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Tag: Golden Years Doctrine

Impact of Life Expectancy On Non-Pecuniary Damages?

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing whether a Plaintiff’s life expectancy should influence the non-pecuniary damages awarded in a personal injury claim.
In today’s case (Mathroo v. Edge-Partington) the Plaintiff pedestrian was injured when struck by the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Defendant was found wholly at fault.  The Plaintiff suffered “a fracture to his right elbow, which required surgery to insert a plate and screws into his arm.“.  He had ongoing issues at the time of trial.
The Plaintiff was 83 years old and argued that the ‘golden years’ doctrine should apply in assessing damages.  The Defendant argued the opposite noting “that the limited remaining life expectancy of a person in Mr. Mathroo’s situation justifies a lower award than would otherwise result.“.
The Court was not comfortable with the Defendant’s submission and noted the following:

[95]         The golden years doctrine has some limited applicability here, in that Mr. Mathroo has experienced a decrease in his willingness to walk because of the effect of his injuries on his perceptions of his physical condition and his feelings of safety when walking, but I take the point made by Mr. Edge-Partington’s counsel that he was not involved in that many activities beforehand, other than going to the temple and gardening, so the curtailment of them has been more limited than in other cases cited on his behalf.

[96]         I do not feel comfortable relying on Olesik to reduce the non-pecuniary damages on the basis of Mr. Mathroo’s limited remaining life expectancy, as urged by Mr. Edge-Partington’s counsel. Its applicability on that issue has been questioned by other decisions of this Court. In Giles v. Attorney General of Canada, [1994] B.C.J. No. 3212 (S.C.) varied on other grounds (1996) 71 B.C.A.C. 319, Mr. Justice Fraser held that the principle described in Olesik and the golden years doctrine essentially balanced each other out, so that advanced age should not be a factor either way in arriving at an appropriate award. This view was adopted more recently inDuifhuis v. Bloom, 2013 BCSC 1180.

[98]         In all the circumstances, before dealing with whether an amount should be added to reflect a loss of Mr. Mathroo’s housekeeping capacity, I would make an award of non-pecuniary damages of $60,000.

 

$75,000 Damages for Onset of Knee Arthritis Pain; Golden Years Doctrine Applied

Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month assessing damages for a knee injury caused in a 2007 collision.
In the recent case (Dulay v. Lachance) the Plaintiff was injured in a broadside collision. Fault for the crash was admitted by the offending motorist. The Plaintiff suffered from chronic knee pain and dysfunction following the crash. The trial focused largely on whether the collision was responsible for this.
Investigation following the collision revealed that the Plaintiff had pre-existing arthritis in his knee. As is often the case, this condition was asymptomatic prior to the crash.
The plaintiff presented medical evidence suggesting the collision was responsible for the onset of pain. The defendant argued the collision was coincidental to the onset of symptoms. The court preferred the Plaintiff’s evidence. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Madam Justice Maisonville applied the ‘golden years‘ doctrine and provided the following reasons:

[78] Dr. McLeod had described the contusion to the right medial femoral condyle and medial tibial plateau (very simply put – the area where the femur meets the lower leg bones) as mild, but as noted he separated this injury from the triggering of the arthritis as clarified in his second report. I accept his evidence on this point and find that his attribution of “mild” to the injury did not mean to incorporate the onset of symptoms of osteoarthritis.

[79] Dr. McLeod stated: “It is impossible to predict whether or not this right knee would have become symptomatic should this accident not have occurred.” I accept his evidence on that issue.

[96] The plaintiff asserts that his injuries arose from the accident. While it is true that he had osteoarthritis before the accident, the plaintiff’s position is that his condition was rendered symptomatic as a consequence of the accident.

[97] The plaintiff relies on the report of Dr. Grover who wrote:

It is also my opinion that, but for the motor vehicle accident in question, he would likely have remained pain free and symptom free (as far as the right knee is concerned) for many years to come, on balance of probability.

As noted above Dr. McLeod also found that the osteoarthritis was rendered symptomatic from the accident…

[106] There was no evidence that any other event triggered the arthritis to become symptomatic. While it was indeed the evidence of both orthopaedic surgeons that asymptomatic arthritis can became symptomatic from no event at all, here, I find that the complaints followed on the accident. I find on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff has proven the injury caused the osteoarthritis to become symptomatic causing pain to his right knee and residual pain to his elbow. This was as a consequence of the accident…

[123] There is no issue that Mr. Dulay has suffered a loss. He will no longer be able to enjoy all the activities he did with his family and for his temple. Further, as noted by Griffin J. in Fata v. Heinonen, 2010 BCSC 385, the injury to a person nearing retirement is frequently more difficult to endure. As aptly stated by Griffin J. at para. 88:

[88] The retirement years are special years for they are at a time in a person’s life when he realizes his own mortality. When someone who has always been physically active loses his physical function in these years, the enjoyment of retirement can be severely diminished, with less opportunity to replace these activities with other interests in life. Further, what may be a small loss of function to a younger person who is active in many other ways may be a larger loss to an older person whose activities are already constrained by age. The impact an injury can have on someone who is elderly was recognized in Giles v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] B.C.J. No. 3212 (S.C.), rev’d on other grounds (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 190 (C.A.).

[124] I find Griffin J.’s reasoning apt here in Mr. Dulay’s case where he is nearing retirement and has lost the ability to function in a way that has altered how he lives.

[125] Additionally, Mr. Dulay continues to work and perform everything he can. He has not asked for his employer to accommodate him. He is a team player and endeavours to do everything he can even though he must stop, take medication, and bear much pain. Again, as stated by Verhoeven J. citing Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 at para. 46 in Power v. White, 2010 BCSC 1084 at para. 68:

Stoicism of the plaintiff should not reduce the award.

[126] In all the circumstances of the case I award the plaintiff $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Video Surveillance; "Golden Years" Doctrine Discussed


As I’ve previously written, video surveillance in and of itself does not harm a persons ICBC claim, being caught in a lie does.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this fact.
In today’s case (Fata v. Heinonen) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 BC collision.  Fault was admitted.  The Plaintiff suffered several injuries including “an obvious impingement syndrome at the shoulder“.  The Defendant disputed the severity of the Plaintiff’s injuries at trial.  Instead of relying on independent medical evidence, the Defendant sought to harm the Plaintiff’s case by relying on video surveillance which was taken the year following the collision.
The surveillance showed the Plaintiff doing various activities such as grocery shopping and unloading and loading objects into his vehicle.  This video surveillance did not harm the Plaintiff’s claim.  Why?  Because it did not show anything that contradicted the Plaintiff’s evidence at trial.  In explaining why the surveillance did not harm the Plaintiff’s claim Madam Justice Griffin held as follows:

[45] The videotape surveillance was not inconsistent with Mr. Fata’s evidence or that of his physicians.  Mr. Fata’s evidence was that his physicians and physiotherapist had recommended that he continue to use his left arm and shoulder, and that he attempts to do so.  No one has suggested that he has no use of his left arm and shoulder.   Neither Mr. Fata nor the physicians, who gave expert opinions on his behalf, suggested any marked limitation in Mr. Fata’s range of motion.  His primary complaint is that he has pain when he uses his left arm and shoulder.  The videotape did not disprove this evidence, nor did it seriously cast doubt on it.  A videotape cannot capture all pain but may illustrate signs of severe pain, for example, if the person being watched grimaces on doing certain activities.  Mr. Fata was not displaying obvious signs of pain.  The videotape perhaps illustrates that whatever pain Mr. Fata might have with ordinary day-to-day activities is manageable.

[46] I have concluded from reviewing the videotape evidence carefully and considering Mr. Fata’s explanations of it, as well as from my review of the medical evidence and Mr. Fata’s evidence of his ongoing symptoms, that Mr. Fata does continue to suffer ongoing symptoms in his left arm and shoulder that were caused by the motor vehicle accident of November 13, 2006.  Given the passage of time, it is likely these symptoms will continue indefinitely.  These symptoms are not severe, as Mr. Fata still has use of his left arm and can do most activities.  However, the symptoms are such that Mr. Fata does suffer pain with the use of his left arm and particularly with excessive use or lifting his arm over his shoulder.  The pain restricts him from some of these types of activities he might otherwise do.

The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $45,000 in non-pecuniary damages for his soft tissue injuries and shoulder impingement.

This case is also worth also worth reviewing for the Court’s explanation of the “Golden Years” doctrine.

  • The “Golden Years Doctrine” Explained

In personal injury claims BC Courts recognize that no two cases are exactly alike and the assessment of non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) depends on the unique facts of any given case.

One principle that is sometimes used in assessing non-pecuniary damages is the “Golden Years” doctrine.  This principle recognizes the fact that the retirement years are particularly special and an injury affecting a person in their golden years may warrant a greater award for non-pecuniary damages.  Madam Justice Griffin succinctly summarized this principle as follows:

[88] The retirement years are special years for they are at a time in a person’s life when he realizes his own mortality.  When someone who has always been physically active loses his physical function in these years, the enjoyment of retirement can be severely diminished, with less opportunity to replace these activities with other interests in life.  Further, what may be a small loss of function to a younger person who is active in many other ways may be a larger loss to an older person whose activities are already constrained by age.  The impact an injury can have on someone who is elderly was recognized in Giles v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] B.C.J. No. 3212 (S.C.), rev’d on other grounds (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 190 (C.A.).

[89] In short, it is Mr. Fata’s loss of enjoyment of life in recreation, home chores, and work that should be compensated for in an award for non-pecuniary damages…

[91] On the facts of this case, where Mr. Fata has suffered a loss of some enjoyment of life in every aspect of his life, I conclude that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $45,000.