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Legal Principles For Left Turning Motorists at T-Intersections Discussed by BC Supreme Court


Last week reasons for judgment were released in a case discussing applicable legal principles when motorists are involved in left hand turn collisions.
In last week’s case (Burgess v. Fisher) the litigants were involved in a 2 vehicle collision in Vernon, BC.  The Crash occurred when the Defendant vehicle left a stop sign and attempted to make a left hand turn at a through roadway.  To complete the turn the Defendant had to first clear two westbound lanes.  The curb westbound lane approaching the Defendant vehicle was full of cars and limited the defendants view of vehicles in the inner westbound lane.  The Plaintiff vehicle was travelling in this inner westbound lane.  As the Defendant vehicle entered the inner westbound lane the collision occurred.  There was evidence that the Plaintiff vehicle in the westbound lane was speeding, although not significantly, at the time of the collision.
Both motorists said the other was to blame.  Mr. Justice Barrow, before addressing the issue of fault, succinctly discussed the governing legal principles for these types of cases.  He summarized the law as follows:

[17] Section 175(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act provides that the driver stopped at a stop sign must, before entering an intersection, yield to through or crossing traffic that has either entered the intersection on the through road or “is approaching so closely on it that it constitutes an immediate hazard”. Similar language is found in s. 174 which governs left turns at intersections. It provides that left turning vehicles must yield the right of way to approaching traffic that is “in the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard”.

[18] In Rae v. Thorpe, [1963] 43 W.W.R. 405 (B.C.C.A.), Tysoe J.A. considered the meaning of “immediate hazard” in the context of s. 164 (the predecessor of the current s. 174). Although he did not attempt to exhaustively define the phrase, he wrote at para. 18 that:

…if an approaching car is so close to the intersection when a driver attempts to make a left turn that a collision threatens unless there be some violent or sudden avoiding action on the part of the driver of the approaching car, the approaching car is an “immediate hazard” within the meaning of sec. 164.

The point at which the determination of whether the through travelling motor vehicle is an immediate hazard is the moment before the serviant vehicle begins to encroach on the through vehicle’s lane of travel (Rae at para. 25).

[19] Ballance J. adopted both of the foregoing propositions in Hynna in the context of s. 175 of the Motor Vehicle Act. In addition, she distilled two further principles applicable to the analysis required by s. 175 from Keen v. Stene, [1964] 44 D.L.R. (2d) 350 (B.C.C.A.). In that case, Davey J.A. wrote at para. 46 that:

…A driver waiting at a stop sign ought not to enter a through street unless it is clear that oncoming traffic does not constitute an immediate hazard. Excessive refinement of what traffic is an immediate hazard will defeat the purpose of the right?of?way regulations contained in s. 165 [ now s. 175], and make them an inadequate and confusing method of regulating traffic at intersections on through streets.

Sheppard J.A., in a separate concurring judgment, made the point that the hazard to which the section is directed extends to the threat of collision as opposed to simply a collision itself.

[20] One final general principle applicable to the analysis comes from the frequently quoted observation of Cartwright J. in Walker v. Brownlee, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.). There, at p. 461, he wrote:

…when A, the driver in the servient position, proceeds through an intersection in complete disregard of his statutory duty to yield the right?of?way and a collision results, if he seeks to cast any portion of the blame upon B, the driver having the right?of?way, A must establish that after B became aware, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, of A’s disregard of the law B had in fact a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident of which a reasonably careful and skilful driver would have availed himself; and I do not think that in such circumstances any doubts should be resolved in favour of A, whose unlawful conduct was fons et origo mali.

[21] Whether a through travelling vehicle constitutes an immediate hazard to a crossing or left turning vehicle is a function of at least two things: how far away the through travelling vehicle is from the intersection and how fast it is travelling. Both of these are matters that the servient driver must estimate before entering the intersection. In making those estimates, the servient driver is entitled to assume, in the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, that crossing or approaching vehicles will observe and obey the rules of the road.

The Court went on to hold that the left turning vehicle was entirely at fault for the crash despite the evidence that the Plaintiff vehicle was speeding.  In coming to this decision Mr. Justice Barrow held as follows:

[32] The law obliged Mr. Karol to either remain at the stop sign or at least not to proceed into the westbound lane of through traffic on 43rd Avenue unless he could determine that approaching in that lane did not pose an immediate hazard. In order to make that determination, he had to be able to see far enough down the westbound lane to determine whether approaching traffic travelling at or near the speed limit would pose an immediate hazard. The hazard, it is to be recalled, is not just a collision but the immanent prospect of one…

[38] Returning to the matter at hand, as noted, Mr. Karol had a limited view of on?coming dominant traffic. Both he and Ms. Faucher testified that the Fisher vehicle was 10 or 15 feet away when they first saw it. I accept that their attention was focused on the through westbound lane of traffic. Neither formed an opinion as to its speed based on observations made prior to the impact. Further, Mr. Karol did nothing to avoid the accident, not because he was not paying attention or failed to appreciate the collision before it happened but because he had no time. His obligation was to assume that through traffic would be proceeding at least at the speed limit. Even if he could see more than 10 or 15 feet into that lane when he proceeded to encroach on it, I am satisfied that he could not see much further than that. He could not see far enough to assess whether he would pose an immediate hazard to traffic travelling at or near the speed limit. He was, therefore, negligent.

[39] The next issue is whether Ms. Fisher was also negligent. Mr. Karol has the onus of establishing that on a balance of probabilities. The question turns not on whether, had she been driving the speed limit, the accident would not have happened because she would not have been there, but rather on whether a reasonable driver, that is, one driving the speed limit, would have had a sufficient opportunity to observe the encroaching vehicle and taken the necessary evasive action.

[40] I am not satisfied that Mr. Karol has established negligence on the part of Ms. Fisher. I accept that she was speeding but not markedly or excessively so. More to the point, I am satisfied that she was so close to the intersection when Mr. Karol encroached on her lane of travel that, even had she been travelling at or near the speed limit, the opportunity she would have had to take evasive action was not such that, with exercise of reasonable skill, the collision would have been avoided.

Motorist At Fault for Failing to Use Emergency Brake When Exiting Vehicle

Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Fort St. John Registry, dealing with an interesting set of facts.
In today’s case (Shular v. Seneca Enterprises Ltd.) the Defendants owned/operated a motor home that stalled. The Plaintiff came across this stalled vehicle and tried to assist the Defendants.  The Plaintiff helped move the motor home across the road then got under it trying to repair it when it rolled back over him and caused serious injury to his hip and leg.
The Defendants were found 75% responsible for the Plaintiff’s damages for failing to engage the emergency brake before allowing the Plaintiff under it and the Plaintiff was found 25% at fault for failing to verify if the vehicle was safe before trying to repair it.
In coming to this finding Madam Justice Kloegman made the following findings and analysis:
I find from all the evidence, on a balance of probabilities, that (the Defendant) likely knew, or ought to have known, that the plaintiff had gone under the motor home to try and change the gears of the motor home manually…

[9] I find that the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to ensure that the motor home was safely secured while he was under it.  The reasonable standard of care in such a situation is set out in the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, B.C. Reg. 296/97, of the Worker’s Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492, and the Seneca Enterprises Ltd. protocol as described by Wahl.

[10] Section 17.2.2(2)(b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation of the Worker’s Compensation Act states that the following procedure must be in place if a vehicle is used to transport workers:

The parking brake must be engaged when the vehicle is left unattended and the wheels locked or chocked if the circumstances require.

[11] Wahl testified that it was standard protocol for them to lock and secure the vehicle if they were not in it.  He said the front of the motor home was on a slight incline so it was common sense to put rocks under the wheels to keep the motor home from moving backwards.

[12] The evidence shows that this standard of care was clearly breached by the defendants.  Bond openly admitted that he did not engage the emergency brake when he locked up the motor home, and took no steps to secure it from movement.  Wahl admitted he was not sure whether they had put rocks under the tires; he thought that they had done so, but that they had not done a very good job of it.

[13] Given the defendants lack of care in the circumstances, they must be found liable to the plaintiff for the accident.  In my opinion, it matters not whether the defendants felt intimidated by the plaintiff and his group. ..

[14] From the defendants’ conduct it is reasonable to infer that the plaintiff had the agreement and the consent of the defendants to push the motor home into a safer location and to attempt to repair it.  The defendants cannot now say that because they did not initially ask the plaintiff for assistance, that they were not responsible for what ensued.  I find that the motor home was in the care and control of the defendants throughout this time period, and that they never lost custody of it to the plaintiff or his group.

[15] The defendants submit as an alternative plea that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and I tend to agree.  The plaintiff described what was quite a risky procedure of moving the transmission manually into drive so the motor home could be mobilized.  He admitted in cross examination he didn’t know what gear the transmission was in, and that he “assumed” the emergency brake was on and “assumed” the motor home was in neutral.  He made no independent check to see if his assumptions were correct and I find that he did not take sufficient care for his own safety in the circumstances.  I accept his explanation that he thought Bond was attending to the brake, but he should have made sure of this before moving the gears.

[16] Given all the circumstances, and the respective degrees of fault, I find that the plaintiff should be held twenty-five percent liable for his injuries and that the defendants should be held seventy-five percent liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.

Driver Found at Fault for Crash for Having High Beams On – Psychological Injuries Discussed

Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with the issue of fault in a BC Car Crash, specifically if a driver could be found at fault for having high beams on making it difficult for other motorists to see.
In today’s case (Scott v. Erickson) the Plaintiff was injured when she drove her vehicle off a road and over an embankment in southeastern British Columbia.  Before losing control the Plaintiff was driving a pick up truck Southbound on the highway.  At the same time the Defendant was driving Northbound on the same highway and crossed the road to stop at the community mailboxes in a pullout adjacent to the southound lane.  While retrieving his mail his SUV was off the road to the right of the Plaintiff’s lane of travel.
The Defendant’s vehicle was facing the Plaintiff’s with its high-beams on.  The Plaintiff thought the Defendant’s vehicle was in the oncoming lane so she tried to keep to the right of the Defendant’s vehicle.  Of course there was nothing but an embankment to the right of the Defendant’s vehicle and the Plaintiff’s vehicle flipped down into the ditch. Mr. Justice Smith found the Defendant 100% at fault for this collision.  In coming to this conclusion Mr. Justice Smith reasoned as follows:

The question is whether the defendant was in breach of the common law duty of care that he owed to other drivers in the circumstances. It is trite law that, apart from specific statutory provisions, every operator of a motor vehicle owes a common law duty to take reasonable care for the safety other users of the highway.  What constitutes reasonable care in a given case depends on what is reasonable in the circumstances.

[25] Those circumstances included the fact that, although he was not parked on the roadway, the defendant knew or should have known that he was close enough to it that his headlights to be visible to oncoming traffic. He also knew or should have known that there were no streetlights or other sources of light that would help oncoming drivers determine the position of his vehicle.

[26] In those circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that an approaching driver seeing the defendant’s headlights would assume they were the lights of an oncoming vehicle in the northbound lane and would attempt to ensure that she stayed to the right of that vehicle….

I find that if the defendant had properly turned his mind to the potential hazard he was creating, the proper course would have been to turn off his headlights. If the absence of light from his headlights would have made it more difficult for the defendant to find and open his mailbox, that problem could have been solved with the simple use of a small flashlight.

[29] The hazard created by the defendant in stopping as he did was aggravated by the fact his lights were on high beam, further interfering with the ability of the plaintiff to properly see and assess the situation…

I find that, by leaving his lights on high beam, the defendant was in further breach of his common law duty of care. Whether or not he was stopped on a portion of the highway, the defendant clearly knew or ought to have known that he was stopped close enough to the travelled road surface that his headlights would be shining toward oncoming drivers and the vision of those drivers could be impaired if the lights were on high beam.

[33] I therefore conclude that, in stopping his car in the position he did with his headlights not only illuminated but on high beam, the defendant breached his duty of care.

In addition to the rather unique circumstances of liability, this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of quantum of damages.

Mr. Justice Smith found that the Plaintiff suffered from fairly “minor” physical injuries.  Despite this she went on to suffer from various cognitive difficulties.

The Plaintiff alleged these were due to a brain injury.  Mr. Justice Smith concluded that no brain injury occured in the crash, instead the Plaintiff’s cognitive difficulties were due to a ‘psychological response‘ to the accident.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $85,000 Mr. Justice Smith noted that while a brain injury did not occur, brain injury precedents were useful guides in valuing the Plaintiff’s loss as her diminished functioning mirrored post concussive symptoms in many ways.  Specifically Mr. Justice Smith noted as follows:

[107]     The plaintiff has suffered a persistent psychological reaction to her accident, which has clearly affected her ability to function as she once did in both social and professional settings. She has difficulties with memory and concentration, has difficulty functioning in groups and has suffers from a lack of energy and confidence. She is, in important respects, no longer the person she was and is unable to enjoy most aspects of life as she previously did. However, I have found that she does not have any organic brain injury and her condition is more likely than not to be treatable with the proper interventions.

[108]     Although I did not find the plaintiff to have mild traumatic brain injury or post-traumatic stress disorder, the impact that her psychological condition has had on her life is in many ways similar to what is seen in cases involving those conditions. Those cases therefore can provide some useful guidance in assessing damages…

[112] I have considered those and other cases referred to, but of course each case must be decided on its own facts and on the need to compensate that plaintiff for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. The accident in this case has had psychological consequences that have, to date, significantly interfered with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, her ability to function in both social and occupational settings, and her general sense of self worth. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s physical pain and suffering were short-lived, she has failed to prove that she suffered an organic brain injury, and the condition she has proved is one from which she is likely to fully recover with proper treatment. Taking all of those factors into account, I find $85,000 to be an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages.

Registered Vehicle Owners and Fault in BC – A Heavy Burden

(Please note the case discussed in this post was overturned by the BC Court of Appeal.  Please go to the September 2010 Archives of this site to read my article discussing the BC Court of Appeal decision)
The law places a very heavy burden on vehicle owners in BC when their vehicles are involved in an at-fault collision.  In British Columbia registered owners are “vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver where the driver acquired possession of the vehicle with the consent (express or implied) of the owner“.
What this means is, if you let someone else operate your vehicle and they are at fault for a crash then you are at fault for that crash.  Reasons for judgement were released today showing just how far Courts in BC can go in determining the circumstances in which an owner “consents” to someone else operating their vehicle.
In today’s case (Snow v. Friesen) the Plaintiff was seriously injured in Vernon BC when a vehicle owned by a man named Mr. Saul and driven by a woman named Ms. Friesen struck the Plaintiff while walking on a sidewalk.  The Defendant driver apparently fell asleep at the wheel and lost control.
The Court found that Mr. Saul did not intend to let Ms. Friesen borrow his vehicle, he in fact did so by mistake.  Mr. Justice Williams found that Ms. Friesen asked to borrow Mr. Saul’s vehicle but at the time he was busy working and did not hear her because he was hard of hearing and had his hearing aid out.  As a result Mr. Saul mistakenly thought someone else was asking to borrow his vehicle so he granted permission,   Notwithstanding this interesting factual finding the Court went on to find that Mr. Saul was still vicariously liable for the collision because his actions constituted “express consent” under section 86 of the BC Motor Vehicle Act.
The Court’s discussion of the law of liability of registered owners is set out below.  This case is worth reviewing in full for all vehicle owners in British Columbia as it shows the serious duties courts impose on vehicle owners when they let others take possession of their vehicles:

[68] Pursuant to the common law and s. 86 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, an owner of a vehicle is vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver where the driver acquired possession of the vehicle with the consent, express or implied, of the owner.

[69] As is apparent from my analysis of the evidence and findings of fact, the implied consent doctrine does not arise in this case.  Instead, the issue stands to be determined on the basis of express consent.  Specifically, it is necessary to decide whether, in these circumstances, the plaintiff has proven that Ms. Friesen had the vehicle with the consent of Mr. Saul.

[70] I consider the following statement of Thackray J.A. in Barreiro v. Arana, 2003 BCCA 58, to be apposite:

[13]      Whether there was consent must be determined by reference to the facts and by the application of general legal principles viewed in the context of the statutory scheme.  The issue of consent is not, as suggested by the trial judge, “defined by s.86”: however the statute is the governing factor.

[71] The cases are replete with reference to the notion of public policy and the necessity of recognizing the legislative intent of s. 86.  Again, I will resort to a quotation from Barreiro:

[26]      The effect that legislative intent has upon the meaning of “consent” is emphasized by the words of Goldie J.A. in Morrison as quoted by the trial judge:

[24]  It is apparent the legislature has imposed a heavy burden on those who have within their power the control of motor vehicles. … The reason for legislative intervention may be traced, in part at least, to the appalling consequences of reckless use of motor vehicles.  Irresponsibility on the part of those who may deny or confer possession of motor vehicles may be seen as the reason for the legislative initiative.  The legislation in question must be regarded as remedial.

[27]      Legislative intention must be acknowledged as having a fundamental purpose and as having been inspired by a need.  As Mr. Justice Goldie said, the legislation is remedial.  As such it might well be at odds with traditional legal concepts of agency, but that will not deny its validity.

[28]      The legislative intent in section 86 must be taken, as noted by Goldie J.A. in Morrison, to address the reckless use of motor vehicles and the section imposes “a heavy burden on those who have within their power the control of motor vehicles.”  In Bareham, Mr. Justice MacDonell, after reviewing the statute, said at 194:

In this case, the only policy reasons to be considered are those in favour of protecting innocent third parties seeking compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of negligent automobile drivers and, vicariously, owners.

[72] A helpful discussion of the importance of bearing in mind the underlying rationale, or legislative purpose, of the legislation is found in Yeung (Guardian ad litem of) v. Au, 2006 BCCA 217, where the matter was touched upon by Newbury J.A., writing for a five judge division of the Court, although the issue there was principally one of determining the liability of an individual who held rights under a conditional sales contract.  Nevertheless, she considered the social and economic policy objectives of the legislation, and the legislative intention.  Her analysis is found at paras. 32 through 38.  I will not reproduce the entire discussion, but consider it worthwhile to quote a portion of her conclusion as found at para. 38:

… the purposes of s. 86 are, I would suggest, similar – to expand the availability of compensation to injured plaintiffs beyond drivers who may be under-insured or judgment-proof, and to encourage employers and other owners to take care in entrusting their vehicles to others.  These objectives are consonant with the objectives of vicarious liability generally, as described by McLachlin J. (now C.J.C.) in Bazley v. Curry [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, 62 B.C.L.R. (3d) 173, the leading Canadian case on vicarious liability.

[Emphasis added.]

[73] In my view, the outcome which must result in the facts at bar is determined by an application of the leading decision on the issue, Vancouver Motors U-Drive Ltd. v. Terry, [1942] S.C.R. 391.  There, an employee of Vancouver Motors U-Drive Ltd. had rented an automobile to a driver who had no valid licence.  The driver had falsely represented that he was another person, and showed that person’s valid driver’s licence.  He signed that person’s name to the rental agreement.  The driver was subsequently involved in an accident, and the appellant argued that it was not vicariously liable because the negligent driver had not acquired possession of the car with the appellant’s consent.  In interpreting a legislative provision similar to s. 86 of the Motor Vehicle Act, Kerwin J., for the majority, stated as follows:

In the present case, the appellant physically transferred the possession of the motor vehicle to Walker. Does the fact of Walker’s false statement that he was Hindle and the holder of a subsisting driver’s licence, accompanied by the forgery of Hindle’s name, vitiate the consent that was in fact given? There may be no difficulty in two of the hypothetical cases put in argument, (1) where a motor vehicle is stolen from a garage, and (2) where possession is obtained from the owner by duress. In the first there would be no consent in fact and in the second the owner would not have been at liberty to exercise his free will. On the other hand, the class of owners under subsection 1 of section 74A is not restricted to those who carry on such a business as the appellant and circumstances may be imagined where an owner loaned his automobile to a friend on the latter’s statement that he possessed a subsisting driver’s licence, which statement might be false either because he never had possessed such a licence or because his current licence had been revoked; or again, where A secured possession of an automobile by falsely representing himself in a telephone conversation with the owner of the vehicle to be a neighbour’s chauffeur. It is impossible to conceive all the various circumstances that might give rise to the question to be determined here but in my view an express consent is given, within the meaning of the enactment, when possession was acquired as the result of the free exercise of the owner’s will.

[74] Later, Kerwin J. reached the following conclusion:

The word “consent” may have different meanings in different statutes. In the present case it has, in my opinion, the meaning already indicated and, on that construction, express consent was given by the employees of the appellant to Walker’s possession of the motor vehicle even though the action of the employees was induced by Walker’s false statements.

[75] In this case, Mr. Saul, of his own free will, absent duress or theft, gave consent to the person who asked to use the motor vehicle.  The fact that Mr. Saul was mistaken as to the identity of that individual does not change the outcome.

[76] In Vancouver Motors U-Drive, consent was not vitiated even though the agent/employee was misled as to the identity of the person renting the car.  In Bareham (Guardian ad litem of) v. Desrochers, [1994] B.C.J. No. 1826, 97 B.C.L.R. (2d) 186 (S.C.), on an application of the same principle, the mother of the driver argued that she had not consented to her son having her vehicle because she was not aware that he had no driving licence.  The trial judge there, Macdonell J., found that once the mother gave consent, the fact that her son was driving her car illegally was irrelevant to the application of s. 86(1).

[77] The erroneous basis upon which Mr. Saul granted his consent is no defence.  The onus was on him to ensure the public safety in lending his truck.  The statute imposes a duty upon him, which duty includes knowing and assessing the fitness of the driver who seeks to have his vehicle.  The heavy burden which is imposed upon motor vehicle owners was not met.

[78] In the present case, Mr. Saul did not take steps to confirm the identity of the person who sought to use his vehicle, other than relying upon what turned out to be the assumption of Mr. Connolly.

[79] The focus of the analysis is on whether the owner gave express consent to the individual who seeks to have the vehicle.  Once that is found, as the facts of that case indicate, there is not a great deal which will impact upon the imposition of liability.

[80] While judicial interpretation of s. 86(1) may, at first glance, appear overly strict, as Paris J. stated in Beaudoin v. Enviro-Vac Systems Inc., [1992] B.C.J. No. 205, 1992 CanLII 444 (S.C.), at para. 13:

The Legislature has placed a very heavy onus on the owner of a motor vehicle who chooses to permit another to drive it. Whether that policy is or is not draconian is not for me to say.

[81] I have no doubt that the outcome here may seem harsh from the perspective of Mr. Saul.  However, holding him liable fits within the purpose of s. 86(1) and the manner in which it has been applied.  From a broader policy perspective, it fits within what has been found to be the most efficient and effective risk allocation from both an economic and public safety perspective, two elements that are central to s. 86(1).

Pedestrian Struck on Road at Night Found 90% at Fault for Crash

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the issue of fault in a pedestrian collision case.
In today’s case (O’Connor v. James) the Plaintiff was walking along No. 6 Road in Richmond, BC, when he was struck by the Defendants vehicle.  The Plaintiff consumed some alcohol before the collision and was struck while he was walking on the actual roadway (as opposed to the shoulder) at the time of impact.  As a consequence the Court found that the Plaintiff was in breach of various provisions of the BC Motor (Vehicle) Act.
Specifically, Mr. Justice Burnyeat made the following findings of fact with respect to this accident:
[22] It was the consensus of all witnesses that Mr. O’Connor was dressed entirely in black that night and was wearing no reflective clothing.  I also find that the approaching vehicle driven by Mr. Hockley had the low beams activated.  I also find that the street light at the corner of No. 6 Road and Triangle Road was not operating.  Taking into account all of the evidence, I find that Mr. O’Connor was on the road surface, and not on the grass median beside the southbound lane of No. 6 Road when he was hit….

[23] I accept the evidence of Ms. Journeau, Mr. Hockley, Ms. Kamayah, and Mr. James that Mr. O’Connor was in the southbound lane of No. 6 Road when he was hit by the vehicle driven by Mr. James.  I find that it would have been impossible for the collision to have occurred on the grassy median and for the vehicle driven by Mr. James to have come to rest where it did if the contact with Mr. O’Connor had been on the grassy median.  Walking where he was walking, Mr. O’Connor violated a number of provisions of the Motor (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 319:

179      (2)  A pedestrian must not leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle that is so close it is impracticable for the driver to yield the right of way.

182      (1)  If there is a sidewalk that is reasonable passable on either or both sides of a highway, a pedestrian must not walk on a roadway.

(2)  If there is no sidewalk, a pedestrian walking along or on a highway must walk only on the extreme left side of the roadway or the shoulder of the highway, facing traffic approaching from the opposite direction.

[35] From the evidence, I make the following findings:  (a) the temperature that night in the area approached the freezing point; (b) the road surface was either icy or covered with dew as a result of the new-freezing atmospheric conditions; (c) the posted speed limit on No. 6 Road is 50 km/h; (d) the vehicle being driving by Mr. James was travelling at somewhere between 55 km/h and 65 km/h that night; (e) it was the intention of Mr. James to make a left turn at the intersection of No. 6 Road and Triangle Road and this intersection which would be to the left of Mr. James was being approached by Mr. James; (f) the vehicle driven by Mr. Hockley was being driven towards Mr. James and the low-beam lights of the Hockley vehicle were activated; and (g) the street light at the intersection of No. 6 Road and Triangle Road was not operative so that illumination of No. 6 Road at that point was diminished.

The court went on to find that the Pedestrian Plaintiff was 90% to blame for this collision and that the Defendant motorist was 10% to blame.  In dividing fault this way Mr. Justice Burnyeat made the following analysis:

I am satisfied that Mr. James was negligent in the operation of the vehicle which struck Mr. O’Connor.  Mr. James ignored the road conditions, visibility on No. 6 Road, the speed limits, his knowledge that there were no sidewalks, and his knowledge that there might be pedestrians.  All of these factors contributed to a need for Mr. James to drive more slowly than even the speed limit which was in effect.  Mr. James owed a duty of care to Mr. O’Connor and did not meet that duty by driving his car at the speed he was going when it hit Mr. O’Connor….

It is clear that the judgment of Mr. O’Connor was somewhat impaired by alcohol.  As well, he was dressed entirely in black without reflective clothing.  His clothing made it difficult if not impossible for drivers to see him.  Contrary to s. 182(2) of the Motor (Vehicle) Act, Mr. O’Connor was not walking facing traffic, and was not walking on the shoulder of No. 6 Road.  Mr. James has shown that the conduct of Mr. O’Connor that evening showed a want of reasonable care for his own safety and that this contributed to causing his injuries.  Mr. James has proven that Mr. O’Connor did not conduct himself in a reasonable manner so that his injuries could have been avoided or, at least, diminished.  In the circumstances, I assess liability at 90% against Mr. O’Connor and 10% against Mr. James.

Can you be at Fault for a Crash if you have the Statutory Right of Way?

The short answer is yes and reasons for judgment were released today demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Karran v. Anderson) the Plaintiff was seriously injured when she was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle while she was jogging “against the light in a marked crosswalk“.  As a consequence of the impact the Plaintiff “was thrown fifty-seven feet in the air and landed in the south crosswalk…She suffered an occipital hematoma, a fractured left femur, a dislocated right knee…back and neck injuries as well as extensive bruises and abrasions.”
At the time of the accident the Defendant had a green light and he was not speeding.  The Plaintiff, on the other hand, was jaywalking.  Nonetheless Mr. Justice Cohen of the BC Supreme Court found that the Defendant was partially at fault for this crash.  How can this be?  The reason is the determination of fault in BC Personal Injury Claims (with the exception of intentional torts) is governed under the common law of Negligence.  A person can be found negligent even if they did not brake any statutory law during an accident.  Mr. Justice Cohen summarized this principle concisely stating that ” the authorities establish that the common law duty of care exists notwithstanding statutory rights of way and that a breach of a statutory right of way merely provides evidence in support of a finding of a negligent breach of the common law duty of care
In today’s case the court made the following findings of fact about how the collision occurred:
I find that the plaintiff jogged across Howe Street against the light in the north crosswalk in front of vehicles that were stopped in the two middle southbound lanes; that the southbound vehicles that were stopped when the plaintiff passed in front of them had the green light; that just before the plaintiff was struck by the truck she glanced to her left looking north up Howe street in the east curb lane; that there was heavy rush hour traffic; that the east curb lane on Howe street was open to southbound traffic; that some of the westbound traffic travelling on Smithe Street had failed to clear the intersection thereby preventing other westbound vehicles from entering the intersection; that the defendant’s speed reached 50 km/h; and, that the defendant braked his vehicle just prior to the collision.
The court found that the Defendant was 25% to blame for this collision because he failed “to take any steps to avoid the accident“.  In coming to this conclusion Mr. Justice Cohen highlighted the following facts:
[65] Thus, in the case at bar the first issue to decide is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff with regard to the circumstances that existed in the intersection at the time of the accident.  In my opinion, he did.  I find that the possibility of danger emerging was reasonably apparent such that special precautions should have been taken by the defendant: there was rush hour traffic; despite the fact that the traffic light for southbound traffic on Howe Street had turned to green, the vehicles in the middle two lanes on Howe Street immediately to the west of the defendant’s lane of travel did not proceed through the intersection; westbound traffic on Smithe Street was backed up into the intersection preventing some westbound vehicles from proceeding through the intersection; there were pedestrians in the area of the intersection; and, the defendant’s view of the intersection was blocked by the southbound vehicles that were stopped in the middle two lanes on Howe Street…

[67]         The defendant was proceeding on a green light and thus had the right of way.  However, I find that the defendant did not keep a proper lookout.  He failed to observe that there were vehicles stopped in the middle two lanes on Howe Street.  I find that by failing to observe that the vehicles in the middle two lanes had not proceeded on the green light, and proceeding into the intersection at 50 km/h, he acted in breach of the duty placed upon him to take special precautions in the circumstances.

[68]         Finally, I find that the opportunity existed for the defendant to take action to avoid colliding with the plaintiff…

[100] The defendant accelerated from the intersection at the intersection of Howe and Robson Streets to reach 50 km/h and he maintained this speed to virtually the point of impact with the plaintiff.  I agree with the plaintiff that driving at the speed limit in the east curb lane while the vehicles in the middle two lanes were stopped on a green light was not reasonable nor prudent given the traffic conditions at the intersection.

This case contains a lengthy and thorough discussion of the law regarding the duties of motorists and pedestrians in crosswalk accidents and is worth reviewing in full for anyone researching or involved in a liability case dealing with the same.

More on Liability – Stop Signs, Speeding and Fault

Reasons for judgment were released this week dealing with the issue of fault for a car crash where one motorist bound by a stop sign enters an intersection and gets hit by a speeding vehicle.
In this week’s case (McKinnon v. Peterson) the Plaintiff stopped at a stop sign heading northbound on Marlborough Avenue at the intersection of Kingsway.  As the Plaintiff entered the intersection and almost cleared it he was struck by the defendants vehicle who was travelling westbound.   The Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck on the right passenger side in a “violent” collision which caused all four tires of the defendant’s vehicle to leave the ground and “drove the plaintiff’s vehicle… over the curb, flattening a stop sign, shearing a light standard, and through a garden bed, and finally into the front of a restaurant. ”
When a motorist leaves a stop sign and attempts to cross an intersection on a through highway the motorist needs to comply with s. 175 of the Motor Vehicle Act which holds in part that:

175(1)  If a vehicle that is about to enter a through highway has stopped in compliance with section 186,

(a)        the driver of the vehicle must yield the right of way to traffic that has entered the intersection on the through highway or is approaching so closely on it that it constitutes an immediate hazard, and

(b)        having yielded, the driver may proceed with caution.

(2)        If a vehicle is entering a through highway in compliance with subsection (1), traffic approaching the intersection on the highway must yield the right of way to the entering vehicle while it is proceeding into or across the highway.

Mr. Justice Hinkson held that while the Plaintiff entered the intersection at a time when the Defendant did not constitute an “immediate hazard” the Plaintiff failed to proceed with caution by “failing to observe the defendant’s vehicle that was there to be seen” and for this the Plaintiff was found at fault.

The analysis did not end there, however, as the Defendant was also found at fault for speeding and failing to yield the right of way to the plaintiff who gained the right of way after he entered the intersection at a time when the Defendant did not pose an immediate hazard.

Specifically Mr. Justice Hinkson found that “the defendant was traveling at a speed of close to double the posted speed limit as he approached the intersection of Kingsway and Marlborough Avenue on November 2, 2006, and that he was unable to do so safely. He failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff.”

The Court went on to find the Defendant 2/3 at fault for this collision and the Plaintiff 1/3 at fault.  In doing so Mr. Justice Hinkson described the relative fault of the parties as follows:

[47] I am unable to conclude that such a division of liability is warranted in this case. Mr. Petersen was travelling at what I have found to be an unsafe speed in all of the circumstances, and knew, or should have known that he would be unable to safely stop for vehicles that might choose to cross Kingsway, having acquired the right of way to do so. His conduct in these circumstances was reckless.

[48] On the other hand, Mr. McKinnon chose to cross a six lane street at other than a traffic controlled intersection, knowing that vehicles travelled that road at that time of day at speeds greater than posted. In so doing, he was obliged to proceed with caution, and I find that he did not.

[49] Weighing the respective negligence of the parties, I consider that the defendant must bear the majority of the liability for the collision. I conclude that the defendant’s conduct was considerably more negligent than the plaintiff’s, and that the defendant must bear two-thirds of the blame for the collision, and the plaintiff the remaining one-third. There will be judgment accordingly.

Intersection crashes are some of the most complicated cases when determing the relative blameworthiness of each party.  While each case turns on its own facts and the results can very depending on all the subtleties of evidence in any given case, this decision is worth reviewing for a careful analysis of some of the factors that come into play when deciding whom to blame to what degree for an intersection crash.

Can you be at Fault for a BC Car Crash if you are Rearended?

Although such a finding is unusual the short answer is yes, you can be at fault for a car crash when rear-ended by another motorist.  Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Saffari v. Lopez) the Plaintiff sustained injuries when she rear-ended the Defendant’s vehicle in West Vancouver on the on-ramp to the Lion’s Gate Bridge.
Traffic at the time of the crash was sparse.  The Plaintiff was following the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Defendant’s passenger attempted to ‘throw out a cigarette and thought it came back in‘ and in reaction to this the Defendant brought his vehicle to ‘a fairly sudden slowdown‘.  At this time the Plaintiff collided with the Defendant vehicle.
Mr. Justice Harvey of the BC Supreme Court found that both the Plaintiff and Defendant were equally to blame for this collision, he reasoned as follows in reaching this conclusion:

[41] Section 144(1)(b) prohibits drivers from driving without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway.

[42] Such would include, in my opinion, consideration of the circumstances of stopping or suddenly slowing one’s vehicle in the flow of traffic where other viable options, such as exiting the roadway, existed.  The emergency resulting in the deceleration of the Lopez vehicle was self-created.  In any event, there is no suggestion that the cigarette had fallen onto the driver’s lap or otherwise onto his person.  Mr. Lopez’s reaction, that is to suddenly slow or stop his vehicle, was but one of several choices he had.  He acknowledged these included signalling an intention to change lanes to reach a point of safety where he could stop his vehicle without impeding traffic or putting on four-way flashers to alert following vehicles and other users of the road to an emergency.

[43] I find Mr. Lopez was negligent in suddenly stopping or slowing his vehicle on the roadway approaching the Lions Gate Bridge: Ayers.  Here, unlike in the authorities referred to by the defendant, traffic was not stop and go as was the case in Pryndik v. Manju, 2001 BCSC 502 at para. 2, aff’d 2002 BCCA 639, nor was there such a lapse of time between the action of the defendant and the happening of the accident to bring the circumstances of this case within the reasoning of the Court in Peterson v. Cabot, 2000 BCSC 1453.

[44] I also need to consider the actions of the plaintiff Ms. Saffari and what, if any, responsibility rests with her actions leading to the collision.

[45] I must reject, almost in its entirety, the evidence of Mr. Javanpour as it relates to the driving of Ms. Saffari prior to and leading to the accident.

[46] His evidence concerning matters such as the conversations he overheard, the use or availability of a cell phone during the journey preceding the accident coupled with his description and explanation as to the Jeep’s running lights, all make his evidence of events unreliable.

[47] Ms. Saffari’s description of events, while more credible in terms of the totality of the evidence, is equally wanting in some areas.  Her description of the conversation with Ms. Pfeifer coupled with her denial of it on discovery, her varying estimates of her speed and that of the Jeep, her admission that she “momentarily lost sight of the Jeep” coupled with the elaborate description of her evasive actions also cause me to question more important aspects of her evidence as it relates to the moments or seconds leading to the accident.

[48] Ms. Saffari never said the Lopez vehicle slammed on the brakes.  She testified she saw the brake lights of the Jeep come on as she entered the arc of the curve.  She did not describe a panic stop nor is such consistent with the evidence of Mr. Lopez.  Her evidence as to “losing sight of the Jeep” simply makes no sense if her estimate as to the separation between the vehicles and her speed is consistent and she was maintaining proper lookout.  Were she travelling both at the speed she describes and the distance from the Jeep when she saw the lights come on, she could have stopped.  This is not a case where the doctrine of “agony of collision” applies.  Drivers are daily confronted with vehicles in front of them stopping or slowing for all sorts of reasons.  If Ms. Saffari did react in the elaborate manner she and Mr. Javanpour described in their evidence then she did so because she was travelling either too fast for conditions or too close behind the Lopez vehicle to bring her car to a timely stop once confronted by the hazard posed by the defendant’s driving.

[49] In the circumstances, I find the plaintiff and defendant equally at fault for the accident.  The defendant Ms. Pfeifer is accordingly liable, as owner, in like proportion to Mr. Lopez.

Motor Vehicle Cases and Expert Reports Addressing Fault

I have written about the role expert witnesses play in ICBC Injury Claims on several occasions.  These past posts have largely dealt with expert medical witness who typically address the nature and extent of injuries caused by motor vehicle collisions.  What about experts addressing the issue of fault, can they play a role in BC personal injury claims?
The answer is yes but for a variety of reasons such witnesses typically are not involved in claims arising from car crashes.  This is so because in most car crash cases addressing fault expert evidence is not needed because judges and juries are able to use their common sense and collective life experience to determine who is at fault.  However, sometimes more unusual circumstances outside of most people’s typical life experience cause a collision such that expert evidence may be necessary.  Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this issue.
In yesterday’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie) the Plaintiff was severely injured while “walking or riding her bicycle along the King George Highway…when her head struck the side of a large tractor-trailer“.
The Plaintiff’s lawyer tried to introduce an expert witness to give opinion evidence on the standard of care of professional drivers of tractor-trailers, whether the driver in this case met that standard and lastly with respect to evidence regarding the characteristics of large tractor trailers.
The defence lawyers objected to this witness claiming expert evidence was not necessary to assist the court in making findings of fault.  Mr. Justice Ehrcke of the BC Supreme Court disagreed and permitted this evidence in and in doing so engaged in a useful discussion about the role that expert witnesses play generally in BC cases addressing the issue of fault.  For your convenience I reproduce the highlights of this discussion below:

[10]            In Burbank v. R.T.B., 2007 BCCA 215 our Court of Appeal observed that while expert evidence on the standard of care is not usually required in negligence actions, it may be capable of assisting the trier of fact and admissible as necessary in certain cases, particularly where the subject matter is beyond the common understanding of the judge or jury.

[11]            In the present case, while most adults in British Columbia may have some experience in driving motor vehicles, few have experience in driving large commercial tractor-trailers.  Few would know from their common experience what the handling characteristics of such vehicles are, or what the visibility is from the perspective of a driver in the cab, or what the common driving practices are of professional drivers of such rigs.

[12]            Not only have most persons never had the experience of driving such vehicles, most persons would not even be legally permitted to drive them, since to do so one must first satisfy the requirements to obtain a special class of driver’s licence…

 

[15]            In Tucker (Public Trustee of) v. Asleson (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 173 (C.A.), Southin, J.A. specifically addressed the issue of expert evidence in motor vehicle negligence actions and observed that a distinction ought to be made between cases involving motor cars and those involving large transport vehicles.  She wrote at pp.194-195:

To my mind, motor car negligence cases differ significantly from all other actions in which one person alleges that the acts or omissions of another in breach of a duty of care have done him injury.

First, the Legislature has laid down for motorists many rules of the road and many requirements concerning the equipping of vehicles, all of which the motorist is expected to obey and which he expects others to obey.  The only other aspect of ordinary life so governed is that of the movement of vessels upon certain navigable waters.  But I do not say that obedience to these rules relieves the motorist from all other obligations.  See British Columbia Electric Railway v. Farrer, [1955] S.C.R. 757.

Secondly, experts are not called to prove the standard of care which is appropriate. Each judge brings into court his or her own notions of what constitutes driving with reasonable care.  As I said in McLuskie v. Sakai in a passage quoted in the appeal from my judgment (1987), 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 372 at 378 (C.A.):

The difficulty with these motor car cases and matters of negligence is that whatever we may be saying, what we are doing as judges is, in fact, applying our own knowledge of driving to the facts in the absence of any other evidence.  That is what a judge does every time he says that the defendant should have avoided an obvious obstruction.  I, on the balance of probabilities, am not satisfied that a competent driver coming upon that ice on that bridge on that morning with both hands on the wheel could have done other than Mr. Sakai did.  Therefore, it follows that I do not think he was negligent.

To put it another way, in motor car cases the judge is his or her own expert.  That is not to say that there could not be expert evidence on the proper way, for instance, for the driver of a mammoth transport vehicle to drive.  If, on such an issue, the plaintiff called an expert to say that such a vehicle should not be driven under certain circumstances at more than 40 miles per hour and the defendant called another expert who said the contrary, the learned trial judge could and usually would be obliged to choose one expert over the other.

[16]            Expert evidence on the standard of care has been considered in a number of negligence cases involving the operation of heavy vehicles.  See for example Millott Estate v. Reinhard, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 678 (Alta. Q.B.) and Fuller v. Schaff, 2009 YKSC 10.

[17]            I am satisfied that Mr. Eckert should be qualified as an expert witness and permitted to give opinion evidence in the areas outlined above.  I find that he has the necessary qualifications and that the evidence is necessary in the sense explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mohan.  What weight should be attached to his evidence is, of course, a matter that can only be determined at the end of trial.

Could You Be At Fault For A Crash If You Have the Right of Way?

The short answer is yes, and reasons for judgment were released by the BC Supreme Court (Bain v. Shafron) today discussing this legal principle.
In today’s case a collision occurred over 8 years ago in Vancouver, BC.  (the reasons why the case took over 8 years to get to trial are discussed in the judgment).  The Defendant entered an intersection on a green light.  While there she yielded to a bus that was trying to make a left hand turn.  By the time the bus cleared the intersection the Defendant’s light turned red.  The Plaintiff, then approaching from the Defendant’s right, entered the intersection on a green light and a collision occurred.   
Despite entering on a green light Madam Justice Fisher of the BC Supreme Court found the Plaintiff to be 100% responsible for this collision and dismissed the claim.
In doing so she discussed the law relating to collisions and the duties of driver’s with the right of way as follows:

[11]            As I explain below, I have found that Ms. Shafron lawfully entered the intersection of Oak and Broadway.  Accordingly, she had a statutory right of way under s. 127(1)(a)(iii) of the Motor Vehicle Act and Mr. Bain was obligated to yield to her right of way when he entered the intersection:

127 (1) When a green light alone is exhibited at an intersection by a traffic control signal,

(a)        the driver of a vehicle facing the green light

(iii)       must yield the right of way to vehicles lawfully in the intersection at the time the green light became exhibited …

[12]            Ms. Shafron as the driver of the vehicle with the right of way was the dominant driver and Mr. Bain was the servient driver.  A dominant driver does not lose that position by unreasonable actions but the existence of a right of way does not entitle the dominant driver to disregard an apparent danger: Atchison v. Kummetz, (1995), 59 B.C.A.C. 81 at para. 19, Abbott Estate v. Toronto Transportation Commission, [1935] S.C.R. 671.  There is a duty of care to avoid a collision when the dominant driver sees or ought to see that the other driver is not yielding the right of way: Bedwell v. McGill, 2008 BCCA 6.  In order for the plaintiff in this case to prove that the defendant was negligent, Mr. Bain must establish that Ms. Shafron should have become aware that he was not yielding and that she had a sufficient opportunity to avoid the collision.  Any doubts should not be resolved in favour of the plaintiff: Walker v. Brownlee, [1952] D.L.R. 450 (S.C.C.) at para. 50, Brewster (Guardian ad litem of) v. Swain, 2007 BCCA 347, Kerr (Litigation Guardian of) v. Creighton, 2008 BCCA 75.

[13]            The standard of care of a driver is not one of perfection, but whether the driver acted in a manner which an ordinarily prudent person would act: see Hadden v. Lynch, 2008 BCSC 295 at para. 69 and the cases cited therein.

The principles summarized by Madam Justice Fisher are something all BC motorists should be familiar with.  Just because you have a green light (or otherwise have the right of way) does not necessarily mean you are not at fault for a collision.  If you are a ‘dominant driver’ and can reasonably avoid a collision where someone is not yielding to your right of way you may be negligent and liable for the crash.