed this and further permitted the previous opinion to go into evidence even though the usual notice requirements for the introduction of opinion evidence were not complied with.  In permitting this evidence to be introduced Mr. Justice Warren provided the following reasons:
[171] I found the medical opinion of Dr. Gurdeep Parhar, the plaintiff’s attending physician for the first two accidents and the author of the medical/legal report of March 10, 2003, important and difficult to resolve with the evidence and submissions of the plaintiff that she had largely recovered prior to the February 2004 accident.  This evidence was entered by the defendant when cross-examining the plaintiff and was not rebutted or varied by Dr. Parhar who was not called to testify.  The court is entitled to draw an adverse inference when a witness who could provide relevant evidence on an issue before the court, is not called.  In my view the defendant was entitled to rely upon the letter and opinion of Dr. Parhar without providing the usual notice.  It was a report prepared for and at the request of the plaintiff and it was identified and portions adopted by the plaintiff in cross-examination.  The plaintiff had the opportunity to call Dr. Parhar or evidence to rebut the opinion or to object to its introduction prior to its use in cross-examination.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for STI's Imposed on Pre-Existing Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released this week dealing with damages for soft tissue injuries imposed on pre-existing symptomatic injuries.
In this recent case, (Hosking v. Mahoney), the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision.  She had pre-existing injuries from previous collisions and as a result had some on-going symptoms.  Mr. Justice Warren found that the new injuries would likely continue well into the future and assessed non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $80,000 then reduced this award by 25% to account for the Plaintiff’s pre-existing injuries.  In reaching this result the Court provided the following reasons:

[178] I find that the plaintiff suffered a mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her cervical and upper thoracic areas as a result of the February 2004 accident.  This was superimposed on her already symptomatic condition caused by the earlier accidents and although she had started to make the expected recovery, the process was interrupted by her falls.  Normally, these would not have affected the plaintiff but she was more vulnerable as a result of the three accidents.  There is no orthopaedic or neurological cause.  It is probable that these complaints will continue well into the future but can be managed and alleviated by an appropriate exercise programme (as recommended by her medical advisors as early as Dr. Parhar in March 2003) and by such passive therapies as may, from time to time, help alleviate her symptoms.

[179] Using the authorities relied upon by counsel as a template, for each case depends on its own unique features, I assess the plaintiff’s general damages at $80,000 which I reduce by 25% as attributable to or an apportionment for her pre-existing symptomatic injuries and her intervening falls.