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Why Tort "Reform" Is Not Needed To Keep Frivolous Lawsuits Out of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in Tort Reform.

Every so often a sensational case makes headlines that gets dismissed after trial. Pundits and the press pick up on these stories.  Such cases can receive disproportionate media attention and are sighted as key examples for the need to have tort “reform“.  The other catchphrase that’s thrown around is “lawsuit abuse”.
“Reform“, however, is not necessary.  The BC Supreme Court already has tools built in to discourage litigation.  We have a “loser pays” system which exposes losing litigants to significant costs consequences.  Additionally, if a litigant continues to pursue actions without merit they can be locked out of the Court process entirely.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal demonstrating this tool in action.
In this week’s case (Keremelevski v. ICBC) the Plaintiff brought an application which the Court described as having “no sensible basis in law or fact” and had “absolutely no chance of success“.  The Plaintiff’s application was dismissed but the Court noted that “The current proceedings, wholly devoid of merit and lacking any possibility of success, are simply another chapter in a long series of proceedings launched by the applicant in this Court”
The Court went on to make a so-called vexatious litigant order and in doing so provided the following reasons:
[12] Mr. Keremelevski has clearly demonstrated that he has no real comprehension of the court process and he persistently files applications in this Court that are completely unmeritorious. As Mr. Justice Frankel observed in the above excerpt from the Houweling case, judicial resources are not infinite, and the filing of what could justly be described as a blizzard of applications does take up valuable court time that ought to be used to hear other matters that have substance. As Frankel J.A. also observed, while persons are entitled to have their day in court, they are not entitled to be always in court “day after day in the futile pursuit of remedies to which [they are] not entitled”. As I observed, Mr. Keremelevski has initiated a significant number of proceedings in this Court that have had no possibility of success. He has also sought unsuccessfully leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in some of the proceedings. As is the case with the instant proceedings, it appears these matters have been devoid of merit with no possibility of success. In these circumstances, it seems apparent to me that it is now requisite for this Court to take action to prevent the misuse of its process. It is time, and indeed probably past time, to make an order in the case of Mr. Keremelevski in the terms made in the earlier cases referred to that Mr. Keremelevski will be precluded from filing any further documents in this Court without leave first obtained from a justice of the Court in chambers. As I observed in the Booty case, such an order is requisite to prevent misuse of the litigation process.

Hospital Insurance Program Payments Non-Deductible Under UMP

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC UMP Cases, Uncategorized.


In my continued efforts to create a searchable UMP Claims database, I summarize a 2009 UMP Decision which dealt with a variety of issues including whether payments received under BC’s Hospital Insurance Program are deductible by ICBC in Underinsured Motorist Claims.
In the 2009 case of APS v. ICBC the Claimant was severely injured in a 2004 collision in Nevada.  She was a BC resident and had UMP Coverage with ICBC.  Following the crash and initial treatment in the US the Claimant was airlifted back to BC and received further hospital treatment.  The cost of these totalled $197,263.  ICBC argued that the cost of these treatments were in the nature of insurance benefits and deductible under Section 148.1(1) of the Insurance (Vehcle) Regulation.   Arbitrator Boskovich disagreed and provided the following helpful reasons rejecting this argument:
130.  The services and benefits covered under out universal compulsory medical coverage, which are incurred in almost every under insured motorist action, cover amounts paid in the past and those to be paid in the future.  Given the catastrophic nature of many of the cases that result in UMP Claims the costs are often considerable.  Had the Legislature intended for UMP awards to be net of these services and benefits then it would have specifically provided for such a deduction in clear and unambiguous terms in the legislation.
131.  Having regard to the nature and extent of the evidence tendered and to the overall statutory intention of Subsection 148.1(1) of the Regulations, I do not find the Hospital Insurance Program payments to be an applicable deductible amount pursuant to paragraph (i).  As stated above, had the Legislature intended such potentially considerable deductions to come into play it would most certainly have specifically stated so.
132.  If I am wrong about the above, I still find having regard to the wording of subsection (i), that such amounts would not be payable to the insured as a benefit or right and claim to indemnity.  They do not represent pecuniary payments of a like nature for which the Claimant is claiming compensation pursuant to the tortious conduct of the underinsured motorist and which would have been recovered thus resulting in double recovery.
This case is also worth reviewing for some of the other finding made with respect to deductible beneifts.  The Claimant’s husband died in the same collision and as a result the Claimant received some modest compensation through a Family Compensation Act action and through varioius insurance benefits.  Arbitrator Boskovich made the following findings with respect to other deductible amounts:
1.  If a Claimant received damages under the Family Compensation Act from the collision in question then those can be deductible in an UMP Claim even if underlying action dealt exclusively with the Claimant’s personal tort claim.
2.  ICBC Part 7 Death Benefits paid from the deceased’s Part 7 benefits to the Claimant are deductible in an UMP Claim.
3.  A CPP Death Benefit paid directly to the claimant is deductible in an UMP claim.
4.  CPP and private survivor’s pension benefits are deductible in an UMP claim with the limitation that these deductions should be calculated on the basis of the natural life expectancy of the claimant.

Why Sidney Crosby's Concussion is the Best Thing That Happened for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Victims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 48 Comments on Why Sidney Crosby's Concussion is the Best Thing That Happened for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Victims

(Image via Wikipedia via pointnshoot’s flickr stream)
In two words: Public Understanding.  While Sidney Crosby’s recent difficulties recovering from the effects of multiple concussions are unfortunate, they lead to an important teachable moment.
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury can cause long-standing and debilitating effects.   Despite this, however, victims of MTBI often face skepticism in two notable ways, particularly in the injury litigation context.
First, many argue that without a loss of consciousness a person cannot suffer a traumatic brain injury.  Medically this is simply wrong.  There is absolutely no need to be knocked unconscious to suffer a traumatic brain injury or to suffer long term consequences from traumatic brain injury.
On the face of it the checks that Sidney Crosby took which caused his brain injury were relatively unmemorable in the hard hitting NHL.  He was not knocked out.  He stood back up and seemed to be generally ‘ok’ following these hits.  He skated off the ice on his own (much like an individual walking around a little dazed after a motor vehicle collision).  Despite this there is no doubt he suffered real brain injury.  His injury, and the circumstances that caused it, help dispel this myth.
The second type of scrutiny often faced by brain injury victims is that they need to ‘suck it up’ and get over it.   How can you have long lasting effects if you weren’t knocked out?  Why can’t you just ‘shake it off’ and get back to work?  Are you malingering?  You don’t look hurt, why aren’t you working?
Again, Sidney Crosby is a prime example that such injuries can and do lead to long term disability.  No one will argue that Sidney Crosby is a malinger or a wimp.  He is one of the highest funcitoning athletes of this generation.  Nobody reaches this level of success without inherent toughness, work ethic and a high pain threshold.  The top of the line doctors treating Sidney’s injuries confirm he is not fit to return to work.  This serves as a great example that caution is the order of the day when returning to work following traumatic brain injury.  The recovery period can be lengthy.  Sometimes career ending.
If nothing else, Sidney Crosby’s injuries have gone a long way in educating the public that there is nothing mild about mild traumatic brain injury.

ICBC Hit and Run Claim Succeeds With The "Expectation The Other Driver Would Comply With the Law"

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.


Useful reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, which I summarize in my continued efforts to highlight the ‘reasonable efforts’ requirement for hit and run accident victims.
In last week’s case (Singh v. Clay) the Plaintiff was injured in a handful of collisions.  In one of the incidents the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended.  Following impact the offending motorist “drove away without stopping, as the Plaintiff exited his vehicle“.  As a result the Plaintiff was unable to take down the offending vehicles licence plate number.
ICBC argued that the Plaintiff did not take reasonable efforts at the scene to identify the driver.  The Plaintiff conceded that he “could have done so but he did not look at the licence plate as he did not expect the driver to drive off as she did“.  Mr. Justice Greyell found this was a reasonable explanation and concluded the Plaintiff complied with his obligations under section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  The Court provided the following useful comments:

[78] In the present case, Mr. Singh might have been able to take down the licence plate number of the offending vehicle if he had done so immediately.  However, he did not expect the vehicle to leave the scene of the accident.  Once it became clear that the vehicle was not going to stop, his wife made an effort to write the number down, but only got two of the letters.  Following the accident Mr. Singh took all reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the driver.  He spoke to two witnesses, he telephoned ICBC, attended the police, phoned his lawyer to obtain advice as to how to proceed, and, as a result, put up flyers seeking witnesses.

[79] In Leggett the plaintiff’s case was dismissed because the Court found he had made a decision not to pursue his rights at the time of the accident.  In Smoluk the Court distinguishedLeggett stating, at para. 9:

[9]        In my view, the Leggett case is clearly distinguishable from this case because the plaintiff in this action made no decision not to pursue her rights. She was prevented from obtaining more information because of the precipitate departure of the wrongdoer, and in my view the plaintiff acted reasonably in taking down the license plate number which would lead any reasonable person to believe that the identity of the person had been or could easily be ascertained. The fact that she got the number wrong in such circumstances does not indicate unreasonableness.

[80] The facts in Smoluk are similar to those in this case.  The offending driver in that case drove away while the plaintiff was inspecting the damage to his vehicle.  While the driver in Smolukdid get the opportunity to take down a partial plate number Mr. Singh did not.  I find that under the circumstances his expectation the other driver would comply with the law and stop his/her vehicle was a reasonable one.  When the vehicle left the scene as he was getting out of his vehicle, it was too late to get particulars of the licence plate number.  I conclude Mr. Singh acted as a reasonable person would have acted in preserving his rights.

Welcome Charles Adler Listeners

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on Welcome Charles Adler Listeners


I’d like to welcome all my new readers who are here following yesterday’s interview with Charles Adler of Corus Radio. You can click here to listen to my portion of the interview:  charles-adler-erik-magraken-interview-september-8-2011 (clip courtesy of CJOB 68 Winnipeg, Corus Radio Network)
Charles canvassed the case in Illinois involving children suing their mother for alleged emotional distress.  The conversation then turned to the thresh-hold for suing for psychiatric injuries in British Columbia and the “Loser Pays” system.
For more on these topics you can click here to read my archived posts addressing lawsuits for psychological harm, and here for my archived posts on BC’s Loser Pays System.

Loss of Companionship "Services" in BC Wrongful Death Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC UMP Cases, Uncategorized. 95 Comments on Loss of Companionship "Services" in BC Wrongful Death Claims


There is a general prohibition preventing damages being awarded for “loss of companionship” in BC Wrongful Death lawsuits.  However, if the companionship can be characterized as a “service” which can be quantified and needs replacement damages can be awarded.  This was demonstrated in the arbitration decision of NN, DN and MEN v. ICBC which I summarize in my continued efforts to create a searchable ICBC UMP claims database.
In NN, DN and MEN v. ICBC, the Claimant’s spouse was killed in a motor vehicle collision.  The at fault driver was uninsured.  The Claimant sought damages under BC’s Family Compensation Act.  It was agreed that the Claimants were insured for UMP coverage with ICBC.  The parties agreed to have damages assessed though private UMP arbitration.
At the time of his death the deceased was separated from his spouse for many years.  Despite this he had a good relationship with her.  She suffered from vascular dementia and lived in a group home.  He visited her on a daily basis and took her out and spent time with her.  She sought damages for “loss of companionship services“.  ICBC opposed arguing nothing was recoverable as “loss of spousal companionship is not a compensable head of damage in a family compensation claim“.
Arbitrator Donald Yule agreed that while the “loss of spousal companionship” prohibition exists, it does not extend to services.   Arbitrator Yule accepted expert evidence that these companionship services were “important to (the spouse’s) quality of life” and assessed damages for this lost service at $35,000.  In doing so Arbitrator Yule provided the following helpful reasons:
52.   This case helps to clarify that it is the “services” aspect of the deceased’s conduct that is compensable.  It does not mater that the service is motivated by love and affection for a spouse.  Household services are also motivated by care and affections.  The replacement of them is clearly compensable.  Mrs. N’s claim is for compensation services, not merely the loss of companionship.  In Bianco Estate the claim was for loss of companionship only.  The plaintiffs were seeking an “at large” lump sum award.  Hence, the issue as to whether the award was pecuniary or non-pecuniary.  There was no attempt in  that case to attach an economic value or cost to the lost services aspect of companionship.  The judgement at paragraph 12 seems to leave open the possibility of a compensable claim where substitute or replacement services result in an actual pecuniary loss.
53.  It seems to me that one aspect of Mr. N’s companionship is the loss to Mrs. N., in terms of the pleasure and comfort that derives from the continuing association with a long time friend and spouse.  That loss is irreplaceable; no economic value can be attached to it and it is not compensable.  That is the solatium aspect.  But another aspect of MR. N’s companionship is the loss to Mrs. N. of having someone to take her out of the Lodge on a daily basis; to encourage and facilitate her maintaining mobility as long as possible; to provide a ‘break’ from the institution; to provide an opportunity to supplement her food intake; and to provide social stimulation to the extent she is able to participate in it.  This is a loss that can be provided by substitute services….There is certainly a health and medical benefit aspect to these services.

Prejudice To Defendant Not Enough To Compel Plaintiff to Attend "Responding" IME

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 7, independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 50 Comments on Prejudice To Defendant Not Enough To Compel Plaintiff to Attend "Responding" IME

(Update November 16, 2011 – The case discussed in the below post has now been published and full reasons for judgement can be found here)
One of the patterns that is becoming very clear under the New Rules of Court is that Parties ignore the 84 day requirement for exchange of expert evidence at their peril.
Often times Defendants apply for an order compelling a Plaintiff to attend an Independent Medical Exam beyond this deadline.  Numerous cases have considered such applications with the argument that an assessment is necessary in order to obtain a ‘responding‘ report under the more generous 42 day deadline of Rule 11-6(4).  Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering and rejecting such an argument.
In today’s case (Scott v. Ridgway) the Plaintiff was injured and sued for damages.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff served the report of a vocational consultant.  The Defendant applied for an order to compel the Plaintiff to attend an independent exam in order to obtain a responding report.   The Defendant brought the application after the 84 day deadline.  Madam Justice Kloegman dismissed the application finding that prejudice is not enough to compel an IME for the purpose of a responding report.  The Court provided the following useful reasons:
[6]  I am not persuaded that the plaintiff is required to attend before Dr. Banks in order for the defendant to file a responsive report.  I am aware of the prejudice claimed by the defendant that their expert’s opinion may be given less weight because of lack of examination of the plaintiff.  However, if they are prejudiced, it is of their making and not the result of any conduct of the plaintiff.
[7]  The rules are clear.  They must be obeyed in the absence of special circumstances.  There are no special circumstances here that would allow the defendant to file a report containing fresh opinion.  The defendant will be restricted to analyzing and respond to the plaintiff’s report.
I should note that some previous cases have ordered physical examination for responding report purposes, however, in such cases the Court was presented with affidavit evidence from the proposed expert explaining why such an examination is necessary.
In today’s case the Defendant did provide an affidavit from a doctor but the court placed no weight in it and criticized it for being “lifted from another affidavit sworn by another expert in another case with other expertise than that of Dr. Cook”.
Today’s reasons are unpublished but as always I’m happy to share a copy with anyone who contacts me and requests these.

More on Implied Consent of Registered Vehicle Owners: "Reasonable Inferences"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 9, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases. 50 Comments on More on Implied Consent of Registered Vehicle Owners: "Reasonable Inferences"

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with an interesting issue – can a Court infer consent to operate when a commercial vehicle is involved in a ‘hit and run’ collision?
In last week’s case (Perret v. John Doe) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  She was run off the road by a U-Haul truck which was driving the wrong way on the highway.  The driver of the U-Haul did not remain at the scene of the accident.  The Plaintiff sued U-Haul arguing they are vicariously liable for the careless driver’s deeds under s. 86 of the Motor Vehicle Act.  She also sued ICBC under the unidentified motorist provisions of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.
ICBC brought an application arguing U-Haul is at fault and that they are liable for the crash because anyone driving the vehicle likely had their consent to do so.  U-Haul opposed arguing ICBC should pay for the Plaintiff’s damages as this was an unidentified motorist claim and consent could not be proven.
The Court was asked to determine “whether ICBC or…U-Haul Co. is the proper Defendant” as a special case under Rule 9-3.  Ultimately the Court held that U-Haul was the proper defendant finding that it was reasonable to infer, on a balance of probabilities, that the driver had the company’s consent to drive.  In reaching this conclusion the Court made the following findings:







[15] The following agreed facts about the accident of May 12, 2005, could support a finding of consent:

1) The truck which caused the plaintiff to lose control of her vehicle was owned by U-Haul;

2) U-Haul rents vehicles to customers in British Columbia;

3) U-Haul consents to drivers, other than the person with whom it contracted, to drive the vehicle if they are at least 18 years of age and have a driver’s licence;

4) Approximately 135 U-Haul vehicles were rented in British Columbia on May 12, 2005;

5) There were 114 vehicles owned by U-Haul Canada that were previously stolen and unrecovered on May 12, 2005, of which 15 had been stolen in British Columbia; and

6) The driver of the U-Haul that caused the accident was probably a man in his 50s.

[16] What I derive from the above agreed facts is that:

1) It is probable that the U-Haul vehicle was not stolen. That suggests it was driven, either by the person who initially rented it, or by someone who that person agreed could drive it, and who was at least 18 years of age. U-Haul accepts that if either is true there is consent, assuming the driver had a driver’s licence;

2) I take notice that a driver in British Columbia must have a driver’s licence and therefore I conclude it is probable this driver had one.

[17] There are other facts which may be inconsistent with consent. They are the following:

1) The driver was clearly lost;

2) The driver may have been uncertain of his ultimate destination;

3) The driver did not stop at the time of the accident.

[18] Those facts may be inconsistent with consent because:

1) It would be expected that a person who rents a U-Haul vehicle will have done so for a particular purpose and will have known his destination and the route he intended to follow;

2) A driver who leaves the scene of an accident may do so because he knew he was driving a stolen vehicle.

[19] However, there are numerous other possible reasons for failing to remain at an accident scene. One could be that the driver did not know he had caused an accident. There was no contact between the vehicles involved in the accident on May 12, 2005. Another could be that the driver knew he had caused an accident and did not wish to face the consequences. There may be a multitude of other reasons peculiar to this driver which caused him to leave the scene of the accident. In my view, the fact the driver left the scene of the accident does not assist in determining the issue of consent.

[20] When considering the circumstances of the accident of May 12, 2005, there is obviously no certainty when attempting to reach a conclusion that the U-Haul vehicle was driven by a person who had consent. However, the law does not require certainty. It does require that I draw a reasonable inference and do not rely on conjecture. The Court of Appeal in Lee v. Jacobson, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2459, has described Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 152 (H.L.) [Caswell], as the leading case making that distinction. In Caswell, at 169-70, Lord Wright observed:

My Lords, the precise manner in which the accident occurred cannot be ascertained as the unfortunate young man was alone when he was killed. The Court therefore is left to inference or circumstantial evidence. Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical certainty as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. But if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture.

[21] I conclude I can safely draw an inference that it is more likely than not that the driver had consent. I therefore answer question 2 in the affirmative.

[22] ICBC is entitled to its costs against U-Haul, if requested.








Examination For Discovery Upcoming? Don't Forget to Google Yourself

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on Examination For Discovery Upcoming? Don't Forget to Google Yourself


Last year I uploaded this video providing a basic overview of some key information for Plaintiff’s attending an examination for discovery in an ICBC Claim.  If I could add one more tip to the issues discussed it would be this: Google yourself before attending.  It’s a safe bet that ICBC already has.
One of the most basic tasks any lawyer can undertake in preparing for discovery is to Google their subject.  Who knows what will come up.  Maybe some embarrassing photos on Facebook, maybe a boastful biography on a dating site, perhaps even some unwitting self-surveillance on YouTube.  Whatever comes up, if it can harm your interests, it likely will be brought out at discovery.
10 minutes of your time can help you and your lawyer greatly in preparing for discovery.  If there is something that needs to be explained its better that this gets discussed for the first time in the privacy of your lawyer’s office as opposed to under oath before a Court Reporter.  A bit of time reviewing potentially harmful (or embarrassing) information can go a long way in taking the bite out of an examination for discovery.
For more on examinations for discovery in ICBC Claims you can click here to access my archived posts on the topic.

Plaintiff Ordered To Pay 30% of Defendant's Trial Costs for Failed Wage Loss Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14.


One of the exceptions to BC’s general rule that ‘costs follow the event‘ is that a party can be ordered to pay their opponents costs relating to a distinct issue at trial.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released last week in the context of an ICBC claim.
In last week’s case (Garcha v. Gill) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision. Following trial the Plaintiff’s damages were assessed at just over $30,000.  The Plaintiff had sought damages for loss of income although this portion of his claim was largely unsuccessful.  The Defendant applied to be paid a portion of the trial costs.  Mr. Justice Cohen agreed that the Defendant was entitled to this relief as the wage loss claim was “the most contentious item during the litigation“.  In ordering the Plaintiff to pay 30% of the costs the Court provided the following reasons:







[42] I find that the defendant is entitled to an order for an apportionment of costs.

[43] The test for whether or not an apportionment of costs should occur is set out in Sutherland v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2008 BCCA 27:

[31]      The test for the apportionment of costs under Rule 57(15) can be set out as follows:

(1)        the party seeking apportionment must establish that there are separate and discrete issues upon which the ultimately unsuccessful party succeeded at trial;

(2)        there must be a basis on which the trial judge can identify the time attributable to the trial of these separate issues;

(3)        it must be shown that apportionment would effect a just result.

[44] First, I am satisfied that the issue of past income loss is a discrete issue.  I am further satisfied that an apportionment of costs of 70% to the plaintiff and 30% to the defendant, as submitted by the defendant, is fair in the circumstances of this case, given the amount for past income loss awarded to the plaintiff, when compared with his claimed amount; the fact that the plaintiff abandoned his claim for future income loss at the commencement of the trial; and, the inordinate amount of time which had to be spent by the defence prior to the trial to secure proper disclosure of the plaintiff’s business records.  There is no doubt from the chronology of the events preceding the trial that the plaintiff’s failure to provide full and timely document production of his business records had a large impact on the conduct of the proceedings leading up to and during the trial.