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Tag: bc injury law

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Partly Limiting Chronic Pain

Written by ERIK MAGRAKEN on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic pain with partial limitations arising from a vehicle collision.

In today’s case (Rabiei v. Oster) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2016 collision.  The Defendants accepted fault.  The crash resulted in various soft tissue injuries resulting in chronic pain in the plaintiff’s neck, back and shoulder.  These injuries resulted in some impairment in the Plaintiff’s ability to work and also impacted activities outside work.  Full recovery was not expected.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70, 000 Madam Justice Adair provided the following reasons:

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Cyclist Struck in Marked Crosswalk Found 100% at Fault for Crash

Written by ERIK MAGRAKEN on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a personal injury claim involving a cyclist struck by a vehicle.

In today’s case (Dhanoya v. Stephens) the Plaintiff cyclist rode into a marked crosswalk without stopping and was struck by a vehicle.  The Court found the cyclist was fully at fault for the collision and had the cyclist kept a proper lookout the collision could have been avoided.  In finding the cyclist solely liable Madam Justice Dillon provided the following reasons:

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$160,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Head Injury With Lingering Cognitive Issues

Written by ERIK MAGRAKEN on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a mild traumatic brain injury caused by a collision.

In the recent case (Dube v. Dube) the Plaintiff was injured as a passenger involved in a single vehicle collision.  The Defendant accepted fault.  The crash caused a variety of injuries including a traumatic brain injury which caused cognitive deficits which were expected to linger indefinitely.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $160,000 Madam Justice Burke provided the following reasons:

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ICBC Criticized For Not Practicing What It Preaches

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

In recent months both ICBC and the Provincial Government have been vocal in criticizing the use of medico-legal reports in injury litigation resulting in rule changes restricting the rights of litigants in relying on such evidence. In reality ICBC has no reservations seeking out numerous expert reports when it suits their interests in litigation. This inconsistency resulted in critical comments today from the BC Supreme Court.

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Court Entitled To Rely on Civil Jury Instructions For Present Value Calculations

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

When awarding damages for future losses BC Courts have an obligation to use appropriate present value multipliers in arriving at the lump sum awarded.  Normally this is achieved by relying on expert evidence in personal injury cases.  Given the BC Government’s recent restrictions on expert evidence Justices will likely have increasingly fewer such reports to assist them.
To this end an interesting footnote appeared at the end of a recent personal injury judgment.  In the recent case (MacGregor v. Bergen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2013 collision.  The crash left the plaintiff with residual partial disability.  Damages were awarded for past and future losses.  The Court noted that no expert evidence was led by either party addressing preset value calculations but this was not a problem as the Court could simply rely on the multipliers provided in BC’s Civil Jury Instructions.  In explaining why this was appropriate Mr. Justice Branch provided the following thoughts in a footnote to his reasons for judgement:
Neither party provided expert testimony as to the appropriate present value multipliers. However, I find that I have an obligation to account for the present value of the future losses pursuant to s. 56 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253. Multipliers are calculated using the designated 1.5% for the present value of future income loss and 2% for any other future losses. The amounts presented for female police officers and female university graduates were determined by inflating the 2015 data provided by Mr. Turnbull to 2018 dollars (resulting in figures of $99,300 versus $67,700), calculating the difference of $31,600, and then applying a present value multiplier of 26.23, assuming a retirement age of 65 (37 years hence). I find that I am entitled to make use of the multipliers provided at Appendix E of the Civil Jury Instructions for this purpose. I note that the court has relied on the Civil Jury Instructions for this purpose in other cases where expert evidence was not made available: Smith v. Fremlin, 2013 BCSC 800 at para. 38; Erickson v. Bowie, 2007 BCSC 1465 at para. 51, footnote 3; Hrnic v. Bero Investments Ltd., 2018 BCSC 1880 at para. 57; Barnes v. Richardson, 2008 BCSC 1349, aff’d 2010 BCCA 116; Duifhuis v. Bloom, 2013 BCSC 1180 at para. 62; Harris v. Ladner Centre Holdings Ltd., 2008 BCSC 1735 at para. 70.

$170,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Hip Injury, PTSD, TOS and Chronic Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Hip Injury Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases, ICBC Thoracic Outlet Syndrome Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a plaintiff who suffered a host of injuries in a vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Firman v. Asadi) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 collision.  The Defendant denied fault but was found liable at trial.  The collision resulted in multiple injuries including a torn labrum, thoracic outlet syndrome, PTSD and chronic pain.  Prognosis for full recovery was poor.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $170,000 Mr. Justice Verhoeven provided the following reasons:

[145]     Based upon the abundant medical evidence as well as the evidence of the plaintiff and other evidence of the lay witnesses, I find that the plaintiff’s injuries that she attributes to the MVA and as reported to the treatment providers and medical experts were caused by the MVA.

[146]     As noted, there is much overlap in the specific diagnoses found in the medical evidence.  In more general terms, the plaintiff’s injuries sustained in the MVA are: (1) left hip injury, including torn labrum, requiring surgery;  (2) TOS or thoracic outlet syndrome, requiring surgery, and with further surgery recommended; (3) whiplash injuries (myofascial pain syndrome, mechanical spine pain) and resultant chronic pain, particularly in her upper back, left shoulder, and arm; (4) left shoulder tendinopathy; (5) chronic headaches; (6) mood or psychological/psychiatric disorders, including depression, somatic symptom disorder, and anxiety.

[147]     The defendants dispute the diagnosis of PTSD, made by Dr. Schweighofer. Dr. Iso noted PTSD “symptoms”.  In the circumstances of this case, the question of whether the plaintiff fully meets the criteria for this diagnosis is of little practical consequence. Dr. Waraich noted that her symptoms meet the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD, with one exception. He states that, while a diagnosis of delayed onset PTSD could be made, in his view her PTSD symptoms are “better accounted for” by the diagnoses that he makes: depressive disorder, and somatic symptom disorder. However, he added:

…in my opinion, her future course and potential treatment of PTSD symptoms are relevant despite her not meeting full criteria for PTSD in my assessment.

[148]     The prognosis for substantial improvement is poor…

[218]     The evidence discloses that the plaintiff has suffered a very substantial non-pecuniary loss.  She is now only marginally able to continue with her former occupations, and passions in life, fitness training and barbering. Her physical and psychological injuries as outlined previously are substantial, and likely permanent to a large extent at least.  She has endured a great deal of pain and suffering, which will continue indefinitely. She has undergone two surgeries and a third surgery is likely, since it is recommended and the plaintiff says she plans to undergo it.

[219]     Her injuries and their consequences have quite dramatically affected her former lifestyle and her personality. She was previously very physically active. She participated in marathon runs and triathlons, operated a fitness business, and engaged in a number of sporting activities. She was independent and took pride in being able to support herself and her younger daughter, who continues to be a dependant. I referred earlier to the change in her personality noted by the witnesses. She is no longer outgoing, social, energetic and happy, as she was before.

[220]     Her homemaking capacity has been impacted. She testified that pre-accident she kept a tidy household. This is corroborated by Mr. MacDonald and her daughter. She no longer has the ability to maintain a tidy household. Now her house is messy.

[221]     On the other hand, she is far from completely debilitated, and there is a chance her condition will improve, with appropriate treatment.  Her pre-accident condition was not perfect, (in particular, she had symptomatic spinal degeneration, and headaches) and there was some risk that her conditions could have affected her detrimentally in future, as they had pre-accident.  They might have worsened.  …

[231]     Having regard to the case authorities I have referred to, I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $170,000.

Martial Arts Student Waiver Held Not To Extend to Injuries Sustained in a Tournament

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Post originally published here on my other legal blog combatsportslaw.com 
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Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, allowing a lawsuit against a Brazilian Jiu Jitsu instructor to proceed for injuries a student sustained in a tournament.
In the recent case (Peters v. Soares) the Plaintiff was a student of the defendant’s BJJ academy.  The Plaintiff participated in a tournament where he sustained injury.  He sued for damages alleging his instructor was negligent in allowing him “to compete against a participant in a higher weight class and in a competition where stand up skills were required….(when the plaintiff) had no experience or training in stand up skills“.
As part of the plaintiff’s BJJ membership agreement he signed a waiver agreeing not to sue for injuries “in connection with my participating in the Classes“.  The Defendant argued that this waiver should be upheld and the lawsuit dismissed.  The Court disagreed noting that a waiver must be interpreted as only covering “matters specifically in the contemplation of the parties at the time the release was given“.  Using this test the court found the waiver for injuries in classes could not extent to a tournament.  In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice Matthews provided the following reasons:

[24]         Mr. Soares argues that because Mr. Peters’ claim of negligence is that the defendants knew he had no standing skills training, his claim arises from or is connected with his participation in the classes.

[25]         I do not accept that argument. Mr. Peters’ claim asserts a duty of care owed in relation to the competition, not the classes. While Mr. Peters alleges that Mr. Soares and Carlson Gracie knew his ability and training did not extend to standing skills and standing skills were required for the competition, it is not the training or lack of it that he asserts was negligent; it is inviting him to participate in the competition given what they knew about his training or lack of it. It is likely that at a trial of the negligence issue, Mr. Peters will seek to prove that the defendants’ had knowledge of his lack of standing skills training at least in part because of their interaction during the classes, but that is not the same thing as alleging negligence in relation to or arising from the classes.

[26]         In addition, there is no evidence that the competition was in Mr. Peters’ contemplation at the time he signed the membership agreement, and so there is no factual basis on which to find that Mr. Peters contemplated that the waiver provisions of the membership agreement would apply to the competition. The membership agreement was signed on September 23, 2015. Mr. Peters signed up for the competition on May 13 or 14, 2016, two weeks before he participated in it. There is no evidence that Mr. Peters was aware of or contemplated participating in the competition at the time he signed the membership agreement.

[27]         Mr. Soares has not led evidence that he had the competition in contemplation when Mr. Peters signed the membership agreement. In his affidavit, Mr. Soares described the waiver terms of the membership agreement. All of Mr. Soares’ evidence about the membership agreement and its waiver terms specifically reference the classes. He does not reference the competition at all when deposing about the waiver terms of the membership agreement.

[28]         I find that neither Mr. Peters nor Mr. Soares had the competition in contemplation when Mr. Peters signed the membership agreement.

[29]         The first Tercon inquiry is answered in the negative. The membership agreement waiver does not relate to Mr. Peters’ claim regarding the injuries he allegedly sustained in the competition and so cannot exclude Mr. Peters’ claim.

$160,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Brain Injury and Chronic Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases.

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a mild traumatic brain injury and chronic pain sustained in a BC vehicle collision.
In today’s case (Ranahan v. Oceguera) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 rear end collision.  Although faut was not formally admitted the Court found the Defendant fully liable for the crash.  The Plaintiff suffered chronic injuries from the collision and in assessing non-pecuniary damages at $160,000 Mr. Justice Mayer provided the following reasons:

[144]     I find that as a result of the accident, Ms. Ranahan has sustained mild traumatic brain injury and soft tissue injuries to her spine, which has developed into chronic neck pain, upper back pain, post-concussion syndrome, cognitive problems with memory and focus, imbalance, tiredness, fatigue, tinnitus, eye strain, sleep disturbance and chronic headaches. I also accept that the imbalance caused by her accident resulted in a further injury, the left ankle dislocation with a chip fracture, while coaching a soccer game.

[145]      I also find that Ms. Ranahan suffers from ongoing mood symptoms including irritability, moodiness a reduction in patience and positivity. She is experiencing on-going difficulties dealing with stress. Although Ms. Ranahan admits that prior to the accident she was under significant stress as a result of her husband’s health issues, family and work responsibilities she was managing these stresses and was fully functioning at work and at home and was able to participate in a number of sports and social activities.  

[146]      I find, based on the totality of the lay and expert evidence, that there are no genuine issues of causation in this case. I find that but for the accident Ms. Ranahan would not be suffering from her current physical and psychological/cognitive symptoms…

[157]     I find that, as a result of the accident, Ms. Ranahan experienced and continues to experience physical and emotional pain, suffering and limitation. Relevant facts have been set out earlier in my reasons and there is no need to repeat them.   

[158]     The impacts have interfered with her family and business life but as a result of her stoicism these impacts have been managed to a certain extent. In addition, her injuries have significantly impacted her recreational and social pursuits but she has not been completely unable to participate in some of these activities.  

[159]     I find that there has been some improvement in some of Ms. Ranahan’s symptoms. What is not clear is whether there will be any further improvement. There appears to be a belief amongst some of the medical experts, including Drs. Chow, Johnston and Boyle, that further assessment and treatment may result in improvement. The prognosis of Dr. Chow and Dr. Johnston is guarded.

[160]     Many of the cases relied upon by Ms. Ranahan occupy the higher end of the spectrum for non-pecuniary damages for similar injuries. The cases relied upon by ICBC are in my view at the lower range and the damages awarded in those cases are not sufficient to address the pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities suffered by Ms. Ranahan. 

[161]     Having reviewed the cases provided by the parties I assess Ms. Ranahan’s non-pecuniary damages at $160,000.  

ICBC's "Meat Chart" Crashes In the BC Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Update February 25, 2019 – The below paragraph 71 was edited in revised reasons for judgement published today and now reads as follows:
[71]         This is the type of case that was ripe for settlement, as demonstrated by the small difference between the plaintiff’s offer and the award made. Were it in my power to award more in costs in favour of the plaintiff I would have done so. This case did not need to occupy the court’s time at the expense to the taxpayer. It should have been settled.
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Earlier this year ICBC instructed its staff to ignore the law when valuing cases and instead make offers based on an internal injury ‘meat chart’.  The result is cases not settling and going to trial.
The first wave of these has now hit the courts and the judiciary seems none too impressed by ICBC and their ‘institutional’ tactics.
In reasons for judgment released today (Tsai v. Murdoch) ICBC was harshly criticized.  The Plaintiff was injured and sought to settle her case.  ICBC declined and made a low settlement offer subject to their ‘meat chart’ guidelines. The plaintiff sensibly rejected the offer and went to trial where damages were assessed under the law and resulted in an award greater than what she was prepared to settle for.
The Court went on to award the plaintiff double costs for ICBC’s tactics and criticized their new approach.  In doing so Madam Justice Sharma provided the following reasons:
[71]         This is the type of case that was ripe for settlement, as demonstrated by the small difference between the plaintiff’s offer and the award made. I was informed the defendant had made a settlement offer, but withdrew it for “institutional” reasons. Whatever “institutional” reasons are they do not protect in any way a litigant from bearing the consequences of its choices in the litigation.  Were it in my power to award more in costs in favour of the plaintiff I would have done so. This case did not need to occupy the court’s time at the expense to the taxpayer. It should have been settled.