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Tag: expert evidence

Who's the Expert? The Rule Against "Corporate Reports"


When a party introduces an expert report at trial in the BC Supreme Court one of the requirements is that the report sets out “the name of the person primarily responsible for the content of the statement“.  If a party fails to do so they risk having the report excluded from evidence.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Jones v. Ma) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident.  She sued for damages.  Fault was at issue and in support of their case the Defendants hired an engineering firm who produced an accident reconstruction report.  The report was signed by a Forensic Engineer.
The Plaintiff objected to the admission of the report arguing that it was not the report of the expert who signed it, rather it was “a corporate report which embodies the observations and opinions of several individuals, without clearly distinguishing who made the various observations on which the opinions are based and who engaged in the process of forming the opinions that are expressed in the report.”
The Engineer was cross examined and it become evident that “the majority of the work on the report was not done by (the engineer that signed it), but rather by other persons in the firm he works for”.  The Court went on to exclude the report from evidence.  Mr. Justice Ehrcke provided the following useful summary and application of the law:

[11]         This is not simply a matter of form. The purpose of the rule is to ensure fairness to both parties by providing the party on whom the report is served with adequate notice to enable them to effectively cross-examine the expert and to properly instruct their own expert if they choose to retain one.

[12]         The relevant case law was reviewed by Burnyeat J. in Dhaliwal v. Bassi, 2007 BCSC 548, 73 B.C.L.R. (4th) 170. In that case, the Court was presented with an expert report of a Dr. Passey who, in forming his opinions, relied on psychological questionnaires administered by a Dr. Ross. Mr. Justice Burnyeat wrote…:

[4]        The purposes of Rule 40A are clear:  (a) neither side should be taken by surprise by expert evidence (Sterritt v. McLeod (2000), 74 B.C.L.R. (3d) 371 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 33) and neither side should be ambushed or surprised at trial; (b) to ensure fairness to the parties and to promote the orderly progression of the trial (C.A. v. Critchley(1996), 4 C.P.C. (4th) 269 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 15). The burden on Mr. Bassi to show that I should exercise my discretion to allow the report to be introduced has been described as a:  “… relatively heavy burden ….”:  McKay v. Passmore, [2005] B.C.J. (Q.L.) No. 1232 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 26. The question which arises is whether there is “… substantial and irremediable prejudice ….” so as to justify the exclusion of the report on the basis that the statement does not comply with Rule 40A(5)(c) of the Rules of Court:  C.A. v. Critchley,supra, at para. 12…

In my view, a document is not a written statement setting out the opinion of an expert unless it appears clearly from the face of that document that the opinions in it are those of the individual expert who prepared and signed the statement. Our rules make no provision for the entry in evidence of joint or corporate opinions. The opinion must be that of an individual expert and it must fall, of course, within the scope of her own expertise. The opinion cannot simply be a reporting of the opinions of others. The statement, to be admissible, must show clearly that this is the case.

I find some support for this view in the decision of my brother Judge Macdonald in Emil Anderson Construction Co. Ltd. … As that case points out, there is a real possibility of procedural prejudice to cross-examining counsel if he or she cannot tell from the report which of the opinions are truly those held by the witness giving evidence and which are simply opinions of other team members reported to her and asserted by her in the written report. (at paras. 11-12)

[10]      Unless the authors of all parts of an opinion are known, unless the qualifications of each person contributing to the opinion are known, and unless the facts upon which each of the persons contributing to an opinion are set out, the cross-examination of an expert witness regarding the opinion that had been provided would be impossible.

[13]         In my view, the report tendered by the defendant in the present case does not comply with the requirements of Rule 40A(5), and it would cause irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff if the report were admitted.

[14]         The report is excluded from evidence.

I should point out that this case was decided relying on the current BC Supreme Court Rule 40A(5)(c).  As readers of this blog know the BC Supreme Court Rules are being overhauled on July 1, 2010 and some of the biggest changes relate to the rule concerning expert opinion evidence.

Rule 40A(5)(c) reads that “The statement shall set out or be accompanied by a supplementary statement setting out…the name of the person primarily responsible for the content of the statement.”

The new rule dealing with the content of expert reports is Rule 11-6 which states

An expert’s report that is to be tendered as evidence at the trial must be signed by the expert, must include the certification required under Rule 11-2 (2) and must set out the following:

(a) the expert’s name, address and area of expertise;…”
While the language has changed somewhat the underlying purpose of the requirement appears the same and that is to not prejudice the opposing party’s ability to cross examine the opinion.  It seems this case will retain its value as a precedent under the New BC Supreme Court Rules but time will tell.

More on BC Personal Injury Claims and Radiologists Evidence


(Please note the topic discussed in this post should be reviewed keeping a subsequent October 2010 BC  Court of Appeal in mind)
Further to my previoius article on this topic, if you are advancing a BC Injury Claim and intend to rely on X-Rays, MRI’s or other diagnostic studies which demonstrate injury in support of your case it is vital that you serve the opposing party appropriate Notice under the Rules of Court.  Failure to give proper notice can keep not only the actual studies out of Court but also the opinions of radiologists discussing what these studies show.  Excluding such evidence can be fatal to a claim.  2 judgements were released today demonstrating this principle.
In the first case (Anderson v. Dwyer) the Plaintiff was injured in 2004 BC Car Crash.  At trial her lawyer attempted to put X-rays into evidence and to have a chiropractor give ‘evidence with respect to the contents of the x-rays‘.  The Defendant objected arguing that appropriate Notice of the proposed exhibit and the expert opinion was not given.  Mr. Justice Schultes agreed and in doing so gave the following reasons:





[3] The stated relevance of this evidence is that the x-rays taken after the accident will allegedly show some abnormality in some of the plaintiff’s vertebrae that could have been caused by the accident.  This, it is said, will rebut the defendant’s position that the plaintiff’s pain is largely the result of a degenerative condition rather than of the accident.

[4] The basis for the objection to Dr. Wooden’s evidence is that he is an expert witness and no notice of his evidence has been given as required by Rule 40A of the Rules of Court.  In addition, the defendant has not been given an opportunity to inspect the x-rays as required by Rule 40(13). ..

…While on the evidence by Dr. Wooden seeking to offer an opinion about the plaintiff’s injuries such as the inferences to be drawn from the observations in the x-rays or with respect to the cause or mechanism of the injury would be prohibited because of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 40A.


[16] As to the lack of compliance with Rule 40(13) the cases make it clear that in such circumstances the court has a discretion to admit the evidence (see, for example, Golden Capital Securities Ltd. v. Holmes, 2002 BCSC 516), but that in exercising its discretion it should take into account the absence of any proper explanation for the failure to disclose…

[17] In this case, the explanation is that counsel for the plaintiff thought it sufficient to simply notify the defendant of the existence of the x-rays and invite counsel to contact Dr. Wooden directly to inspect them.

[18] I do not think such a passive approach was sufficient.  The requirement in the Rule that the parties be “given the opportunity to inspect” an item connotes some positive action on the part of the party in possession of it.  At the very minimum, efforts should have been made by counsel for the plaintiff to facilitate the viewing of the x-rays.  It was not appropriate for the defendant to be invited to seek out the treating chiropractor himself even if consent by the plaintiff was said to be readily forthcoming.

[19] The very importance to her case ascribed by the plaintiff to the x-rays speaks to the necessity of her having obtained and disclosed copies of the exhibits in a proactive manner.

[20] There being no satisfactory explanation of the failure to comply with Rule 40(13) I decline to exercise my discretion to allow copies of the X-rays themselves to be admitted in evidence.  Because a witness may refresh his memory from anything that will assist him that process, even if that source itself is inadmissible (see R. v. Fliss, 2002 SCC 16 at para. 45) Dr. Wooden may refresh his memory by reviewing the x-rays should the need arise during his evidence.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

In the second case released today, Gregory v. ICBC, the Plaintiff wished to put an expert report into evidence that gave an opinion based on the assumption that “there has been a partial tear of (the Plaintiff’s) subscapularis tendon.”  The doctor relied on a radiologist’s interpretation of an MRI as the source of this opinion.  The radiologists report was not put into evidence and the radiologist was not called as a witness.
The Defence lawyer argued that the opinion of the expert should be inadmissible in these circumstances.  The Court agreed.  In doing so Madam Justice Kloegman gave the following reasons:

[3] Dr. Chu’s second report discloses that his opinion is based on an assumption   that there has been a partial tear of the subscapularis tendon.  The defendant takes issue with that alleged fact.  The plaintiff has taken no steps to prove the truth of this assumption.  Originally, she did not intend to enter the radiologist reports interpreting the MRI scans.  Now counsel advises that she could lead them through Dr. Chu.  However, all this would do is show the source of Dr. Chu’s assumption.  It would not prove the truth of the radiologist’s interpretation, which in effect is just another expert opinion.

[4] Although the radiologist reports are expert opinions, the plaintiff has not served them pursuant to Rule 40, nor has she given notice of any intention to call the radiologists.  Therefore, it is obvious that she does not intend to prove as a fact this assumption about the partial tear.  Dr. Chu’s second report is based solely on this assumption of a partial tear.  There will not be any evidence proving the truth of this assumption, therefore, any opinions that are based on the partial tear as the primary assumption must be considered irrelevant and inadmissible.

These cases illustrate that if you wish to prove an injury through diagnostic imaging care should be taken to ensure that appropriate witnesses are available to get the evidence before the Court and further that appropriate notice is given to opposing counsel.

More on BC Injury Claims and Biomechanical Engineering Evidence


Further to my recent post on this topic, the evidence of biomechanical engineers is becoming more common in BC injury lawsuits.
Biomechanics is the study of forces applied to biological tissue and the injuries that can result from such forces.  In litigation it is easy to imagine the use such expert opinion evidence can be put to in proving causation of injuries.
Biomechanics is a relatively new scientific field.  Courts are generally conservative and can be slow to accept ‘novel‘ scientific evidence.  Despite judicial conservatism, biomechanical evidence does appear to be gaining acceptance by BC Courts as demonstrated in reasons for judgment released today.
In today’s case (More v. Bauer) the Plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury while playing hockey.  The Plaintiff claimed his helmet was negligently designed and sued the manufacturers of the helmet.  In support of his claim he called a biomechanical engineer who gave evidence in the field of biomechanics and the biomechanics of safety standards.
The Defendants did not challenge his qualifications to give this evidence, however, at the conclusion of the expert’s testimony the Defendants brought a motion to rule the testimony inadmissible arguing that the expert’s “underlying methodology and science are so flawed that the evidence (does not meet the legal test for admissibility)” and that the expert was “biased and purposely misled the court to assist the plaintiff“.
Mr. Justice Macaulay rejected the motion and concluded that the evidence was in fact admissible.  In doing so the Court recognized biomechanics as an “accepted area of scientific and academic expertise“.  The Court reasoned as follows:
[1] Dr. Stalnaker has a Ph.D. in theoretical and applied mechanics. Through much of his lengthy career, he has worked in the branch field of biomechanics. He also has practical experience in standards development for certification purposes although not specifically with regard to hockey helmet standards. Biomechanics involves the study of body kinematics ? the forces applied to biological tissue and the injuries that can result. The plaintiffs sought to qualify Dr. Stalnaker as an expert in biomechanics and the biomechanics of safety standards…

[12] Mohan sets out the current approach to the admissibility of expert evidence. Mr. Justice Sopinka outlines the following criteria for the admissibility of opinion evidence:

(1)      the evidence must be relevant to some issue in the case;

(2)      the evidence must be necessary to assist the trier of fact;

(3)      the evidence must not contravene an exclusionary rule; and

(4)      the witness must be a properly qualified expert.

[15] Assessing reliability includes determining whether the science or technique the witness uses to reach a conclusion is “novel”. Novel science will be subject to a stricter level of scrutiny than theories or techniques that are more generally accepted…

[23] To conclude, in assessing reliability when exercising my gatekeeper role, I must determine whether the approach the impugned expert takes is novel. If Dr. Stalnaker is relying on a novel theory or technique, I should exercise a higher level of scrutiny when examining reliability, in order to prevent the trial becoming “a medical or scientific convention with an exchange of highly speculative points of view” (R. v. J.E.T. at para. 77).

[24] In assessing reliability, I may find the Daubert factors helpful, but need not apply them too strictly. The purpose of applying the factors is to determine the degree of uncertainty present in the impugned expert’s analysis. The question is whether “the degree of uncertainty is unacceptable given the likely effect upon the trial process and the trier of fact. The level of acceptable uncertainty may depend upon the purpose for which the evidence is tendered and the use made of the evidence by other experts” (Wolfin at para. 20). Both the mode of trial and the importance of the evidence to making a final determination of the matter are factors to consider. If a theory or technique is implausible it will not be admitted.

[25] I remain persuaded that biomechanics is a recognized and accepted area of scientific and academic expertise. I am satisfied that Dr. Stalnaker is qualified to give opinion evidence in the area of biomechanics including in relation to safety standards. Opinion evidence is necessary to assist me in drawing appropriate inferences of fact.

BC Injury Lawsuits and Expert Witnesses; Hired Guns Need Not Apply

I’ve written many times about the role expert witnesses play in injury claims.  From diagnosing injury, commenting on causation, prognosis, future care needs and disability expert witnesses play a crucial role in ICBC and other injury lawsuits.
In addition to experts called by the Plaintiff, the Rules of Court also permit the Defendant to retain their own experts in order to ‘level the playing field‘.
Expert witnesses owe a duty to the Court to present their opinions impartially and not to act as advocates for the side that hired them.  Sometimes, regrettably, experts forget this and stray into the field of advocacy.  When this happens the expert’s opinion can be rejected entirely or even be kept from entering into evidence in the first place.  Today reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, discussing this area of the law.
In today’s case (Hodgkins v. Street) the Plaintiff was involved in a BC Car Crash and was awarded damages of just over $650,000.  (You can click here to read my post summarizing the trial judgement)  The parties could not agree on what damages should be awarded for  a tax gross-up award and management fees and a Court application was brought.
Both the Plaintiff and Defendant produced expert reports from economists.  The Plaintiff argued that the Defence report ought to be rejected in its entirety because the defence expert was a “partisan advocate“.  Mr. Justice Kelleher disagreed with this submission but before reaching this conclusion gave the following useful summary on the role of expert witnesses in BC litigation:

[6] In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 BCSC 131 at para. 32, the court referred to the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses discussed in National Justice Compania Naviesa S.A. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (“The Ikarian Reefer”), [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 68:

1.         Expert evidence presented to the court should be and should seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.

2.         An expert should provide independent assistance to the court by objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his or her expertise.  An expert witness should never assume a role of advocate.

3.         An expert should state the facts or assumptions on which the opinion is based and should not omit to consider material facts which detract from that opinion.

4.         An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside of the expert’s expertise.

5.         If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because insufficient date is available, this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.

[10] I am in respectful agreement with the guidelines put forward in the Ikarian Reefer.  As trial judges, we must be wary of advocacy dressed up in the guise of an expert’s report.

If you are involved in an injury lawsuit and are served with an expert report by opposing counsel that you think is not objective the above passage should be kept handy.  You can challenge the opposing party’s experts if they contain “advocacy presented in the guise of opinion evidence” and such objections should be raised to keep reports that cross the line out of Court.

Expert Evidence – Doctors, Biomechanical Engineers and Force Necessary to Cause Injury


When a personal injury claim is advanced the Plaintiff has the burden to prove what injuries they suffered and that these were caused (or materially contributed to) by the trauma in question.  In proving a case it is common for a Plaintiff to obtain expert opinion evidence from medical doctors to address issues such as diagnosis of injury, prognosis, treatment needs, disability and causation.
One tactic used by personal injury lawyers is to try and limit the scope of the opposing sides expert witness’ opinions.  If a witness wanders outside of their area of expertise then those portions of their opinion become inadmissible.
When addressing the issue of causation a developing area of BC Injury Law is whether a physician can give opinion evidence with respect to the forces necessary to cause a specific injury.  Some argue that this is outside of a medical doctors training and is better left to biomechanical engineers.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such an argument.
In today’s case (Pham-Fraser v. Smith) the Plaintiff sustained numerous injuries in a 2006 BC car crash.  The Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck at an intersection when the Defendant entered against a red light.  The issue of fault was admitted focusing the trial on the issue of damages.
In support of her case the Plaintiff called numerous physicians to give expert opinion evidence.  One of these witnesses was Dr. Brian Hunt, a neurological surgeon.  He provided the opinion that the “accident created sufficient deceleration forces to produce damage to (the plaintiff’s) L5 vertebra through abnormal axial-loading but that a biomechanical engineer (would need to) confirm this probability“.
The Defence lawyer argued that Dr. Hunt was simply not qualified to give this opinion and that this opinion was inadmissible.  Mr. Justice Greyell rejected this submission and provided the following useful analysis:

[50] Mr. Killas argued certain aspects of the expert evidence called by the plaintiff were inadmissible and that other expert opinion evidence should be given little or no weight.  In particular the defendants argued I should give little or no weight to Dr. Hunt’s opinion the accident created sufficient forces to produce damage to the L5 vertebral body through abnormal axial loading.  Mr. Killas pointed out Dr. Hunt then qualified this opinion with this remark:  “However a biomechanical engineer will need to confirm this probability”.  Mr. Killas noted Dr. Hunt had not done an investigation into the circumstances of the accident (vehicle speed, etc.) to make his opinion.

[51] Mr. Killas also argued Dr. Hunt’s diagnosis that the plaintiff sustained a brain dysfunction secondary to brain injury was simply based on the reading of Dr. Longridge’s medical report and on an unproven assumption the plaintiff had a lack of awareness of the circumstances of the motor vehicle accident.  Mr. Killas also argued Dr. Hunt’s opinion the plaintiff probably suffered abnormal axial loading on her spinal column during the accident was qualified by Dr. Hunt when he said in his report that “a biomechanical engineer will need to confirm this probability”.

[52] I accept Dr. Hunt’s opinion on both these issues.  There was evidence concerning the plaintiff’s limited recollection of what happened following the accident and I accept Dr. Hunt, given his qualifications and special experience, was well able to offer the opinions he did.

[53] I have ascribed as much weight to Dr. Hunt’s opinion concerning the cause of the plaintiff’s lower back injury as I have on the opinions of the other specialists who testified, including Dr. Schweigel.  Dr. Hunt’s expertise (and that of the others) has been gained through many years treating patients who have been involved in motor vehicle accidents.  He is well qualified to offer the opinion he did.  The fact Dr. Hunt was prepared to defer to the opinion of a biomechanical engineer does not, in my view detract from his expertise in offering his opinion to the court on the cause of the plaintiff’s lumbar spine injury.  I similarly find that the evidence of Dr. Hartzell concerning the forces applied to the plaintiff’s lower spine during the accident is helpful to the court and hence admissible, given his experience and qualifications.  Both Dr. Hunt and Dr. Hartzell, through their long and distinguished medical practices have had experience with persons with spinal injuries.

Scope of Neuropsychological Evidence in BC Brain Injury Cases Discussed


Reasons for judgement were published today on the BC Supreme Court website dealing with the scope of permissible neuropsychological opinion evidence in BC Brain Injury Cases.
When ICBC or other BC brain injury cases go to trial a neuropsychologist is a common type of expert witness called by both Plaintiff and Defence Lawyers.  Neuropsychologists are extensively trained with respect to the cognitive and behavioural consequences of brain injuries and for this reason their evidence is often vital in the prosecution of brain injury claims.
In today’s case (Meghji v. Lee) the Plaintiff alleged she suffered a traumatic brain injury.  In support of her case the Plaintiff sought to have a neuropsychologist give opinion evidence with respect to the cognitive and behavioural sequelae of brain injuries and also with respect to whether the Plaintiff suffered from organic tissue to her brain.  The Defence lawyer objected claiming the latter opinion is outside of the scope of a neuropsycholgists permissible expert opinion.  Mr. Justice Johnston agreed with the defence objection and summarized and applied the law as follows:

[27] Counsel for the plaintiff wants Dr. Malcolm to be permitted to give an opinion on whether Ms. Meghji has had an injury to her brain. I looked briefly at Dr. Malcolm’s written reports, and in his first report, the one of February 1, 2007, Dr. Malcolm provides an overview of the place of psychometric testing in his overall task in this way. He says:

Once the test results are determined to reflect the person’s neuropsychological status with acceptable accuracy, the question remains as to whether clinically significant test results reflect organic damage, or stem from other factors, such as psychological causes. The neuropsychological process considers all of these possibilities in reaching diagnostic conclusions. The conclusions reached are based on a balance of probability, the strength of which is indicated where possible.

[28] At the risk of appearing to be overly semantic about this analysis, I take it that what counsel want Dr. Malcolm to be able to do is to testify by way of opinion about whether or not there has been some form of harm or damage to the tissues of the brain of Ms. Meghji as opposed to some form of harm or damage to the mind or emotions or personality of Ms. Meghji. Whether there is a distinction between the brain as an organ of the body, on the one hand, and the mind and personality of the person in whose body the brain is found, on the other, is a metaphysical question that I hope I never have to answer in a court of law. I am going to confine myself to what I think is in issue, and that is Dr. Malcolm’s qualifications as a neuropsychological and whether they permit him to provide the ready-made inference through opinion on whether there has been physical harm or damage to the brain as an organ of the body, and in my view, they do not.

[29] The statutory regime does not, in my view, go any further than to allow testing, assessment, diagnosis of, and therefore opinions on the abilities, aptitudes, interests, et cetera, or the behaviour, emotional, or mental disorders, that is, disorders of the mind. These conditions may arise with or without damage to the structure or tissues of the brain. They may be associated with or flow from injury or damage to the brain itself. They may arise from or flow from other causes. It does not necessarily follow that because Dr. Malcolm is permitted by statute to test, assess, or diagnose behavioural, emotional, or mental disorder that he must therefore be permitted to give in evidence his opinion that the cause of any of these conditions stems from an injury to the tissues or structures of the brain.

[30] In my view, Dr. Malcolm’s qualifications do not go so far as to permit that opinion.

[31] That does not say that Dr. Malcolm cannot give, in evidence, his opinion based upon the results of his testing, nor does it prevent Dr. Malcolm from giving an opinion on whether the test results as evaluated by him are of a nature, kind, or quality seen in people who have been diagnosed as having had organic brain injuries.

[32] In my view, the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Clancy in Knight remains appropriate, and that is, Dr. Malcolm is qualified to give his opinion on the cognitive and behavioural sequelae of brain injuries and to indicate the relative likelihood of any cognitive and behavioural abnormalities being the consequence of a traumatic brain injury, but to paraphrase Mr. Justice Clancy, it does not permit him, that is, Dr. Malcolm, to diagnose physical injury and the manner in which it was incurred.

[33] It therefore follows that Dr. Malcolm will not be permitted to give his opinion on whether Ms. Meghji has had an injury to the tissues of her brain or, obviously, as to the cause of any such injury, but he will be permitted to testify as I have indicated.

$95,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Pain From 2 MVA's

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday dealing with an appropriate award of damages for soft tissue injuries and chronic pain lasting for over 6 years.
In yesterday’s case (Gosal v. Singh) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 BC Car Crashes.  The first in 2003, the second in 2005. The first crash was a rear end collision.  Fault was admitted.  As the Plaintiff was recovering from her injuries from the first collision she was involved in the second collision.
The second crash happened when the Defendant, who was parked, pulled out in front of the Plaintiff’s lane of travel.  Fault was not admitted but Madam Justice Loo held that the defendant was 100% at fault finding that he “moved his vehicle from a parked position without first determining that he could do so safely, and that (the Plaintiff) had no opportunity to avoid the collision.”
The Plaintiff suffered from various soft tissue injuries and chronic pain which lasted for over 6 years and still bothered the Plaintiff by the time of trial.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $95,000 Madam Justice Loo made the following findings:

[49] Ms. Gosal suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper back, shoulders, and mid and lower back, which caused severe headaches. She was treated with physiotherapy, massage, and chiropractic treatments, but her recovery took longer because of her depression and anxiety. She was recovering when the second accident exacerbated her injuries, including her depression and anxiety.

[50] Dr. Khunkhun states that Ms. Gosal’s long-term prognosis is guarded because her symptoms have not resolved after such a long period of time since the accidents. She does not consider Ms. Gosal to be at an increased risk of any long-term sequelae such as osteoarthritis. She believes Ms. Gosal would continue to benefit from body conditioning and strengthening exercises. She observed that in the past Ms. Gosal benefitted from regular exercise and when she stops exercising regularly, her mood deteriorates and her pain increases.

[51] Dr. Manchanda last saw Ms. Gosal on September 24, 2008. She told him that she had pain on about four or five days a week, and no pain on about two days a week. She was still looking for employment in counselling. At that time, Dr. Manchanda felt that Ms. Gosal could work in a job that was sedentary or involved light physical duties. He also felt that Ms. Gosal could complete the majority of her household chores, but that she might require a break or assistance with the heavier chores, such as vacuuming or carrying heavy laundry.

[52] Dr. Manchanda’s prognosis has thus far proved to be accurate. Ms. Gosal has worked full-time since October 6, 2008 in a job that is fairly sedentary and involves only light physical duties. There is no evidence that she has taken time off work because of symptoms arising from the accidents…

[67] I prefer Dr. Sandhu’s opinion that Ms. Gosal is not seeking secondary gains. She was looking after the household and her children’s needs as best she could, and doing her best to continue with her studies. Having observed Ms. Gosal, and on all the evidence, I conclude that she is not malingering and that her complaints of pain and depression are genuine.

[68] She continues to improve, albeit slowly. I find that there are two to three days a week when she is not in pain. Full-time employment has assisted her both physically and emotionally. Though it is now more than six years since the first accident, and more than four years since the second accident, she still suffers from depression and pain. I anticipate that over the next few years, with a regular daily exercise program, her physical pain and depression will continue to improve but may not resolve completely.

[71] I find that circumstances of Ms. Gosal’s injuries are similar to those in Foran v. Nguyen, 2006 BCSC 605, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 419, where the award for non-pecuniary damages was $90,000, and Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 276, where the award was $100,000.

[72] I consider an award of $95,000 for non-pecuniary damages to be appropriate.

In addition to this case’s value as a precedent for valuing non-pecuniary damages for chronic pain, this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s criticism of the expert witness called by the defense.

I’ve previously written about the duty of experts to the court and highlighted judicial criticism when experts ignore this duty.  In today’s case the court made critical findings with respect to Dr. Hymie Davis, a psychiatrist who billed over $290,000 to ICBC in 2008.  Specifically Madam Justice Loo found that Dr. Davis “was presenting a case for the defence rather than providing an impartial expert opinion.  Dr. Davis’ argument that (the Plaintiff’s) injuries should have healed and that she is seeking secondary gains or malingering, is at odds with his article “The Whiplash Injury“.

BC Supreme Court Addresses Scope of Expert Witness Cross Examination

Reasons for judgement were released today addressing the permissible scope of Cross Examination of an expert witness in a BC Injury Claim.
In today’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie) the Defendants called a physician to give expert opinion evidence.  This physician happened to be a treating doctor of the Plaintiff’s prior to her injuries.  While testifying the doctor was taken through his clinical records by defence counsel on an entry by entry basis.  The doctor was asked what happened on each of those clinic visits and in canvassing this the doctor gave evidence about the prognosis and treatment of Hepatitis C (which is an area the doctor apparently was not called to address).
The Plaintiff then wished to cross examine the doctor about treatments and the prognosis for Hepatitis C.  The Defence lawyer objected to this on the basis that such a cross examination would “call for new opinion that are not admissible since the Plaintiff has not served the defendants with notice of those opinion“.
Mr. Justice Ehrcke swiftly rejected the Defendant’s objections noting that they could not restrict the cross examination on a topic which they chose to ask the doctor about in direct.  Specifically Mr. Justice Ehrcke noted as follows:

[11]         With respect to the first point, the CN Defendants argue that the notice which they served on the plaintiff in connection with Dr. Glynn-Morris contains only treatment opinions and does not touch on the area of the plaintiff’s Hepatitis C. This argument misses the mark. The plaintiff is entitled to respond to all the opinion evidence led by the CN Defendants, not just that which was contained in the written statement of Dr. Glynn-Morris’ opinion. It was counsel for the CN Defendants who chose in direct-examination to ask Dr. Glynn-Morris about testing of the plaintiff for Hepatitis C. It was in direct-examination that Dr. Glynn-Morris opined that in 30 percent of people, Hepatitis C cures itself and disappears, and that he ordered a test to see if that is what had happened in Ms. MacEachern’s case. Having opened up that area in examination-in-chief, the CN Defendants cannot now restrict the plaintiff’s cross-examination about it simply on the ground that it was not covered in the written statement that they had delivered to the plaintiff.

[12]         In any event, the proposed evidence is also truly responsive as a rebuttal to the opinion of another expert witness called by the CN defendants, Dr. Baker, whose report entered at Tab 1 of Exhibit 61 states:

I note Ms. MacEachern had already contracted hepatitis C which with her ongoing ingestion of multiple drugs would likely have progressed with liver damage and possible cirrhosis and eventual liver failure.

[13] Nevertheless, the CN Defendants argue that even if the proposed line of questioning did not require notice pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40A, notice was still required because of the case management order made in respect of this trial on February 6, 2009, which provided, among other things, that the plaintiff’s reply or rebuttal reports were to be delivered by January 29, 2009. The CN Defendants point out that Dr. Baker’s report was delivered to the plaintiff on December 1, 2008. They submit therefore that any opinion evidence in reply to Dr. Baker’s report should have been delivered to them by January 29, 2009.

[14]         The short answer to this argument is that the deadlines set out in the case management order relate to expert witnesses that each party proposed to call as witnesses in their own case. The order does not, by its terms, require a party to give notice of the questions it proposes to ask in cross-examination of another party’s witnesses, even if those questions in cross-examination have the effect of eliciting an expert rebuttal or reply opinion.

[15] The case of Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada, 2002 BCSC 1669, 8 B.C.L.R. (4th) 323 cited by the CN Defendants is distinguishable, because that case did not deal with the effect of a case management order on questions asked of an opposing witness in cross-examination.

[16] To summarize:  the questions that the plaintiff proposes to ask in cross-examination of Dr. Glynn-Morris are proper, and to the extent that they elicit expert opinions, those opinions are proper reply or rebuttal. Such reply or rebuttal opinions elicited in cross-examination are not subject to the notice requirements of Rule 40A, or of the case management orders that were made in this case.

Can a Plaintiff's Treating Doctor Give Expert Opinion Evidence for the Defence in an Injury Claim?

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court dealing with this interesting issue.
In today’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie) the Plaintiff ‘suffered traumatic brain injury when her head came into contact with a tractor trailer while she was walking or riding her bicycle along King George Highway in Surrey, BC
In the years before the collision the Plaintiff was treated by a physician, Dr. Dowey, who apparently “prescribed methadone (to the plaintiff) as part of her treatment for heroin addiction“.
In the months leading up to the trial the Defence lawyers had a pre-trial interview with the doctor which was not consented to by the Plaintiff’s lawyers.  After speaking with this doctor the defendants decided to rely on him as a witness in their case.
The Defendants called the doctor to give evidence and sought to have the doctor qualified as an expert to give medical opinions about the Plaintiff’s pre-accident condition and prognosis.  The Plaintiff opposed this for several reasons and argued that “it was improper for Dr. Dowey to have pre-trial meetings with counsel for the defendants in the absence of plaintiff’s counsel“.
In permitting the doctor to testify as an expert witness for the defence Mr. Justice Ehrcke of the BC Supreme Court summarized and applied the law as follows:
[22] Plaintiff’s counsel submits that as a treating physician, Dr. Dowey owed the plaintiff a duty of confidentiality not to divulge her personal information without her consent, and that Dr. Dowey breached his duty of confidence when he spoke with counsel for the CN Defendants in the their absence. The submission is that as a result, the CN Defendants should not be permitted to lead evidence of Dr. Dowey’s expert opinions….

[29]         The only question before me, then, is whether Dr. Dowey should be prohibited from giving opinion evidence. He has been subpoenaed by the CN Defendants. As a witness under subpoena, he must answer the questions asked of him unless there is a basis in law for excluding his evidence. The plaintiff does not make a claim of privilege, but rather submits that to permit Dr. Dowey to give expert opinion evidence would conflict with his duty of confidentiality.

[30]         The plaintiff relies on a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Burgess v. Wu (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 710 (Sup. Ct. of Justice). In that case, Ferguson J. emphasized the distinction between pre-trial disclosure and the admissibility of evidence at trial, as well as the distinction between a claim of privilege and the duty of confidentiality. He wrote at para. 55-57:

[55]      It is important at the outset to distinguish between access at trial and access before trial. Once a physician takes the witness stand, and regardless of whether he or she is called by the patient or subpoenaed by the defence, the physician must answer all relevant questions subject to a ruling in unusual circumstances that some subjects are privileged (see the discussion below re M. (A.) v. Ryan, infra). It is irrelevant whether or not the patient consents. The physician cannot refuse to answer on the ground of a duty of confidentiality:  Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Frenette, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 647, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 653, at p. 687 S.C.R., p. 681 D.L.R., per L’Heureux-Dubé J.

[56]      This rule is consistent with the rules of ethics promulgated by the profession and by regulation which specifically state that the duty does not apply to situations where disclosure is “required by law”.

[57]      The issue of concern in the present case is access before trial. The general question is:  what is required by law outside the witness stand? In this context the primary restraint is the duty and right of confidentiality, and not the evidentiary issue of legal privilege.

[31]         Counsel for the plaintiff points out that Ferguson J. went on to hold that the doctor who had treated the plaintiff in that case would be prohibited from testifying as an expert for the defence. Counsel urges me to make a similar ruling here.

[32]         There are, however, two important distinctions between that case and this. First, Ferguson J. made a finding that there had been improper pre-trial contact between the witness and counsel for the defence, and that finding was instrumental in his decision that the witness should not be permitted to testify as an expert for the defence. He wrote at para. 134: “The party at fault should not benefit from the fruits of the impropriety.”  On the facts of the present case, I have found that there was no impropriety in the meeting between Dr. Dowey and counsel for the CN Defendants.

[33]         The second distinction is in the nature of the opinion evidence that is being sought. In Burgess v. Wu, the tenor of the opinion sought was expressed in a letter quoted at para. 21:

We are interested in your views, as a forensic psychiatrist, as to the likelihood that Mr. Burgess would have committed suicide (regardless of the prescription of Seconal), his prognosis otherwise, and the probability of him returning to a functioning lifestyle.

[34]         That is, the opinion sought in Wu related to the patient’s prognosis after the period of time when the witness had treated him. In the present case, counsel for the CN Defendants have stated that they do not seek any opinion from Dr. Dowey about Ms. MacEachern’s prognosis after the last date he saw her, November 29, 2004. More specifically, they do not seek from him an opinion about whether she likely would have continued using drugs after September 2005 had it not been for the accident. They might attempt to elicit such an opinion from another expert who did not treat the plaintiff, but they will not seek such an opinion from her treating physicians.

[35]         Counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63, but its provisions do not support the plaintiff’s position since s. 3(4) of thatAct provides:

3(4) This Act does not limit the information available by law to a party in a proceeding.

[36]         In the circumstances of this case, I do not find that the duty of confidentiality would prevent Dr. Dowey from giving relevant opinion evidence as a medical doctor in relation to the period of time that she was his patient.

The New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules and Admissibility of Expert Reports

One of the biggest changes in the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules (click here and here to read my previous posts on these rules) are those with respect to the requirements for admissibility of expert reports.  These changes are significant for ICBC and other Personal Injury Lawyers because these types of lawsuits are heavily dependent on expert opinion evidence.  From medical doctors to engineers to vocational specialists, personal injury trials are perhaps more reliant on expert evidence than any other type of trial.
One thing we should all keep in mind is that as of July 1, 2010 ongoing lawsuits will be deemed to be started under the new rules.  This means that any report ordered now that will be used in trial after July 1, 2010 will have to comply with the new rules.  For this reason it is vital that lawyers and expert witnesses alike become immediately familiar with the new Civil Rules.
Under the current Supreme Court Rules expert evidence requirements are governed by Rule 40-A.  These are rather modest.  Rule 40A(2) requires that expert reports be exchanged “to every party of record at least 60 days before the statement is tendered in evidence” and Rule 40A(5) requires that the reports set out “the qualifications of the expert, the facts and assumptions on which the opinion is based, and the name of the person primarily responsible for the content of the statement”
Under the new BC Civil Rules requirements of expert reports are set out in Rule 11-6.  Below I reproduce Rule 11-6 in its entirety.  On review it is clear that the new rule has significant changes compared to the current Rule 40A.
One of the most obvious changes is the time when expert evidence needs to be exchanged.  Currently reports need to be exchanged 60 days before they are put into evidence.  The new rule requires reports to be exchanged at least 84 days ‘before the scheduled trial date‘ and goes on to create a second category of reports called “responding reports” which need to be served “at least 42 days before the scheduled trial date
The other significant change relates to requirements for admissibility.    Rule 11-6(1) requires experts to be much more clear and detailed about how they arrived at their opinions as compared to the current Rule 40A.  Although, to be fair, these changes are really little more than a codification of the common law that has developed around Rule 40-A.
The new rule also improves on the disclosure obligations to opposing counsel.  Under the current rule opposing counsel is not entitled to review the experts working files and materials until the expert takes the stand.  This can lead to unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.  Under the new Rule 11-6(8) opposing parties are entitled to fulsome pre-trial disclosure of the experts materials which will let lawyers better prepare for cross examination.
Other parts of Rule 11 contain interesting provisions about court appointed experts, joint experts and the role of the expert in the lawsuit.  I hope to write about these shortly.  Overall these improvements will likely be for the better, however, lawyers and doctors can be stubborn and it may take some adjustment for all of us to get used to these changes.
RULE 11-6 – EXPERT REPORTS
Requirements for report
(1) An expert’s report that is to be tendered as evidence at the trial must be signed by the expert, must include the certification required under Rule 11-2 (2) and must set out the following:
(a) the expert’s name, address and area of expertise;
(b) the expert’s qualifications and employment and educational experience in his or her area of expertise;
(c) the instructions provided to the expert in relation to the proceeding;
(d) the nature of the opinion being sought and each issue in the proceeding to which the opinion relates;
(e) the expert’s opinion respecting each issue and, if there is a range of opinions given, a summary of the range and the reasons for the expert’s own opinion within that range;
(f) the expert’s reasons for his or her opinion, including
(i) a description of the factual assumptions on which the opinion is based,
(ii) a description of any research conducted by the expert that led him or her to form the opinion, and
(iii) a list of every document, if any, relied on by the expert in forming the opinion.
Proof of qualifications
(2) The assertion of qualifications of an expert is evidence of them.
Service of report
(3) Unless the court otherwise orders, at least 84 days before the scheduled trial date, an expert’s report, other than the report of an expert appointed by the court under Rule 11-5, must be served on every party of record, along with written notice that the report is being served under this rule,
(a) by the party who intends, with leave of the court under Rule 11-3 (9) or otherwise, to tender the expert’s report at trial, or
(b) if 2 or more parties jointly appointed the expert, by each party who intends to tender the expert’s report at trial.
Service of responding report
(4) Unless the court otherwise orders, if a party intends to tender an expert’s report at trial to respond to an expert witness whose report is served under subrule (3), the party must serve on every party of record, at least 42 days before the scheduled trial date,
(a) the responding report, and
(b) notice that the responding report is being served under this rule.
Supplementary report of joint or court-appointed expert
(5) If, after an expert’s report is served under subrule (3) (b), the expert’s opinion changes in a material way,
(a) the expert must, as soon as practicable, prepare a supplementary report and ensure that that supplementary report is provided to the party who served the report under subrule (3), and
(b) the party to whom the supplementary report is provided under paragraph (a) of this subrule must promptly serve that supplementary report on every other party of record.
Supplementary report of own expert
(6) If, after an expert’s report is served under subrule (3) (a) or (4), the expert’s opinion changes in a material way and the party who served the report intends to tender that expert’s report at trial despite the change,
(a) the expert must, as soon as practicable, prepare a supplementary report and ensure that that supplementary report is provided to the party, and
(b) the party must promptly serve that supplementary report on every other party of record.
Requirements for supplementary report
(7) A supplementary report under Rule 11-5 (11) or under subrule (5) (a) or (6) (a) of this
rule must
(a) be identified as a supplementary report,
(b) be signed by the expert,
(c) include the certification required under Rule 11-2 (2), and
(d) set out the change in the expert’s opinion and the reason for it.
Production of documents
(8) Unless the court otherwise orders, if a report of a party’s own expert appointed under Rule 11-3 (9) or 11-4 is served under this rule, the party who served the report must,
(a) promptly after being asked to do so by a party of record, serve on the requesting party whichever one or more of the following has been requested:
(i) any written statement or statements of facts on which the expert’s opinion is based;
(ii) a record of any independent observations made by the expert in relation to the report;
(iii) any data compiled by the expert in relation to the report;
(iv) the results of any test conducted by or for the expert, or of any inspection conducted by the expert, if the expert has relied on that test or inspection in forming his or her opinion, and
(b) if asked to do so by a party of record, make available to the requesting party for review and copying the contents of the expert’s file relating to the preparation of the opinion set out in the expert’s report,
(i) if the request is made within 14 days before the scheduled trial date, promptly after receipt of that request, or
(ii) in any other case, at least 14 days before the scheduled trial date.
Notice of trial date to expert
(9) The person who is required to serve the report or supplementary report of an expert under this rule must, promptly after the appointment of the expert or promptly after a trial date has been obtained, whichever is later, inform the expert of the scheduled trial date and that the expert may be required to attend at trial for cross-examination.
Notice of objection to expert opinion evidence
(10) A party who receives an expert report or supplementary report under this Part must, on the earlier of the date of the trial management conference and the date that is 21 days before the scheduled trial date, serve on every party of record a notice of any objection to the admissibility of the expert’s evidence that the party receiving the report or supplementary report intends to raise at trial.
When objection not permitted
(11) Unless the court otherwise orders, if reasonable notice of an objection could have been given under subrule (10), the objection must not be permitted at trial if that notice was not given.