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More on Rule 37B – Lack of a "Reasonable Counter Proposal" Considered

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Civil Procedure, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on More on Rule 37B – Lack of a "Reasonable Counter Proposal" Considered


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, considering a factor that I don’t believe has been previously considered under Rule 37B, the effect (or lack of) a reasonable counter offer.
In today’s case (Foster v. Juhasz) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC car crash.  She sued for damages.  Before trial she made a formal offer under Rule 37B for some $285,000 and at the same time indicated she would be willing to settle for $214,000.  The Defendants rejected the offers, apparently did not make a counter offer and went to trial.
At trial the Jury awarded the Plaintiff over $450,000 in total damages.  The Plaintiff then brought a motion for ‘double costs’ under Rule 37B.
The Defendants argued that they could not have accepted the offer because their insurance policy was only for $200,000.   Mr. Justice Crawford rejected this argument and ordered that the Defendants pay double costs.  He reasoned that the offer should have been accepted.  In coming to this decision he took into consideration the fact that the Defendants did not make a “rational counter-proposal“.  Mr. Justice Crawford provided the following reasons:

[14] While I accept the policy limits may have been a factor in not accepting the offer, it does not answer the question why a rational counter-proposal was not made by the defendants. There was no comment made by the defendants as to the reasonableness or otherwise of the plaintiff’s offer. Rather, the position was taken that the defendants had a meritorious case to present on the issues which could result in an award under policy limits. If that was so, then a sensible and rational defendant could have sat down and appraised the plaintiff’s case. For instance an assessment of general damages at $60,000, past wage loss at $2,000, future lost earning capacity at $35,000, and $25,000 for future care could be made. That would not have been unreasonable and at least if not accepted, might have created a pathway to settlement. Such an offer pales in comparison to the jury award, especially the future income capacity and future care components. More so in that I recall directing the jury to be moderate. I am obliged to say the jury’s award was far beyond the evidence on these aspects.

[15] However, I do not accept the argument that the defendants were in an impossible situation in terms of accepting the offer. They chose their own level of insurance, and their choice was, with respect, a very low one given current potential liabilities for motor vehicle owners. I accept counsel’s belief that there were reasonable arguments to advance as to the amounts of the plaintiff’s claims. It was not unreasonable to think a jury, in light of the small past income loss, might not give a large future lost income award. As to the reasoning of the jury on the future care aspect, that cannot be fathomed. But no direction is given to a jury on the quantum of general damages, save in catastrophic cases.

[16] The motion for judgment was not contested by the defendants at trial. Counsel does say the case is under appeal, so the quantum may not be settled. I agree with Humphries J. that while consideration should be given to the result, the court’s discretion is not to be driven by “hindsight analysis”: see Lumanlan v. Sadler, 2009 BCSC 142.

[17] Another aspect is deterrence. The difference in the offer and the final award is a factor, as is the failure of the defendants to make a sensible counter-offer. It was not a case where the plaintiff would not obtain a reasonable award. It was a case to be carefully assessed and the usual avenues for settlement explored. A reasonable counter-offer would show a sensible stance being taken by the defendants before trial. That course was not chosen.

[18] Under the previous rule, double costs would have been automatic. Now there is consideration of whether or not the offer could be reasonably accepted.

[19] While there may have been some grounds for not accepting the offer, no response was made, the defendants choosing to “keep their powder dry” for trial. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to her double costs, which I allow for preparation for trial, examination for discovery, and the trial. I do not allow costs for the notices to admit which I now address.

In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.

BC Injury Claims and the Rule Against "Case Splitting"

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 145 Comments on BC Injury Claims and the Rule Against "Case Splitting"


When an ICBC or other injury claim goes to trial the Plaintiff needs to prove their case.   In the most basic terms this means that in a tort claim fault needs to be established along with the nature and extent of the accident related injuries and the losses that these have caused.  The Plaintiff normally does this in what’s called the Plaintiff’s ‘case in chief‘.  If the Plaintiff fails to call evidence on any of these points the case can be dismissed on a ‘no-evidence‘ motion.
Once the Plaintiff finishes calling his/her case the defence has the opportunity to call evidence to contradict the Plaintiff’s case or in support of theirs.  A Plaintiff can then call ‘rebuttal evidence‘ and this is something that often occurs in injury litigation when the Defence calls medical experts with conflicting opinions about the cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
There are limits on rebuttal evidence, however, and one such limit is that the evidence called in rebuttal must be truly responsive to the other sides case as opposed to addressing the points that needed to be proven in the ‘case in chief‘.  If a court concludes that rebuttal evidence is not truly responsive a court can keep it from going in.  Reasons for judgement were released today discussing this point of civil procedure.
In today’s case (Bransford v. Yilmazcan) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In her case in chief she called evidence discussing her accident related injuries which apparently included Thoracic Outlet Syndrome and Headaches.  The Defendants then called their expert (Dr. Makin) who addressed the cause and prognosis of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
The Plaintiff then wished to call Drs. Prout and Caillier to give rebuttal evidence.   The Defendants objected arguing that the evidence was not truly responsive and the Plaintiff was attempting to ‘split her case‘.  Madam Justice Griffin agreed that some of the evidence was indeed not true rebuttal evidence and did not allow portions of the proposed evidence in.  Specifically she found that the proposed evidence diagnosing accident related Thoracic Outlet Syndrome and Headaches could have been called in the Plaintiff’s case in chief.  Madam Justice Griffin held as follows:

[6] First, Dr. Makin was asked a number of questions in his direct evidence regarding definitions of thoracic outlet syndrome, including the question “What are two types of thoracic outlet syndrome that involve nerves?”  His evidence was that one, the type that involves nerves, is true neurogenic thoracic outlet syndrome, and that is the only type that involves the nerves.  He said a different type, disputed thoracic outlet syndrome, is a type diagnosed by vascular surgeons, and that neurologists do not agree with that classification.

[7] The implication of his evidence, including other questions he was asked in direct about how he conducted his tests, was that neurologists as a group are of the view that provocative testing reveals no clinically helpful information in diagnosing thoracic outlet syndrome and that they are opposed to vascular surgeons reaching this diagnosis.

[8] In my view this is a proper basis for rebuttal evidence on this narrow point; i.e., is a neurologist of the opinion that there can be a diagnosis of thoracic outlet syndrome in the absence of positive signs and a nerve conduction study?  And, is a neurologist of the opinion that provocative testing can be helpful in diagnosing this?

[9] The plaintiff cannot have been in a position to respond to the suggestion that neurologists do not hold that opinion as a group until the defence witness was heard on that point.  Indeed, arguably this point could not have been anticipated as it was not specifically identified in Dr. Makin’s report.

[10] I therefore conclude that it would be appropriate for the plaintiff to call rebuttal evidence of Dr. Prout to respond to this point, since Dr. Prout is a neurologist.

[11] However, Dr. Prout goes beyond this in his report and does his own evaluation and diagnosis of Hanna Bransford for thoracic outlet syndrome.  I am of the view that this goes further than proper rebuttal and runs the risk of splitting the plaintiff’s case, and so it is not appropriate.

[12] Second, Dr. Makin performed what were referred to as inching studies as part of his nerve conduction studies and reached a different diagnosis than the plaintiff’s physicians and experts, namely he diagnosed a problem with Ms. Bransford’s ulnar nerve.  I am of the view this is an appropriate matter for rebuttal evidence, namely an analysis of Dr. Makin’s nerve conduction studies and any comment disputing his findings and any contrary inching studies regarding the ulnar nerve.  This evidence would not be splitting the plaintiff’s case because the plaintiff does not assert that her diagnosis has anything to do with her ulnar nerve.

[13] I also note that the oral evidence of Dr. Makin reporting on these studies is not significantly narrowed from the point he makes in his written report and the defendants had agreed earlier that this was the proper subject of the rebuttal reports of Dr. Caillier and Dr. Prout.

[14] Further, the plaintiff could not properly have anticipated this evidence in its entirety until it was called from Dr. Makin.

[15] As for Dr. Makin’s evidence on headaches, I am of the view this is not the proper subject of rebuttal evidence, at least insofar as revealed in Dr. Prout’s report.  Headaches have always been part of Ms. Bransford’s symptoms and we have heard one plaintiff’s witness, Dr. O’Connor, describe them as cervicogenic.  Dr. Makin disagrees and describes them as migraine.  Dr. Prout does not point out any flaw in Dr. Makin’s science from a neurologist’s perspective, but really just gives an opposite opinion, an opinion that could have been given in the plaintiff’s main case.  The plaintiff was in a position to respond to the labelling of Ms. Bransford’s headaches as cervicogenic or migraine prior to the close of its case as it had notice of Dr. Makin’s description of the headache as migraine.

Please My Lady, Overturn that Award! One of BC's Largest Personal Injury Jury Awards Discussed

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 42 Comments on Please My Lady, Overturn that Award! One of BC's Largest Personal Injury Jury Awards Discussed


Late last year a Vancouver Jury handed out one of the biggest Personal Injury awards in British Columbia’s history.  In that case (Ciolli v. Galley) the Plaintiff was injured in three seperate motor vehicle accidents.  The trial for all of her claims were heard together and a Jury initally awarded some $12 million in compensation.
The award included $6.5 million for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  Such an award is not allowed in Canada as a result of a series of cases known as “the trilogy”.  In the trilogy the Supreme Court of Canada found that the maximum a victim can be awarded for non-pecuniary damages in a negligence claim is $100,000.  Adjusted for inflation this cap is now close to $327,000.  After being advised of this fact the Jury reduced their award of non-pecuniary damages to this maximum amount bringing the total judgement to some $6.2 million.
The Defendants, undoubtedly surprised by the award, asked the trial judge to disregard the Jury’s award arguing that the damages awarded were “exceptional” and mandated “judicial intervention“.  The Defendants asked that a mistrial be ordered .
Madam Justice Loo dismissed the mistrial application finding she had no jurisdiction to overturn the award.   In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice Loo made the following observations:
Only in limited circumstances may a trial judge refuse to accept a jury’s verdict; when he or she concludes “that there is no evidence to support the findings of the jury; or where the jury gives an answer to a question which cannot, in law, provide a foundation for judgment”…
In my respectful view, the defendants are really complaining that the jury’s award is inordinately high or wholly out of proportion to the evidence and cannot be reasonably supported by the evidence. That may be, but unless there is no evidence to support the jury’s findings, a trial judge may not reject a jury’s verdict. I cannot conclude that there was no evidence before the jury relating to Ms. Ciolli’s claim for pecuniary loss, and accordingly, the application is dismissed.
This case is heading off to the BC Court of Appeal and I’ll be sure to report the BC High Court’s comments on this case once they have an opportunity to release their reasons for judgement.

BC Court of Appeal Discusses In Trust Claims and Document Disclosure Requirements

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal discussing two important legal principles in the context of personal injury claims, “In Trust” Claims and Document Disclosure requirements.
By way of brief background, in today’s case (Dykeman v. Porohowski) the Plaintiff was injured in two motor vehicle accidents.  Her matter went to trial and a Jury awarded $44,000 in total damages.  The Plaintiff was seeking substantially greater damages and she appealed alleging the trial judge made multiple errors.
The BCCA granted the appeal and ordered a new trial.  In doing so the Court made some useful comments about the above areas of law.
1.  In Trust Claims
Generally speaking when a person is injured through the fault of another and has limits they can be compensated for hiring others to help them with their limits.  If the help is provided free of charge by family members a claim can still be made and this is called an ‘in trust’ claim.
In today’s case the trial judge refused to put the “in trust” claim to the jury reasoning that injuries were not “grievous” enough for an in trust claim.   The Court of Appeal agreed that this was incorrect and that “grievousness” is not required to advance an in-trust claim.  The Court provided the following useful summary of the law:

[28] Since Kroeker, it has been settled law in this province that “housekeeping and other spousal services have economic value for which a claim by an injured party will lie even where those services are replaced gratuitously from within the family.”  In Kroeker, such recovery was allowed under the heading of ‘loss of future ability to perform household tasks’, but obviously, damages for loss of such ability prior to trial may also be properly claimed and recovered: see, e.g., McTavish v. MacGillivray, 2000 BCCA 164 at paras, 43, 51-7, perHuddart J.A.; West v. Cotton (1995) 10 B.C.L.R. (3d) 73 (C.A.) at para. 25; and Campbell v. Banman 2009 BCCA 484.  The reasoning in Kroeker has been extended beyond “spousal” services to services rendered by other members of a family: see Boren v. Vancouver Resource Society, Dufault, McTavish v. MacGillivray; Bystedt v. Hay, all supra.  Such awards are colloquially referred to as “in trust” even though it is the plaintiff who recovers them, and British Columbia courts do not generally impose trust terms in their orders, regarding the loss as that of the plaintiff: see Feng v. Graham (1988) 25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 116 (C.A.) at 9-10; McTavish, supra.

[29] The majority in Kroeker was alive to the possibility that awards for gratuitous services by family members of plaintiffs could “unleash a flood of excessive claims” (supra, at para. 29) and for that reason, urged courts to be cautious in making such awards.  In the words of Gibbs, J.A.:

… as the law has developed it would not be appropriate to deny to plaintiffs in this province a common law remedy available to plaintiffs in other provinces and in other common law jurisdictions. It will be the duty of trial judges and this Court to restrain awards for this type of claim to an amount of compensation commensurate with the loss. With respect to other heads of loss which are predicated upon the uncertain happening of future events measures have been devised to prevent the awards from being excessive. It would be reasonable to expect that a similar regime of reasonableness will develop in respect of the kind of claim at issue in this case.  [At para. 19; emphasis added.]

I do not read Kroeker or Ellis, however, as establishing a threshold of “grievousness” in terms of the injuries which may necessitate such services.  A plaintiff who has a broken arm, for example – presumably not a “grievous” injury – and who is obliged to seek assistance in performing various household tasks should not be foreclosed from recovery on this basis.  This was recognized in Ellis in the quotation reproduced above.  Thus I disagree with the trial judge’s reference to grievous injury as a threshold that the plaintiff was required to surmount if her claim was to go to the jury.  Instead, claims for gratuitous services must be carefully scrutinized, both with respect to the nature of the services – were they simply part of the usual ‘give and take’ between family members, or did they go ‘above and beyond’ that level? – and with respect to causation – were the services necessitated by the plaintiff’s injuries or would they have been provided in any event?  Finally, if these questions – which I would have thought are appropriate for determination by a jury – are answered affirmatively, the amount of compensation must be commensurate with the plaintiff’s loss.  The assessment of such loss has been the subject of several considered judgments in this province, most notably McTavish and Bystedt, both supra.

[30] The trial judge’s second reason for not putting the claim to the jury in this case was that the services which were the subject of the in-trust claim were not personal or household services but were related to the business operated by the plaintiff’s family.  As mentioned above, counsel evidently agreed that the plaintiff’s parents’ claim for ‘business losses’ had not properly been made.  It is not correct to say, however, that the plaintiff herself could not claim for assistance provided by family members in a family enterprise (see Johnson v. Miller, supra) or that there was no evidence of personal or household services having been provided by Ms. Dykeman’s parents to her.  The mother testified that she was “supposed to spend” a third of her time on the farm – in accordance with the partnership agreement in evidence – and had planned on going back to practice on a part-time basis.  Instead, she found herself spending at least 10 to 12 hours per week assisting in the business and babysitting her grandchildren when her daughter had medical appointments or migraine headaches.  At the time of trial, she testified, she was caring for her grandchildren “pretty well every day” plus assisting in the equestrian business.  The plaintiff’s migraines had become less frequent, but the medication she took for them essentially ‘knocked her out’ for 12-14 hours – during which Ms. Dykeman’s mother slept in the same room with her granddaughter.  The thrust of her evidence was that at least until her grandchildren were in school, she would not be able to return to practice even on a part-time basis.  Mr. Dykeman’s services, on the other hand, related almost entirely to “physical work” in the Freedom Fields Farm operation.

[31] In all the circumstances, it seems to me that there was evidence of household and other assistance provided by Ms. Dykeman’s parents that could have been the basis of an award and that the trial judge erred in effectively granting a ‘no evidence’ motion in respect thereof.  I would allow the appeal on this ground.

2. Document Disclosure Obligations

The second area highlighted in this case relates to document disclosure.  In pre-trial investigation the Defendants gathered a number of Internet postings apparently written by the Plaintiff.  They listed these documents as ‘privileged‘ and did not reveal them until shortly before trial.  In describing the privileged documents they labelled them as a “diskette containing an index to the Plaintiff’s web postings“.

The Plaintiff objected to these documents being used in cross examination but the trial judge allowed the cross examination.  On appeal the BCCA found that this was an error finding that the documetns were not properly described and this may have pejudieced the Plaintiff.  Specifically the BCCA said as follows:

[41] Applying these observations to the case at bar, can it be said that the descriptions reproduced above were such as to enable the plaintiff and her counsel, or a judge in chambers, to assess the validity of the claim of privilege?  In my opinion, none of the items was sufficiently described for this purpose.  Item 77, an index to the plaintiff’s “web postings”, could contain any number of “writings” posted on any number of websites, relevant or irrelevant to the case.  With respect to item 78, one does not know who wrote the “articles” regarding the plaintiff’s equestrian business or the date of such articles; with respect to item 79, there is no description of the “pictures printed out from the Internet regarding horse riding”, where they are from or what connection, if any, the plaintiff had with them; and with respect to item 80, there is again no description of the “articles”, who wrote them or when.  Counsel told the court below that the postings had all been written by the plaintiff, but even that was not apparent from the disclosure document.  Thus I disagree with the trial judge’s ruling that the postings had been adequately “listed” for purposes of R. 26.  (For a discussion of ‘e-discovery’ generally, see The Sedona Conference Working Group 7, The Sedona Canada Principle: Addressing Electronic Discovery (2008).)  If the defence had been more forthcoming, counsel for Ms. Dykeman might well have challenged the claim of privilege asserted by Mr. Harris – via the Form 93 filed by Mr. Gibb.

[42] Assuming, then, that the defence failed to make proper discovery of the Internet documents, the next question is whether it can be said the trial judge nevertheless properly exercised his discretion under the opening words of R. 26(14) to permit Ms. Dykeman to be cross-examined on some of those documents.  In Stone v. Ellerman, the majority stated that the factors relevant to the exercise of such discretion include the question of prejudice to the party being cross-examined, whether there was a reasonable explanation for the other party’s failure to disclose, whether excluding the document would prevent the determination of the issue on its merits, and whether in the circumstances of the case, the ends of justice require that the document be admitted.  In this case, counsel did not provide any “explanation” for the non-descriptiveness of Mr. Gibb’s list and argued only that disclosure hadbeen sufficient.  The trial judge therefore had no explanation to consider, even if he had been of the view that the listing was deficient.

[43] It is difficult to square the trial judge’s ruling on this second question with his prior ruling that the documents had been properly disclosed or ‘listed’.  If the latter was correct, there was no need to ‘balance’ the interests of justice in avoiding trial by ambush against the interests of justice in assessing Ms. Dykeman’s credibility by cross-examining her on the Internet postings.  Given that her lawyer had only half an hour to discuss the 124 pages with her, it cannot be said with any certainty that she was not prejudiced by what transpired.  At the end of the day, I am not confident that the apparent exercise of the trial judge’s discretion was fair to the plaintiff or rested on a correct understanding of the Rule.  I would therefore allow the appeal on this basis as well.

This case contains some other interesting comments which are worth reviewing, particularly with defence statements to the jury regarding adverse inference.  I urge all personal injury lawyers in BC to read this case in full as it thoroughly canvasses many areas that routinely arise in injury prosecution in this Province.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Accident Related Fibromyalgia

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Fibromyalgia Cases, Uncategorized. 64 Comments on $60,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Accident Related Fibromyalgia

(Please note the case discussed here was overturned by the BC Court of Appeal in May, 2010)
Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, (Poirier v. Aubrey) awarding a Plaintiff just over $220,000 in total damages as a result of a BC Car Crash.
The Collision occurred in 2006 and was a rear-end crash.  The Plaintiff suffered from some pre-existing injuries but the trial judge found that the Plaintiff did not have a ‘relevant’ pre-existing condition.  Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that the accident caused fibromyalgia and awarded $60,000 non-pecuniary damages.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Stewart noted the following:
there was no relevant significant pre-existing condition and the doctors may differ as to what label should be applied to the plaintiff’s condition – fibromyalgia, fibromyalgia-like syndrome, chronic pain condition – but the fact is that she suffers from chronic widespread pain that is, for her, debilitating and with respect to which the prognosis is guarded.  An “optimal fibromyalgia based treatment protocol”, including biofeedback, is recommended and there is a real and substantial possibility, bordering on likelihood, that her pain and discomfort will be relieved and her functioning improved.  (Exhibit 5 Tab B Page 6).  But no “cure” is in prospect…
I find as a fact that the plaintiff’s persistent, consistent and, ultimately, chronic pain and suffering arose only immediately after the September 5, 2006 motor vehicle accident.  The schism in the expert medical evidence placed before me was not as to whether the September 5, 2006 trauma was a materially contributing cause of the plaintiff’s ongoing chronic pain condition but as to whether it so contributed by exacerbating a pre-existing chronic pain condition or by simply triggering a chronic pain condition.  It is now a fact that there was no significant pre-existing condition.  The only available conclusion in the case at bar is that but for the defendant’s negligence on September 5, 2006 the plaintiff would not be burdened with the chronic pain condition that has been her lot since September 5, 2006.

[23] Soft tissue damage is the source of her problems.  I have kept Maslen v. Rubenstein (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131 (C.A.) in mind.  I find that the plaintiff is one of that small percentage of people, well known to the law, whose pain and suffering continues long after science would say that the injured tissue must have healed.  I have cautioned myself about the need to be slow to rely on what are uncorroborated reports of long-standing pain and discomfort.  But, on the whole of the evidence I have decided that her complaints of pain are true reflections of a continuing injury and are not a product of desire by the plaintiff for things such as care, sympathy, relaxation or compensation and that she has used every ounce of willpower she has to overcome her problems and could not reasonably be expected to have achieved more by her own inherent resources or willpower.  (Maslen v. Rubenstein,supra, paragraphs 8 and 15).

[24] I turn to the future.

[25] To use language employed by Dr. Jaworski, the prognosis is “guarded”.  Taken together, the evidence of Dr. Hyams, Dr. Shuckett and Dr. Jaworski bottoms the conclusion that what is now in place – an ongoing, positive, pro-active approach, to echo Dr. Shuckett – means that there is a real and substantial possibility that significant improvement is in the offing.  To date, the plaintiff has sought help in such things as prescription drugs, chiropractic treatments, physiotherapy, massage, acupuncture and trigger point injections.  Only now is the plaintiff in the course of an organized effort to both alleviate her pain and discomfort to the extent possible and teach her techniques and methods of dealing with and surmounting her pain and discomfort.

[26] I turn to the assessing of non-pecuniary damages.  The plaintiff has been burdened thus far for 39 months.  Her prospects are not bleak, but guarded.  The level of the pain and discomfort she has endured was such that her life apart from work has been turned from one full of activity to one devoted to rest and recovery.  She is not housebound.  She drives a car for up to 20 hours a week and makes herself useful in the lives of her children.  The level of her pain and discomfort resulted in this woman – whom I am convinced is not a slacker and enjoyed her job in the world of insurance adjusting – being off work for six weeks, returning to work at half-time for two months and, ultimately, stopping work after having her employer cooperate in every way possible to reduce the demands of the job so that she could continue working.  That speaks volumes about her condition.  Additionally, the fact she actually enjoyed her work and has had it curtailed as a result of the defendant’s negligence must weigh heavily in the assessment of non-pecuniary damages.  I have considered the cases placed before me by counsel.  To track some of the language used in Knauf v. Chao, 2009 BCCA 605, I classify this as a case in which there is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff’s soft tissue injury will prove to be “permanent” but the degree of pain and discomfort cannot be considered to be “the most severe in nature” when compared with that of plaintiffs in other such cases.  Taking into account not just what I have said here but the whole of the evidence and all I have said thus far in these reasons for judgment, I award the plaintiff $60,000 by way of non-pecuniary damages.

This case was interesting for Mr. Justice Stewart’s very specific reasons setting out why he rejected many of the defence positions advanced at trial and also for the Court’s discussion of the law of adverse inference for failing to call a treating physician in an injury claim.

Navigating the Minefield – BCCA on Improper Opening and Closing Statements in Jury Trials

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 36 Comments on Navigating the Minefield – BCCA on Improper Opening and Closing Statements in Jury Trials


One role lawyers have in Injury Litigation is to persuasively advance their clients case and this extends to opening statements and closing arguments at trial.  Sometimes, however, lawyers become caught up in the moment and cross the line in their remarks to a jury and this can lead to a mistrial.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal reviewing this area of the law.
In today’s case (Knauf v. Chao) the Plaintiff was involved in two Motor Vehicle Collisions in 2002.  The Plaintiff was injured in both crashes.  The Plaintiff’s claim proceeded to trial and the Jury awarded just over $500,000 in total compensation for her injuries including an award of $235,000 for non-pecuniary damages.
The Defendants appealed the judgement arguing in part that the trial was unfair because the Plaintiff’s lawyer made improper statements in his opening and closing submissions to the Jury.  The BC Court of Appeal agreed with this submission and found that the Jury’s award for non-pecuniary damages was excessive.  The Court reduced the jury’s award by $100,000.  In doing so the court made some useful comments with respect to the Plaintiff’s lawyers submissions which are worth reviewing.
During the trial the Plaintiff called an expert witness who conducted a functional capacity assessment of the Plaintiff’s abilities.  In doing so the expert used some validity tests which are used to measure the consistency of effort applied by the Plaintiff.  When the expert gave evidence the results of the validity testing was discussed.  In short the validity testing showed consistent effort throughout the assessment.  In closing arguments, the Plaintiff’s lawyer commented on this evidence and stated as follows ” She was consistent throughout.  What she said and what the test result showed were the same.  She wasn’t exaggerating; she wasn’t saying she was in pain when the test results showed differently.  She was consistent. And that’s what those tests were designed to do to show if what she told Mr. Pakulak, if what she told her doctor, what she told you was real and legitimate.”
The Court of Appeal took no issue with the validity testing but held that the Lawyers comments were improper.  Mr. Justice Tysoe held as follows: “In my opinion, there is nothing objectionable about validity testing per se.  It goes to the reliability of the opinion expressed by the expert and the weight to be given to it by the trier of fact.  That is a proper purpose…However, the remark made by the plaintiff’s counsel in his closing address to the jury was clearly improper (this was conceded on appeal by counsel for the plaintiff, who was not counsel at trial).  The plaintiff’s counsel effectively told the jury that they could use Mr. Pakulak’s evidence for the improper purpose of oath-helping.  This was not corrected by an instruction in the charge to the jury.”
The Court then went on to highlight some further statements made by the Plaintiff’s lawyer and reproduced the following exerpts at paragraphs 39-40:

[39] The opening statement made by the plaintiff’s counsel to the jury included the following (with the comments the defendants say are objectionable emphasized by me):

The statements of defence that were filed on behalf of the defendants say they are not responsible, and this confused and upset Ms. Knauf. … Responsibility was still denied, that is until last Friday, six years after these accidents, when the defendants’ lawyer told us that they now admit responsibility; …

Ms. Knauf comes to court to ask you to fix the harm that was done to her on those two days in 2002.

Ms. Knauf lost her ability to make good money as a waitress and save to buy a home back when prices were still reasonable.  These accidents were six years ago and Ms. Knauf had already saved — and by coincidence the figure is $6,000.  She’d already saved that from the time a year before the accident when she started working as a waitress….

Ms. Knauf has not collected any disability benefits or sick benefits or social assistance because of her injuries.  She’s a worker. She’s struggling in an expensive city and wants to work not less but more.

[40] His closing address included the following (with the similar added emphasis):

It took six years for the defendants to acknowledge their responsibility for these accidents. We are now here, not for sympathy, but to collect the debt that is owed to Ms. Knauf and the rules require that that debt be paid.

Ms. Knauf does not stay at home and whine.  She has not collected disability benefits; she has not collected welfare; she’s not collected employment insurance or any benefits because of her injuries.

Now, Ms. Knauf has had to deal with other problems, big, difficult problems:  the death of her mother; an unrelated knee problem; her marriage. Don’t be sidetracked by those issues.

I said that we’re here to collect a debt, a debt that is owed to Ms. Knauf by the defendants.  That debt is compensation for the harm and the losses that they caused her. …You’re not to consider any outside reasons.  The rules don’t allow that.  You’re only to consider the losses and the harms that were suffered by Ms. Knauf, nothing else. If any of you consider any outside reasons, you’re breaking the rules and everyone here has to follow the rules.

You’re going to be asked about special damages.  That’s the money that Ms. Knauf spent on treatment.  That’s Exhibit 1.  It’s just under $6,000 and those amounts were not challenged.  And it’s a coincidence, perhaps a sad coincidence, that the money Ms. Knauf has spent on her own treatment these last six years is about equal to what she had saved up hoping to buy her own home at the time of these accidents.

The Court of Appeal concluded that these comments were improper and provided the following guiding comments:

Some of the comments made by the plaintiff’s counsel were irrelevant and appeared to be designed to arouse hostility against the defendants.  Others appeared to be designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury or otherwise engender sympathy for the plaintiff.  Counsel improperly stated that his client was owed a debt by the defendants.  He improperly suggested to the jury members that they would be “sidetracked” or “breaking the rules” if they considered the death of the plaintiff’s mother, the injury of her knee or her unsuccessful marriage, all of which were relevant to the state of her health or enjoyment of amenities.

[43] The plaintiff concedes that some of the comments made by her counsel at trial were unfortunate or improper, but says there were no exceptional circumstances warranting interference by this Court in view of the lack of objection by the defendants’ counsel.  I do not agree.  The effect of the improper comments is manifested in the jury’s award for non-pecuniary damages, which, as I will discuss under the next heading, was wholly disproportionate and constitutes a substantial wrong.

The Court went on to reduce the Jury’s award of non-pecuniary damages by $100,000 but pointed out that if the Defence lawyers objected during trial a mistrial may have been an appropriate remedy.

As trial lawyers know it is a fine line distinguishing between what comments are persuasive and which cross the line to improper.  Cases such as this will continue to add clarity and help trial lawyers navigate the minefield of Jury Trials.

More on Rule 37B and the Timing of Formal Settlement Offers, "All Inclusive" Offers Discussed

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 80 Comments on More on Rule 37B and the Timing of Formal Settlement Offers, "All Inclusive" Offers Discussed


One pattern that is becoming well developed under Rule 37B (the Rule dealing with Formal Settlement Offers in BC Supreme Court Lawsuits) is that of timing.  Caselaw seems to require that formal offers need to be available for acceptance for a reasonable period of time before triggering cost consequences under Rule 37B.  Reasons for judgement were released this week demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Dodge v. Shaw Cablesystems [SBC) Ltd.) the Plaintiff sued for damages as a result of a slip and fall.  As a result of the fall the Plaintiff injured her knee.  Before trial the Defendant made a formal offer for $50,000 on an “all-in” basis (meaning inclusive of all damages, costs and disbursements).  This offer was made two working days before the start of trial.
After trial, the Jury decided that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were equally at fault for the fall an awarded a net sum of $20,000 for her injuries.  The Defendant then brought a motion for costs under Rule 37B.  Mr. Justice Masuhara refused to award the Defendant any costs because the offer was not left open for consideration for a reasonable period of time.  In coming to this conclusion Mr. Justice Masuhara stated as follows with respect to timing of formal offers under Rule 37B:

I conclude that the defendant’s offer was in effect from Wednesday, January 7, 2009 to Friday, January 9, 2009.

[14] A party requires a reasonable time within which to consider an offer and decide in the circumstances existing at the time of the offer whether it should be accepted or rejected:Coquitlam (City) v. Crawford, 2008 BCSC 1507. There is case law on Rule 37B that suggests that a reasonable amount of time to consider an offer is seven days. In Arnold, Butler J. cited Bailey when he stated at para. 22 that “[a] reasonable period of time to consider an offer to settle is seven days”. In Towson v. Bergman, 2009 BCSC 978 at para. 70, Gray J. stated that the seven day period “has been applied in the case law.” I do not, however, read these cases as laying down a rule of general application. In Wright v. Hohenacker, 2009 BCSC 996, for example, Fisher J. did not consider a “seven day rule” when determining whether an offer should have been reasonably accepted, stating that, in the circumstances of that case, the fact that the offer was made only four days before trial was not particularly significant. Suffice it to say that every case must be judged on its own facts. Imposition of an inflexible rule as to what is considered a reasonable amount of time risks returning to the rigid consequences of the old Rule 37 and fettering the wide discretion intended under Rule 37B.

[15] In this case, the plaintiff was only given two days to consider accepting the offer before it expired. Apart from pointing out that the offer was made after mediation and after delivery of the defendant’s expert reports, neither party has led any evidence surrounding the circumstances at the time the offer was made. It is known, however, that the plaintiff was a resident of Ontario at the time, whereas her counsel was resident in Abbotsford. While this alone is not determinative (the plaintiff has not led any evidence of her whereabouts at the time of the offer), when an offer to settle is received, counsel and client are required to make a careful appraisal of the merits, taking into account complex and subjective factors in appraising the eventual outcome of a trial, in this case, a jury trial. Complexity is increased where the plaintiff is asked to evaluate an “all-in” offer where, by the very nature of the offer, the actual amount offered in discharge of the action is not immediately apparent.

[16] Taking into account that analysing the “all-in offer” would have required breaking out the appropriate cost consequences, and that plaintiff and counsel undoubtedly had many other things that required their attention, two days was an unreasonable amount of time in which to properly analyze the offer. Even if the offer did beat the result, counsel for the plaintiff did not have enough time to reach this conclusion within the deadline set by the defendant…

[18] Since I have decided that it was unreasonable for the defendant to expect that the plaintiff would accept the offer within two days, the policy underlying Rule 37B, which is to encourage the settlement of disputes by rewarding the party who makes a reasonable offer and penalizing the party who declines to accept such an offer, is not engaged. Accordingly, as permitted by Rule 37B(4), I decline to consider the defendant’s offer to settle in exercising my discretion relating to costs.

Another interesting point in this decision was the Court’s discussion of “all-inclusive” offers under Rule 37B.  Under the now repealed Rule 37 such offers were not allowed and could not trigger costs consequences.  Mr. Justice Masuhara ruled that such a strict prohibition is not warranted under Rule 37B but parties should make such “all-in” offers at their own peril, Specifically the Court stated as follows:

24] Since the introduction of Rule 37B, there is no longer a complete code to dictate the cost consequences of an offer to settle. Rule 37B contemplates a summary procedure to determine costs. It offers broad discretion to the trial judge to determine cost consequences of a failure to settle. While the defendant is no longer automatically entitled to costs from the date of the offer if the offer is more favourable than the judgment, Rule 37B(5)(d) still states that the court may in such a case “award to the defendant the defendant’s costs in respect of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery of the offer to settle.” While I accept that the consequences of an uncertainty in the calculation of costs up to the date of the offer to settle are no longer as stringent, as under the old Rules, the court is still faced with difficulty in summarily determining the relationship between the offer and the costs in an “all-in” offer. Consequently, the potential for injustice still exists. Thus, under Rule 37B, it does not appear to me that the rationale for the rule in Helm is no longer of assistance. In my view the language of Rule 37B is broad and assumes that the trial judge in every case is in the best position to determine whether an “all-in” offer can be considered. Provided that the proper form of an offer to settle is adhered to, the court has under Rule 37B the discretion to take into account that offer to settle. Nonetheless, defendants who make an “all-in” offer do so at their own peril.

In my continued efforts to get prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I am cross referencing Civil Procedure cases that I discuss on this blog with the New Rules.  To this end  it is worth pointing out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.

The Standard of Care When Driving Near Children

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases.


We all know that children can be unpredictable.  As such motorists have to take special precaution when driving by pedestrian children.  The standard of what is safe will be stricter in these situations and reasons for judgement were released this week discussing this legal principle.
In this week’s case (Johnson v. Eyre) the 7 year old Plaintiff, who was riding his bike, was struck by the Defendant’s motor vehicle and sustained injuries.  Ultimately the lawsuit was dismissed because the Court found that “(the Defendant) simply could not avoid striking (the Plaintiff)…The collision occurred because the youths turned…into the path of the (defendant) vehicle…(the Defendant) took appropriate evasive action in the little time he had to react.”
Before dismissing the claim, however, Mr. Justice Greyell did a good job summarizing the standard of care motorists should exercise when driving by children.  The below quote is a useful summary of this area of personal injury law:
[15] The plaintiff relies on the following passage in Bourne v. Anderson, 27 M.V.R. (3d) 63 where Hood J. said at para 55:

55        In my opinion, once the presence of a child or children on a road is known, or should have been known, to the driver of a vehicle proceeding through a residential area where children live, that driver must take special precautions for the safety of the child or children seen, and any other child or children yet unseen whose possible appearance or entrance onto the road is reasonably foreseeable. The precautions include keeping a sharp look out, perhaps sounding the horn, but more importantly, immediately reducing the speed of the vehicle so as to be able to take evasive actions if required.

This passage was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Hixon v. Roberts, 2004 BCCA 335.

$80,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Knee Injury and Chronic Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Knee Injury Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

(Please note the below case was partially overturned on Appeal with a slight reduction in the Court’s assessed damages for cost of future care.  The BC Court of Appeal judgement can be found here)

Reasons for Judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry (Penner v. Silk), awarding a Plaintiff just over $555,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss from a 2005 BC Car Crash.
The collision occurred while the Plaintiff was rear-ended on a highway in Langley, BC.   The issue of fault was admitted at trial by ICBC leaving the court to deal with the assessment of damages.
The Plaintiff sustained a variety of soft tissue injuries that largely recovered in 6 months.  His knee, however, sustained long term injury.  Dr. Hirsch, a well respect specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, gave evidence that the Plaintiff suffered from “chronic knee pain caused by post-traumatic patellar tendonopathy as well as the development of patellofemoral joint syndrome.”    Dr. Hirsch testified that the Plaintiff would likely be left with ongoing problems as a result of this accident related injury.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $80,00 Mr. Justice Sewell made the following findings:
[36] Based on the whole of the evidence, I have reached the conclusion that Mr. Penner is suffering from chronic pain in his left knee and that that chronic pain is significantly impairing his ability to function, both at work and at home.  Pain is, of course, inherently subjective.  Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that there is a psychological component to Mr. Penner’s pain perception and that his quality of life and perception of pain would benefit from a course of vigorous, physical exercise and psychiatric intervention.  Dr. Riar and Dr. Smith agree that Mr. Penner is suffering from either adjustment disorder with depression or Major Depression.  Both are of the view that he would benefit from psychiatric intervention.  That intervention would probably consist of counselling with a psychologist or psychiatrist and the prescription of appropriate anti-depressant medication…
[39] As indicated above, my observation of Mr. Penner is that he is a driven, somewhat obsessive individual.  It is my view that much of Mr. Penner’s self-esteem is wrapped in his job performance.  Before the accident he was able to draw on very high levels of energy to permit himself to devote considerable energy both to work and his social and home life.  It is apparent to me that the symptoms he is experiencing, whether from depression or his organic injury, have contributed directly and indirectly to a significant diminution in Mr. Penner’s energy levels.  The preponderance of evidence before me satisfies me that Mr. Penner will continue to experience pain and mobility difficulties regardless of whether he avails himself of psychiatric intervention and/or a regime of physical exercise.  However, I am also of the view that a combination of such treatment, exercise and lifestyle changes would result in a significant improvement in the quality of Mr. Penner’s life and a diminution of his pain perception.  My view is that a necessary component of Mr. Penner’s adjustment to his altered circumstances would be for him to reduce the amount of time and energy he is devoting to his employment.

[55] Mr. Penner has satisfied me that the pain which he is experiencing is “real” in the sense that it is genuine and that he has honestly reported it in his evidence and to his treating physicians.  I am also satisfied, and it appears to be common ground, that the psychological component of Mr. Penner’s pain was caused by the defendant’s negligent act.  I am satisfied that Mr. Penner’s life has been significantly changed for the worse as a result of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.  Given his present condition and, in particular, the persistent pain he experiences, the dramatic degradation of the quality of his social and family life, his loss of libido and loss of ability to engage in activities that he formerly found pleasurable, or at least significant restriction in his ability to engage in those activities, I assess non-pecuniary damages in this case at $100,000 before taking into account the reasonable prospect that Mr. Penner’s condition could be significantly improved if he acts on the recommendations made by the medical experts in this case.

[56] The medical evidence in this case is that a regimen of exercise coupled with psychiatric treatment would be beneficial for Mr. Penner.  According to Dr. Smith such treatment would result in a very significant reduction in Mr. Penner’s perception of pain.  Dr. Riar and Dr. Gouws are of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from psychiatric intervention to address his depressive symptoms.  Dr. Hirsch is of the view that Mr. Penner would benefit from a regimen of physical exercise.  I am, however, mindful of the fact that all of the doctors agree that Mr. Penner will continue to experience symptoms and that none of the medical evidence in this case quantifies with any specificity the probability that the recommended treatments will be effective.  It is also my view that psychiatric intervention and treatment of depression are somewhat problematic in terms of lasting benefits given the underlying causes of Mr. Penner’s depression.  Finally, I must take into account the substantial possibility that Mr. Penner’s psychiatric problems may recur or be worsened if he loses his current employment. In his report, Dr. Smith says this:

With effective treatment Mr. Penner’s problems will improve. Without treatment he may become more dysfunctional, and if Mr. Penner for some reason loses his job his mood would likely crash as a good deal of his self- esteem is built around his work performance.

[57] Taking these contingencies into account, I assess Mr. Penner’s compensable non-pecuniary damages in this case at $80,000.

More on BC Injury Claims and Mode of Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Jury Trials, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on More on BC Injury Claims and Mode of Trial

Further to my previous post about parties flip-flopping on their choice to have a Trial by Jury in a BC Injury Claim reasons for judgement were released today considering the issue of “whether or not a party who has taken the necessary two steps to require a trial by jury…can change that mode of election before the trial commences“.
In today’s case (Iskum v. Badali) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle collisions.  The Plaintiff sued and both cases were set for trial.  The defence lawyers in each lawsuit filed Jury Notices within the time frames required.    The Defendants paid the Jury fees as required by the Rules of Court.  Late in the litigation new defence lawyers were appointed and 10 days before trial they told the Plaintiff’s lawyer that they intended to have this matter tried before a judge without a jury.  The Plaintiff objected arguing that it was too late for the defendant to change their mind.
Madam Justice Griffin agreed with the Plaintiff and reasoned as follows:

[10] Here, the plaintiff did not exercise any right to trial by jury.  The plaintiff simply did not contest the defendants’ election of trial by jury.

[11] Thus, the issue before me does not have to do so much with a party’s right to a jury trial, rather, it has to do with a party’s right to know the mode of trial no later than 30 days before trial.  The issue properly framed is whether or not a party who has taken the necessary two steps to require trial by jury, as set out in Rule 39(26), can later change that mode of election before the trial commences…

[30] I find that by taking the two steps set out in Rule 39(26), the defendants “required a jury,” and therefore the payment of the subsequent fees is mandatory pursuant to s. 17 of theJury Act.

[31] The defendants suggest that having paid the first set of fees, they can decide to not pay the second set of fees simply by giving notice to the sheriff that they no longer require a trial by jury.  They suggest that s. 19 indicates that the trial judge has discretion to allow this.

[32] I find that s. 19 of the Jury Act does not give a party who has elected trial by jury the right to simply give notice that it will not pay the jury fees required on a daily basis and thereby unilaterally un-elect the mode of trial by jury.  Rather, the payment of those fees is mandatory and only if they are not paid will the sheriff bring this to the attention of the court to make such order as the court considers just.  This preserves the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, but does not confer a procedural right on a party to simply “un-elect” trial by jury by not paying subsequent fees.

[33] Here, the defendants attempted to unilaterally un-elect trial by jury within 10 days of the trial starting by simply advising the sheriff and the other side that they no longer wished to proceed by trial by jury.  I conclude that the Rules of Court do not allow for such a re-election within 30 days before trial.  I find that the defendants had no authority to do so under theRules of Court.

[34] It is clear that the Rules of Court do not allow for a party to elect trial by jury late in the process.  This election must be made within strict time limits set out in Rule 39(26).

[35] The mode of trial is very relevant to how the parties will prepare for trial and is also relevant to settlement discussions before trial.  The Rules of Court as a whole recognize that it is not efficient to conduct civil trials by ambush.  Civil trials are more efficient and settlement is more likely if parties have advance notice of not just the case they have to meet, but the mode of trial.  The 30-day notice period in Rule 39(26) is there to provide parties with some certainty as to the mode of trial with a goal of efficient resolution of disputes.

[36] As noted by Mr. Justice Taylor of our Court of Appeal in Hoare v. Firestone Canada Inc. (1989), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 237 at 241:

The learned judge very properly emphasized the importance of the right to elect for jury trial.  But on a broad consideration of the rules and authorities which has been possible in these appeal proceedings I have concluded that the election is intended to be made once only, at a particular stage, and for good reason.  If the trial may be before judge and jury, rather than judge alone, that is generally an important consideration for both parties in preparation of the case and perhaps, indeed, in the selection of counsel.  It is, I think, for these reasons that the rules require the election to be made, once for all, soon after the action is set down, instead of leaving the parties free to elect thereafter on the basis of later developments.

[37] As a matter of common sense and in light of the clear purpose of the Rules of Court to avoid trial by ambush, the time limits imposed on the mode of selection of trial apply whether the mode of trial is by jury or is by judge alone.  I conclude that were it intended to be otherwise, there would be an express provision in the Rules of Court, pursuant to which a party could unilaterally elect to proceed by judge alone, despite having elected trial by jury by meeting the requirements of Rule 39(26) at least 30 days before trial.  There is no such provision.

[38] Rather, once the election has been made and has crystallized by the taking of the two steps set out in Rule 39(26) at least 30 days prior to trial, the only basis for a party to set aside the election of trial by jury is pursuant to Rule 39(27) on the basis that the case is unsuitable for trial by jury.

[39] On its face, Rule 39(27) would seem to apply only to the party who has received the jury notice.  However Rule 35(4) provides that the court, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, may order that the trial proceed without a jury on any of the grounds set out in Rule 39(27).  In this regard, see Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd. (1979), 12 B.C.L.R. 335 (S.C.), aff’d 14 B.C.L.R. 377 (C.A.).

[40] This brings me back to the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in Molnar.  I conclude that having elected trial by jury, the defendants must proceed with a jury unless they can discharge the onus of proving that this matter is not suitable for a jury on the grounds set out in Rule 39(27).

[41] Here, the defendants did not apply at this pre-trial conference to set aside the jury notice, and advanced no argument based on the grounds set out in Rule 39(27).  It is clear that the defendants simply asserted that they had a right to re-elect trial by judge alone at any time prior to the start of trial.  I have found that the Rules of Court do not permit this.

This is the first case that I am aware of dealing with these specific facts making this case a useful precedent.  Now the question is will this precedent continue to be useful once the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules come into force?

The answer appears to be yes.  This case turned on the Court’s interpretation and application of Rule 39(26).  This rule is replaced in the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules at Rule 12-6(3) which is almost identical to the current rule in its language and requirements (there are some minor changes in the timelines involved but otherwise the rules appear identical).  If a party wants to change their minds after filing a Jury Notice they better do so before paying the Jury Fees otherwise it appears to be too late.

To read my other posts cross referencing the current Rules with the New BC Supreme Court Rules simply click here or on the New BC Supreme Court Rules tag below.