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Tag: bc injury law

Credibility Concerns Lead to Outright Rejection of Personal Injury Claim

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, outright rejecting a personal injury claim as a result of credibility concerns.
In today’s case (Fancy v. Gareau) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted.   At the time of the collision the Plaintiff was on a WCB claim.  She claimed the collision caused a neck injury and that this was not a pre-existing problem.  In the course of the trial this claim proved unreliable and the Court ultimately dismissed the claim.  In reaching this result Mr. Justice Parrett noted as follows:
[69]         Perhaps the most startling reversal in her evidence was the cross-examination of the plaintiff about a portion of Exhibit 8.
[70]         This document was a spreadsheet prepared by the plaintiff and her husband as a part of their submission to the Workers Compensation Board to help establish that she had suffered “an upper back injury”.  In item 11 on page 2 of the spreadsheet the plaintiff specifically refers to the August 5, 2008 Physiotherapy Initial Notification (Exhibit 10) referred to above.  The excerpt contained in item 11 specifically notes that the “Injury Recorded on Claim: Neck” and then records the following submission regarding the document:
Corroborating Documentation of stiff neck from workplace injury (July 8, 2008) – this injury is NOT from the MVA as suggested by CD in Item 32.
[71]         The last column of this spreadsheet is entitled “Proof of:” and is divided into two columns, the first of which is “Upper back/left arm injury”.
[72]         The plaintiff entered “Yes” in this column with respect to Item 11.
[73]         When confronted with this document the plaintiff conceded that when the Workers Compensation Board case manager said that the neck injury was not as a result of the workplace injury but from the motor vehicle accident she disagreed and said ‘no, I injured my neck in the workplace accident’.
[74]         When pressed on this point she advised the court that:
The upper back, to me, includes the neck.
[75]         This evidence was given without the faintest embarrassment or apparent realization that the previous day she had testified that:
When I say upper back I do not mean my neck.

[125]     This is a personal injury action in which the issue is causation.  Simply put the question amounts to this – Was the plaintiff injured or did she have existing injuries or conditions aggravated by the motor vehicle collision on September 30, 2008?
[126]     The evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff is devoid of medical evidence and opinion touching on the issue of causation.
[127]     The only expert opinion placed before the court is that of Dr. McKenzie who first saw the plaintiff some 28 months after the motor vehicle collision.  In providing Dr. McKenzie with the history he used as the foundation of his opinion the plaintiff misrepresented and altered the facts and withheld critical information about her physiotherapy treatments and pre-existing symptomology.
[128]     The effect of her actions destroyed any value of Dr. McKenzie’s opinion…
[139]     The plaintiff’s action is dismissed.
 

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Soft Tissue Injuries and Headaches

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In this week’s case (Lewis v. Scheer) the plaintiff was involved in a “significant” collision in 2010. The Defendant admitted liability. The collision caused various soft tissue injuries and headaches which lingered at the time of trial.  The Plaintiff had some pre-existing symptoms which left her susceptible  to developing chronic pain.  Her symptoms were expected to carry into the future with optimism that they can be reduced with weight loss and exercise.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Mr. Justice Funt provided the following reasons:
[9]             In general terms, the plaintiff’s injuries involve her back, spine, shoulders and neck.  She has daily headaches and has chronic pain…
[18]         The three doctors were in general agreement that the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms of daily headaches and pain affecting her neck, chest, shoulders and spine were caused by the MVA.  Dr. Travlos noted in his November 14, 2011 report that the plaintiff “was likely vulnerable to injury and the development of more chronic symptoms, given some of the pre-accident complaints she had”…
[22]         The medical evidence recognizes that the pain will be ongoing although it may reduce as a result of the recommended steps to be taken.  These steps include losing weight, a focus on functionality and not on pain, a regimen of exercise and activity, and the reduction of the medication the plaintiff is currently taking…
[35]         As noted, the plaintiff will have ongoing pain.  The focus for the future is on improving function.  In particular, the pain has affected and will affect her enjoyment of life, family and social relationships, and lifestyle.  The Court will award $70,000 inclusive of housekeeping capacity.  The plaintiff will be able to perform housekeeping functions, albeit with degrees of pain depending on the particular activity.
 
 
 

Bus Driver Liable Following Injury to "Elderly, Frail and Hunched" Passenger

Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing bus driver liability for injuries to passengers, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding a bus driver partly liable after putting the bus in motion when an elderly passenger was attempting to exit.
In this week’s case (Bideci v.Neuhold) the 93 year old plaintiff boarded a bus.  When the bus came to his stop he “spent several seconds in the process of attempting to rise from his seat“.  The bus driver failed to see this, closed the door and put the bus in motion prior to the plaintiff exiting.  This caused the Plaintiff to fall resulting in injury.
In finding the bus driver liable Mr. Justice Abrioux provided the following reasons:
[72]         The standard of care to which Mr. Neuhold was subject included taking a careful enough look into the rear-view mirror as was appropriate under the circumstances in existence at the time. As he candidly admitted in his evidence, he was under no specific time constraints: “If you’re late, you’re late”. Safety of his passengers was his primary consideration.
[73]         Mr. Neuhold’s evidence was that photograph 8 of Exhibit 7 was the most accurate approximation of what he would have seen as he looked in his rear-view mirror, with a caveat being that he would not have been able to see the wheel well on the passenger side of the bus.
[74]          Mr. Bideci’s seat is clearly visible in this photograph and there were no obstructions such as someone standing or moving which would have obscured Mr. Neuhold’s view of this area.
[75]         I appreciate that Mr. Neuhold is not subject to a standard of perfection nor is he the plaintiff’s insurer. But when I apply the legal principles to which I have referred above to my findings of fact, I conclude that the defendants have not satisfied the burden on them to establish that Mr. Neuhold used all due, proper and reasonable care and skill to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff.
[76]         Based on my review of the video, I am of the view that Mr. Neuhold did not look carefully enough in his rear-view mirror before deciding to perform his final outside mirror check, which preceded his putting the bus in motion. Had he in fact taken a “long hard look” or a “pretty significant look” in his rear-view mirror as Ms. Trott stated that he did, he would have seen his elderly, frail and “hunched” passenger in the process of slowly rising from his seat.
[77]         Accordingly, I conclude the defendants have not satisfied the burden on them to answer the prima facie case of negligence and I find them liable for the Accident.
 

Negligent RCMP "Bait Car" Pursuit Results in nearly $1 million in Damages

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, resulting in a nearly $1 million judgement following the RCMP’s negligent response to a ‘bait car’ theft.

In today’s case (Watkins v. Dormuth) the Defendant RCMP officer was responding to a bait car activation call.  He proceeded North in the southbound lanes to get around traffic.  At the same time the Plaintiff was making a left hand turn at an intersection.  A t-bone collision occurred which resulted in serious injuries whith profound consequences and were expected to have a permanent disabling effect on the Plaintiff.  Damages of close to $1 million were assessed.
The RCMP argued the Plaintiff was to blame for the collision.  Mr. Justice Blok disagreed finding the RCMP were entirely at fault.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[78]         The provisions show there are certain prerequisites that must be met before a police officer may exercise the privileges set out in s. 122 of the Motor Vehicle Act.  In particular, the police officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the risk of harm to members of the public from the exercise of those privileges is less than the risk of harm to the public should those privileges not be exercised.  Even where the prerequisites are met, the driving privileges afforded by the Motor Vehicle Act must be exercised with due regard for safety, having regard to certain factors.
[79]         I conclude that Cst. Dormuth did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the risk of harm to the public from exercising emergency vehicle privileges was less than the risk to the public should he not exercise those privileges.  All he knew was that there had been a bait car activation.  An activation did not mean that there was a risk of harm to the public because an activation signal could be caused by the mere opening of the bait car door or trunk.  It did not necessarily mean the car was being driven, let alone driven in a manner dangerous to the public.
[80]         This conclusion is consistent with the detachment’s bait car policy, which provides that the normal response level to a bait car activation is Code 2, that is, by proceeding immediately but without using lights or siren.  In other words, the detachment’s own policy recognizes that a bait car activation is a non-emergency event.
[81]         The defendants assert that Cst. Dormuth was not negligent in responding at a Code 3 level because that is how he had been trained, erroneous as it was.  However, I do not see that this absolves the defendants of liability since it is plain that the training given to Cst. Dormuth was faulty….
[95]         Emergency vehicles do not have free rein in exercising the driving privileges accorded by s. 122 of the Motor Vehicle Act.  They may only do so within the limits set by the Emergency Driving Regulation and they are constrained by the duty to drive with due regard for safety: Frers, at para. 89.  I conclude that Cst. Dormuth had no basis to exercise any emergency vehicle driving privileges, and I conclude that in exercising those privileges he did not drive with due regard for safety in the circumstances of this case.
[96]         For these reasons I conclude that the responsibility for this accident rests entirely with the defendants.
 

Dislodged Breast Implant and Voice Injury Result in $120,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment

Reasons for judgment were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for breast implant disruption and a voice injury following a collision.
In last week’s case (Giczi v. Kandola) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The collision resulted in chronic soft tissue injuries, a dislodged breast implant requiring surgical correction and muscle spasms leading to voice disruption.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $120,000 Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following reasons:
[120]     In the instant case, the subject accident caused the plaintiff injuries, including: soft tissue injuries to her neck, jaw, and upper back which caused her chronic pain, functional thoracic outlet syndrome, and damage to her breast implant necessitating surgery months later.  The plaintiff’s injuries have resulted in symptoms that are significantly worse than her pre-accident condition and have affected her ability to cope and function.
[121]     I find the plaintiff suffers from a chronic pain condition which was caused by the subject accident.  Not only is the condition painful in the neck, arm and jaw, but the accident dislodged a breast implant requiring further surgery and a painful period of recovery. The chronic pain condition has also had a negative impact on the plaintiff’s relationship with her partner and the intimacy that the couple enjoyed. 
[122]     In addition, the accident has also caused difficulty in the plaintiff’s singing from muscles spasms as a result of her injury.   I find the accident’s effect on the plaintiff’s ability to sing has been profound, given the importance of singing to the plaintiff throughout her life.  The expert evidence of Ms. Davies and Dr. Morrison convinces me that her voice is impaired.  I think that this is a significant factor apart from its effect on her income earning capacity.
[123]     In all the circumstances, I find that the appropriate award of general damages is $120,000. 
 

$95,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Meniscal and Labral Tear

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic knee and shoulder injury.
In today’s case (Hart v. Hansma) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions.  The Defendants admitted fault for both.  The Plaintiff suffered a variety of injuries including a torn meniscus, a labral tear and a variety of soft tissue injuries.  These continued to post problems at the time of trial with a poor prognosis.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $95,000 Mr. Justice Verhoeven provided the following reasons:
[54]         I find that the most significant injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the accidents are as follows:
1.     soft tissue injuries to his neck, particularly the right side, resulting in chronic neck pain;

  1. chronic headaches, associated with the neck pain;

3.     right shoulder injury, including a labral tear and tendonitis with a partial rotator cuff tear; and
4.     left knee injury, including a meniscus tear.
The foregoing injuries continue to cause significant ongoing pain and disability currently.
[55]         I find that the plaintiff also suffered from the following, less serious injuries sustained in the accidents:
1.     right upper limp numbness and pain;
2.     low back injury, and associated pain (that is not presently bothering him) in the right hip and buttock area;
3.     right knee pain (although it is now substantially resolved); and
4.     left hip pain (although it is now substantially resolved)….
[65]         The prognosis for full recovery is negative.  It is unlikely that his neck injury will ever fully recover.  There is a risk that his neck condition will deteriorate to the point where cervical discectomy surgery will be required.  The headaches he suffers from are related to his neck injury.  The plaintiff finds that treatment such as acupuncture, physiotherapy and the prolotherapy provide short term relief for his neck pain and headaches.  He takes a variety of medications in order to allow him to cope.  The planned knee surgery may provide some benefit for his left knee pain, but may have long term negative consequences, such as the risk of osteoarthritis. His shoulder condition is also chronic.  The plaintiff has the choice of enduring the pain and limitation of function in his shoulder, or undergoing surgery which may offer some benefit…
]         Taking into account the factors in Gillam as they apply to Mr. Hart’s circumstances, and the above awards in Prince-Wright, Hanson, Steward, and the cases cited by the defendants, adjusting for inflation, I find that an award of $95,000 is appropriate in this case.
 

Saskatchewan No Fault Scheme Catches All Out of Province Motorists

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that Saskatchewan’s restrictive ‘no-fault’ auto insurance scheme strips the right of out of Province visitors from seeking tort compensation when injured through the wrongful driving of another in Saskatchewan.
In this week’s case (Ngo v. Luong) the parties were BC residents driving in Saskatchewan.  The Defendant lost control of the vehicle flipping over and causing injury to the passenger.  The Plaintiff started a lawsuit in BC Supreme Court hoping to get around Saskatchewan’s no-fault system.  Mr. Justice Ehrcke found that Saskatchewan’s laws applied and stripped the Plaintiff’s right to seek damages in tort.  In dismissing the claim the Court provided the following reasons:
[1]             Are British Columbia residents who are involved in a motor vehicle accident in Saskatchewan able to sue for damages in tort in British Columbia, or are they bound by Saskatchewan’s no-fault insurance scheme?…
[27]         The substantive rights of a person who is injured in a motor vehicle accident in Saskatchewan after 2002 and who did not make a tort election prior to the accident are those rights set out in Part VIII. That is true for anyone who did not make a prior tort election, regardless of whether that person is a Saskatchewan resident or not. The only difference is that the out-of-province claimant never had the possibility of making such an election. But once the accident has occurred and the claimant, whether from Saskatchewan or not, has not previously made a tort election, the claimant’s rights are those defined by Part VIII of the AAIA. Thus, the statute does not, as submitted by the plaintiff, set out a procedural election by which a claimant who has been injured in an accident can then select the means by which he or she enforces his or her rights. The rights are already defined by the statute at the moment the accident has occurred. Since the AAIA defines what the claimant’s rights are and not the means of their enforcement, the AAIA is substantive, not procedural law.
[28]         This categorization of the AAIA has the consequence that a British Columbia plaintiff who is injured in a Saskatchewan motor vehicle accident is in no better position bringing his or her suit in British Columbia than in Saskatchewan. The fact that this categorization eliminates a motive for forum shopping is an additional indicator that the categorization of the law as substantive is the correct categorization…
[30]         As I have found the AAIA to be substantive, rather than procedural law, and as the AAIA is therefore applicable to the plaintiff’s claim regardless of the fact that it is brought in a British Columbia court, the plaintiff’s request for a declaration that this action is not barred by the provisions of the AAIA is dismissed.
 

Accelerated Depreciation Claim Succeeds From Crash Causing $18,000 in Vehicle Damage

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff damages for accelerated vehicle depreciation following a significant collision.
In this week’s case (Pan v. Shihundu) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first causing significant vehicle damage resulting in over $18,000 of repair costs.  The Plaintiff was injured and sued for damages.  Among these was a claim for ‘accelerated vehicle depreciation’ arguing that the vehicle’s market value was deflated due to the Defendant’s fault.  ICBC opposed this claim however the Court sided with the Plaintiff.  In awarding damages for this loss Mr. Justice Punnett provided the following reasons:
160]     The plaintiff purchased the 2004 BMW M3 for $30,000 US in March 2008. As noted above, the vehicle required $18,421 in repairs following the First Accident. After that accident the plaintiff attempted to sell the BMW. He listed it on Craigslist for three months at an asking price of $27,000. It was his evidence that he had a few inquiries but no offers after advising prospective buyers of the damage caused by the First Accident. He made similar attempts to sell it in 2011 but received no response. As a result, he still owns and drives the vehicle.
[161]     The plaintiff provided an expert report from Carey Scarrow, who was qualified as an expert in the field of automotive appraisals and automotive collision repairs. He opined that as a result of the 2009 accident the vehicle sustained an accelerated depreciation of $4,000 due to the stigma associated with the BMW having been in the accident.
[162]     In examining the vehicle Mr. Scarrow noted uneven body panel alignment in the front of the vehicle and other minor deficiencies including flaws in the refinished body panels with inconsistent coating thickness. He commented that the overall repair quality was of acceptable industry standards for the calibre of car but not representative of its previous pre-accident factory standard.
[163]     Mr. Scarrow noted that it was mandatory for the seller to declare any damage over $2,000 to a prospective purchaser. He stated that the repaired areas will deteriorate at varying rates, making the repairs more evident as the vehicle ages.
[164]     He then provided his opinion that the collision repairs resulted in a value of $15,000, an accelerated depreciation of $4,000 when compared with an estimated value of $19,000 for a BMW of that make, age, and mileage but without the accident damage. In his report Mr. Scarrow indicated that he based this opinion on his inspection of the vehicle itself, references to the Sanford Gold Book, July 2013 edition (a used car valuation guide), as well as what he referred to as “local market comparable research.” In cross-examination he expanded somewhat on this methodology, noting that he relies on his years of experience in used car valuation and sales to determine the valuation numbers. In this case he said that he also posted the car for sale for a period of three to four days and gauged the response from potential buyers. He noted that potential buyers for vehicles of this type are particularly “fussy” about the details of previous damage and repairs.
[165]     The plaintiff relies on Signorello v. Khan, 2010 BCSC 1448, and Cummings v. 565204 B.C. LTD., 2009 BCSC 1009. Signorello stands for the proposition that a vehicle need not be sold in order to demonstrate an accelerated depreciation loss (para. 29); see also Cummings, at para. 73.
[166]     The defendants acknowledge that claims for accelerated depreciation are good in law. However, they submit there is a heavy burden on a plaintiff to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that accelerated depreciation has actually taken place. They rely on Miles v. Mendoza, 1994 CanLII 419 (B.C.S.C.), and Burrard Import Ltd. v. Budget Rent-A-Car of B.C. Ltd, 2001 BCPC 75. In Miles, the court noted that “difficulties of proof” arise where the car is not sold after the accident, as the depreciating effect of the accident declines over time. The court also said that expert evidence of that only spoke to the general “stigma” attaching to damaged vehicles was not sufficiently persuasive proof to award damages for accelerated depreciation: “it cannot be “assumed”, by virtue of the occurrence of an accident requiring extensive repairs, that a properly repaired vehicle has suffered accelerated depreciation” (para. 40).
[167]     Burrard followed Miles in finding that the evidence did not meet the necessary standard given the claimant’s expert’s opinion amounted to no more than a simple proposition and as a result was not the type of persuasive evidence contemplated by the jurisprudence.
[168]     The defendants submit that the plaintiff must prove that the accelerated depreciation actually occurred by adducing evidence that goes over and above the simple proposition that a car which has been in an accident, even though properly repaired, carries a stigma. They say that in this case the plaintiff’s evidence does not go beyond asserting the existence of such a stigma.
[169]     I cannot accept this submission, for two reasons. First, in my view, the evidentiary standard as described in Miles has not been applied quite so strictly in recent decisions. In Cummings, for example, Madam Justice Gerow awarded $7,600 in damages for accelerated depreciation. There the evidence consisted of an automobile valuation expert’s opinion that the plaintiff’s vehicle had suffered an accelerated depreciation of 20% following the accident. There is no comment in the decision as to the factual basis for this opinion and no suggestion that it went beyond the expert’s experience of the “stigma” in the marketplace. The owner had also attempted to trade the vehicle in but was informed by the dealership that they did not accept trade-ins on vehicles with more than $5,000 in damage.
[170]     In Signorello the car was an extremely rare exotic high-performance luxury sports car, manufactured by Mercedes-Benz. The valuation expert set a value based on conversations he had with various Mercedes-Benz dealers in the province. The court identified some concerns with this evidence, noting that the defendant had argued that the expert’s opinion was based on hearsay and opinion evidence itself. Justice Grauer then said at para. 25:
[25]      … the starting point for any vehicle appraisal is the Canadian Black Book, a guide to the wholesale value of used vehicles in Canada relied upon by dealers across the country. This car is so rare, however, that it does not appear in theBlack Book. Of course the figures in that book could also be described as opinion evidence … In the particular circumstances of the case, it is my conclusion that it was not an inappropriate way for Mr. Cogbill to approach the problem, although it would have been preferable had he included the specifics of his conversations. As it was, he did indicate the dealers whom he consulted, …
[171]     From this I take that the expert may rely on the Black Book or similar valuation guides in coming to an opinion as to the value of the vehicle. It also suggests that the “difficulties of proof” that may arise if the car is not sold can be overcome by an expert’s opinion.
[172]     Second, even if one accepts that the standard from Miles still applies, I am of the view that the evidence tendered here does go beyond a “bare” opinion that the car has suffered depreciation due to a “stigma.” Mr. Scarrow based his valuation on a long history of appraising cars, including BMWs. He also relied on the Gold Book, a valuation guide, and market research that he described in cross-examination. The plaintiff also provided evidence that he had attempted to sell the vehicle at a reduced price following the accident and received no offers.
[173]     I conclude that the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish accelerated depreciation in value for the BMW. I accept Mr. Scarrow’s figures and award damages of $4,000.
 

Failing to Wear Seatbelt Results in Increased Injuries and Decreased Damages

Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing damages when a Plaintiff fails to wear a seatbelt, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, reducing a Plaintiff’s damages by 25% due to not wearing a seatbelt.
In this week’s case (Mosimann v. Guliker) the Plaintiff was involved in three collisions.  She was not at fault for any of them.  She suffered chronic injuries as a result of these crashes.  In one of the collisions she was not wearing a seat belt and her face hit the dashboard.  Although the Plaintiff hired an expert who testified that this did not contribute to her injuries Mr. Justice McEwan rejected this evidence and reduced the Plaintiff’s damages by 25%.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[28]         Although Dr. Whetter was somehow under the impression that the plaintiff was wearing a seatbelt, it is clear that that was not the case. According to Craig Lukar, a professional engineer who gave an opinion to the court, however, the plaintiff would have suffered her facial injuries in any event, that is, even she had been wearing seatbelt.
[29]         Mr. Lukar’s analysis proceeded by using an exemplar vehicle (the one involved In the accident was no longer available) and placing the plaintiff in the passenger seat, demonstrating her position. It appears to be critical to the analysis that the plaintiff is short and the seat is too long for her to sit with her bottom all the way to the seatback without extending her legs. That is not evident in the third of the photos put in evidence, where the plaintiff appears to be seated comfortably back in the seat. Mr. Lukar suggests that the photograph is deceiving in that regard. The sixth photo shows the plaintiff apparently striking a part of the console, but from a position well advanced from the back of the seat. The dashboard in front of the passenger’s seat is significantly farther away than an instrument panel to the left of the seat, which is what Mr. Lukar suggests the plaintiff struck.
[30]         What the photographs did appear to show was that if the plaintiff was sitting with a properly adjusted lap belt, even allowing for some stretching or body compression that would allow the plaintiff to move forward, the arc of her upper body would fall short of hitting the dashboard. In making this observation, I am not substituting my own interpretation of the evidence for that of Mr. Lukar. I am simply saying that despite his qualifications, Mr. Lukar was not able to satisfy me that what he described displaced the inference the court might have drawn without assistance. His suggestions were simply unconvincing.
[31]         The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the court ought to accept Mr. Lukar’s evidence on the basis that an adverse inference could be drawn from the defendants’ failure to produce an expert report. That is not, in my view, a proper approach to opinion evidence. While it may be risky, counsel are entitled to rely on cross-examination and argument in relation to an expert witness as with any other witness. The defendants referred to Lakhani v. Samson, 1982 CarswellBC 2262, [1982] B.C.W.L.D. 1126, 70 B.C.L.R. 379 a decision of McEachern C.J.S.C. at para. 3:
I reject the suggestion that engineering evidence is required in these cases. The court is not required to leave its common sense in the hall outside the courtroom and the evidence is clear that upon impact in both cases the Plaintiff’s upper body was flung or thrown forward striking the dashboard or the steering wheel. And common sense tells me that the restraint of a shoulder harness would have prevented that, and therefore some of the injury from having occurred.
[32]         Sometimes experts state the obvious, in which case they are superfluous. Sometimes they do not. On those occasions, it is up to the trier of fact to decide whether the inference the expert invited has the authoritative force of training or experience, or whether it is just not helpful. Having done my best to assess Mr. Lukar’s surprising conclusion – that failure to wear a lap belt would have made no difference in this face-hit-the-dashboard collision – I am simply unable to say that I am persuaded that that is the correct inference. I assess the plaintiff’s contributory negligence at 25%.
 

The "Heavy Burden" of BC's Loser Pays System

I have frequently highlighted BC’s loser pays system where a losing litigant is typically ordered to pay costs to the opposing side.   Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that this result can be harsh and is typically unyielding to factors such as sympathy and financial hardship.
In this week’s case (Laktin v. (Vancouver) City) the Plaintiff was shot three times by police officers rendering him paraplegic.  He sued however his claim was ultimately dismissed following a 5 week jury trial.   Vancouver sought their costs from the Plaintiff who opposed the application arguing financial hardship.  Mr. Justice Pearlman noted the loser pays system does not yield to financial concerns in and of themselves.  In awarding costs the Court noted as follows:
[24]         The plaintiff says that the defendants should be denied their costs on the basis that his life was permanently and catastrophically altered by the event of January 21, 2006 and his future care and financial support are now in jeopardy. Mr. Laktin argues that the costs of a five-week trial will impose an onerous financial burden, which the plaintiff lacks the means to satisfy.  I accept that Mr. Laktin is in difficult financial circumstances, and that an order requiring him to pay costs to the defendant will be a real and heavy burden for him.  While I have a great deal of sympathy for the plaintiff, the case law clearly establishes that the unfortunate personal circumstances and financial hardship of a litigant are not, standing alone, factors warranting a departure from the general rule that costs follow the event: Morris at para. 36; Chen at para. 11;Vesuna v. British Columbia (Transportation), 2011 BCSC 1618 at para. 8.
[25]         In Robinson v. Lakner (1998), 159 D.L.R. (4th) 191, the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the trial judge who had limited the costs payable to the successful defendant to $1,500 because the plaintiff was in difficult financial circumstances, held at para. 5, that “financial hardship in itself is not a sound basis for departing from the usual rule with respect to costs”. 
[26]         In Cowherd v. Fraser Valley Health Region et al, 2004 BCSC 698 at para. 5, Madam Justice Ballance cited Brown v. Blacktop Cabs Ltd. (1997), 43 B.C.L.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.); Zelenski Estate v. Fairway(1998), 60 B.C.L.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.); Churchland v. Gore Mutual Insurance Co. (unreported), September 23, 1999, No. S09912, Vancouver (S.C.); and Robinson for the principle that “in general, the unfortunate personal circumstances and characteristics of a litigant are not to be taken into account by the court in exercising its discretion in making an award of costs”.
[27]         In Morris at para. 38, Madam Justice Ker concluded that the court is unable, on any principled basis to take the plaintiff’s financial circumstances into account in determining whether to award costs.
[28]         At para. 39, Her Ladyship cited the following passage from the Reasons for Judgment of Greyell J. in Chen at para. 15:
[39]  To do otherwise would lead to inconsistent and no doubt unreasonable results. As Greyell J. so eloquently noted in Chen at para. 15:
[15] To conclude otherwise would undermine the rationale underlying Rule 14-9 and would likely lead to the promotion of litigation rather than to promote the “winnowing” function described by Hall J.A. in Catalyst Paper. It would lead to a collapse of the general principle discussed in the authorities and result in the unacceptable proposition that costs in each case would be measured not by a party’s success but by the personal financial circumstances of the litigants.
[29]         I conclude that the plaintiff’s difficult personal circumstances and financial hardship, standing alone, do not provide grounds for the Court to depart from the normal rule that costs should follow the event…
[49]         I conclude that there are no special circumstances in this case that would warrant a departure from the general rule that costs should follow the event.
[50]         Accordingly, the defendant, City of Vancouver, will have costs of this action at Scale B, together with its reasonable disbursements.