I’ve written extensively about some of the troubling changes the government is proposing for collision victims through their ICBC legal reforms. One topic that has yet to receive any press, and is perhaps as concerning as any, is the Government’s proposal to give ICBC and themselves total power over what therapies collision victims receive.
If you are injured in a crash by a careless driver you have the right to choose your own health care treatments. If these expenses are deemed ‘reasonable’ you are entitled to be paid back the full cost of your expenses from the at fault driver’s insurance company (usually ICBC for BC based crashes).
This will all change if the NDP pass Bill 20. Instead an injured collision victim will be stripped in their ability to recover actual ‘health care losses’ from ICBC and recovery is reduced only to an amount that the government establishes by regulation. If your actual medical costs exceed this you are out of luck. The government is stripping your right to sue for the difference. Specifically proposed s. 82.2 reads as follows:
Liability limited for health care costs
82.2 (1) In this section, “health care loss” means a cost or expense incurred or to be incurred for health care provided by a health care practitioner.
(2) In an action for damages caused by a vehicle or the use or operation of a vehicle, a person may not recover, for a health care loss, an amount that exceeds one of the following:
(a) the amount, if any, that is established or determined for the particular health care loss under a regulation under section 45.1 (1) (a);
(b) in any other case, the value of the particular health care loss.
(3) If, for the purposes of this section, it is necessary to estimate the value of a health care loss, the value must be estimated according to the value the deferred health care loss has on the date of the estimate determined in accordance with subsection (2).
(4) This section applies only in relation to a health care loss resulting from an accident occurring on or after April 1, 2019.
If you are concerned about these changes contact your MLA and speak up now. Bill 22 is set to pass into law imminently and time to persuade government to divert course is quickly running out.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a cost of future care award for a First Nation’s plaintiff can be reduced where the federal government’s health benefits program for Aboriginal persons may cover the needed treatments.
In today’s case (Watkins v. Harder) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2012 rear-end collision that the Defendants accepted blame for. The Plaintiff was injured and was awarded damages for chronic soft tissue injuries at trial. These included damages for future care costs. The Defendants argued that these should be reduced by the amount of any payments that could be claimed under the health benefits program for Aboriginal persons. Mr. Justice Gaul refused to make the deduction and in doing so provided the following reasons:
 Mr. Benning estimates that the present day value of the costs of Ms. Watkins’ Tylenol 3 and Extra Strength Advil amount to approximately $12,500. The defendants do not challenge these costs but argue that, like the physiotherapy costs, the costs for these medications will likely be paid by the federal government under its health benefits program for Aboriginal persons. Consequently, to avoid Ms. Watkins’ unjustified double recovery, the defendants contend these costs should be deducted from any cost of future care award.
 Ms. Watkins argues that to deduct her anticipated physiotherapy costs and her medication costs from a cost of future care award would be to force her into a position where she is reliant solely on the state to pay for these expenses when they are more properly attributable to the defendants’ admittedly negligent conduct. In this regard she relies on Harrington v. Sangha, 2011 BCSC 1035, which addressed the deductibility of benefits provided under the PharmaCare program. In that case, Mr. Justice Willcock found there was no risk of double recovery as the evidence showed that the program was intended to be an insurer of last resort and would not provide benefits where a tort award provided compensation for those costs. To deduct the costs from an award would be to presume the plaintiff would make a fraudulent claim for PharmaCare benefits. It was noted, however, that PharmaCare had made submissions on this issue and so was aware of any potential tort award, making double recovery unlikely (see: paras. 160-162).
 In Mitchell v. We Care Health Services Inc. et al., 2004 BCSC 902, the plaintiff, a member of the Kwumut Lelum First Nation, was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident. On account of her injuries and as a part of her ongoing treatment, Ms. Mitchell used a variety of prescription and non-prescription medications. At trial the defendants argued the costs associated with those medications should not form part of any award for the costs of future care because they would be paid for under the federal government’s health benefits program for First Nations persons. Mr. Justice Kelleher declined to make any deduction on the basis that the plaintiff would not be eligible for the benefits program because of the tort claim compensation. A factor that distinguishes this case from Ms. Watkins’ is that Justice Kelleher had evidence before him from the acting manager of the health benefits program on that specific point (para. 124).
 Other decisions not referred to by counsel indicate these benefits are generally not deducted from tort awards. In Whetung v. West Fraser Real Estate Holdings Ltd., 2007 BCSC 990, Mr. Justice Grist refused to make a deduction for health benefits received as a result of the plaintiff’s Aboriginal status. He noted at para. 71 that the “defendant’s obligation should not be put aside on the basis of possible double coverage where the social source is only prepared to be called on should any prior obligation fail”. Again, unlike the present case, there was evidence before Justice Grist that the coverage under this program only extended where no other source of funding was available.
 In Cottrelle v Gerrard,  O.J. No. 5472 (S.C.J.) the court took the opportunity to summarize the evidence on the nature of the health benefits program for Aboriginal persons. Madam Justice Leitch concluded at para. 103 that the publicly-funded benefits program was a matter of policy and, as such, even though there was no evidence to suggest the program would be terminated or the benefits would be reduced, there was no guarantee the benefits would continue. On this basis, the court did not deduct such benefits from the damage award. The decision was later overturned on the issue of liability and the issue of deductibility was not considered (Cottrelle v. Gerrard,  O.J. No. 4194 (C.A.)).
 In H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 SKQB 233, at para. 71 the health benefits provided to Aboriginal persons were deducted from a tort award. The fact that the defendant government of Canada was both the tortfeasor as well as the benefits provider is an important distinguishing feature of that case. On appeal the court overuled the trial judge’s decision, concluding that the intensive therapy required by the plaintiff would not be covered under the benefits program and should therefore be compensated through the tort award (H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SKCA 131 at paras. 259-63).
 Neither party has provided any evidence with regards to the nature of the benefits Ms. Watkins is entitled to as a result of her status as an Aboriginal person. I have no evidence before me regarding her continued entitlement or the certainty of the benefits provided under the program, or on the eligibility for benefits when an alternative source of funding, such as a tort award, is available.
 In these circumstances I cannot conclude that the cost of the treatments and medications in question should be deducted from the award Ms. Watkins is entitled to for her future care costs. As was noted in Harrington, without any evidence to suggest it, I cannot presume that the plaintiff would make a fraudulent claim for publicly-funded health benefits. On this basis, I do not find that an award that provides for full compensation of these costs results in double-recovery for Ms. Watkins.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing the evidence needed to justify an award for cost of future care.
In today’s case (Lo v. Matsumoto) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision and was awarded damages at trial. The Plaintiff appealed the trial judgement arguing the damages for cost of future care was unreasonably low and that the trial judge was wrong in requiring the Plaintiff to testify as to the intention to pursue all recommended care items. The BC Court of Appeal modestly increased the award for care and in doing so provided the following comments on the evidence required to justify such a claim:
 The plaintiff submits that the trial judge was wrong to require that the plaintiff should have had to give positive evidence of his intention to pursue the various medical recommendations as a condition of awarding amounts for any of the items sought. Counsel suggests that since the costed items were recommended by one or more doctors, the onus should have been on the defence to show Mr. Lo would not have used them. In counsel’s submission, an “evidentiary link” was drawn in this case because Ms. Henry was relying on the recommendations of the physicians referred to in her report.
 As well, counsel for the plaintiff referred us to evidence given by Mr. Lo that he had obtained physiotherapy, although he had not done so within the 12 months prior to trial. At the end of the day, counsel suggested an award of $100,000 would have been appropriate, but did not explain how she had reached that figure.
 I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that there is no hard and fast rule that requires a plaintiff to testify that he intends to use every item in the “wish list” of an occupational therapist in order to justify some award. On the other hand, a plaintiff must prove his case, both in terms of need and the likely utility of the item sought: see O’Connell v. Yung, 2012 BCCA 57 at para. 68. Where the costs claimed are not matters of absolute necessity, a plaintiff cannot assume that the court will simply accept the recommendations of occupational therapists or even of medical practitioners. Unfortunately in this case, Mr. Lo was not closely examined in chief or cross-examined on every item in the therapist’s report or on any discrepancies between his own testimony and what he had told the therapist.
It pays to take reasonable efforts to get better. Not only does it make good sense to take all reasonable steps to recover from injury for the sake of your well being but failing to do so can strip significant damages from a personal injury award. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with a “textbook” example of this.
In this week’s case (Maltese v. Pratap) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision. The Defendant admitted fault. The Plaintiff was injured which continued to cause problems by the time of trial and were expected to continue in the future. The court noted that the Plaintiff received “remarkably similar” treatment advice which he unreasonably refused to follow. The Court reduced the awarded damages by just over $100,000 and further stripped the Plaintiff of future care costs on the basis that “it is entriely unlikely” that the Plaintiff would follow the recommended treatments. In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Kelleher provided the following reasons:
 The facts of this case represent a textbook example of a failure to mitigate. There is a consensus among the professionals who assessed and treated the plaintiff that Mr. Maltese needed to undertake a program of physical rehabilitation and fitness with a kinesiologist or personal trainer. Their recommendations are remarkably similar. Mr. Maltese has chosen to ignore them…
 I am satisfied that the first stage of the test in Gregory has been met: I have no difficulty concluding that Mr. Maltese, having all the information at hand that he possessed at the time, ought reasonably to have undergone the recommended treatment of active rehabilitation through a kinesiologist or personal trainer.
 Among other reasons, Mr. Maltese submitted that because he felt worse after attending physiotherapy, he made a decision to not pursue an active rehabilitation program. I cannot accede to this argument. The medical evidence taken as a whole also establishes that, on a balance of probabilities, there would have been a significant improvement in the plaintiff’s condition or a reduction in his damages.
 On such a clear case, a reduction of 30% in the awards for non-pecuniary damages, wage loss after his return to work and loss of future earning capacity is appropriate…
 In this regard, the plaintiff relies on the fact that Drs. Travlos, le Noble, Chan and Kokan all recommended an active rehabilitation program. The plaintiff argued that there is a consensus among these physicians that he needs to recondition himself and would benefit from the assistance of a kinesiologist or personal trainer.
 But there must be a likelihood that a plaintiff will incur costs before an award can be made under this head of damages. I conclude that it is entirely unlikely that Mr. Maltese will avail himself of these services in the future. After all, the plaintiff has been advised by medical professionals on numerous occasions to engage in active reconditioning. He has not done so. I conclude an award for cost future care costs in these circumstances is inappropriate: Izony v. Weidlich, 2006 BCSC 1315 at para. 74.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal discussing future care awards and the appropriate analysis that trial judges should undertake when considering such awards.
In last week’s case (Gignac v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 collision. The Plaintiff’s injuries were expected to cause on-going difficulties. At trial the Plaintiff sought $115,975 for future care needs. This claim was awarded in full. ICBC appealed arguing that the evidence did not support some of the claims made and that the trial judge did not apply the proper analysis. The BC Court of Appeal agreed and reduced the award by almost $45,000. In doing so the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
 The purpose of the award for costs of future care is to restore, as best as possible with a monetary award, the injured person to the position he would have been in had the accident not occurred.
 The award is “based on what is reasonably necessary on the medical evidence to promote the mental and physical health of the plaintiff: (Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 (B.C.S.C.) and adopted inAberdeen v. Zanatta, 2008 BCCA 420 at para. 41.
 ICBC says that the trial judge did not examine each request and determine if there was an evidentiary link between the medical assessment and the care recommended by the occupational therapist and rehabilitation consultant. As Garson J.A. said in Gregory v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2011 BCCA 144 at para. 39:
I do not consider it necessary, in order for a plaintiff to successfully advance a future cost of care claim, that a physician testify to the medical necessity of each and every item of care that is claimed. But there must be some evidentiary link drawn between the physician’s assessment of pain, disability, and recommended treatment and the care recommended by a qualified health care professional: Aberdeen at paras. 43, 63.
 The failure of the trial judge to perform an analysis of each item sought by the plaintiff with respect to whether there was “some evidentiary link between the physician’s assessment of pain, disability and recommended treatment and the care recommended by a qualified health professional” was a legal error. The trial judge has since retired, and therefore it is not appropriate to refer the matter back to the trial court as the costs to the parties would be significant. Instead, this Court can make the assessment.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal largely upholding a trial award for damgages following a motor vehicle collision including damages for the cost of future pilates.
In this week’s case (Tsalamandris v. McLeod) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions, the first in 2004, the second in 2006. At trial the Court found the collisions resulted in permanent injury and awarded damages accordingly. Included in these were damages of $93,000 for pilates for the Plaintiff’s life expectancy. The Defendants appealed this award arguing it was excessive. The BC Court of Appeal, while making a modest reduction in this award to account for negative contingencies, largely upheld the award. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
 The appellants allege that the trial judge erred in over-compensating for certain future care costs; namely, the cost of a Pilates programme, child care and a membership to a community centre.
 The test for assessing future care costs is well-settled: the test is whether the costs are reasonable and whether the items are medically necessary: Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 at page 78; affirmed (1987), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 99 (C.A.):
3. The primary emphasis in assessing damages for a serious injury is provision of adequate future care. The award for future care is based on what is reasonably necessary to promote the mental and physical health of the plaintiff.
 McLachlin J., as she then was, then went on to state what has become the frequently cited formulation of the “test” for future care awards at page 84:
The test for determining the appropriate award under the heading of cost of future care, it may be inferred, is an objective one based on medical evidence.
These authorities establish (1) that there must be a medical justification for claims for cost of future care; and (2) that the claims must be reasonable…
 The trial judge based her award on her finding that this particular Pilates programme was medically necessary in assisting the respondent manage her chronic pain and, consequentially, her chronic depression. She relied on medical evidence that the respondent should continue with this programme indefinitely.
 She also found that the use of the community centre, particularly the opportunity it gave to exercise in a therapeutic pool, was medically beneficial and that it was reasonable to include therespondent’s portion of a family membership as a cost of future treatment. The appellants do not contest the benefit of exercising in the community centre, but argue that the failure to consider any contingencies results in over-compensation.
 I am satisfied that there was evidence before the trial judge capable of supporting the inference that this particular Pilates programme offered the respondent benefits not available in other programmes and not easily replicated by exercising at home. Similarly, the evidence is capable of supporting the conclusion that the respondent would benefit from using the programme consistently and continuously regardless of the “waxing and waning” of her depression. I do not think the trial judge made any error in failing to recognize a negative contingency based on temporary improvements in the respondent’s depression.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing whether future care damages can be awarded for health care items that are publicly available but more quickly available through private options. In short the Court held that damages can be awarded for these damages provided there is evidence that electing the private route is reasonable and subject to the possibility the expenses will actually be incurred.
In this week’s case (Engqvist v. Doyle) the Plaintiff suffered chronic injuries as a result of two collisions. These needed diagnostic nerve blocks and depending on the results rhizotomies. Both procedures were available through BC’s public healthcare system but private options were available on a much more expedient basis. The Plaintiff sought damages for the private procedures. ICBC argued this was not necessary.
Ultimately Mr. Justice Rogers awarded some damages considering the cost of these private interventions but was conservative in the award noting some “reservations” about whether the Plaintiff would actually undertake private treatments. In allowing damages for these items the Court provided the following reasons:
 The parties brought to trial conflicting views concerning the plaintiff’s claim for money to pay for private health care. That claim is for money to pay for private provision of four to six medial nerve block injections and, if the injections are diagnostic of further therapy, one or more rhizotomies upon the indicated nerves. The parties differed on whether the plaintiff should receive an award sufficient to pay for the injections and rhizotomies at a private health care clinic, or whether the plaintiff should confine herself to the free-to-her public health care system. The plaintiff plumps for the former, the defendants argue for the latter.
 The first point to address on this issue is that it does not concern the Canada Health Act. It does not require a philosophical discussion of the pros and cons of a general public health insurance scheme. Neither does the issue raise concerns about “queue jumping” by a well-resourced patient.
 Instead, the fundamental issue is whether a particular future treatment modality is reasonably necessary to promote the plaintiff’s mental and physical health: Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 (S.C.). In the case of medial nerve blocks, the evidence at trial was clear that the plaintiff should undergo at least one set of medial nerve block injections. The evidence at trial was also clear that the plaintiff could access medial nerve block injections on a fee-for-service basis at a private health clinic pretty much at her convenience, while publicly funded medial nerve blocks require that the plaintiff go on a four- to six-month waiting list. Similar time frames apply to rhizotomy procedures if such are indicated by the nerve blocks.
 In Moussa v. Awwad, 2010 BCSC 512, Russell J. considered a similar claim. The plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury and, after a lengthy period of investigation and diagnosis, elected to pay for repair surgery at a private clinic. He claimed the cost of that surgery as a special damage. Russell J. allowed the claim, saying:
 While the cost of private care will not be an appropriate special cost in every case, given the plaintiff’s emotional uncertainty about surgery and his continuing pain, this is a rare case and I find it reasonable in this case that the plaintiff chose to pursue private surgery with the doctor that he trusted and so that he could have his pain relieved immediately. I therefore award the plaintiff the costs of the surgery.
 In the present case, the evidence established that it is possible for the plaintiff to obtain nerve blocks and rhizotomies more quickly if she paid for them than if she waited for the public health system to provide them.
 Private fee-for-service care, therefore, offers the plaintiff the possibility of alleviating her symptoms more quickly than the public system. That is the only point of commonality on this narrow issue between this case and Moussa. More particularly, the plaintiff testified that she wants to try the medial nerve block injections and would consider a rhizotomy. She is not, therefore, unsure or uncertain about the therapy. Unlike the plaintiff in Moussa, the plaintiff here did not testify that she has any feelings of trust in or loyalty to any particular medical practitioner.
 The question in this case comes down to whether the plaintiff ought to mitigate her cost of future care by confining herself to the public health care system. That question can only be resolved by determining whether it is reasonable for the plaintiff to submit to the wait times and vagaries of the public health care system, thus increasing the length of time before she will know if a rhizotomy will reduce her pain. Private provision of medial blocks will considerably accelerate her coming to know whether a rhizotomy will likely help her.
 Reasonable in this context must be measured by an objective standard. What is reasonable in a given case must take into account not only the wait times involved, but also the degree of the plaintiff’s pain while sitting out those wait times and the effect that that pain will have on the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life. A minor ache in one’s little finger would be unlikely to be sufficient to underwrite expensive privately funded health care while a case of surgically curable paraplegia probably would.
 Accepting as I do the plaintiff’s evidence concerning the pain she has and its interference with her everyday life, I find that the plaintiff’s pain and its interference with her enjoyment of life is sufficient to merit acceleration of treatment via funding of private health care.
When presenting an injury claim with a future care component expert evidence is often called to address not only the future care required, but also the cost of future care. These experts sometimes rely on hearsay evidence in discussing the costs of the items recommended for future care. Can this evidence be admitted? This question was squarely answered in a 2008 ICBC UMP Arbitration which I summarize in my continued effort to create a searchable UMP caselaw database.
In the 2008 decision (MEN NN and DN v. ICBC) the Claimants sought damages following the wrongful death of their father/husband following a motor vehicle collision. The matter was arbitrated under UMP. In support of their claim the Claimants sought to introduce an expert report from a rehabilitation consultant to address future care needs for the surviving family members. ICBC objected to this report on several grounds. One of ICBC’s objections was that the report relied on hearsay evidence in addressing future care costs. Arbitrator Yule rejected this argument and admitted the report (with a few modifications based on other objections). In addressing the hearsay component Arbitrator Yule provided the following useful reasons:
18. As noted previously, the Report as it applies to the claims of DN and NN also includes the commercial cost of various services such as courier service, handyman service, storage locker fees, taxis and airfares. The cost of various services is considered to be within the scope of opinion evidence customarily given by rehabilitaiton experts notwithstanding that, to some extent, it may be hearsay information obtained from other service providers. Cost of care expers routinely include informaiton regarding the costs of services in their reports. In Jacobson v. Nike (1996) BCLR (3d) 63, the cost of care experts were Ms. Schulstad, a nurse with experience and education in rehabilitation nursing, and Ms. Harris, whose background was in occupational therapy. Levine J. (as she then was) accepted these witnesses as qualified to provide expert evidence concerning both the care required and the costs of providing it. At paragraph 185 the Judge said:
I am satisfied from the evidence of his injuries and function and of the clinical records that the plaintiff requires personal attendant care and homemaker services to sustain or improve his physical and mental health. I am also satisfied that consultants with the experience, skill and training of Ms. Schulstad and Ms. Harris are qualified to assess his specific care needs and to provide expert evidence concerning the care required to meet his medical needs and the costs of providing for them.
In MacDonald v. Neufeld, [Vancouver Registry, September 3, 1993] the cost of care expert, Mr. Simpson, included in his report the cost of airplane tickets and other expenses for a travelling companion.
19. As a practical matter, the admissibility of costing information on this basis makes eminent sense. If it were not admissible as part of Ms. Stewart-Blair’s report, then one of the Claimants could herself make the same inquiries, but adducing the evidence in that fashion would be subject to the same objection as hearsay. Thus, in the absence of admissions, the various service providers themselves would have to give evidence which would be both an inconvenience to them and an inefficient use of Hearing time. Accordingly, I rule that the costs information in the Report of commercially provided services in relation to the claims of DN and NN is admissible.
For more on this topic from a Judicial authority, the latest case from the BC Court of Appeal is worth reviewing for their practical take on the role hearsay evidence can play in expert reports.
Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a Plaintiff’s award for cost of future care in a personal injury claim should be reduced by the availability of Pharmacare benefits. In short the Court held that these benefits are non-deductible.
In yesterday’s case (Harrington v. Sangha) the Plaintiff suffered severe and disabling injuries following a collision with a tractor-trailer. Her injuries resulted in future care costs of $488,495 including medication costs of $118,000. The Defendant argued that this portion of the award should be reduced because British Columbia’s Pharmacare program may cover some of the expenses. Mr. Justice Willcock rejected this argument and in doing so provided the following useful reasons:
 The short answer to that argument is that where the benefit in question is not available to individuals, because they have a remedy against a tortfeasor, where there is a provision in the plan for subrogation, or where there is an obligation on the recipient of the benefit to repay the benefit from the proceeds of litigation, an award will not result in double recovery. The availability of benefits paid on such terms should not reduce the award.
 As this court noted in MacEachern v. Rennie, 2010 BCSC 625 at para. 422:
Medication costs required as a result of a motor vehicle accident must be paid for by a motor vehicle insurer, and in such a case, PharmaCare is the insurer of last resort.
 It was the evidence of Mr. Moneo that the PharmaCare programme is not intended to be available to persons who have a tort claim for the cost of their medications. Counsel seeking to have the deduction made from the award was reduced to arguing that there will be double recovery if the plaintiff recovers an award for the cost of her medications and conceals the award from PharmaCare or if she squanders her award and again becomes dependent on the state to pay for her drug expenses.
 The award in this case is made in the expectation that Ms. Harrington will report the outcome and use the award as intended. The judgment cannot be founded upon the presumption that the plaintiff will make a fraudulent PharmaCare claim. In any event, PharmaCare will be aware of this judgment, having made submissions and having been given standing to address the issue.
 There is no real risk of double recovery in this case and no basis for an award other than that which is necessary to ensure the plaintiff will be in a position, without relying upon the state, to pay the cost of the drugs she requires.
In what I believe is the first award of its kind, damages of $30,000 were recently allowed in a BC personal injury claim for the purchase medical marijuana to help manage the consequences of chronic pain.
In reasons for judgement released earlier this month (Joinson v. Heran) the Plaintiff sued the Defendant surgeon for medical malpractice. The Plaintiff’s claim was in part successful and damages of just over $310,000 were awarded including a $30,000 cost of future care assessment for medical marijuana. Mr. Justice Brown provided the following reasons setting out his legal analysis in allowing this claimed damage:
 As a judge of the law, I cannot make orders that directly or indirectly endorse unsanctioned accessing of medical marijuana. At the same time, my role is now to assess medical needs and necessities. It is the responsibility of Dr. Surgenor and Dr. Bright, as Mr. Joinson’s treating physicians, to address professionally these medical questions and to ensure Mr. Joinson’s medical use of marihuana complies with the rules and regulations. Ultimately, however compensation claims for medical use of marihuana, either as a special damage claim or as a future cost of care claim, must be assessed based on recommended guidelines and on costs charged by legally authorized dispensaries. All said, the foundational principle for an award of a cost of future care is that the expense must be both medically justifiable and reasonable on an objective basis. It is not enough to show merely that it is beneficial; the medical evidence must show it is reasonably necessary:Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd.,  S.C.J. No. 6, at para. 120; Aberdeen v. Langley (Township), Zanatta, Cassels, 2007 BCSC 993, at para. 198; Strachan v. Reynolds et al., 2004 BCSC 915, at para. 632.
 There is no bright line distinguishing mere benefit and reasonable necessity in this case. But with basic reasoning and application of the above stated legal principles it can be drawn, if roughly. Pain control and its contribution to Mr. Joinson’s ability to function to his maximum potential are core considerations here. Without use of medical marihuana or a synthetic substitute, Mr. Joinson would have to increase his use of morphine, which is detrimental, particularly to his functioning: he does not function as well, physically or mentally, without use of medical marihuana. His treating physicians endorsed this treatment option, supporting him in his use of medical marihuana. Other physicians may disagree, but his family physician and psychiatrist see him on a regular basis and, in this particular instance, are in the best place to consider what is medically necessary.
 The issue remains controversial and is one which more research and clinical experience must ultimately decide, or at least reveal clearer parameters for the safe and effective use of medical marihuana or its synthetic derivatives. Meanwhile, I find the medical evidence supports a finding that compensation for some medical use of marijuana is reasonably necessary in this case. However, I cannot find for compensation based on the quantity used by Mr. Joinson in his claim for exemption or on amounts he has been paying to purchase products from the TAGGS dispensary. The award will based on a maximum of 5 grams per day, and priced as if purchased from a Health Canada legally authorized source, or, alternatively, at the cost of the medically equivalent amount of a synthetic substitute such as Cesamet.
 Ultimately of course, any award must make allowance for the fact Dr. Heran’s errant surgery is not responsible for providing Mr. Joinson with a lifetime supply of medical marijuana, certainly not for the portion Mr. Joinson would have used for recreational purposes, irrespective of any of his surgeries. Moreover, I need to account for the medically beneficial effects of his participation in a chronic pain program, notably anticipated benefits that should help reduce his need to use pain medications….
 Therefore, I award $30,000 for costs of medical marihuana.