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Tag: Family Compensation Act

FCA and Tort Claim Limits Under ICBC's Underinsured Motorist Protection

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC UMP Cases, Uncategorized.


An ICBC UMP decision has recently been provided to me dealing with the amount of coverage available under UMP when a claimant has the right to advance a tort claim and a Family Compensation Act claim arising from the same collision.
This decision was released well before the 2007 amendment requiring UMP Arbitration decisions to be published publicly on ICBC’s website.  I summarize the decison to add it to this public and searchable UMP Claims Database.
In the 1996 case, (CCK v. ICBC) the Claimant was severely injured in a collision.  She suffered a spinal cord injury rendering her a paraplegic.  Her mother was killed in the same collision.  The at-fault motorist was underinsured for all of the civil claims flowing from the crash.  The Claimant was entitled to damages not only for her own injuries but also as a beneficiary under the Family Compensation Act for the death of her mother.
The arbitrator had to decide whether the Claimant could access $1 million in UMP Coverage in her tort claim along with an additional $1 million in coverage for her FCA claim or whether both claims were covered by a single limit.  Arbitrator Schmitt provided the following reasons:
If CCK had been injured but had not lost her Mother, she would, of course, under section 148.1(2) be entitled to compensation under UMP coverage.  In this case she was insured and she lost her Mother so she is an insured under not one but two of the definitions.  What ICBC is arguing is that she is entitled to UMP coverage for her injuries and loss of her Mother but only under her own million dollars coverage…
In the case of CCK, she happens to be insured under two different definitions and she will be entitled to the benefits of her UMP coverage for both her claims up to the $1,000,000 limit…
The Mother’s estate is likewise entitled to the benefit of UMP coverage up to $1,000,000 but the Mother’s estate claims do not include the claims of survivors under the Family Compensation Act which belong specifically to those survivors…
The estate’s coverage is available to cover claims by the estate itself which may be advanced under the Estate Administration Act.  Insofar as CCK or her grandmother may be entitled to receive some or all of the proceeds of the estate as a beneficiary they may directly benefit from such coverage.  Otherwise CCK is entitled to the benefit of her own UMP coverage of $1 million with respect to her claim for personal injuries and her claim for damages under the Family Compensation Act.
This case should be contrasted with a subsequent Court of Appeal decision in 2007 (Lougheed v. Co-operators General Insurance Company)  which upheld the following trial judgement reasons finding that the ‘insured‘ in an FCA claim brought following a collision is the personal representative of the estate of the deceased and that all beneficiaries of such an FCA claim are subject to the representative’s single policy limit:

[85]  The issue, then, is how one ought to read the definition of “insured” in s. 148.1(1)(c), bearing in mind the scope of coverage granted by s. 148.1(2).  But for his death, Mr. Lougheed would have received UMP coverage by operation of s. 148.1(1)(a).  As a result of his death, the “insured” is “a person who…is entitled to maintain an action” because of Mr. Lougheed’s death.  The “action” refers to the family compensation claim that may be commenced under the FCA by the personal representative on behalf of all of the beneficiaries, or by the beneficiaries if it is not commenced by the personal representative.  In either case, however, the action must be treated as though it had been brought by the personal representative.  It is a single cause of action brought on behalf of all of Mr. Lougheed’s beneficiaries.

[86]  It follows, in my view, that the “insured” in s. 148.1(1)(c) must be the personal representative, who is the individual entitled, either directly or indirectly, to maintain a family compensation action as a result of the death of the primary insured, Mr. Lougheed.  That interpretation is consistent with the grant of coverage provision, which limits the recovery of benefits to those otherwise accruing to the deceased insured.

[87]  In the result, the UMP coverage limit is not $1 million for each beneficiary of a family compensation action, but $1 million for the beneficiaries of the action as a whole.  The plaintiffs, all beneficiaries, are entitled collectively to the $1 million of UMP coverage that would otherwise have been available to the deceased, Mr. Lougheed.

Wrongful Death Law Reform Public Awareness Events This Weekend

Written by admin on . Posted in Tort Reform.


On Sunday, September 25, 2011 two public awareness events will be held to bring attention to the need for wrongful death law reform in British Columbia.
The Events are scheduled at 2:00 pm in Vancouver at the backsteps of the Vancouver Art Gallery and at the same time at 1850 Shannon Lake Road in West Kelowna.  You can click here for more details.
I’ve written about the need for wrongful death law reform before.  If you are in Kelowna or Vancouver this weekend and would like to learn about the shortcomings of BC’s wrongful death laws and steps that can be taken to positively change this area of the law I encourage you to attend these important public awareness events.

Loss of Companionship "Services" in BC Wrongful Death Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC UMP Cases, Uncategorized. 95 Comments on Loss of Companionship "Services" in BC Wrongful Death Claims


There is a general prohibition preventing damages being awarded for “loss of companionship” in BC Wrongful Death lawsuits.  However, if the companionship can be characterized as a “service” which can be quantified and needs replacement damages can be awarded.  This was demonstrated in the arbitration decision of NN, DN and MEN v. ICBC which I summarize in my continued efforts to create a searchable ICBC UMP claims database.
In NN, DN and MEN v. ICBC, the Claimant’s spouse was killed in a motor vehicle collision.  The at fault driver was uninsured.  The Claimant sought damages under BC’s Family Compensation Act.  It was agreed that the Claimants were insured for UMP coverage with ICBC.  The parties agreed to have damages assessed though private UMP arbitration.
At the time of his death the deceased was separated from his spouse for many years.  Despite this he had a good relationship with her.  She suffered from vascular dementia and lived in a group home.  He visited her on a daily basis and took her out and spent time with her.  She sought damages for “loss of companionship services“.  ICBC opposed arguing nothing was recoverable as “loss of spousal companionship is not a compensable head of damage in a family compensation claim“.
Arbitrator Donald Yule agreed that while the “loss of spousal companionship” prohibition exists, it does not extend to services.   Arbitrator Yule accepted expert evidence that these companionship services were “important to (the spouse’s) quality of life” and assessed damages for this lost service at $35,000.  In doing so Arbitrator Yule provided the following helpful reasons:
52.   This case helps to clarify that it is the “services” aspect of the deceased’s conduct that is compensable.  It does not mater that the service is motivated by love and affection for a spouse.  Household services are also motivated by care and affections.  The replacement of them is clearly compensable.  Mrs. N’s claim is for compensation services, not merely the loss of companionship.  In Bianco Estate the claim was for loss of companionship only.  The plaintiffs were seeking an “at large” lump sum award.  Hence, the issue as to whether the award was pecuniary or non-pecuniary.  There was no attempt in  that case to attach an economic value or cost to the lost services aspect of companionship.  The judgement at paragraph 12 seems to leave open the possibility of a compensable claim where substitute or replacement services result in an actual pecuniary loss.
53.  It seems to me that one aspect of Mr. N’s companionship is the loss to Mrs. N., in terms of the pleasure and comfort that derives from the continuing association with a long time friend and spouse.  That loss is irreplaceable; no economic value can be attached to it and it is not compensable.  That is the solatium aspect.  But another aspect of MR. N’s companionship is the loss to Mrs. N. of having someone to take her out of the Lodge on a daily basis; to encourage and facilitate her maintaining mobility as long as possible; to provide a ‘break’ from the institution; to provide an opportunity to supplement her food intake; and to provide social stimulation to the extent she is able to participate in it.  This is a loss that can be provided by substitute services….There is certainly a health and medical benefit aspect to these services.

Wrongful Death Claims in BC and the Definition of "Spouse"

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BC’s Family Compensation Act permits a defined class of family members to sue for damages following the wrongful death of a loved one.  Spouses are part of this defined class.  However, the definition of spouse goes beyond legally married individuals and also includes a person who “lived and cohabited with the deceased in a marriage-like relationship, including a marriage-like relationship between persons of the same gender, for a period of at least 2 years ending no earlier than one year before the death“.
In last week’s case (James v. Gillis) Ms. James died in a motor vehicle collision in 2006.   Mr. Cornet claimed he was the spouse of Ms. James and sought damages under the Family Compensation Act.  ICBC took the position that he was not a spouse as defined by the Act and denied the claim.  The matter went to trial and ultimately Madam Justice Watchuk agreed that Ms. Cornet was a “spouse” as defined by the FCA and was able to claim damages.
While the relevant discussion is far too lengthy to reproduce here, the Court extensively canvassed the law regarding the definiton of spouse and “marriage-like relationship” for the purpose of FCA claims at paragraphs 48-52 of the reasons for judgement and these are worth reviewing in full for anyone interested in this area of the law.
While on this topic I should again point out that a proposed amendment to the Family Compensation Act passed First Reading this Spring and will hopefully pass into law during the Legislature’s next session.

Wrongful Death Law Reform in BC Closer to Reality

Written by admin on . Posted in Tort Reform, Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Wrongful Death Law Reform in BC Closer to Reality


As previously discussed BC’s Family Compensation Act(the statute dealing with lawsuits for damages for wrongful death in BC) is out of date, inadequate and in need of reform.  I’ve had the unfortunate experience of fielding too many phone calls over the years explaining that the wrongful death of many people was seen as worthless in the eyes of the law.  Members of the Trial Lawyers Association of BC along with other organizations such as the BC Coalition of People With Disabilities have been working for years to persuade the government that reform is needed in this area of law.  It seems all of this effort is slowly but surely paying off.
West Vancouver MLA Ralph Sultan has introduced a Bill which seeks to amend BC’s outdated Family Compensation Act.   Mr. Sultan stated as follows when introducing the Bill “The Family Compensation Act Amendment Act would permit the court to award damages up to specified limits for grief, and loss of guidance, care, and companionship to spouses of deceased persons as well as parents and children…This amendment is a carbon copy of the statute currently on the books in Alberta granting the potential for the court to grant awards, within limits, for those who have suffered the tragedy of wrongful death. The Family Compensation Act Amendment Act is consistent with the families-first agenda of this government.“
The Bill is titled “The Family Compensation Act Amendment Act” and can be found here.  It is designed to provide greater accountability for those who take the life of another in BC and will bring better compensation rights for families who lose a loved one through the wrongful act of another.  Specifically it seeks to amend section 3 of the FCA by adding the following provision:


(10) If an action brought under this Act, the court, without reference to any other damages that may be awarded and without evidence of damage, shall award damages for grief and loss of the guidance, care and companionship of the deceased person of

(a) subject to subsection (3), $75,000 to the spouse ofthe deceased person,

(b) $75,000 to the parent or parents of the deceased person to be divided equally if the action is brought for the benefit of both parents, and

(c) $45,000 to each child of the deceased person.

(11) The courts shall not award damages under subsection 10 (a) to the spouse if the spouse was living separate and apart from the deceased person at the time of death.




I should point out that this new Bill is not law yet and likely won’t go beyond first reading before the Legislature’s Spring session closes on June 2, 2011.  The proposed amendment is a step in the right direction but can certainly go further in bringing meaningful compensation to those who lose a loved one through others actions.  I suggest all who support this much needed reform take a brief moment to contact Ralph Sultan and thank him for tabling this welcome legislation  along with making suggestions to improve these amendments before they become law.

Saanich Police Officer Found "Grossly Negligent" For Fatally Shooting Disturbed Man

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(UPDATE January 10, 2013 – In reasons for judgement released today the BC Court of Appeal ordered a new trial in the below discussed case finding that the trial judge’s reasons did not adequatly address the important evidence presented at trial)
Important reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing lawsuits for damages against police officers when excessive force is used in the line of duty.
This week’s case (Camaso v. Egan) has been covered in the conventional press and I don’t intend to repeat all the well publicized details.  From a legal perspective, however, this case is useful for anyone interested in the law of police officer liability in British Columbia.
In this week’s case the Saanich Police Department were called to deal with a disturbed man.   Constable Dukeshire was one of the officers who responded to this call.  Shortly after encountering the disturbed individual Constable Dukeshire shot him several times resulting in his death.  He was found negligent making the City of Saanich liable for his actions under the principles of vicarious liability.  Damages of almost $350,000 were awarded to the disturbed man’s survivors under the BC Family Compensation Act.
Mr. Justice Burnyeat of the BC Supreme Court went further and found the officer grossly negligent for the death.  Paragraphs 269-308 are worth reviewing in full for anyone interested in this area of law.  Some of the highlights of Mr. Justice Burnyeat’s reasons were as follows:

[272]It is not in dispute that Constable Dukeshire shot Mr. Camaso.  Having established that, the onus shifts to Constable Dukeshire to establish that the shooting was justified.  In Prior v. McNab (1976), 16 O.R. (2d) 380 (Ont. H.C.), Reid J. stated in this regard:

… It is enough to allege and prove an assault.  Plaintiff need not prove that the force used was excessive.  He need prove only that it was used upon him.  The onus of proving that the force was not excessive would lie on the policeman.  This is clear from the decisions of our Court of Appeal.

The onus on a plea of justification in the use of force lies on him who asserts it: Miska v. Sivec, [1959] O.R. 144, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 363.  This applies to one who sets up the defence of self-defence (as in Miska) or on one who relies on a statutory duty:  O’Tierney v. Concord Tavern Ltd., supra, per Roach, J.A., who said, at p. 534:

It was implicit in a plea of justification even based on a statutory duty that the degree of force used was not excessive and the party making that plea must prove it.

That onus would lie on the police if sued. (at p. 385)…

[282]The “Use of Force Continuum” that is taught to all officers and which is part of the Policy of the Saanich Police Department provides for a continuum from “presence” to “communication” to “open hand control” to “taser” to “capsaicinoid aerosols” (pepper spray) to “empty hand impact techniques” to “impact weapons” to “lateral neck restraint” to “firearms”.

[283]After Mr. Camaso came out from behind his vehicle the first time, Constable Dukeshire moved directly to “firearms” without going through any of the earlier stages of the continuum.  After Constable Dukeshire saw that Mr. Camaso was not holding a weapon which could cause him harm from afar, Constable Dukeshire failed to deescalate the situation in order to establish “presence” and in order to establish “communication”.  This failure to do so breached the duty of care which Constable Dukeshire owed to Mr. Camaso.

[284]Rather than calling for backup, Constable Dukeshire pursued Mr. Camaso on his own.  Saanich Police Department Policy required Constable Dukeshire to engage a supervisor.  He failed to do so.  Saanich Police Department Policy required Constable Dukeshire to take charge and coordinate the efforts of the other two Constables.  He did not do so.  Rather than pursuing Mr. Camaso as the leader of a team or as part of a team, Constable Dukeshire pursued Mr. Camaso without the knowledge of the location of Constables McNeil and Murphy, and without attempting to coordinate their activities with his own.  No call was made by Constable Dukeshire for a supervisor to coordinate activities.  No attempt was made by Constable Dukeshire to allow Constables McNeil and Murphy to catch up to him in order that they could assist him in apprehending Mr. Camaso under the Mental Health Act….

[289]It was not reasonable for Constable Dukeshire to continue to aim his gun at Mr. Camaso when Mr. Camaso appeared to be complying by going down onto the ground as was requested by Constable Dukeshire.  His service revolver should have been holstered….

[295]Even with one or two potential weapons in Mr. Camaso’s hands, Constable Dukeshire who weighed almost one hundred pounds more and stood almost a foot taller than Mr. Camaso could not have had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to shoot Mr. Camaso for his own preservation.  It was always apparent to Constable Dukeshire that Mr. Camaso did not have a gun in his hands. …

[299]Putting myself in the position of Constable Dukeshire or putting a reasonable officer in the position of Constable Dukeshire, it is not reasonable to conclude that it is part of the responsibility of Constable Dukeshire to shoot Mr. Camaso three times and it is not possible on reasonable grounds to conclude that the force he used was necessary for the purpose of protecting himself and others from imminent or grievous bodily harm.  Putting myself in the position of Constable Dukeshire or putting even an inexperienced officer in the position of Constable Dukeshire, it is not possible on reasonable grounds to conclude that the force that was used was necessary.  Constable Dukeshire did not act on reasonable grounds when he shot Mr. Camaso.

[300]I find that Constable Dukeshire breached the duty of care owed to Mr. Camaso when he did not use the least amount of force necessary to carry out his duties, when he failed to remain a safe distance away from Mr. Camaso, when he failed to properly assess the situation before approaching Mr. Camaso, when he failed to plan an appropriate method to deal with the situation, when he advanced on Mr. Camaso thereby failing to deescalate the situation once it appeared that Mr. Camaso was beginning to comply with his commands, and when he failed to wait for backup support.  Constable Dukeshire breached his duty owed to Mr. Camaso to use only so much force as was reasonably necessary to carry out his legal duties.

[301]In the circumstances, I find Constable Dukeshire liable in negligence because I find that there was duty of care owed to Mr. Camaso, that there was a breach of that duty of care, and that the breach of the duty of care caused the death of Mr. Camaso.

[302]At the same time, Constable Dukeshire has failed to establish that the shooting was justified and that the force that he used was not excessive.  In fact, the Plaintiffs have shown on the balance of probabilities that the force that was used was excessive.  I find that Constable Dukeshire cannot rely on s. 25 of the Criminal Code of Canada or the provisions of ss. 16 and 28 of theMental Health Act.  His use of force was not justified.  I cannot find that Constable Dukeshire believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary for his self-preservation to use the force that he did.  I have reached the conclusion that Constable Dukeshire is liable in damages as a result of his failure to act in good faith and with reasonable care…

307]In reviewing all of the circumstances of this case, I conclude that Constable Dukeshire was grossly negligent.  When the pursuit of Mr. Camaso commenced, Constable Dukeshire was not involved in a dangerous activity.  However, as soon as Constable Dukeshire removed his service revolver from its holster and aimed it at Mr. Camaso, he was involved in an activity where it is plain that the magnitude of the risks involved were such that more than ordinary care had to be taken.  If more than ordinary care was not taken, a misstep or a mishap was likely to occur such that loss of life or serious injury would be almost inevitable.  More than ordinary care was not taken.  The loss of the life of Mr. Camaso resulted.  I also find Saanich vicariously liable for the damages caused by Constable Dukeshire.

Court Finds Abuse of Process for Liability Denial After Careless Driving Conviction

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 9, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 111 Comments on Court Finds Abuse of Process for Liability Denial After Careless Driving Conviction


Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, finding that it is an ‘abuse of process‘ pursuant to Rule 9-5(1)(d) for a Defendant to deny the issue of liability in a personal injury lawsuit after they have been convicted of careless driving as a result of the same collision.
In this week’s case (Ulmer v. Weidmann) the Plaintiff’s husband was killed when his motorcycle was struck by a vehicle operated by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff sued for damages pursuant to the Family Compensation Act.
Following the collision the Defendant was charged with “driving without due care and attention” under section 144(1)(a) of the BC Motor Vehicle Act.  He contested this charge but ultimately was found guilty following trial in the BC Provincial Court.
The Defendant then denied fault for the crash in the Wrongful Death lawsuit and claimed the Plaintiff was partly responsible.  Mr. Justice Truscott rejected this argument and found the Defendant solely responsible for the fatal collision.  The Court went further and found that while a party convicted under s. 144(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Act can argue an opposing motorist is partly to blame for a crash, it is an abuse of process for the convicted party to outright deny the issue of fault.  The Court provided the following useful reasons:

[83]         In my opinion the finding of driving without due care and attention in Provincial Court was akin to a finding of negligence against Mr. Weidmann, because his manner of driving was found to have departed from the standard of a reasonable man and he failed to avoid liability by proving he took all reasonable care in the circumstances.

[84]         I agree with plaintiff’s counsel that it was an abuse of process for the defendants to deny full liability in their statement of defence as this constituted an attempt to re-litigate the findings of the Provincial Court that were necessary for Steven Weidmann’s conviction of driving without due care and attention. This was an attempt to undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process which is not to be allowed.

[85]         I do not conclude however that the findings essential to Mr. Weidmann’s conviction in Provincial Court prevented Mr. Weidmann from alleging contributory negligence against Mr. Ulmer in this action…

[91]         While I have decided that there was no negligence on Mr. Ulmer contributing to the collision, based upon the evidence that I have accepted, I cannot say that this was a defence advanced in bad faith for the ulterior purpose of emotionally disturbing the plaintiff and putting pressure on her to settle at a figure favourable to the defendants.

[92]         Although I have concluded that it was an abuse of process by the defendants to deny liability completely, they were not guilty of an abuse of process in maintaining the defence of contributory negligence of Mr. Ulmer at all times.

The Plaintiff was ultimately awarded damages for her accident related losses and these included $10,000 for ‘nervous shock’.  Paragraphs 97-215 of the Reasons for Judgement are worth reviewing for Mr. Justice Truscott’s thorough review of the law of nervous shock claims.

Mike de Jong Addresses Wrongful Death Law Reform in BC

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As I’ve previously discussed, if a person dies through the carelessness of others in British Columbia claims for damages by surviving family members must be brought under the BC Family Compensation Act. This outdated law has been the subject of much criticism due to its restrictions for survivors claims. You can find an in-depth analysis on this topic here.
Recently BC Liberal leadership candidate Mike de Jong gave the following invitation:

I took this opportunity to ask Mike the following two questions:

Mike was kind enough to answer my first question on this recent video he uploaded to YouTube:

My question is addressed 1:13 into the clip.  For the sake of convenience here is Mike’s answer transcribed:
“That’s a good question because I think our laws in BC have fallen a little out of step with what’s happened in other jurisdictions and my belief is that if an accident occurs and someone loses a loved one they should be entitled to the same type of compensation as is available to the families elsewhere in Canada and that is not presently the case in British Columbia and I think it’s time we updated our laws in that respect.  It’s really about fairness for BC families.  Thanks for the question”
Maybe Mike will tackle my second question on his next episode of Open Mike Mailbag.  Given Mike’s views on wrongful death laws I’m optimistic he is not a tort ‘reformer‘  (for those unfamiliar with the phrase, tort reform generally refers to limiting the rights of those injured through the carelessness of others to the beneift of insurance company profits)  but a clear stance is always appreciated.  Thanks Mike.

More on the Shortcomings of BC Wrongful Death Laws and the Tragedy of Georgia Luge Competitor Nodar Kumaritashvili

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The Olympics are now over. British Columbians (and all Canadians for that matter) have much to be proud of. The Olympic Games have been a great success and created a sense of national unity and pride that have been unparellelled. As a Canadian I am proud of these games and the historic success of our athletes. Canadians will not soon forget where they were when Sidney Crosby scored his spectacular overtime goal to claim Olympic Gold.

With the dust settling, however, one story that has not gone away was the cloud that the Olympics started under with the unfortunate and tragic death of Georgia Luge Competitor Nodar Kumaritashvili.

When this news broke I shared my immediate thoughts on the tragedy.

Since authoring my article I’ve been approached by a handful of people to further share my views. I’ve been asked to comment on some of the specific shortcomings of British Columbia law that I alluded to in my initial article. After having this discussion several times I thought I would share some of my thoughts by way of this follow up post.

If a person dies through the carelessness of others in British Columbia the BC Family Compensation Act governs claims for compensation brought by survivors. This outdated law has been the subject of much criticism due to its restrictions for survivors rights. I could not have commented on the shortcomings of BC Wrongful Death law better than the TLABC (Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia) who have just released their comprehensive views of the need for overhaul of BC Wrongful Death laws.  You can find these here and I strongly urge anyone interested in reform in this area to review TLABC’s submissions in full

Another shortcoming under BC Law is the quick notice limitation period contained in the BC Local Government Act.

Local Governments, are defined under the act as:

(a) the council of a municipality, and

(b) the board of a regional district;

If you are injured and can bring a claim against a Local Government you will lose your right to make your claim unless you comply with s. 286 of the local government act which provides as follows:
Immunity Unless Notice Given To Municipality After Damage
(1) A municipality is in no case liable for damages unless notice in writing, setting out the time, place, and manner in which the damage has been sustaibed, is delivered to the municipality within 2 months from the date on which the damage was sustained.

(2)        In case of the death of a person injured, the failure to give notice required by this section is not a bar to the maintenance of the action.

(3)        Failure to give the notice or its insufficiency is not a bar to the maintenance of an action if the court before whom it is tried, or, in case of appeal, the Court of Appeal, believes

(a)        there was reasonable excuse, and

(b)        the defendant has not been prejudiced in its defence by the failure or insufficiency.

Assuming that Local Governments had some responsibility for the design/set up / access to the now world famous Whistler Sliding Centre this limitation period would be triggered for anyone advancing an injury claim against the Local Governments. While this legislation does have an exclusion for claims involving “death” this limitation period has operated to strip the rights of many seriously injured people following alleged negligence of Local Governments.

When people are forced to deal with the consequences of a tragedy it is very harsh to take away their right to seek lawful compensation if they fail to turn their mind to litigation within two months.

The above examples are some of the first which came to mind when asked to comment on the shortcomings of British Columbia Personal Injury Law. While I am generally very proud of the tort system we have in this Province it is important to point out areas where there is room and need for improvement.