Rule 37B and Withdrawn Formal Settlement Offers
I’ve written many times about the relatively new Rule 37B and its consequences in BC personal injury claims (click here to read my previous posts), yesterday reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court (New Westminster Registry) giving more clarity to this rule.
In yesterday’s case, ICBC v. Patko, ICBC sued the defendant alleging fraud. In the course of the proceedings the Defendant made 2 offers to settle, one of which was withdrawn prior to trial and replaced with a subsequent formal offer. The Jury dismissed ICBC’s claim against the Plaintiff. In deciding what costs consequences should flow from these facts one of the issues decided by Mr. Justice Grauer of the BC Supreme Court was whether costs consequences can flow from a formal Rule 37B settlement offer when that offer is withdrawn prior to trial. In finding that Rule 37B does permit costs consequences to be triggered in these circumstances the court stated as follows:
 Jonathen Patko made a formal offer to settle to ICBC in the amount of $22,500 on June 5, 2007. On June 4, 2008, after Mr. Patko had pleaded guilty to the quasi-criminal charge against him and had been fined and ordered to pay restitution, he withdrew that offer. On October 23, 2008, when it became clear that a summary trial was impracticable and this matter would therefore proceed to a full trial, Mr. Patko delivered a further offer to settle in the amount of $11,000.
 Because the action against Mr. Patko was dismissed, the issue addressed by my brother Goepel in A.E. v. D.W.J., 2009 BCSC 505, does not arise, except to confirm that my discretion is limited by the provisions of Rule 37B(5).
 The plaintiff argues that the first offer to settle, dated June 5, 2007, is of no consequence and cannot be considered, because it was revoked a year later. As to both offers, the plaintiff argues that neither was “one that ought reasonably to have been accepted” in accordance with Rule 37B(6)(a). In this regard, the plaintiff pointed out that it had paid out over $55,000 as a consequence of the accident and its aftermath, and that Mr. Patko admitted his lie. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued, both offers were for far less than what the plaintiff had paid out and might have reasonably expected to recover. ICBC would, of course, have had to pay out that $55,000 even if Mr. Patko had not lied. This reality did not seem to factor in its assessment of the claim and Mr. Patko’s offers.
 The first question is whether I am limited to considering the second offer to settle, given that the first was revoked a year after it was made.
 In my view, there is nothing in Rule 37B that would place that limitation on my discretion. Notwithstanding the evolution of the treatment of offers to settle in the Rules, it is clear that one of the principal purposes of Rule 37B remains the same as that noted of the former Rule 37 by Cumming J.A. in Skidmore v. Blackmore (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 330 (C.A.):
… to encourage conduct that reduces the duration and expense of litigation, and to discourage conduct that has the opposite effect.
 Both offers constitute an “offer to settle” within the meaning of Rule 37B(1)(a). Although the first offer was indeed revoked, it was outstanding for a full year. The real question is whether, notwithstanding its eventual withdrawal, it was an offer that ought reasonably to have been accepted while it remained open. To treat it this way is, in my view, consistent with the object described by Cumming J.A. in Skidmore.
 Turning to the issue of reasonableness, I do not think that this question turns on the losing party’s view, at the time that the offer was made, of the result it might expect to achieve. Rather, reasonableness must be viewed from the perspective of the state of the litigation at the time of the offer, and from the perspective of the result. In this case, the issues were clear at the time of the first offer, let alone the second. This was not a case where, for instance, further discovery and investigation was required before the plaintiff could reasonably evaluate its position in light of the offer.
 As to the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s expectation, I note that it was ICBC who had chosen trial by jury, thereby accepting the degree of uncertainty that arises from that mode of trial.
 Moreover, it was the plaintiff that chose to bind itself by a “zero tolerance” policy, which prevented the possibility of a compromise settlement in a case that was not a typical automobile insurance fraud claim. It was certainly open to ICBC to adopt such a policy, no doubt for its own good reasons. But in this proceeding, the policy worked against ICBC, allowing for no flexibility notwithstanding the unique facts of the case.
 In all of these circumstances, I conclude that the first offer was one which ought reasonably to have been accepted. In choosing not to accept it because of its own assessment of the strength of its position and its “zero-tolerance” policy, ICBC took its chances, and it lost.
 Taking that into account, as well as the other factors set out in Rule 37B(6), and the course of the litigation in general, I conclude that Jonathen Patko should be awarded double costs of all steps taken in this proceeding after June 5, 2007, when the first offer to settle was delivered.