Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, dismissing a negligence claim against a bus driver whose hard braking injured several passengers.
In today’s case (Clarkson v Elding) multiple plaintiffs sued for damages following injuries sustained while passengers on a bus. The Defendant operator “braked suddenly to avoid a collision with a pedestrian who was jaywalking across East Hastings.” The resulting force of the braking “caused many passengers on the bus, including the plaintiffs, to fall or be slammed against seats and/or other passengers“.
The claims were dismissed with the court finding no negligence in these circumstances. In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice Horsman provided the following reasons:
The legal principle of “agony of collision” sometimes also called “agony of the moment” gives wide latitude to a Plaintiff who is confronted with a sudden and unexpected hazard on the roadway due to someone else’s negligence. This principle was in action in reasons for judgement published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Biggar v. Enns) the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle and was riding in a staggered fashion behind the Defendant who was also operating a motorcycle. The Defendant rounded a curve and was out of sight of the plaintiff. During this time the Defendant took his eyes off the road and drifted into the oncoming lane of traffic. He crossed back over the centre line and re-entered his intended lane of travel roughly perpendicular to the proper direction of travel.
At this moment the plaintiff rounded the corner, saw the Defendant in his lane and braked hard losing control of his bike and crashing.
The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was partly at fault as a more prudent motorist could have avoided the hazard he posed. The Court disagreed and in doing so relied on the agony of collision principle finding the Defendant fully at fault. Madam Justice Sharma provided the following reasons:
 In my view, the phrase “agony of the moment” aptly describes the plaintiff’s situation. The plaintiff’s first reaction was to avoid colliding with the defendant, or an oncoming vehicle. Therefore, it was a reasonable course of action for him to brake hard which caused his bike to fall and slide. The defendant agreed that in order to avoid hitting him, the plaintiff had to brake hard, and that made the plaintiff’s bike fall.
 In my view the evidence is clear that the plaintiff was riding in a prudent and careful manner. There is no evidence that his speed was inappropriate for the conditions of the road or any other circumstance.
 As noted earlier, I do not accept the defendant’s argument that once he lost sight of the defendant in front of him, the plaintiff should have slowed down more than he did. Also, I have already concluded the plaintiff was driving at an appropriate rate of speed, and that he had already slowed down.
 Drivers are entitled to assume that other people will be driving in a prudent and safe manner. In Bern v. Jung, 2010 BCSC 730 the plaintiff lost control of a bicycle because of a sudden and unexpected presence of the defendant’s vehicle travelling in the wrong direction. The Court noted, at paras. 13-14, that the plaintiff was forced to act quickly and apply his brakes quickly and that he should not be found contributorily negligent for doing so.
 In this case the plaintiff was entitled to assume that his friend had negotiated the curve safely; coming upon the defendant situated in front of him and perpendicular to his line of traffic was unexpected and sudden. The plaintiff cannot be blamed for doing what I find to be the only reasonable thing he could do to avoid a more serious accident: applying his brakes hard. I conclude it was the defendant’s string of actions (looking to the canyon, and trying to get back in position instead of waiting on the shoulder) that caused the accident.
 For all those reasons, I find the defendant 100% liable for the accident.
Reasons for judgement were released earlier this week demonstrating liability after a motorist intimidated a cyclist who subsequently crashed.
In this week’s case (Davies v. Elston) the Plaintiff was an experienced cyclist. As he a passed parked truck whose mirror extended into the bike lane the Plaintiff’s son who was riding with him commented about the truck. The truck’s owner heard this, jumped in his vehicle and drove after the cyclists to confront them. Words were exchanged during which time the truck came close enough that the Plaintiff placed his hand on the passenger side window of the vehicle. As the truck drove away the Plaintiff lost control of his bicycle and fractured his pelvis.
The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was solely at fault for the incident. Madam Justice Griffin disagreed and found the defendant fully responsible. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
 As for whether Mr. Elston’s conduct was negligent, I find that the defendant fell below the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent driver, in driving alongside the two cyclists and yelling at them, while so close to the bike lane that it made it intimidating, threatening and unsafe for the cyclists; and then in addition in pulling away quickly, without warning, with Mr. Davies so close by and with his hand on the truck.
 It is obvious as a matter of common sense that such driving conduct was without reasonable care for the safety of the cyclists and was negligent.
 No matter how aggravating a cyclist’s behaviour might be, and I find there was nothing aggravating about the Davies’ conduct, a driver of a motor vehicle can never be justified in deliberately using a motor vehicle to confront a cyclist who is riding a bike. Confrontation creates a serious risk of harm to the cyclist which is way out of proportion to anything the cyclist might have done. A driver of a motor vehicle is not entitled to impose a penalty of death or serious bodily harm on a cyclist just because the cyclist was rude or broke a traffic rule.
 It has to be remembered that motor vehicles have four wheels, automatic brakes, seatbelts, and the driver is nicely encased in a heavy steel cage and that a person on a bicycle is not in a situation which is the least bit comparable, even if going the same speed as a vehicle. A cyclist cannot stop on a dime, is vulnerable to losing balance, and can be seriously injured or killed if he or she makes contact with a motor vehicle or falls at a high speed.
 Mr. Elston and Jim Davies knew this at the time that Mr. Elston was confronting Jim Davies. This is what made the situation so unnerving for Jim Davies and this was entirely foreseeable to Mr. Elston who wished to intimidate him.
 I conclude that but for Mr. Elston’s aggressive and negligent conduct, Jim Davies would not have fallen from his bike. Mr. Elston’s negligence therefore caused the accident and resultant injuries.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the liability of a motorist who darts into traffic causing a cyclist to lose control.
In this week’s case (Graham v. Carson) the Defendant motorist was stopped at a commercial loading zone and the “darted out into traffic too quickly” when it was unsafe to do so. The Plaintiff, who was travelling in the same direction, lost control trying to avoid a collision with the Defendant and subsequently drove his bicycle into a parked car causing injury to himself. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was the author of his own misfortune. Mr. Justice Macintosh rejected this argument finding the Plaintiff acted reasonably in the agony of collision and that the Defendant was fully to blame. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:  Having found as I have regarding the turn signal, I add that the failure to signal is not the central concern in this case. If Ms. Carson had signalled at about the same moment she pulled out and drove into the traffic, the signal would have been of little or no assistance to anyone. The main problem was that Ms. Carson’s car darted out into traffic too quickly. The traffic was proceeding south on Blanshard immediately behind or beside her car when her car had been stopped in the commercial zone moments before that. She should have waited for a safe opening in the traffic, which might have entailed waiting where she was until the light changed so as to stop the southerly flow on Blanshard before cars started south onto Blanshard from Fort Street…  Proceeding through the green light southward on Blanshard were, first, the SUV, second, the plaintiff on his bicycle, and third, Mr. Enns in his car. The SUV, the plaintiff’s bicycle and the Enns car were thrown into disarray by the defendant driver pulling out too suddenly, immediately in front of the SUV.  I noted above that the SUV stopped before hitting the defendant’s car, but avoiding that collision was a near thing. The SUV had to stop very quickly. Mr. Enns veered his car toward the left; that is, toward the centremost of the southbound lanes on Blanshard, in order to avoid a collision. Meanwhile, the plaintiff on his bike had a matter of seconds to decide what to do. He was conscious from past experience that he risked being rear‑ended by the Enns vehicle if he stayed his course and simply braked, hoping to stop in time to avoid hitting the SUV. Instead, he steered his bike, to the right, into what appeared as a metre‑wide opening between the stopped SUV and a car parked on Blanshard, just south of the commercial zone.  As I noted above, Mr. Graham is an experienced cyclist, and hoping to avoid injury by driving into the space between the SUV and the parked car was not unreasonable in that dire circumstance, when there was no time and little opportunity to do anything else.  Unfortunately, that escape route did not save the plaintiff. His elbow hit the mirror of the parked car, breaking off the mirror. That impact drove him from his bike and injured him, thus giving rise to this claim…  My view of the evidence and my resulting findings of fact lead to my conclusion that the defendant driver is fully liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. He acted promptly and not unreasonably in a desperate situation, which was brought about entirely by Ms. Carson’s re‑entering traffic when her car should have stayed where it was until there was a safe opportunity to proceed.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, finding a motorist who was struck while stationary fully at fault for a collision.
In last week’s case (Hart v. Jackson) the Defendant lost control of his vehicle in winter driving conditions and drove into a snow bank. A good Samaritan helped him retrieve his vehicle leaving it facing southbound in the northbound lane. The Defendant’s vehicle’s wheel wells were packed with snow such that it could not be steered. The Defendant spend several minutes using a ice scraper to remove the snow. At the same time the Plaintiff vehicle was driving Northbound. When he realized the Defendant vehicle was in his lane he applied his brakes but could not avoid the collision.
In finding the Defendant fully at fault for the crash Mr. Justice McKinnon provided the following reasons:  In my view, Mr. Jacobsen was not a credible witness. He argued with plaintiff’s counsel, dismissed the plaintiff’s expert opinion about the Kia’s woeful lack of winter readiness, and generally set himself up as an expert northern driver fully alert and ready for winter conditions.  It was somewhat telling that even the defendant’s expert engineer was critical of the defendant’s position that “all weather tires” were perfectly adequate for northern winter driving.  The defendant testified that he drove at a constant speed of 75 KPH, which clearly was too fast, given the state of his vehicle, particularly the condition of his tires. Before the collision at issue in this case, the defendant’s vehicle began to slide as it rounded the curve referred to earlier and it ended up in the snow bank off the northbound lane. A passing motorist stopped to assist and pulled him out, leaving the Kia facing southbound in the northbound lane. According to Mr. Jacobsen he was “at most a foot away from the snow bank”.  Unfortunately, the wheel wells were packed with snow and thus the Kia could not be steered. The defendant had no shovel and so was reduced to chipping away at the wheel wells with a snow scraper to free up the steering. Although his vehicle was equipped with four way flashers he did not turn these on but did have his head lights on.  He said that as he was close to completing this task, he heard a flashing or skipping noise, turned to his left and saw a silver pickup sliding toward him. He said he turned and leaped into the ditch, never taking any strides.  Mr. Jacobsen denied ever admitting to either Mr. Landolt or Mr. Hart that the collision was his fault, indeed he capped that denial by asserting that “I was parked, it wasn’t my fault”. As stated earlier in this judgment, I did not find Mr. Jacobsen to be a credible witness. I found that the plaintiff and Mr. Landolt were credible and prefer their evidence over that of the defendant Jacobsen…  Mr. Jacobsen had his Kia parked in the northbound lane facing southbound. It is not entirely clear just how much of the Kia was in the northbound lane but it was to a substantial degree such that a northbound driver like Mr. Hart could conclude he was facing an immediate hazard.  The defendant was not just momentarily parked in this hazardous position but remained there for some 15 minutes, all the while scraping away at the wheel wells with a tool not designed for such work. Thus we have a vehicle, substantially in the northbound lane with a pedestrian walking around it posing an additional hazard to northbound traffic. The Kia’s head lights were on but the hazard lights were not. Given the curve and hump, the true nature of the hazard would not be readily apparent to the driver of a northbound vehicle until he rounded the curve and was so close to the parked vehicle that a collision was inevitable…  The two experts both agree that Mr. Jacobsen ought not to have been driving on “all season” tires which they testified were completely inappropriate for northern driving.  In my view, Mr. Hart was faced with the “agony of collision” doctrine. Given the curve and hump that obscured any clear view of just where the Kia was, he could not appreciate just what hazard was facing him. By the time he was able to see that the Kia was in fact parked substantially in his northbound lane there was almost no time to react. He cannot be faulted for opting to brake as opposed to some other manoeuvre: see Soto v. Peel, 2013 BCSC 409; Ayers v. Singh (1997), 85 B.C.A.C. 307, 69 A.C.W.S. (3d) 207; and Brook v. Tod Estate, 2012 BCSC 1947.  I also accept that Mr. Jacobsen had a duty to warn oncoming motorists of the hazard he had created by at least operating his four way flashers. The better course would have been to flag the curve with emergency reflectors but he had no such equipment: see Skinner v. Fu, 2010 BCCA 321.
In what can only be described as a unique and bizarre collision, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, assessing fault for a collision where an individual was struck by his own vehicle put in motion by his spouse.
In this week’s case (Mayne v. Mayne) the Plaintiff was in his vehicle with his wife, the Defendant, occupying the passenger seat. As he was pulling out of his garage he stopped the vehicle and went back in his home to retrieve a key. He left the vehicle running in neutral (mistakenly believing it had been placed in park). The vehicle slowly started to run down into the roadway. His wife, concerned it would be involved in a collision, reached over and attempted to put the vehicle in park. She was not successful, however, and shifted the vehicle into drive. The vehicle lurched forward and struck the Plaintiff who was just coming back out of the home.
The Court found both individuals equally to blame for the incident. In placing 50% of the fault on the Defendant Madam Justice Bruce provided the following reasons:  Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I am unable to find that Mrs. Mayne has satisfied the onus of proof regarding the defence of “agony of the moment”. There was only a nominal risk of harm to the neighbour’s home and Mrs. Mayne panicked and took unreasonable and dangerous steps to stop the backward rolling vehicle. While Mrs. Mayne did not expect the Buick to roll backward, having no foreknowledge of Mr. Mayne’s failure to engage the emergency brake or to leave the vehicle in park, she nevertheless severely overreacted to the perceived danger. Given the very slight slope of the driveway, and viewed in light of the video presentation showing the likely speed of the Buick as it rolled backward, it is apparent that things were not happening quickly at all. The Buick was travelling ever so slowly albeit in a backward direction. There was no one in the area and the roadway was devoid of other traffic. The neighbour’s home was a considerable distance away. The Buick would have to travel out of the driveway, over the first curb, cross the roadway and negotiate the next curb, and travel through the lawn and the hedges of the neighbour’s home before it would have come into contact with a structure.  In these circumstances, Mrs. Mayne had time to consider what to do. She could have easily unbuckled her seatbelt to make it easier to reach over and place the vehicle in park. She could have simply taken the key out of the ignition. There was no imminent danger from any objective point of view.  The court must not make armchair judgments based on hindsight; however, clearly Mrs. Mayne panicked in a situation that would not have panicked a reasonable person in the same circumstances. Counsel argued that her age should be a factor. At 81, her reaction times and her judgment would be impaired. However, the law cannot countenance a lower standard for elderly drivers. Mrs. Mayne had a drivers’ licence and regularly operated the Buick. As a consequence, the court must presume that she possessed sufficient competence to operate a motor vehicle safely.  For these reasons, I find that Mrs. Mayne was negligent when she took control of the Buick and struck Mr. Mayne.
Update November 28, 2013 – the below decision was upheld by the BC Court of Appeal in reasons for judgement released today
___________________________________________________ I have previously discussed the ‘agony of collision’ doctrine which can shield a motorist from liability following a collision if they are faced with a sudden and unexpected hazard not of their making. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, demonstrating this doctrine in action.
In last week’s case (Brook v. Tod Estate) the Defendant Goodrick changed lanes when it was unsafe to do so. Her lane change resulted in a potential collision with a vehicle driven by the Defendant Tod who swerved away into the oncoming lane of traffic. The decision proved fatal with his vehicle striking the on-coming Plaintiff’s vehicle in a head-on collision. The Defendant Tod died in the crash and the Plaintiff sustained injuries.
The Plaintiff sued both Defendants. The Court found the Defendant Goodrick was negligent in making an unsafe lane change. The Defendant Tod, however, was found faultless for the “agonizing choice made…in the last two or three seconds of his life as he attempted to avoid an accident“. Mr. Justice Affleck provided the following reasons addressing ‘agony of collision’:  Mr. Tod’s counsel stresses the law in relation to the agony of collision which would exonerate Mr. Tod of mistakes which he made in an emergency situation. In Van Zanten v. Bruhs, 1991 CanLII 1023 (BCSC), Mr. Justice A.G. Mackinnon referred to Carswell’s Manual of Motor Vehicle Law, Volume III, 3rd edition, at page 22, where there is a discussion of agony of collision. These words are found: In a number of cases concerning what is commonly called ‘agony of the collision,’ it has been pointed out that a driver acting in an emergency created by another vehicle or by some extraneous fact cannot be expected to exercise nice judgment and prompt decision, and mere errors of judgment in such circumstances may often be excusable … Where an emergency arises, it is not necessary for a driver to possess extraordinary skill, presence of mind, poise or self-control, and his failure to act as an ordinary person in an emergency is not held to be negligence. He is not necessarily required to adopt the most prudent course and is entitled to a reasonable time, depending on the circumstances, to exercise his judgment as to what steps should be taken to avoid a collision [citations ommitted.]  Counsel has submitted that it was Mr. Brook who faced the agony of collision and yet his evasive efforts, although fruitless, have not been characterized as negligence. On the other hand it is argued Mr. Tod had choices available to him and his circumstances cannot be properly characterized as the agony of collision. Notwithstanding the able arguments of Ms. Goodrick’s counsel, I do not agree that Mr. Tod did not face an agonizing choice with no time to make a considered decision. I have found Ms. Goodrick’s vehicle intruded into the fast lane already occupied by Mr. Tod’s vehicle. She began her lane change and simultaneously saw Mr. Tod’s vehicle overlapping hers by several feet. It was not realistic to expect Mr. Tod to make an instantaneous decision to accept a collision, no matter how minor it might in retrospect have been, with Ms. Goodrick’s vehicle. In the negligible time available to Mr. Tod, he cannot have been expected to weigh that fine calculation. It is true he could have braked. One difficulty with that proposition is that it cannot be now known if he both braked and swerved. What we do know from the evidence of Mr. Leggett is that Mr. Tod was travelling at a safe speed. He did not create the danger that caused him to react in the agony of the moment. If there had been a collision between his car and Ms. Goodrick’s car, we cannot know if one or both of those cars would have lost control leading to this accident.  Mr. Garner for the plaintiff submits Mr. Tod had a higher standard of care imposed on him because Ms. Goodrick’s car had an “N” plate on the back indicating she was a novice driver. I doubt if the presence of that letter on a car changes the standard of care of other drivers, but in any event, Mr. Tod was driving with reasonable care before he was cut off by Ms. Goodrick’s failure to see his car before beginning her lane change. It is not open to this Court to criticize the agonizing choice made by Mr. Tod in the last two or three seconds of his life as he attempted to avoid an accident which I find was caused solely by the negligence of the defendant, Ms. Goodrick.
I have written numerous times about ICBC hit and run claims and a Plaintiff’s obligation to make ‘all reasonable efforts’ to identify an unknown motorist prior to being able to successfully sue ICBC for damages. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further addressing this obligation.
In this week’s case (Akbari v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision in which he struck a light pole. The Plaintiff alleged an unknown motorist ran a red light forcing him to take evasive action in the agony of collision. This motorist fled the scene. Madam Justice Baker accepted this and found that an unidentified driver did indeed cause the collision.
ICBC argued that the Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because he failed to make all reasonable efforts to identify the motorist after the fact. The steps ICBC suggested included staking out the intersection to try and see the vehicle on a subsequent occasion and interviewing residents at a nearby townhouse complex. Madam Justice Baker found these suggestions to be nothing more than a ‘fool’s errand’ that would be fruitless. In finding the Plaintiff’s actions reasonable the Court provided the following reasons:  I am satisfied that Mr. Akbari did make all reasonable efforts to ascertain the identity of the unknown driver in the circumstances that pertained here. Mr. Akbari’s vehicle could not be driven and he was injured and in pain; he could hardly be expected to attempt to pursue the southbound vehicle on foot. Mr. Akbari told the attending police officer ? Constable Da Silva ? that another vehicle had been involved and he provided a description of the vehicle as a light-colored – white or silver – small car. Mr. Perez confirmed the involvement of the other vehicle and the description. Constable Da Silva obviously considered there to be little or no prospect of locating the suspect vehicle even minutes after it had left the scene; he did make any effort to do so, or to alert other patrol cars to search for the vehicle.  Mr. Akbari recalls having inquired of Messrs. Shiles at the scene to find out if they had seen the vehicle that crossed his path. The accident was reported to the defendant as a “hit and run” within two hours after the collision happened. Both Mr. Akbari and his father provided statements to ICBC. Upon learning from his counsel of his obligation to attempt to ascertain the identity of the driver who left the scene, Mr. Akbari posted a sign at the intersection asking any witnesses to come forward. If any part of Mr. Chinchilla’s testimony is to be believed, it is that he saw the sign on the past at the intersection, and it was that sign that prompted him to contact ICBC and, eventually, Mr. Akbari’s counsel.  Mr. Akbari also contacted Constable Da Silva a few days after the accident and asked whether there was a traffic camera at the intersection where the accident happened. Constable Da Silva said if there was a camera, it likely took only one photo ? when the light turned green ? but he said he would check and get back to Mr. Akbari. It was reasonable for Mr. Akbari to assume that there was no camera ? or no useful footage ? when he heard nothing further from Constable Da Silva.  When Mr. Akbari realized that Ms. Berry did not know about Mr. Chinchilla and his claim to have witnessed the collision, he made sure that Ms. Berry was provided with the phone number he had for Mr. Chinchilla.  Counsel for the defendant suggested to Mr. Akbari that he should have canvassed the residents of the townhouse complex located near the intersection to search for possible witnesses, but I consider that would have been a fool’s errand. The photographs of the scene indicate that the townhouse complex is some distance off the roadway and that it is highly unlikely that anyone in the townhouse complex would have been able to see anything happening in the intersection, particularly late at night, when it was dark and raining. The resident who did call to report the collision only did so because she heard the sound of the crash.  Counsel also suggested that Mr. Akbari could have staked out the intersection to see if he could spot the vehicle that crossed his path. Again, this would have been fruitless, I conclude, as neither he nor Mr. Perez was able to recall anything more specific than the fact that the other vehicle was a light-colored small car.  To summarize, I am satisfied that it is more probable than not that the accident was caused by the negligent actions of an unidentified driver who entered the intersection from 84th Avenue against a red light; and drove across Nordel, cutting off Mr. Akbari’s vehicle when it was so close to the intersection as to pose an immediate hazard. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr. Akbari did not fail to meet the standard of care required of a reasonably prudent motorist when he swerved to avoid colliding with the vehicle crossing his path.  I am also satisfied that Mr. Akbari made all reasonable efforts to ascertain the identity of the unknown driver; and that the unknown driver’s identity is not ascertainable.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, following a summary trial addressing negligence for a collision which occurred after a tree suddenly fell onto a roadway.
In this week’s case (Waters v. Mariash) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision after a cottonwood tree “suddenly fell across the the highway, cutting off both lanes“. The Plaintiff was in the curb lane and struck the tree. The Defendant was driving in the inside lane a few car lengths behind the Plaintiff. He hit his brakes, his vehicle fishtailed and hit the tree and the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The Plaintiff argued the Defendant was negligent but the Court disagreed dismissing the claim against him. In doing so Madam Justice Humphries provided the following reasons: The defendant said on discovery that he was about 100-150 feet away from the tree when he started to brake. He said he had switched into the fast lane to avoid the merging traffic from 176th Street, and had been travelling about 100 kph in a zone posted at that speed. He reduced his speed to about 90 – 95 kph when the downpour started. He was travelling 8 – 10 car lengths behind the plaintiff’s Bronco. When he saw the tree begin to fall, he put on his engine brake and downshifted, breaking and beginning to slide a little on the wet pavement. His tires were brand new Michelins…
The accident occurred on a heavily travelled freeway near between Vancouver and Surrey. While there is always the possibility of obstructions on such a highway, such as an animal or a child dashing out, it would be a very remote possibility in such a location.
The accident was not the result of an obstruction such as branches or debris that one might expect in a wind storm and that would be there to be seen if one were travelling at a reasonable speed. This accident occurred because a tree fell suddenly in front of both vehicles, blocking both lanes. Both vehicles hit the tree.
This is not similar to a situation where a driver is travelling in the winter and is expected to cope with unexpected icy patches (according to the Court of Appeal in Redlack v. Vekved, supra, but perhaps not inHearn v. Rowland, supra). There is no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the defendant in this case was driving beyond his own competence or that of his vehicle. He was travelling below the speed limit. He was faced with an unexpected event that could not be anticipated and he reacted reasonably. The other options suggested by the plaintiff are not reasonable in these exigent circumstances, and may have been even more dangerous.
According to Hearn v. Rowland, the defendant does bear a heavier onus if he asserts a defence of inevitable accident, but not if he seeks to show, as in this case, that the accident happened without any negligence on his part. The onus is therefore on the plaintiff to show that the accident occurred as a result of the defendant’s negligence. I am not persuaded that he has done so.
The action against the defendant Mariash is dismissed, with costs at Scale B.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, discussing the issue of fault for a crash involving black ice.
In this week’s case (Johns v. Friesen) the Plaintiff was a passenger in the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant encountered black ice and lost control of his vehicle. The Plaintiff was injured in this incident and sued for damages. The value of the Plaintiff’s case was agreed to leaving the Court to deal only with the issue of fault. Madam Justice Kloegman ultimately found that the Defendant was not driving negligently and dismissed the Plaintiff’s injury claim. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
In my opinion, this was an unfortunate case of accident that is not attributable to anyone. There is an insufficient evidentiary basis to find that the defendant Friesen was driving below the standard of care of a reasonable, prudent driver. In fact, the evidence established that although it was winter, the driving conditions were good. The Truck and tires were in new and excellent condition. The plaintiff and defendant Friesen were both well-rested. The road conditions were good the day before and that morning, both through Merritt and on the highway. There had been no warnings from any source of black ice. The black ice was invisible, and the defendant Friesen was driving at least 20 kilometers per hour below the speed limit.
The standard of care of a driver in these circumstances is not one of perfection: Hadden v. Lynch, 2008 BCSC 295 at para. 69. The defendant Friesen admitted that he should not have braked, but braking in such a situation is an automatic reflex to try and regain control of a skidding vehicle. The plaintiff did not suggest that this automatic reaction of the defendant Friesen could be the sole foundation for a successful allegation of negligence.
In conclusion, I dismiss the plaintiff’s case as having failed to show on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff was negligent in the circumstances.
This case, along with the fast approaching winter season, makes this an opportune time to remind passengers injured in single vehicle collisions of the use their statement to ICBC can have on their injury claim. My previous post addressing this topic can be found here.
When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.
This blog is authored by personal injury and ICBC Claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Use of the site and sending or receiving information through it does not establish a solicitor/client relationship. The views expressed and the content provided on this blog is for nonprofit educational purposes. It is not, and is not intended to be, legal advice on any specific set of facts. The use of this website does not create a solicitor-client (attorney-client) relationship. If you require legal advice, you should contact a lawyer directly.