Tag: brain injury cases

Scope of Neuropsychological Evidence in BC Brain Injury Cases Discussed

Written by admin on November 12, 2009. Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published today on the BC Supreme Court website dealing with the scope of permissible neuropsychological opinion evidence in BC Brain Injury Cases.
When ICBC or other BC brain injury cases go to trial a neuropsychologist is a common type of expert witness called by both Plaintiff and Defence Lawyers. Neuropsychologists are extensively trained with respect to the cognitive and behavioural consequences of brain injuries and for this reason their evidence is often vital in the prosecution of brain injury claims.
In today’s case (Meghji v. Lee) the Plaintiff alleged she suffered a traumatic brain injury. In support of her case the Plaintiff sought to have a neuropsychologist give opinion evidence with respect to the cognitive and behavioural sequelae of brain injuries and also with respect to whether the Plaintiff suffered from organic tissue to her brain. The Defence lawyer objected claiming the latter opinion is outside of the scope of a neuropsycholgists permissible expert opinion. Mr. Justice Johnston agreed with the defence objection and summarized and applied the law as follows:

[27] Counsel for the plaintiff wants Dr. Malcolm to be permitted to give an opinion on whether Ms. Meghji has had an injury to her brain. I looked briefly at Dr. Malcolm’s written reports, and in his first report, the one of February 1, 2007, Dr. Malcolm provides an overview of the place of psychometric testing in his overall task in this way. He says:

Once the test results are determined to reflect the person’s neuropsychological status with acceptable accuracy, the question remains as to whether clinically significant test results reflect organic damage, or stem from other factors, such as psychological causes. The neuropsychological process considers all of these possibilities in reaching diagnostic conclusions. The conclusions reached are based on a balance of probability, the strength of which is indicated where possible.

[28] At the risk of appearing to be overly semantic about this analysis, I take it that what counsel want Dr. Malcolm to be able to do is to testify by way of opinion about whether or not there has been some form of harm or damage to the tissues of the brain of Ms. Meghji as opposed to some form of harm or damage to the mind or emotions or personality of Ms. Meghji. Whether there is a distinction between the brain as an organ of the body, on the one hand, and the mind and personality of the person in whose body the brain is found, on the other, is a metaphysical question that I hope I never have to answer in a court of law. I am going to confine myself to what I think is in issue, and that is Dr. Malcolm’s qualifications as a neuropsychological and whether they permit him to provide the ready-made inference through opinion on whether there has been physical harm or damage to the brain as an organ of the body, and in my view, they do not.

[29] The statutory regime does not, in my view, go any further than to allow testing, assessment, diagnosis of, and therefore opinions on the abilities, aptitudes, interests, et cetera, or the behaviour, emotional, or mental disorders, that is, disorders of the mind. These conditions may arise with or without damage to the structure or tissues of the brain. They may be associated with or flow from injury or damage to the brain itself. They may arise from or flow from other causes. It does not necessarily follow that because Dr. Malcolm is permitted by statute to test, assess, or diagnose behavioural, emotional, or mental disorder that he must therefore be permitted to give in evidence his opinion that the cause of any of these conditions stems from an injury to the tissues or structures of the brain.

[30] In my view, Dr. Malcolm’s qualifications do not go so far as to permit that opinion.

[31] That does not say that Dr. Malcolm cannot give, in evidence, his opinion based upon the results of his testing, nor does it prevent Dr. Malcolm from giving an opinion on whether the test results as evaluated by him are of a nature, kind, or quality seen in people who have been diagnosed as having had organic brain injuries.

[32] In my view, the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Clancy in Knight remains appropriate, and that is, Dr. Malcolm is qualified to give his opinion on the cognitive and behavioural sequelae of brain injuries and to indicate the relative likelihood of any cognitive and behavioural abnormalities being the consequence of a traumatic brain injury, but to paraphrase Mr. Justice Clancy, it does not permit him, that is, Dr. Malcolm, to diagnose physical injury and the manner in which it was incurred.

[33] It therefore follows that Dr. Malcolm will not be permitted to give his opinion on whether Ms. Meghji has had an injury to the tissues of her brain or, obviously, as to the cause of any such injury, but he will be permitted to testify as I have indicated.

BC Health Care Costs Recovery Act Gets Its First Judicial Consideration

Written by admin on May 28, 2009. Posted in Uncategorized. 47 Comments on BC Health Care Costs Recovery Act Gets Its First Judicial Consideration

As of April 1, 2009 the BC Health Care Costs Recovery Act came into force. This legislation applies to almost all non-ICBC personal injury claims in this Province. (click here for some background on this act).
The first judgement that I’m aware of dealing with this legislation was released today by the BC Supreme Court.
In today’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie), the Plaintiff was seriously injured when her head came in contact with a tractor trailer driven by the defendant Rennie. The Plaintiff’s personal injury trial started in March, 2009 (before the Health Care Costs Recovery Act came into force) and proceeded well beyond April 1 (when the Act came into force). On April 21, well into the trial, the Plaintiff’s lawyer brought a motion to amend the claim to include $699,195 in hospitalization costs paid by the BC Government.
Mr. Justice Ehrcke concluded that it would be prejudicial to permit the Plaintiff to amend her claim to include these significant costs so late in the trial. In dismissing the motion he reasoned as follows:

[30] Counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the intervenor submit that it might not be necessary for the defendants to call evidence if the claim were limited to a claim for hospital costs. The suggestion is that these costs are calculated on a simple per diem basis, and there would be no realistic basis on which the defendants could contest hospital costs.

[31] I cannot accept that submission. During argument on this motion, counsel for the defendants advised that they still have not seen a copy of the Minister’s certificate. Since counsel have not seen what would actually be in the certificate, it is speculative to hypothesize that the defendants would have no factual basis to challenge it. The salient point is that in law, the defendants are at liberty to lead evidence to challenge the facts asserted in a s. 16(1) certificate. Their opportunity to lead such evidence has been irreparably compromised by the fact that the application to amend the statement of claim, to add the claim for past health care costs was brought so late in the trial.

[32] Because of the prejudice that the proposed amendments would cause to the defendants, and in light of the fact that the plaintiff would not enjoy any personal benefit from the addition of a claim for past health care costs, the application for leave to amend the statement of claim is dismissed.

As the first precedent dealing with this Act today’s case is worth reviewing for all BC personal injury lawyers. Mr. Justice Erhcke goes through the Act in detail and analyzes the Act’s application to personal injury claims filed, but not resolved, prior to the Act coming into force.

The Law of "Adverse Inference" Exlpained in BC Brain Injury Case

Written by admin on May 28, 2009. Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

One of the most important decisions a personal injury lawyer needs to make when going to court is deciding which witnesses to call in support of the claim. This is particularly true when it comes to deciding what medical experts will be called in support of an injury claim.
Typically a seriously injured plaintiff will have seen many medical practitioners (GP, specialists, physiotherapists etc.) If you fail to call some of these witnesses can that harm your case? The answer is yes and is contained in the law of ‘adverse inference’. The law of adverse inference means that the judge or jury are permitted to, in certain circumstances, presume that you failed to call a certain witness (such as your doctor) because that witness would not have helped your case.
Reasons for judgment were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, (Hodgins v. Street) explaining and applying this legal principle in a BC brain injury case.
In this case the Plaintiff was injured in a serious accident in 2004 in Courtenay, BC. The Plaintiff suffered a moderate brain injury which was expected to have permanent consequences. In awarding just over $650,000 in total damages for the Plaintiff’s losses Mr. Justice Kelleher summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries and their effect on her life as follows:

[81] In this case, the plaintiff has suffered constant headaches and continues to do so.

[82] Her emotional and other difficulties arising from the brain injury are permanent and affect many aspects of her life.

[83] I am persuaded that Ms. Hodgins’ pleasure in life has been significantly reduced. Both the plaintiff’s cognitive and physical conditions limit what she can do outside the home. Her ability to be a mother will be complicated by these injuries. She will have a loss of opportunity of engaging with her children while they are growing up. I accept, as well, Dr. Anton’s opinion that neurological recovery after a traumatic brain injury is usually maximal within two years and therefore further recovery cannot be expected. I accept, as well, neurologist Dr. Donald Cameron’s opinion that she is “functionally disabled to a significant degree”. Her fatigue, hypersomnilance and dizziness will be permanent. She is more vulnerable than before to episodes of depression.

In reaching his judgement Mr. Justice Kellehar was asked to draw an adverse inference because the Plaintiff failed to call her GP of many years as a witness. The judge did in fact draw this adverse inference and in doing so did a great job summarizing this area of the law as follows:

Adverse Inference

[51] The defendant argues that I should draw an adverse inference from the failure of the plaintiff to have Dr. Law, the plaintiff’s family doctor, provide a report or to call him as a witness.

[52] Dr. Law is the only physician (other than the chiropractor Dr. Kippel) who treated the plaintiff extensively before and after the accident. A central issue in this case is the plaintiff’s pre-accident medical history and the extent to which the accident is the cause of the plaintiff’s difficulties today.

[53] Dr. Law’s clinical records were produced. But they are, by the terms of a document agreement between the parties, simply records kept in the ordinary course of business. They do not contain any opinion.

[54] The principle was stated in Wigmore on Evidence, (Chadbourn rev. 1979) vol. II at 192:

…The failure to bring before the Tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party. These inferences, to be sure, cannot fairly be made except upon certain conditions; and they are also open always to explanation by circumstances which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party’s fear of exposure. But the propriety of such an inference in general is not doubted.

[55] Sopinka and Lederman in The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1999), describe the principle at para. 6.321:

In civil cases, an unfavourable inference can be drawn when, in the absence of an explanation, a party litigant does not testify, or fails to provide affidavit evidence on an application, or fails to call a witness who would have knowledge of the facts and would be assumed to be willing to assist that party. In the same vein, an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who does not call a material witness over whom he or she has exclusive control and does not explain it away. Such failure amounts to an implied admission that the evidence of the absent witness would be contrary to the party’s case, or at least would not support it.

[emphasis added]

[56] There have been recent developments in the application of this principle in British Columbia.

[57] In Barker v. McQuahe (1964), 49 W.W.R. 685 (B.C.C.A.), the Court of Appeal stated an adverse inference may be drawn if a litigant fails to call a witness who might be expected to give supporting evidence. Mr. Justice Davey stated at 689 that a plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries “… ought to call all doctors who attended him in respect of any important aspect of the matters that are in dispute, or explain why he does not do so”.

[58] That approach was modified in Buksh v. Miles, 2008 BCCA 318, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 162, at para. 34:

[34] Taking the admonition of Mr. Justice Davey to the extreme in today’s patchwork of medical services raises the likelihood of increased litigation costs attendant upon more medical reports from physicians or additional attendances of physicians at court, with little added to the trial process but time and expense, and nothing added to the knowledge of counsel. Perhaps the idea that an adverse inference may be sought, on the authority of Barker, for the reason that every walk-in clinic physician was not called fits within the description of “punctilio” that is no longer to bind us, referred to by Mr. Justice Dickson in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, in a different context.

[59] Mr. Justice Macaulay considered this issue in Prato v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2003 BCSC 76, in circumstances similar to those before me.

[60] In that case, the defendant had access to the clinical records. Mr. Justice Macaulay noted that in Barker, the plaintiff failed to call the specialist and the inference was that the specialist did not support the view of the general practitioner. In Prato, the specialists were called but not the general practitioner. His Lordship said at para. 26: “I am less concerned about the lack of supporting evidence from a general practitioner than I would be if the situation were reversed”.

[61] The defendant points to Djukic v. Hahn, 2006 BCSC 154, aff’d 2007 BCCA 203, 66 B.C.L.R. (4th) 314, where Josephson J. at para. 60 gave five reasons for declining to draw an adverse inference:

1. Both parties have produced volumes of medical evidence from a number of doctors;

2. The complete clinical records of these doctors were disclosed to the defence;

3. These same records were expressly considered and subsumed in the opinions of doctors whose reports are before me;

4. Having had disclosure of these records, it was open to the defence to interview and call these doctors as witnesses without risk of being blindsided;

5. These were not doctors whom Mrs. Djukic consulted on a regular basis.

[62] As the plaintiff points out, the decisions in Prato, Djukic and Buksh are consistent with the initiative to streamline trials and make them less costly.

[63] However, there were two peculiarities in the Prato case that bear mentioning. Of concern was the evidence or lack of evidence from two family doctors. One of them, Dr. Leong, was not available to testify at trial. Therefore, the records that were sought to be admitted, which contained opinion evidence, were not admitted. In the circumstances, Mr. Justice Macaulay declined to infer that the doctor held views inconsistent with those of the specialist.

[64] The other physician was Dr. Hayes. He had provided a medical report directly to an adjuster at ICBC. (This was an action for temporary total disability benefits.) Thus, the defendant had the opinion of Dr. Hayes but declined to call Dr. Hayes.

[65] In all the circumstances of this case, I infer that the plaintiff did not call Dr. Law because he would not have provided evidence helpful to the plaintiff’s position on these points:

1. The plaintiff’s medical condition, both physical and psychological, at the time of the accident.

2. The medical cause for the plaintiff’s fatigue before and after the accident.

3. How the plaintiff progressed following the accident with the effects of the brain injury and the other soft tissue injuries.