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BC Supreme Court – Property Owners Under No Legal Duty To Clear Ice From Sidewalks

Written by admin on . Posted in Occupier's liability claims.

Reasons for judgment were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Rossland Registry, dismissing a slip and fall lawsuit against a property owner on the basis that they have no duty to clear ice and snow from sidewalks outside their property.
In today’s case (Scheck v. Parkdale Place Housing Society) the Plaintiff slipped and fell on a public sidewalk which separated Angus Street in Summerland, BC from a senior’s housing facility operated by the defendant Parkdale Place Housing Society.
The Plaintiff sued both the City of Summerland and the Housing Society who owned the business adjacent to the sidewalk.  In dismissing the claim against the Society the Court concluded there is not common law duty for property owners to clear municipal sidewalks running adjacent to their property.  In reaching this decision Mr. Justice Johnson provided the following reasons:

[45]         As to whether Parkdale owed a duty at common law, I accept the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bongiardina at para. 19:

The question then becomes: is there a common law duty on the owner of the property to clear snow and ice from public sidewalks adjacent to the property? In my view, the answer to this question must be “No”. Although the “neighbour” principle from Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.), has been expanded in recent years to cover a myriad of new relationships, it would stretch it too far if it was applied in the circumstances of this case. A homeowner has a duty to ensure that his or her own property is maintained in a reasonable condition so that persons entering the property are not injured. If the homeowner complies with this duty, he or she should be free from liability for injuries arising from failure to maintain municipally owned streets and sidewalks. The snow and ice accumulating on public sidewalks and the potholes on the street in front of the house are the legal responsibility of the municipality, not the adjacent property owner.

[46]         I do so with some reluctance as this seems contrary to the prior decision of this court in Reidy v. Kamloops Hotel Ltd. (1997), 41 B.C.L.R. (3d) 338 (S.C.). There, a plaintiff fell on an icy municipal sidewalk outside the defendant hotel. The court found that the hotel was not an occupier of the sidewalk at para. 6, then went on to consider whether the hotel was liable at common law. In concluding that the hotel was liable to the pedestrian, the court applied the “unusual danger” test from Indermaur v. Dames (1866), L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (Eng. C.P.), and referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Campbell v. Royal Bank (1963), [1964] S.C.R. 85, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 341, which considered a test to determine if an unusual danger existed.

[47]         What the court in Reidy did not refer to, as it was apparently not cited, were the decisions in Weiss and Tutinka. With respect, it seems to me that the decision in Reidy was per incuriamas a result of not having the advantage of those two decisions, and should not be followed.

[48]         I am able to determine the question put by Parkdale’s application, as it does not depend on the condition of the sidewalk. I conclude that Parkdale owed no duty to Ms. Scheck with respect to Summerland’s sidewalk and dismiss her claims against Parkdale.

$20,700 "Accelerated Depreciation" Claim Succeeds Following Vehicle Damage in Crash

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Provincial Court ordering a Defendant (insured by ICBC) to pay over $20,000 in vehicle depreciation after a crash.
In the recent case (Chiang v. Kunar) the Plaintiff purchased a Mercedes for just over $68,000.  The following year the Plaintiff was involved in a crash caused by the negligence of the Defendant.  The crash caused over $34,000 in repair costs leaving the vehicle far less valuable after repairs.  The Plaintiff sued to recover the value of this accelerated depreciation but ICBC argued that there was no loss.  In siding with the Plaintiff, who to his credit succeeded in litigation while self represented, The Honourable Judge K. Arthur-Leung provided the following reasons:

      I am satisfied that the Claimant has met the burden of proof, and that this low to mid-level luxury vehicle was indeed a customized vehicle that was in the high end of its own category of Mercedes Benz, and sustained accelerated depreciation.  The Bill of Sale shows thousands of dollars of extras that he ordered for this Vehicle.  It was a rare vehicle at the time that it was initially in the Vancouver market, and the experts both testified that it remains an in demand vehicle if it was not in an accident.

In addition, the decision of Rutter v. Adams, 2016 BCSC 554 (CanLII) at paragraph 314 relies upon Signorello v. Khan, 2010 BCSC 1448 (CanLII) to include quantification that “…such losses can include a ‘loss of use and the inconvenience of having to return the vehicle on several occasions’.”  In addition, in Cummings v. 565204 BC Ltd., 2009 BCSC 1009 (CanLII), the Court relied upon Reinders v. Wilkinson, 1994 CanLII 2527 (BC CA), 1994 CanLII 2527 (BCCA) that it is not necessary for the party to sell the vehicle in order to succeed in a claim for accelerated depreciation.  The damage sustained to this Vehicle was not merely cosmetic and required significant repair, to wit it remains outstanding with ongoing operational and mechanical problems…

THEREFORE THIS COURT ORDERS JUDGMENT TO THE CLAIMANT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY AS FOLLOWS:

a)            The amount of $20,700.00, for accelerated depreciation of the Vehicle ($18,000.00 plus 15% tax);

b)            Interest on the sum of $20,700.00 as of February 26, 2015, in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;

c)            The amount of $1,990.08 in general damages as claimed by the Claimant;

d)            Interest on the sum of $1,990.08 as of May 9, 2016, in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;

e)            The amount of $472.50 for the cost of the Coast Auto Appraisal Report;

f)            Court attendance fees of Mr. Sparrow of Coast Auto Appraisal in the amount of $1,155.00;

g)            Court filing fees in the amount of $156.00; and

h)            Service fees in the amount of $30.00.

Court Allows Video Surveillance Evidence Despite Defence Failing to List Document

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, allowing the introduction of video surveillance evidence despite counsel failing to disclose this evidence on their list of documents.
In today’s case (Karpowicz v. Glessing) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages.  The Defendant “retained a private investigator and, on June 27, 2016, filmed a short video of the plaintiff at the Vancouver International Airport accompanied by his wife and children.”  Plaintiff’s counsel was provided the video ahead of a mediation but the document was never listed on the Defendant’s formal list of documents.  The Plaintiff objected to the video’s introduction at trial but the Court ruled the evidence was admissible as there was a lack of prejudice from the failed disclosure.  In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice MacNaughton provided the following reasons:

[34]         I have concluded that the video evidence should be admitted. While I agree that the defendant had a clear obligation under Rule 7‑1(9) to list the video as a document as soon as it came into his possession, I accept defence counsel’s representation that the failure to list the video was not for a tactical advantage at trial. Counsel frankly acknowledged that it was an oversight on her part, and as soon as the plaintiff raised the issue, the video was listed in the supplementary list of documents. The late listing of the video has not caused the plaintiff prejudice.

[35]         If it had been listed in the summer of 2016, presumably it would have been done so as a privileged document. The plaintiff would have known of its existence, but not its content, as the video was not required to be disclosed until the defendant determined to rely on it at trial. On that determination, the video was disclosed to the plaintiff. The disclosure was in advance of the deadline for disclosure in Rule 12‑5(10).

[36]         The plaintiff has had time to consider the video and to prepare to address it in his evidence at trial. The defendant had the right to investigate the plaintiff’s claims and the video is relevant to the issues the plaintiff has put before the court.

[37]         As to the issue of privacy, the video was taken at Vancouver International Airport at the passenger pickup area. The plaintiff and his family had no reasonable expectation of privacy while at the airport. The video focuses on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s spouse and the children are incidental to that focus or in the background of the video. Counsel for the defendant has obscured the faces of the children so that they are not identifiable.

[38]         In all these circumstances, I conclude that the video ought to be admitted.

$85,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Pain With Guarded Prognosis

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic injuries sustained from two vehicle collisions.
In today’s case (Harry v. Powar) the Plaintiff was a pedestrian struck by a vehicle in a crosswalk in 2012.  She was involved in a rear end collision the following year.  The collisions resulted in ” headaches, chronic myofascial pain syndrome, cervical facet joint syndrome and lumbar facet joint syndrome” with a guarded prognosis for full recovery.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000 Madam Justice Winteringham provided the following reasons:
[79]         I have found that Ms. Harry’s most significant injuries are the headaches, chronic myofascial pain syndrome, cervical facet joint syndrome and lumbar facet joint syndrome. ..

[84]         Ms. Harry was in her early thirties at the time of the Accidents. Sadly, the symptoms connected to her injuries are ongoing and I accept that her prognosis for a full recovery is guarded although she may experience some improvement with further treatments.

[85]         The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Harry has tried to manage her pain in a way that enables her to carry on with her life.  That is not to say her pain is insignificant.  Rather, I have found that Ms. Harry has done almost all that she can to pursue her career despite the defendants’ negligence.  It is also clear from the evidence that the energy exerted on pursuing her professional endeavours has taken a toll on the other aspects of her life.  She does not have the energy or the physical well being to regularly conduct day-to-day household tasks, engage in social events or participate in physical activity – all of which formed an integral part of her life before the accidents. ..

[90]         In all of the circumstances and taking into account the authorities I have been referred to, I am satisfied that an award of $85,000 will appropriately compensate Ms. Harry for her pain and suffering and loss of past and future enjoyment of life for which the defendants are responsible.    

Is Evidence of a Withdrawn Ticket Admissible in a Personal Injury Prosecution?

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure.

This week the BC Court of Appeal had the opportunity to decide if it is appropriate for a jury deciding fault for a crash in the context of a personal injury lawsuit can hear evidence that a motorist was issued a ticket by the police which was ultimately withdrawn before trial.
Unfortunately the BC Court of Appeal sidestepped the question finding that if such evidence is inappropriate, any harm caused by it can be cured by a warning to the Jury.
In today’s case (Jones v. Frohlick) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages.  A jury assessed the Plaintiff’s claim at $30,200 but then cut this down to $4,530 on the basis that they found the Plaintiff 85% at fault for the crash.
In the course of the trial the Defendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff was issued a ticket at the scene for failing to yield the right of way to the Defendant.  The ticket was subsequently withdrawn.  The Plaintiff sought a mistrial but this request was rejected.  In finding no mistrial was warranted and a warning to the jury about the significance of a withdrawn ticket was sufficient the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[18]       In his ruling, the judge found that the evidence elicited from Mr. Jones on cross-examination regarding the traffic ticket was relevant as it was part of the narrative of the events that occurred at the scene of the Accident, and that any prejudice it may have caused Mr. Jones could be remedied by an instruction to the jury that they could not place any weight on the fact that the ticket was issued or that it was ultimately withdrawn or dismissed. He also noted that counsel for Mr. Jones would be able to cross-examine the attending officer about the ticket and its withdrawal or dismissal, which might even benefit Mr. Jones’ claim.

[19]       In his instructions to the jury, the judge stated:  

I will deal at the outset with the fact that you heard evidence that Mr. Jones was initially given a ticket at the scene of the accident and that the ticket was later dismissed or withdrawn. Neither the fact of the initial ticket nor the fact of the subsequent dismissal is relevant to your determination of liability here. Your obligation is to determine the issue based on the evidence that you heard in court and the legal principles that I will explain to you.

…

[25]       Mr. Jones raises an interesting issue of whether the traffic ticket was incorrectly characterized by the judge as “narrative” evidence given that the traffic ticket was unnecessary to explain the context or background of the events at the scene of the Accident as they unfolded, was disputed by him, and was subsequently withdrawn or dismissed. In support of these submissions he relies on R. v. Taweel, 2015 NSCA 107. He submits that, in these circumstances, the evidence was irrelevant and should not have been admitted as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, or lack thereof, and it went to the ultimate issue on liability that was for the jury to decide.

[26]       However, even if the admission of that evidence was erroneous, that is not determinative of the appeal. The determinative issue is, assuming but not deciding that the impugned evidence was inadmissible, whether the prejudice caused by its admission could be remedied by an appropriate and adequate limiting instruction to the jury.

[27]       That brings me to the second ground of appeal: whether the admission of the impugned evidence was so prejudicial that even with an appropriate corrective instruction it would have caused a substantial wrong or would have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

[31]       The impugned evidence in this case was not inflammatory. Nor was it in my view highly prejudicial as it was potentially open to both unfavourable and favourable inferences to Mr. Jones’ claim, the latter including that the ticket was withdrawn because it had no merit or, as was noted by the judge in his ruling, that it was misguided from the start. In these circumstances, I find no error in the judge’s exercise of his discretion in deciding that a corrective instruction was appropriate to alleviate the potential of any prejudice that may have been caused by the admission of the impugned evidence.

[32]       In my view, the instructions were also adequate. The direction to the jury that they should not consider the fact of the traffic ticket or its subsequent withdrawal or dismissal as part of their deliberations on liability, as it was not relevant to their determination, was clear and unambiguous, and therefore forceful. The instruction could not have been misunderstoods by the jury as permitting them to consider the impugned evidence, not only in assessing the evidence as a whole, but also in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and of Mr. Jones’ evidence in particular. As this Court stated in Paskall v. Scheithauer, 2014 BCCA 26 at para. 37:

…once it is determined that a corrective instruction was appropriate and adequate, the matter ends. This Court must assume that juries act judicially and responsibly, that is, the instructions of trial judges are followed “unless there is a clear basis for finding otherwise” (Hovianseian v. Hovianseian, 2005 BCCA 61 at para 25). It is not appropriate for this Court to speculate on whether the jury may have disregarded the judge’s corrective instruction.

[33]       The adequacy of the judge’s instructions is also evident in the final award by the jury. While undoubtedly not embraced by either side, it cannot be said that the award for non-pecuniary damages of $24,000 would not meet the test in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 705 (P.C.) in that it was inordinately high or low, or that the total award of damages was “wholly disproportionate or shockingly unreasonable” (Young v. Bella, 2006 SCC 3 at para. 64).

[34]       In the result, I would dismiss the appeal.

"Marginal Difference" Between Trial Result and ICBC Settlement Offer Results in Full Costs to Plaintiff

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, awarding a Plaintiff full trial costs after the Plaintiff failed to beat an ICBC settlement offer by a “marginal difference“.
In today’s case (Goguen v. Maddalena) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision the Defendant accepted fault for.  The Plaintiff proceeded to trial where he was awarded total damages of $174,360.84.
Prior to trial ICBC made a formal offer to settle for $175,000.  The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should be deprived of some of his post offer costs for failing to beat the settlement attempt.  In finding that a “marginal difference” does not warrant such an outcome Madam Justice Forth provided the following reasons:

[39]         The plaintiff submits that the Defendant’s Offer was greater than the judgment amount by only $639.16, or approximately 0.5%. He argues that this marginal difference should afford little weight. In support, the plaintiff cites Saopaseuth v. Phavongkham, 2015 BCSC 45 at para. 74, in which Bernard J. noted that an award 2% greater than an offer to settle “suggests that little weight should be given to this factor”. Furthermore, in Zhao v. Yu, 2015 BCSC 2342 at para. 11, Baker J. held that an offer that exceeded an award by $1,800 was “of little significance in arriving at a decision about costs”.

[40]         The defendant submits that the Defendant’s Offer was only with respect to the plaintiff’s tort claim and that acceptance of the offer would have allowed the plaintiff to collect Part 7 ICBC benefits. Therefore, the Defendant’s Offer exceeds the trial award by a larger margin that what appears on its face.

[41]         The plaintiff, in reply, submits that he understood that any settlement offers made by the defendant were full settlements of both the tort claim and Part 7 claims against ICBC, and that at no time did defence counsel convey that Part 7 benefits would still be available in the event that the Defendant’s Offer was accepted.

[42]         With respect to Part 7 benefits, I note the first page of the Defendant’s Offer reads in part:

The Settlement Payment:

(a)     is offered after taking into account Part 7 benefits paid or payable, pursuant to section 25 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231 (in respect of policies in force before June 1, 2007) and/or pursuant to section 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231 (in respect of policies in force on or after June 1, 2007);

[43]         Neither counsel have provided submissions on the implications of this settlement term or the quantum of Part 7 benefits that would have likely been available to the plaintiff. As a result, it would be speculative of me to attach significant weight to the submissions on these points.

[44]         Considering the marginal difference between the Defendant’s Offer and the ultimate award, this factor is of little significance in my determination…

[52]         Taken together, the factors pursuant to subrule 9-1(6) weigh in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, I exercise my discretion to award the plaintiff costs pursuant to R 9-1(5)(c). The plaintiff is entitled to his costs at Scale B.

New Insurance Law Looks to Give ICBC and Government Control Over Your Health Care Choices

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Minor Injury Caps.

I’ve written extensively about some of the troubling changes the government is proposing for collision victims through their ICBC legal reforms.  One topic that has yet to receive any press, and is perhaps as concerning as any, is the Government’s proposal to give ICBC and themselves total power over what therapies collision victims receive.
If you are injured in a crash by a careless driver you have the right to choose your own health care treatments.  If these expenses are deemed ‘reasonable’ you are entitled to be paid back the full cost of your expenses from the at fault driver’s insurance company (usually ICBC for BC based crashes).
This will all change if the NDP pass Bill 20.  Instead an injured collision victim will be stripped in their ability to recover actual ‘health care losses’ from ICBC and recovery is reduced only to an amount that the government establishes by regulation.  If your actual medical costs exceed this you are out of luck.  The government is stripping your right to sue for the difference.  Specifically proposed s. 82.2 reads as follows:

Liability limited for health care costs

82.2  (1) In this section, “health care loss” means a cost or expense incurred or to be incurred for health care provided by a health care practitioner.

(2) In an action for damages caused by a vehicle or the use or operation of a vehicle, a person may not recover, for a health care loss, an amount that exceeds one of the following:

(a) the amount, if any, that is established or determined for the particular health care loss under a regulation under section 45.1 (1) (a);

(b) in any other case, the value of the particular health care loss.

(3) If, for the purposes of this section, it is necessary to estimate the value of a health care loss, the value must be estimated according to the value the deferred health care loss has on the date of the estimate determined in accordance with subsection (2).

(4) This section applies only in relation to a health care loss resulting from an accident occurring on or after April 1, 2019.

If you are concerned about these changes contact your MLA and speak up now.  Bill 22 is set to pass into law imminently and time to persuade government to divert course is quickly running out.

NDP Introduces ICBC Bill Saying "Psychiatric Conditions" Are "Minor Injuries"

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Minor Injury Caps.

Today the BC Government introduced their so called ‘minor’ injury Bill strippng the judicial rights of collision victims.
Despite their media soundbites to the contrary, the Government is calling many serious injuries “minor” even those that can have permanent consequences.
Included in their open ended list of “minor injuries” are “Psychological Conditions, Psychiatric Conditions and Pain Syndromes“.  Pain Syndromes by definition are long lasting and debilitating mental health conditions.
On its plain reading this definition of “minor” captures

  • Chronic Depression
  • Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
  • Conversion Disorders
  • Chronic Pain Syndromes
  • Chronic physical injuries
  • Disabling physical injuries
  • All psychological “conditions”
  • All psychiatric “conditions”

The Bill, if passed into law, will strip the judicial and compensatory rights to everyone in BC who suffers a “minor injury” at the hands of a careless driver after April 1 2019.  All this so careless drivers can pay less for their insurance.   Below is the government’s open-ended list of everyone who will be captured by this bill designed to beef up ICBC’s bottom line.  Note they can grow it whenever they want by ‘prescribing’ more injuries to the list and by prescribing criteria to call even permanent injuries minor –

“minor injury” means a physical or mental injury, whether or not chronic, that

(a) subject to subsection (2), does not result in a serious impairment or a permanent serious disfigurement of the claimant, and

(b) is one of the following:

(i) an abrasion, a contusion, a laceration, a sprain or a strain;

(ii) a pain syndrome;

(iii) a psychological or psychiatric condition;

(iv) a prescribed injury or an injury in a prescribed type or class of injury;

“permanent serious disfigurement”, in relation to a claimant, means a permanent disfigurement that, having regard to any prescribed criteria, significantly detracts from the claimant’s physical appearance;

“serious impairment”, in relation to a claimant, means a physical or mental impairment that

(a) is not resolved within 12 months, or another prescribed period, if any, after the date of an accident, and

(b) meets prescribed criteria.

(2) Subject to subsection (3) and the regulations, an injury that, at the time of the accident or when it first manifested, was an injury within the definition of “minor injury” in subsection (1) is deemed to be a minor injury if

(a) the claimant, without reasonable excuse, fails to seek a diagnosis or comply with treatment in accordance with a diagnostic and treatment protocol prescribed for the injury, and

(b) the injury

(i) results in a serious impairment or a permanent serious disfigurement of the claimant, or

(ii) develops into an injury other than an injury within the definition of “minor injury” in subsection (1).

(3) An injury is not deemed, under subsection (2), to be a minor injury if the claimant establishes that either of the circumstances referred to in subsection (2) (b) would have resulted even if the claimant had sought a diagnosis and complied with treatment in accordance with a diagnostic and treatment protocol prescribed for the injury.

(4) For the purposes of this Part, a minor injury includes a symptom or a condition associated with the injury whether or not the symptom or condition resolves within 12 months, or another prescribed period, if any, after the date of an accident.

 

$75,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Onset of Symptoms in Pre Existing Scoliosis

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgment were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, assessing damages for a collision causing the onset of symptoms in pre-existing asymptomatic scoliosis.
In the recent case (Cyryl v. George) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision when she was 17 years old.  Liability was admitted by the at fault motorist. The collision resulted in several injuries including pain in her previously asymptomatic spine.  The Plaintiff alleged that the collision went on to cause a chronic pain syndrome but the Court rejected this assertion.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:

[104]     I find, on the whole of the evidence, the plaintiff had an asymptomatic scoliosis condition as well as a 1.5 cm leg length discrepancy that became activated and aggravated by the Collision.  I find that the Collision caused the plaintiff to suffer the following injuries: several contusions, abrasions and lacerations to her face, headaches, a bitten tongue and soft tissue injuries to her jaw, neck and back. 

[105]     I also find that for approximately two months immediately following the Collision, the plaintiff continued to suffer considerable pain and discomfort in her neck, jaw and back as well as headaches.  I find that, while some pain and discomfort has persisted since then, it is not as prevalent and debilitating as the plaintiff has suggested.  Rather, I find that her pain symptoms flare up from time to time depending upon levels of activity and that she is able to tolerate her symptoms and cope well with the use of over-the-counter pain medication such as Advil.  I find that the only restrictions on the plaintiff’s activities are related to her symptom tolerance.

[106]     On the whole of the evidence, I am unable to find that the plaintiff has demonstrated a loss in cognitive function as a result of the Collision or that her ongoing symptoms have developed into Chronic Pain Syndrome…

[114]     In my view, the appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages in this case is $75,000.

BC Court of Appeal – "Costs Thrown Away" Should Routinely Be Ordered For Late Adjournments

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Court of Appeal finding that ‘costs thrown away’ should ordinarily be ordered against a party obtaining a late trial adjournment.
In today’s case (Bolin v. Lylick) the Plaintiff sued for damages from personal injuries.  6 weeks prior to trial she successfully applied to adjourn it after having switched lawyers.  The Court of Appeal noted there was nothing wrong with this however found that the adjournment was prejudicial to the Defendants and this should have been remedied with an order of costs thrown away.  In discussing this norm the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
[19]       In these circumstances, there is no apparent reason to depart from the usual approach to costs in circumstances of a late adjournment; in other words, there is no apparent reason not to relieve the defendants from the prejudice of the late adjournment by an award of costs thrown away. It is to be remembered that even though the judge did not attribute fault to the plaintiff in the adjournment application, in asking for an adjournment the plaintiff was asking for an indulgence from the court that had adverse consequences for the defendants. I would add to the order made for the adjournment a term that the defendants are entitled to their costs of trial preparation thrown away. I would not define the degree of such wasted costs in the circumstances of this case as was done, for example in Dhillon v. Foster, 2004 BCSC 1782, to which we have been referred, and I note further, that what fits within the waste captured by the term “costs thrown away” is properly a matter for the trial court’s determination.