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Tag: chronic pain

Non-Pecuniary Damages for Fibromylagia Assessed at $110,000 in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized.

(Update March 19, 2012 – The Below Decision was modestly modified by the BC Court of Appeal in reasons for judgement released today, reducing the claim for future care by $32,115.  The other trial findings were left intact)
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding just over $1.4 million in total damages for injuries and loss suffered as a result of a BC car crash.
In today’s case (Shapiro v. Dailey) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 intersection crash.  The Defendant driver had been drinking earlier in the day and was operating the vehicle without permission of its owner.  Fault was not admitted but the Defendant driver was ultimately found 100% responsible for the crash.
The Plaintiff was 23 years old at the time of the crash and 29 by the time of trial.  The Court heard from a variety of expert physicians who all agreed the Plaintiff suffered “serious injuries“.  The Court concluded that the Plaintiff did indeed suffer serious and permanent injureis and would struggle to earn a competitive living throughout her career.  Mr. Justice Grauer awarded $110,000 for non-pecuniary damages and $900,000 for diminished earning capacity.  In reaching the award for non-pecuniary damages the Mr. Justice Grauer made the following findings:

[58]         On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that, as a result of the motor vehicle collision that is the subject of this action, Ms. Shapiro suffered soft tissue injuries to her cervical, lumbar and sacral spine that, through no fault of her own, have left her with:

·                 disabling cervicogenic headaches, and periodic headaches of a migraine nature;

·                 chronic pain disorder, manifesting itself as myofascial pain syndrome and post-traumatic fibromyalgia syndrome;

·                 depressive symptoms falling short of depressive disorder;

·                 mood disorder including resolving post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder and panic attacks;

·                 mild, but not insignificant, cognitive difficulties in concentration and memory.

[59]         Whether some of these diagnoses overlap in terms of their symptomatology matters not.  What is clear is that Ms. Shapiro genuinely suffers from the symptoms, and that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  This has wrought a profound change in every aspect of her life, from interpersonal relationships with her family, friends and partner to her ability to love, work, play, exercise, relax, sleep, and her ability to move forward with her life.  I find that her prognosis is not hopeless, but is extremely guarded.  Although Ms. Shapiro is the type of person who will work hard to achieve as much improvement as is possible, I am satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, nothing more than a modest improvement can reasonably be expected.  Accordingly, at the age of 29, Ms. Shapiro faces a lifetime of struggling with pain and fatigue in everything she does.

[60]         I have considered the authorities to which counsel referred me, including Dikey v. Samieian, 2008 BCSC 604; Alden v. Spooner, 2002 BCCA 592, 6 B.C.L.R. (4th) 308;Prince-Wright v. Copeman, 2005 BCSC 1306; La France v. Natt, 2009 BCSC 1147; Pelkinen v. Unrau, 2008 BCSC 375; Whyte v. Morin, 2007 BCSC 1329; Niloufari v. Coumont, 2008 BCSC 816, varied 2009 BCCA 517; and Unger v. Singh, 2000 BCCA 94.

[61]         Each case must, of course, be assessed on its own facts.  Considering all of the circumstances, including her age at the time of the accident (23), the toll her injuries have taken on her, and her prospects for the future, I consider Ms. Shapiro’s plight to be considerably worse than that of, for instance, the older plaintiff in the recent decision of La France($80,000) and worse than the older plaintiff in Prince-Wright ($100,000).  I have considered as well the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Poirier v. Aubrey, 2010 BCCA 266, where the 38-year-old plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages were increased to $100,000.  I assess Ms. Shapiro’s non-pecuniary damages at $110,000.

This decision also has a useful discussion of the law of ‘diminished earning capacity‘ and ‘failure to mitigate’ and is worth reviewing in full for the Court’s comments on these areas of law.

If you’re researching the non-pecuniary value of post traumatic fibromyalgia cases you can click here to access my recent archived posts.

Damages for "Chronic Pain" Assessed at $80,000; Dr. Schweigel Criticized

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court awarding an injured Plaintiff just over $112,000 in total damages as a result of 2 BC car crashes.  In reaching verdict the court had some critical words for Dr. Schweigel who is one of ICBC’s biggest billing physicians.
In this week’s case (Frangolias v. Parry) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions in December, 2004.  Fault was admitted for both crashes.  Both cases were tried at the same time with the Court focusing on the value of the claims.  As is usual in these types of claims there was competing medical evidence.  Ultimately the Court preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s physicians and in assessing her non-pecuniary damages at $80,000 the Court made the following findings:

[97]    I find that Mrs. Frangolias continues to suffer debilitating chronic pain symptoms arising from soft tissue injuries caused by the December MVAs. She suffers headaches, and pain that begins in her head and extends down through her shoulders and then extends through her back to her tail bone.

[98]    Mrs. Frangolias’ headaches and pain caused by the December MVAs have had an adverse effect on her life. I accept as accurate the limitations on Mrs. Frangolias’ lifestyle described by Mr. Frangolias and Effie Ainsley. While Mrs. Frangolias is able to carry out light housekeeping duties and do some minor cooking, she is otherwise prevented from engaging in active housekeeping, cooking, and gardening.

[99]    While there are no objective signs of injury at this time such as muscle spasm, Mrs. Frangolias continues to display tenderness during medical examinations.

Mr. Justice Walker went on to make some critical comments of Dr. Scwheigel.  Specifically his objectivity as a witness was questioned as illustrated by the following paragraphs of the judgement:

[85]    The defendants relied upon the medical-legal report of Dr. Schweigel, which followed his independent medical examination of Mrs. Frangolias that took place on October 20, 2008. I have considerable concerns about the reliability of the opinions expressed in that report. My concerns arise in respect of Dr. Schweigel’s opinions relating to surveillance videos of Mrs. Frangolias taken on May 12 to 14, 2006, March 14 to April 26, 2008, and May 17 to May 23, 2008, and in respect of some of the comments contained in his report concerning his findings on examination.

[86]    The surveillance videos were marked in evidence and shown to me during the trial. The videos show Mrs. Frangolias in her front yard, driving to a grocery store, and driving to a medical appointment. Surveillance of Mrs. Frangolias must have been taken at some distance away or with a camera of poor quality since with the exception of one sequence, none of Mrs. Frangolias’ facial features are discernable.

[87]    In respect of the first DVD containing the videos from May 12 to May 14, 2006, Dr. Schweigel wrote:

This lady is seen walking in a very normal fashion. She bends quite easily on repeated occasions to inspect her flowers on the May 13, 2006 section of this video. She rotates her neck in a very agile fashion with no obvious discomfort both right and left.

[88]    I carefully watched the images on the first DVD. There were a number of occasions where Mrs. Frangolias appeared to be moving stiffly, moving her head with her body in a stiff manner, as if they were all one stiff board. There are times when Mrs. Frangolias bends over to look at the flowers in her front garden, but due to the quality of the video images, it is impossible to tell whether Mrs. Frangolias was in discomfort when she did or indeed, at any time. My concern with Dr. Schweigel’s remarks is for overstatement and more importantly, for the failure to remark on those images showing Mrs. Frangolias to be moving more slowly or stiffly…

[96]    The foregoing excerpts as some examples of the remarks that cause me to be concerned that some of the opinions expressed in Dr. Schweigel’s report lack balance and objectivity. I am, therefore, most concerned about the reliability of the opinions expressed in the report. In the circumstances, I prefer to rely upon the evidence of Drs. Liu and Travlos as well as my assessment of Mrs. Frangolias and the accounts provided by Mr. Frangolias and Effie Ainsley.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Whiplash and likely Zygapohyseal Joint Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, awarding a Plaintiff damages as a result of a BC car crash resulting in whiplash claim with a likely zygapophyseal joint injury.
Zygapophyseal joints (also known as facet joints) are the interconnecting joints joining vertebral bodies to one another and it is not uncommon for injury to occur to these joints in motor vehicle collisions.

In this week’s case (Lamont v. Stead) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear end collision caused by the Defendant in Burnaby, BC.  Fault was admitted leaving the Court to deal with the extent and value of the injury claim.   The Defendant accepted he injured the Plaintiff however argued that these injuries substantially resolved within 9 months.  The Plaintiff disagreed giving evidence that her neck injury symptoms were ongoing through trial.
In support of her case the Plaintiff advanced evidence from Dr. Rhonda Shuckett, a well respected BC rheumatologist.  Dr. Shuckett testified that the Plaintiff likely had permanent injuries explaining as follows:

I suspect her left neck injury since the MVA is mainly attributable to soft tissue and perhaps zygapophyseal joint injury…It is already approaching two years since the subject MVA and she remains symptomatic. I think there is a good chance that she is going to continue with her current level of pain. She is not disabled but is impaired to some degree…

Mr. Justice Bernard accepted this evidence and awarded the Plaintiff damages accordingly.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss (damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $60,000 the Court made the following findings:

[30] The evidence establishes that the plaintiff’s prospects for any significant improvement in her neck pain are poor. As a consequence, she faces a considerably altered future; particularly as it relates to her life outside the workplace. Her chronic pain deprives her of much of the enjoyment she found in being physically active, in attending to her family, and in participating in family activities…

[35] In summary, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s pain is chronic, partially disabling, and likely permanent. Similarly, I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that the plaintiff’s neck pain was caused by the defendant’s negligence, in the sense that it directly caused or materially contributed to it. There is a substantial connection between the plaintiff’s chronic neck pain and the collision, and the plaintiff has shown, on a balance of probabilities, that but for the negligence of the defendant, she would not have chronic neck pain: see Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333…

[40]        The loss of enjoyment of life due to chronic neck pain is undoubtedly greater for Ms. Lamont than it would be for a person who has led a more sedentary lifestyle. Ms. Lamont has been actively engaged in strenuous sport throughout her adult life, and this has been a significant feature of life with her husband and children. It is, understandably, a source of great frustration and sadness to her that she has been deprived of the capacity to engage in most of the activities she loved, and to experience them with her family.

[41]        Given the relatively profound nature of the loss to this plaintiff (including compromised household management and parenting), the chronic pain which she must endure, the age of the plaintiff, and the very poor prospects for significant improvement, and, having regard to the similarities between the cases cited by the parties and the case at bar, I assess the non-pecuniary losses of the plaintiff at $60,000.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Neck/Low Back Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on $50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Neck/Low Back Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the fair assessment of damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Baxter v. Jamal) the Plaintiff was involved in a ‘substantial‘ 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff was in her vehicle in an intersection waiting to turn left.  The Defendant “ran a red light and struck the driver’s side door of the plaintiff’s vehicle“.
Despite feeling no pain at the time of the accident the Plaintiff in fact was injured.  Her symptoms came on shortly after the crash and some of them persisted to the time of trial.   In awarding $50,000 for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) Madam Justice Boyd stated as follows:
[18] Dr. Witherspoon and Dr. Rosemary Nairne Stewart, a physiatrist who conducted an independent medical examination on behalf of the plaintiff in February 2009, both opine the plaintiff has suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck and back.  Since more than three years have passed since the injury, they expect she will continue to experience her current symptoms over the long term and that as a result, she will likely be unable to do physically demanding work.  ..

I am satisfied that pre-accident, the plaintiff was asymptomatic and that since the accident, she has unfortunately been plagued by ongoing neck and back pain which now remain unresolved over four years since the accident.  I accept Dr. Nairne Stewart’s opinion that her condition is either the reflection of the soft tissue injuries (suffered at the time of the accident) which remain unresolved or are the result of the trauma to her back (suffered at the time of the accident), which has rendered a previously asymptomatic condition symptomatic.

[34] I accept Dr. Nairne Stewart’s evidence concerning the plaintiff prognosis, namely that she is “likely to continue to experience all of her current symptoms and limitations over the long term.  She will be unable to do physically demanding work because of her injury.  In sedentary work, she will continue to need a good ergonomic setup in her workstation and the flexibility to change her work tasks and position periodically throughout her workday”.

[35] I accept that these injuries have had a significant effect on the plaintiff’s life, both in terms of her career and her recreational activities. ..

[43] On a revinew of all of the evidence, and considering the significant impact these injuries have had and will continue to have on this young woman, I find that an appropriate award of damages is $50,000.

An interesting part of this decision dealt with the Court’s analysis of the competing medical evidence.  As is common in ICBC Injury Claims the Defence called the evidence of an ‘independent medical examiner’ (orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Maloon) who provided an opinion contrary to the Plaintiff’s treating physician with respect to the extent of the accident related injuries.  The court noted that Dr. Maloon’s competing opinion was ‘obliquely stated‘ and ultimately preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s doctors.  This case is worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the competing expert evidence and the analysis of the Court in favouring the expert evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s case.


Chronic Pain With No Objective Signs Discussed in Injury Litigation

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized.


One set of facts personal injury lawyers frequently encounter are Plaintiffs who sustain injuries in motor vehicle accidents and continue to have chronic pain well beyond the time that the objective injuries have healed.
Pain is an inherently subjective condition and it is well accepted in peer-reviewed medical literature that pain can be present without ongoing objective physical injury.  So how do courts deal with such claims?  Without getting into the many nuances of trial outcomes a general theme in these types of cases is credibility.  If a court accepts that a Plaintiff’s claims are credible then these claims are generally accepted.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such a claim.
In today’s case (Sylte v. Rodriguez) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 motor vehicle collision in Port Coquitlam, BC.  The Defendant failed to yield the right of way to the Plaintiff when he made a left hand turn in front of her.  The issue of fault was admitted leaving the Court to deal with the value of the Plaintiff’s injury claim.
Mr. Justice Sewell awarded the Plaintiff just over $114,000 in total damages for her injuries and losses.  The award included $45,000 for non-pecuniary damages.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Sewell discussed the subjective but real nature of the Plaintiff’s ongoing lower back pain due to soft tissue injuries.  The highlights of the Court’s discussion were as follows:

[12] Ms. Sylte continues to suffer from left side back pain around her sacroiliac joint area.  In Dr. Shu’s opinion this pain is caused by the initial car accident of September 15, 2005, but is definitely aggravated by the second accident.  Dr. Shu does not expect a complete recovery as the pain has been on-going since 2005.  He thinks that Ms. Sylte will experience on-going back pain for the foreseeable future.

[13] I also heard evidence and was provided with medical reports from Dr. Stone and Dr. Duncan McPherson.  I do not think it is necessary to refer to their evidence in any detail.  In this case, the consensus of medical opinion is that Ms. Sylte is suffering from low back pain in the left sacroiliac area.  The doctors also all agree that there is no objective evidence of underlying injury causing this pain.  They are all of the view that as the pain has persisted since June 2005 it will in all likelihood continue to persist for the foreseeable future.

[14] Dr. McPherson’s initial opinion was that there was no objective evidence of disability.  However in cross examination at trial he did agree that he thought Ms. Sylte still had back pain as of the date of his examination in 2006.  I did not take him to be disagreeing with Dr. Shu’s opinion that Ms. Sylte will probably continue to suffer from ongoing back pain for the foreseeable future.  However, I do not think that Dr. Shu considered that Ms. Sylte suffers from any significant disability as a result of her injuries.

[15] The conclusion I have reached is that any restriction on Ms. Sylte’s activities is caused by pain rather than physical limitation.  The pain is however very real to Ms Sylte and the functional effect of that pain is that Ms. Sylte no longer feels able to do all the things she did before the accident.

[16] Based on the evidence before me I conclude that Ms. Sylte suffered a soft-tissue injury to her lower back in the motor vehicle accident which continues to cause her chronic pain in her lower back area.  I also conclude that she developed depressive symptoms which she would not have developed had the accident not occurred…

[18] Ms. Sylte is 51 years old.  She testified that prior to the first motor vehicle accident she was an active, energetic individual.  She enjoyed playing mixed softball, golf and skiing.  She was employed as a nurse’s aide at the Royal Columbian Hospital in New Westminster.  She was a single mother whose adult son, Josh, lived with her.

[19] Ms. Sylte said that as a result of the pain which she is now experiencing she is no longer able to play softball and can golf only very occasionally.  She simply finds these activities too painful to pursue.  In addition she no longer skis.  She indicated that Josh is now required to do many of the more physically demanding tasks around the house.  She also indicated that she finds it difficult to drive long distances and that her general quality of life has deteriorated significantly as a result of her pain.  She indicated that this pain is about 4 out of 10, with 10 being the worst pain imaginable.

[20] Josh gave evidence at the trial.  He generally corroborated the drop in Ms. Sylte’s activity level since the motor vehicle accident.  He also indicated that his mother had become much less social after the accident.  Josh, who is now 31, does much of the heavy work around the house.

[21] Ms. Sylte has suffered a significant impact on her social and recreational life as a result of the injuries she suffered in the accident.  The evidence before me is that these symptoms will be permanent.  I note that Ms. Sylte is no longer able to play softball, participate in golf in any meaningful way or pursue skiing.  She is in more or less constant discomfort from the injuries she has suffered.  As I have found, she is genuinely experiencing the pain which, I have no doubt, has some psychological component.

[22] I have concluded that there should be a substantial award for non-pecuniary damages in this case.  I was referred to in a number of cases which seem to establish a range of approximately $35,000 to $125,000 for non-pecuniary damages for plaintiffs who suffer permanent pain symptoms without significant physical disability.  In my view, an appropriate amount for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Accident Related Fibromyalgia

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized. 64 Comments on $60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Accident Related Fibromyalgia

(Please note the case discussed here was overturned by the BC Court of Appeal in May, 2010)
Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, (Poirier v. Aubrey) awarding a Plaintiff just over $220,000 in total damages as a result of a BC Car Crash.
The Collision occurred in 2006 and was a rear-end crash.  The Plaintiff suffered from some pre-existing injuries but the trial judge found that the Plaintiff did not have a ‘relevant’ pre-existing condition.  Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that the accident caused fibromyalgia and awarded $60,000 non-pecuniary damages.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Stewart noted the following:
there was no relevant significant pre-existing condition and the doctors may differ as to what label should be applied to the plaintiff’s condition – fibromyalgia, fibromyalgia-like syndrome, chronic pain condition – but the fact is that she suffers from chronic widespread pain that is, for her, debilitating and with respect to which the prognosis is guarded.  An “optimal fibromyalgia based treatment protocol”, including biofeedback, is recommended and there is a real and substantial possibility, bordering on likelihood, that her pain and discomfort will be relieved and her functioning improved.  (Exhibit 5 Tab B Page 6).  But no “cure” is in prospect…
I find as a fact that the plaintiff’s persistent, consistent and, ultimately, chronic pain and suffering arose only immediately after the September 5, 2006 motor vehicle accident.  The schism in the expert medical evidence placed before me was not as to whether the September 5, 2006 trauma was a materially contributing cause of the plaintiff’s ongoing chronic pain condition but as to whether it so contributed by exacerbating a pre-existing chronic pain condition or by simply triggering a chronic pain condition.  It is now a fact that there was no significant pre-existing condition.  The only available conclusion in the case at bar is that but for the defendant’s negligence on September 5, 2006 the plaintiff would not be burdened with the chronic pain condition that has been her lot since September 5, 2006.

[23] Soft tissue damage is the source of her problems.  I have kept Maslen v. Rubenstein (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131 (C.A.) in mind.  I find that the plaintiff is one of that small percentage of people, well known to the law, whose pain and suffering continues long after science would say that the injured tissue must have healed.  I have cautioned myself about the need to be slow to rely on what are uncorroborated reports of long-standing pain and discomfort.  But, on the whole of the evidence I have decided that her complaints of pain are true reflections of a continuing injury and are not a product of desire by the plaintiff for things such as care, sympathy, relaxation or compensation and that she has used every ounce of willpower she has to overcome her problems and could not reasonably be expected to have achieved more by her own inherent resources or willpower.  (Maslen v. Rubenstein,supra, paragraphs 8 and 15).

[24] I turn to the future.

[25] To use language employed by Dr. Jaworski, the prognosis is “guarded”.  Taken together, the evidence of Dr. Hyams, Dr. Shuckett and Dr. Jaworski bottoms the conclusion that what is now in place – an ongoing, positive, pro-active approach, to echo Dr. Shuckett – means that there is a real and substantial possibility that significant improvement is in the offing.  To date, the plaintiff has sought help in such things as prescription drugs, chiropractic treatments, physiotherapy, massage, acupuncture and trigger point injections.  Only now is the plaintiff in the course of an organized effort to both alleviate her pain and discomfort to the extent possible and teach her techniques and methods of dealing with and surmounting her pain and discomfort.

[26] I turn to the assessing of non-pecuniary damages.  The plaintiff has been burdened thus far for 39 months.  Her prospects are not bleak, but guarded.  The level of the pain and discomfort she has endured was such that her life apart from work has been turned from one full of activity to one devoted to rest and recovery.  She is not housebound.  She drives a car for up to 20 hours a week and makes herself useful in the lives of her children.  The level of her pain and discomfort resulted in this woman – whom I am convinced is not a slacker and enjoyed her job in the world of insurance adjusting – being off work for six weeks, returning to work at half-time for two months and, ultimately, stopping work after having her employer cooperate in every way possible to reduce the demands of the job so that she could continue working.  That speaks volumes about her condition.  Additionally, the fact she actually enjoyed her work and has had it curtailed as a result of the defendant’s negligence must weigh heavily in the assessment of non-pecuniary damages.  I have considered the cases placed before me by counsel.  To track some of the language used in Knauf v. Chao, 2009 BCCA 605, I classify this as a case in which there is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff’s soft tissue injury will prove to be “permanent” but the degree of pain and discomfort cannot be considered to be “the most severe in nature” when compared with that of plaintiffs in other such cases.  Taking into account not just what I have said here but the whole of the evidence and all I have said thus far in these reasons for judgment, I award the plaintiff $60,000 by way of non-pecuniary damages.

This case was interesting for Mr. Justice Stewart’s very specific reasons setting out why he rejected many of the defence positions advanced at trial and also for the Court’s discussion of the law of adverse inference for failing to call a treating physician in an injury claim.

$75,000 Non Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Chronic Soft Tissue Neck Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $156,000 in total damages as a result of damages and loss from a BC Car Crash.
In yesterday’s case (Szymanski v. Morin) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear end collision in 2004.  Liability (Fault) was admitted by the Defendants leaving the court to deal with the value of the Claim.
The Plaintiff suffered mild/moderate soft tissue injuries but due to the nature of his physical work (a hard-wood floor installer) his injury continued to be aggravated and symptomatic through trial some 5 years later.
In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) Madam Justice Ker highlighted the following facts with respect to the accident related injuries:
[134] Upon a consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Mr. Szymanski’s complaint of continuing neck and trapezius pain was caused by the accident.  The fact that he suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck is not disputed.  The significance in this case is that the complaint continues.  I find that Mr. Szymanski continues to suffer neck and trapezius pain and that is because the accident and injuries occurred to a person with Mr. Szymanski’s particular occupation such that it has made it difficult for the injuries to fully resolve in the ordinary course.  As noted in the evidence of Dr. Tomaszewski, Dr. Hershler and Ms. Quastel, which I accept, Mr. Szymanski’s occupation as a hardwood floor installed has exacerbated the situation and made him more susceptible to suffering injury for a greater period of time than a normal person might have.  Mr. Szymanski has established that he has continuing problems with chronic neck pain and his continuing problems were caused by the defendants’ negligence.  He is entitled to be compensated for his injuries…

[142] I accept Mr. Szymanski’s evidence that he sustained a soft tissue injury to the left side of his neck as a result of the accident and that he still experiences pain in the left side of his neck that radiates into his upper left trapezius muscle area.  The injury can be described as mild to moderate in nature but has developed an element of chronic pain that continues to bother Mr. Szymanski.  The pain is most evident when Mr. Szymanski works.  His job as a hardwood floor installer is physically demanding although he has been able to find contracts that are less demanding than what he undertook prior to the accident.  This chronic neck pain still manifests itself some four years after the accident, albeit significantly reduced from what it was immediately after the accident and the two years following the accident.

[143] Mr. Szymanski is a stoic and determined person.  Despite the neck and upper left trapezius pain he has tried to remain physically active but is less active than he was prior to the accident.  He no longer goes for long hikes, electing shorter slower walks, he no longer canoes, he hunts less than he did prior to the accident, primarily by reducing the number of hours he goes out hunting.  His injuries have impacted on his ability to contribute to various household chores such as vacuuming and washing dishes, and he is not able to conduct the home renovations at the pace he had set before the accident.  He no longer socializes to the extent he used to prior to the accident because of the chronic pain and fatigue he experiences.  His plan of retiring and building and opening a bed and breakfast may well be compromised by the continuing pain he experiences and thus is a further component in the assessment of impairment and loss of his previous lifestyle.

[144] Taking into account all of these circumstances, the referenced authorities and the nature of Mr. Szymanski’s injuries, the fact that the injury of real consequence was to the left side of his neck, and the upper left trapezius muscles that lead to his left shoulder, the relatively enduring nature of this injury, the pain he has suffered and may continue to experience in the future, as well as the fact that he suffered some diminishment in lifestyle, I assess non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $75,000.

$95,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Pain and PTSD – Dr. Sovio Scrutinized

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 42 Comments on $95,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Pain and PTSD – Dr. Sovio Scrutinized

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $300,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss sustained in 2 BC Car Crashes.
In today’s case (Roberts v. Scribner) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first in 2005, the second in 2006.  She was not at fault for either crash.  The trial focused solely on the issue of the value of the Plaintiff’s ICBC Injury Claims.
The Plaintiff’s injuries affected her neck, mid back, low back, left shoulder collar bone and caused headaches.  She also suffered from depression and PTSD.
In assessing non-pecuniary loss (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $95,000 Madam Justice Bruce made the following findings about the Plaintiff’s injuries:

[173] I am satisfied that the soft tissues injuries Ms. Roberts suffered to her back, and to a lesser extent, her neck, have caused her substantial pain and disability since November 2005 when the first accident occurred. After the second accident she further aggravated her physical injuries, which developed into a chronic pain condition. In addition, Ms. Roberts’ psychological illnesses have aggravated her physical pain and suffering and have clearly contributed to the cycle of continuing pain. I note parenthetically that there is no dispute that Ms. Roberts’ PTSD symptoms and depression stem from the trauma of the accidents. Even the defence specialist, Dr. Smith, was of this view. At p. 5 of his report Dr. Smith says:

The most common sequel of motor vehicle accidents, particularly rear-end-type accidents, is the development of soft tissue injuries. If the soft tissue injury pain goes on for a number of months, individuals develop poor sleep and then are at risk for depression. I believe this is exactly what has happened with Ms. Roberts as a result of the two accidents.

[174] All of the specialists who examined Ms. Roberts have guarded prognosis for her complete recovery from the soft tissue injuries given the length of time they have persisted despite her tremendous efforts to rehabilitate herself. While Dr. Shah opined that some improvement could be expected in the future, he was unable to say at what point this might occur and to what extent Ms. Roberts’ condition would improve. Certainly there is some hope that different therapies may assist Ms. Roberts; however, her physical condition has plateaued since mid 2006 and she has not improved substantially since that time…

[177] The injuries caused by the accidents have also adversely affected Ms. Roberts’ ability to enjoy the recreational activities she loved to do before the collisions. She has attempted to return to snowboarding, but has not been able to tolerate more than one or two hours before the pain makes her stop for the day. Ms. Roberts has given up competitive horseback riding and the other sports she enjoyed before the accidents. Hiking and camping are also activities that she now finds too difficult to do because of the back pain she experiences when walking on an incline and sleeping on the ground. The physical and psychological injuries have also affected her social life; she is not able to sit for long periods at friends’ homes or in a movie theatre and thus spends most of her time at home seeking out a comfortable position. Her sleeplessness has affected her relationship with Mr. Harvey. They now have to sleep in separate rooms.

[178] Ms. Roberts has also undergone a complete personality change due to the injuries caused by the accident. The collateral witnesses testified about how fun- loving and comical Ms. Roberts was before the accidents and how depressed, sad and serious she has become since these events occurred. She does not enjoy life anymore and appears to function physically like a far older woman, moving slowly and stiffly and constantly attempting to find a comfortable position.

[179] Mr. Pakulak tested Ms. Roberts’ functional capacity overall, and in respect of several different movements that may be required for work, household chores, and recreational activities. There is no doubt that Ms. Roberts in many respects is functioning at a high level. However, it is also apparent that she has a reduced capacity in several functions, some of which are critical in her line of work. While the fact that she is unable to lift over 30 lbs does not render her disabled from performing the work of a graphic designer, Ms. Roberts’ reduced capacity for sitting and other movements related to working at a computer desk adversely affect her ability to carry out these duties efficiently and over an extended period. It is also important to consider that while Ms. Roberts may appear to be able bodied compared to many people, it is the changes in her life that are relevant to an assessment of damages. Before the accidents, Ms. Roberts was a youthful, extremely fit and active woman who had no difficulty whatsoever managing a full-time job, a busy social life, and an active recreational and exercise program. The functional limitations that now govern Ms. Roberts’ activities clearly represent a substantial change for her. Thus the impact on her ability to enjoy life cannot be underestimated. Moreover, in light of the guarded medical prognosis for her complete recovery, it is likely that these functional restrictions may, to some extent, continue to govern her life for the foreseeable future….

[181] Turning to the issue of quantum, it is well established that each case must be decided on its own facts. The authorities cited by the parties are useful as a guide in regard  to quantum; however, each particular case has unique factors that must be considered when awarding damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. In this regard, I found the authorities cited by Ms. Roberts, and in particular, the circumstances in Gosal, more closely mirror the facts in this case than the authorities cited by the defendants. Given my conclusions regarding the nature of Ms. Roberts’ injuries, the impact these injuries have had on her life, the length of time she has continued to suffer, and the guarded prognosis for her complete recovery, I find an award of $95,000 is appropriate in the circumstances.

An interesting side note to this judgement was the Court’s critical commentary of Dr. Sovio.  ICBC hired this doctor to conduct an ‘independent medical examination‘ of the Plaintiff.  As I’ve previously pointed out there are a handful of doctors who do a lot of these independent examinations for ICBC and it is not unusual for some of the reports generated by some of these physicians to contradict the opinions of treating doctors.  That indeed was the case in today’s judgement and Madam Justice Bruce pointed this out and gave ‘little weight‘ to Dr. Sovio’s opinions.  The Court made the following critical comments:

[131] Bearing in mind the anomaly of Dr. Sovio’s report, his lack of independent recollection of the interview, and the failure to cross examine Ms. Roberts on what is recorded in his report, I find little weight can be placed on his recorded history of her complaints and symptoms. It is also important to note that Dr. Sovio did not record Ms. Roberts’ exact words. Thus there may be errors of interpretation in his assessment of her pain levels, as well as her history of past and current symptoms…

While Dr. Sovio has come to a conclusion that Ms. Roberts is no longer suffering from her soft tissue injuries, I find his opinion is clearly inconsistent with the considered opinions of a variety of different specialists. As such, I find little weight should be placed on his assessment.

$80,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Knee Injury and Chronic Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Knee Injury Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

(Please note the below case was partially overturned on Appeal with a slight reduction in the Court’s assessed damages for cost of future care.  The BC Court of Appeal judgement can be found here)

Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry (Penner v. Silk), awarding a Plaintiff just over $555,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss from a 2005 BC Car Crash.
The collision occurred while the Plaintiff was rear-ended on a highway in Langley, BC.   The issue of fault was admitted at trial by ICBC leaving the court to deal with the assessment of damages.
The Plaintiff sustained a variety of soft tissue injuries that largely recovered in 6 months.  His knee, however, sustained long term injury.  Dr. Hirsch, a well respect specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, gave evidence that the Plaintiff suffered from “chronic knee pain caused by post-traumatic patellar tendonopathy as well as the development of patellofemoral joint syndrome.”    Dr. Hirsch testified that the Plaintiff would likely be left with ongoing problems as a result of this accident related injury.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $80,00 Mr. Justice Sewell made the following findings:
[36] Based on the whole of the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that Mr. Penner is suffering from chronic pain in his left knee and that that chronic pain is significantly impairing his ability to function, both at work and at home.  Pain is, of course, inherently subjective.  Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that there is a psychological component to Mr. Penner’s pain perception and that his quality of life and perception of pain would benefit from a course of vigorous, physical exercise and psychiatric intervention.  Dr. Riar and Dr. Smith agree that Mr. Penner is suffering from either adjustment disorder with depression or Major Depression.  Both are of the view that he would benefit from psychiatric intervention.  That intervention would probably consist of counselling with a psychologist or psychiatrist and the prescription of appropriate anti-depressant medication…
[39] As indicated above, my observation of Mr. Penner is that he is a driven, somewhat obsessive individual.  It is my view that much of Mr. Penner’s self-esteem is wrapped in his job performance.  Before the accident he was able to draw on very high levels of energy to permit himself to devote considerable energy both to work and his social and home life.  It is apparent to me that the symptoms he is experiencing, whether from depression or his organic injury, have contributed directly and indirectly to a significant diminution in Mr. Penner’s energy levels.  The preponderance of evidence before me satisfies me that Mr. Penner will continue to experience pain and mobility difficulties regardless of whether he avails himself of psychiatric intervention and/or a regime of physical exercise.  However, I am also of the view that a combination of such treatment, exercise and lifestyle changes would result in a significant improvement in the quality of Mr. Penner’s life and a diminution of his pain perception.  My view is that a necessary component of Mr. Penner’s adjustment to his altered circumstances would be for him to reduce the amount of time and energy he is devoting to his employment.

[55] Mr. Penner has satisfied me that the pain which he is experiencing is “real” in the sense that it is genuine and that he has honestly reported it in his evidence and to his treating physicians.  I am also satisfied, and it appears to be common ground, that the psychological component of Mr. Penner’s pain was caused by the defendant’s negligent act.  I am satisfied that Mr. Penner’s life has been significantly changed for the worse as a result of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.  Given his present condition and, in particular, the persistent pain he experiences, the dramatic degradation of the quality of his social and family life, his loss of libido and loss of ability to engage in activities that he formerly found pleasurable, or at least significant restriction in his ability to engage in those activities, I assess non-pecuniary damages in this case at $100,000 before taking into account the reasonable prospect that Mr. Penner’s condition could be significantly improved if he acts on the recommendations made by the medical experts in this case.

[56] The medical evidence in this case is that a regimen of exercise coupled with psychiatric treatment would be beneficial for Mr. Penner.  According to Dr. Smith such treatment would result in a very significant reduction in Mr. Penner’s perception of pain.  Dr. Riar and Dr. Gouws are of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from psychiatric intervention to address his depressive symptoms.  Dr. Hirsch is of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from a regimen of physical exercise.  I am, however, mindful of the fact that all of the doctors agree that Mr. Penner will continue to experience symptoms and that none of the medical evidence in this case quantifies with any specificity the probability that the recommended treatments will be effective.  It is also my view that psychiatric intervention and treatment of depression are somewhat problematic in terms of lasting benefits given the underlying causes of Mr. Penner’s depression.  Finally, I must take into account the substantial possibility that Mr. Penner’s psychiatric problems may recur or be worsened if he loses his current employment. In his report, Dr. Smith says this:

With effective treatment Mr. Penner’s problems will improve. Without treatment he may become more dysfunctional, and if Mr. Penner for some reason loses his job his mood would likely crash as a good deal of his self- esteem is built around his work performance.

[57] Taking these contingencies into account, I assess Mr. Penner’s compensable non-pecuniary damages in this case at $80,000.

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court Awarding damages as a result of a BC Car Crash.
In today’s case, (KT v. AS) The Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision while seated as a passenger in 2005.  It was a significant intersection collision.  The Plaintiff was 17 years old at the time.  The Plaintiff claimed that she suffered both physical and psychological injuries as a result.
Madam Justice Ballance largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for accident related psychological injuries but did accept the claim for physical injuries.  In awarding the Plaintiff $70,000 in non-pecuniary damages the Court summarized the Plaintiff’s accident related physical injuries as follows:

[210]     According to the plaintiff, since the accident she has felt an ache along with tightness and sore muscles in her low back.  She says that every few weeks the pain is so intense that she keels over.  She testified that in the first six months or so following the accident, her neck and muscles were stiff and knotted, particularly when her head was bent.  Her headaches would follow at least once per week, building up slowly from the back of her neck.  At times they lasted an entire day.  Unlike the headaches that she experienced prior to the accident, eating did not alleviate the pain in her head.  Also within the initial six months time frame, the plaintiff said she would feel a sharp pinching sensation in her upper back/trapezius area a few times each month that seemed to come out of nowhere.  She testified that at her last appointment with Dr. Smith roughly 22 months post-accident,  her neck was still stiff and she was still experiencing intermittent sharp pinching pain in her shoulder blade/trapezius area.  Her low back continued to produce a dull ache most of the time that fluctuated considerably in intensity depending on her activity.

[211]     The plaintiff says that she has not had a pain-free day since the accident.  In terms of her current symptoms, the plaintiff claims that her low back pain, of variable intensity, persists and is her dominant problem.  Physical activities such as soccer, jogging and extensive walking, climbing up or descending stairs can cause a flare-up of pain.  However, the postures that are most aggravating are those which appear to be innocuous, such as sitting and static standing for prolonged periods.

[212]     The plaintiff also continues to experience episodic pain in her neck and upper trapezius area.  She claims that the jabs of pain in her shoulder blade area have become infrequent, flaring up roughly once per month.  Although she still suffers headaches, especially when she sits down for long periods to study, they have substantially diminished in their frequency.  Her hips and “upper butt” area have not caused her difficulty for a very long time.

[213]     The defence concedes that the plaintiff sustained mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck and back.  As to her low back injury, the defendants assert that, at most, the accident caused a temporary aggravation of an “ongoing injury process” due to her pre-existing injuries and core weakness.  It should be evident from my discussion of the expert medical evidence and, specifically, my disapproval of Dr. Hepburn’s opinion, that I find the evidence does not support the defendants’ position that the plaintiff’s current low back pain is basically the same as the dysfunction in her upper “butt” sacroiliac joint or hip regions experienced before the accident.

[214]     The evidence amply establishes that the accident caused musculoskeletal injuries to the plaintiff’s neck, upper trapezius (left shoulder area) and her lumbar spine.  Relying on Dr. Hershler, Dr. Jung and Ms. Cross, I also find that it is more probable than not that the accident injured the facet joints of the plaintiff’s lumbar spine.  I find, as well, that it caused her headaches secondary to her neck pain, injured her left sacroiliac joint and aggravated her pre-accident difficulty with the right side of that joint.  On balance, I am not persuaded that she suffered a costovertebral injury as opined by Dr. Jung.

Another interesting aspect of this decision was the Court’s discussion of the Defence Medical Evidence.  The Defence hired Dr. Hepburn, a retired orthopaedic surgeon, to conduct a so-called ‘independent medical exam‘ of the Plaintiff.  Madam Justice Ballance largely rejected this expert’s evidence and in doing so made the following critical comments:

191]     Since his retirement in 2007, Dr. Hepburn’s medical practice has been solely devoted to conducting independent medical examinations.  Virtually every referral examination he receives comes from defence counsel and ICBC.

[192]     By his own admission, a mere 10%-15% of Dr. Hepburn’s practice prior to his retirement involved soft tissue injuries, and even then he was not involved in their ongoing management and treatment.  Dr. Hepburn testified that, while in practice, he did not treat patients with back injuries who had not suffered a fracture, slipped disc, disc prolapse or other type of injury requiring surgical intervention.  Generally, he would not even see such patients and would typically refer them to a specialist better trained to treat ongoing non-orthopaedic soft tissue injuries, such as a physiotherapist and physiatrist.

[193]     Dr. Hepburn could not recollect treating any costovertebral joint injuries, and testified that he only treated orthopaedic facet joint injuries (dislocations and fractures) for which surgery can produce some benefit.

[194]     As Dr. Hepburn testified, it became apparent that, although he was qualified as an expert in the diagnosis and prognosis of soft tissue injuries, his expertise lies almost exclusively in the field of orthopaedics.  This, however, is not an orthopaedic case.  It is a claim involving chronic soft tissue injuries which cannot be repaired through surgical intervention.

[195]     The plaintiff told Dr. Hepburn that her major problem related to her low back.  She also complained of pain in her left shoulder, a stiff neck, and headaches.  Dr. Hepburn agreed that the plaintiff likely suffered some soft tissue injury to her neck and knee from the accident.  However, he found it unclear as to whether her lower back pain was connected to the accident.  In this regard, he seemed to place some reliance on his understanding that there had been no complaint of back pain noted in the plaintiff’s medical records in the months following the accident.  That is a misconception.  The physiotherapy records are replete with the plaintiff’s complaints of low back pain in the months immediately after the accident.  The treating physiotherapist’s discharge note, which formed part of Dr. Smith’s file, leaves no doubt that the plaintiff’s lumbar spine was the chief area of treatment throughout the many sessions.  I can only conclude that Dr. Hepburn’s review of those records was superficial.

[196]     As an aside I would also note that the plaintiff’s controversial ICBC statement tendered into evidence by the defence itself refers to complaints of low back pain within the first two weeks following the accident.

[197]     In addressing the plaintiff’s pre-accident physical difficulties, Dr. Hepburn seemed to suggest that it would be legitimate to interpret her physiotherapist’s notations of sacroiliac joint pain as being medically equivalent to a notation of unspecified low back pain.  The implicit suggestion was that the plaintiff’s post-accident low back pain is the same as her sacroiliac joint complaints before the accident and, accordingly, was not caused by the accident.  He went so far to say that, in all likelihood, the plaintiff actually had low back pain and not sacroiliac joint dysfunction when she saw her physiotherapist before the accident.  I have previously made clear that I reject the free-floating notion that a physiotherapist would confuse those distinct anatomical areas.  His evidence on this point distinguished Dr. Hepburn from the other medical experts who gave evidence on the point.  It caused me considerable concern.

[198]     I also found it strange that in his report, Dr. Hepburn described the plaintiff’s headache complaints as falling beyond his area of expertise.  The preponderance of all of the other medical opinion evidence, which I find credible, is that the plaintiff’s post-accident headaches probably stem from her injured neck.  In his report, Dr. Hepburn did not allow for the prospect that the plaintiff’s headaches could be cervicogenic in origin, and represented referred pain from her injured neck.  He was only prepared to admit that potential in cross-examination.  Instead, in his report he had implied that the plaintiff’s headaches had a psychological source by suggesting that they could be addressed by medication for anxiety.  In my view, Dr. Hepburn’s assessment of the plaintiff’s ongoing headaches was not evenly balanced.  That too was of concern.

[199]     Dr. Hepburn did not find a restricted range of movement in the plaintiff’s spine.  He explained that the dual inclinometer applied by Dr. Jung is not used by him or any orthopaedic surgeon to his knowledge.  That does not mean that measurement with that device is not the gold standard.  I was most impressed with Dr. Jung’s explanation of the frailties of the so-called “eyeballing” assessment of range of motion and the superior measurement capability of the device he used.

[200]     Dr. Hepburn was adamant that the manner in which Dr. Jung and Dr. Hershler purported to diagnose a potential facet joint injury was not adequate.  He testified that a definitive diagnosis cannot be made without proper imaging studies such as a bone scan, CT scan or MRI.  He stood by his opinion that there was no facet joint injury that he could detect on his examination of the plaintiff.  Dr. Hepburn’s comments regarding the diagnosis of facet joint injury illustrates the difference between the medical approach to diagnosis for the purposes of determining causation, and the legal approach to the question of causation.  As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, [Snell ] at para. 34:  “Medical experts ordinarily determine causation in terms of certainties whereas a lesser standard is demanded by the law.”

[201]     With respect to Dr. Jung’s diagnosis of costovertebral injury, Dr. Hepburn opined that such an injury is quite rare and would normally be associated with severe trauma such as in an individual with broken ribs.  He suggested that it would take a “divine talent” to diagnose this type of injury based on physical/clinical presentation alone.

[202]     Relying on Dr. Hepburn’s opinion, the defence argues that the plaintiff’s subjective pain complaints which have continued for more than four years after the accident are inconsistent with the fact that her spine has suffered no structural damage or other ominous pathology.  The underlying logic appears to be that pain and chronic injury do not occur in the absence of orthopaedic or other structural injury.  That notion offends common sense and is blind to the credible explanations given by Drs. Jung and Hershler and Ms. Cross as to the nature of soft tissue injury.

[203]     In the end, I consider it unsafe to give any weight to the opinions expressed by Dr. Hepburn.