Brain injuries, like chronic pain, often are described as ‘invisible injuries’ as proof of their reality often escapes diagnostic imaging. In a revealing breakthrough findings were published this week in the Journal of Neurosurgeory showing that the brain indeed is physically altered following a concussive injury and these subtle changes are detectable on dMRI imaging. The article dealt with hockey players however are equally applicable regardless of the origin of the physical trauma such as motor vehicle collisions.
Below are the conclusions of these recent breakthrough study:
CONCLUSIONS
Concussion during ice hockey games results in microstructural alterations that are detectable using dMRI. The alterations that the authors found suggest decreased extracellular space and decreased diffusivities in white matter tissue. This finding might be explained by swelling and/or by increased cellularity of glia cells. Even though these findings in and of themselves cannot determine whether the observed microstructural alterations are related to long-term pathology or persistent symptoms, they are important nonetheless because they establish a clearer picture of how the brain responds to concussion.
Update September 23, 2015 – The below decision was overturned in reasons released today by the BC Court of Appeal.
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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, dealing with the responsibility of ICBC to pay damages following a collision caused by a passenger grabbing a steering wheel.
In today’s case (Felix v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was driving her vehicle when her boyfriend, who was riding as a passenger, “grabbed the steering wheel causing the vehicle to leave the highway and overturn.” He was killed in the collision and the Plaintiff suffered numerous physical injuries.
The passenger was found at fault for the crash. The Plaintiff, who was a verbatim reporter, suffered injuries which seriously compromised her abilities both vocationally and recreationally. The matter proceeded to trial and damages of over $800,000 were assessed. The Defendant motorist was insured with ICBC at the time. ICBC refused to pay arguing they had no responsibility to cover the damages. In a “disturbing” finding Mr. Justice Saunders agreed and provided the following reasons letting ICBC off the hook: [48] First – though it makes no difference to the outcome – I reject the plaintiff’s contention that the estate of Mr. Hearne can obtain indemnity by virtue of Mr. Hearne having been an insured under his own owner’s certificate. Section 63(a) of the Revised Regulations does use the indefinite article, defining an insured as a person named in an owner’s certificate. But it does not refer to any owner’s certificate. Reading Part 6 of the Revised Regulation as a whole, the scheme of insurance created thereunder clearly envisages the owner’s certificate referenced in s. 63 to be the certificate on the at-fault vehicle, not any certificate on which an atfault driver may be named. I agree with the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff’s interpretation of s. 63(a) would lead to an absurdity: having one’s own owner’s certificate would entitle one to the status of an insured in respect of any motor vehicle, without that vehicle’s owner’s consent, and without having paid any extra premium. I further agree that indemnity to an insured operating a motor vehicle not described in an owner’s certificate issued to the insured is extended by operation of s.65 of the Revised Regulation. To provide indemnity to such an insured through the plaintiff’s interpretation would render s. 65 redundant. [49] Second, I would not find – and it is not contended by the plaintiff – that Mr. Hearne’s grabbing of the steering wheel constituted operation of the vehicle, with the meaning of s. 64 of the Revised Regulation. I cannot find on the evidence that Mr. Hearne probably intended to take control or intended to aim the vehicle in any particular direction. Ms. Felix’s impression is that in the first two incidents of him grabbing the wheel, Mr. Hearne was simply intending to scare her. Although the final incident was different in that the movement of the vehicle was affected, there is not sufficient evidence for me to infer that Mr. Hearne meant to alter its course. His action interfered with the operation of the vehicle by Ms. Felix, but was not operation in itself. [58] While the Revised Regulation does, in effect, create a policy of liability insurance, and while, as I have found, it is appropriate to apply to the Revised Regulation the interpretive rule that coverage is to be construed broadly, the rules of interpretation of statutory instruments must be paramount. Statutes are to be construed liberally, but the construction and interpretation must be consistent with the evident legislative intent. It appears to have been the intention of the governor in council not to extend indemnity to vehicle passengers except those who may be found to have been operating a vehicle with consent, or, in the limited case of injury to a person who was not an occupant, to have been operating a part of the vehicle within the meaning of s. 66. [59] For that reason I am led to the conclusion that Mr. Hearne, as a passenger in the plaintiff’s vehicle, was not engaged in use of the vehicle within the meaning of s. 64. The defendant is under no obligation to indemnify the Hearne estate, and the plaintiff’s claim must therefore fail. [60] The consequence of this interpretation as regards designated drivers is one which some may find disturbing. If that consequence was unintended, that is a matter for consideration by the government.
(Update March 25, 2015 – an appeal from the below liability finding was dismissed)
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing fault for a crash involving a wide left hand turning vehicle.
In this week’s case (Le v. Point) the Plaintiff was operating a scooter and passed a vehicle which was stopped ahead of him waiting to turn left. The Plaintiff passed on the right hand side of the vehicle. At the same time the Defendant, coming from the opposite direction, was attempting a left hand turn through the intersection. The Defendant almost cleared the intersection when the Plaintiff clipped the rear of the vehicle.
The Court found the Defendant was established in the intersection and was the dominant vehicle with the Plaintiff failing to keep a proper lookout. Despite this the Defenant was found partially at fault because she was turning wide into the curb lane.
In finding the Defendant 30% at fault Madam Justice Russell provided the following reasons: [51] I find that Mr. Le did not keep a proper lookout as he entered the intersection. If he had, he would have seen Ms. Dickson’s vehicle conducting a left turn. By the time he entered the intersection, Ms. Dickson’s vehicle was in the northeast corner of the intersection, which was directly in front of his line of vision. [52] However, Ms. Dickson has admitted that she violated s. 165 of the Motor Vehicle Act by turning wide into the northbound curb lane of traffic on Arbutus rather than the lane of traffic closest to the centre line. While this in itself is not sufficient to establish that she breached her duty of care, if she had turned into the nearest northbound lane as required, it is likely she would have been clear of the intersection by the time that Mr. Le entered it and the collision may never have occurred. On this basis, I find Ms. Dickson was contributorily negligent in causing the collision despite the fact that she was the dominant driver. [53] In closing arguments the plaintiff referred to several cases in which a left turning driver was held 100% liable for collisions: Andrews v. Mainster, 2012 BCSC 823, Clarke v. Stephan, 1993 CanLii 1554 (B.C.S.C.), Djukiv v. Hahn, 2006 BCSC 154, Tait v. Dumansky, 2012 BCSC 332, Pasemko v. Van Varner, 1994 CanLii 1043 (B.C.S.C.). These cases are not of assistance to the Court in deciding the issues at hand. In all of these cases it was found that the left turning driver failed to observe traffic which constituted an immediate hazard and breached an obligation to yield the right-of-way. Since I have found that Mr. Le was not an immediate hazard and Ms. Dickson was the dominant driver, these cases are distinguishable on their facts. [54] In the circumstances of this case, I apportion the fault for the 2010 Collision as 70% to Mr. Le and 30% to Ms. Dickson.
It what is a fairly unusual symptom following motor vehicle related injuries, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic pain with associated heart palpitations. In this week’s case (Morena v. Dhillon) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision. The Defendant admitted fault. The Plaintiff suffered a variety of injuries which remained symptomatic at the time of trial and were expected to linger into the future, the most unusual of which were heart palpitations. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $130,000 Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey provided the following reasons: [117] The evidence establishes that she was injured in the accident and as a result developed of the following injuries and conditions as listed by to Dr. Koo: 1. Soft tissue injuries to the neck, shoulders, arms, lower back and legs with chronic residual sequelae of: a) Chronic whiplash injury with mechanical neck pain, myofascial origin, involving the right scalenes, trapezius, supraspinatus, infraspinatus and rhomboids, and left trapezius, levator scapula, rhomboids, supraspinatus, and infraspinatus muscles. b) Mechanical low back pain. 2. Chronic sleep disruption. 3. Posttraumatic stress disorder. 4. Severe depression. 5. Heart palpitations. [130] In the present case, prior to the accident, the plaintiff was a vital, energetic 43-year-old wife and mother of two. The extent of her injuries and the ensuing conditions is clearly set out above. She is likely to continue to suffer from pain, depression, PTSD, sleep disruption and potentially heart palpitations in to the future. Her depression is severe and seems to be entrenched. Her pain is severe at times and she requires constant pain medication. Her emotional suffering is great due to her great sadness and regret that she is not able to make the contributions to her family life that she did prior to the accident. Her relationships with family and friends have been negatively affected although her family remains intact. The best evidence is that she is fully disabled from work except for the one hour a day as a lunch supervisor she currently performs during the school year. She remains partially disabled from housework and other physical activities. Her enjoyment of all aspects of her life is significantly reduced. She is prevented by the injuries and their aftermath from living what otherwise was likely to have been a very happy, productive and fulfilling life. She has lost much. [131] Considering the range of awards in the authorities provided on behalf of the plaintiff, I find the decisions of Marois and Morlan to be of the most assistance. I award non-pecuniary damages in this case in the amount of $130,000.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a novel claim; whether ‘ski buddies’ owe each other a legal duty of care.
This week’s case (Kennedy v. Coe) involved a heli-skiing expedition. The Plaintiff’s husband and the Defendant never met before. The skiers were to ski in a buddy system for certain runs and the two were paired up for this purpose.
During a run which did not require buddy supervision the Plaintiff’s husband had a fatal accident. The Defendant did not notice at the time but when he realized the Plaintiff’s husband was absent he alerted the group and a search was undertaken. The Plaintiff sued for damages arguing that had the Defendant paid better attention the search could have been undertaken sooner and possibly saved her husband’s life.
Madam Justice Fischer dismissed the claim finding the Defendant acted reasonably in the circumstances and even if he did not there was no legal duty of care in these circumstances. In reaching this conclusions the Court provided the following reasons: [99] There is no question that there are many inherent risks in back-country heli-skiing such that all skiers and snowboarders who agree to be buddies should look out for each other so far as is practicable in whatever circumstances they may find themselves. However, translating a moral obligation into a legal one requires as a first step a relationship of proximity that meets the factors established in the jurisprudence I have reviewed. For the reasons I have outlined, I conclude that none of the three factors in Childs support the imposition of a positive duty to act in the circumstances of this case, and the plaintiff has failed to establish aprima facie duty of care. A skier participating in guided, back-country skiing who agrees to be assigned as a ski buddy with another skier on a particular run is not, without more, in a relationship of sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care to the other skier when they are not skiing as buddies on other runs. The “more” may require clear instructions from the guides or a clearly defined mutual understanding between ski buddies of their roles and responsibilities to each other in varying terrain, snow conditions and other circumstances, which would be subject to an analysis of the contrary policy considerations at stage two of the Annstest… [121] The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. It is indeed very sad that Mr. Kennedy met a tragic and untimely death, but he did so after a terrible accident while participating in a high-risk sport and responsibility for his death cannot be placed on Mr. Coe.
In what may be the low water mark in upheld assessed damages for a skull fracture and brain injury, the BC Court of Appeal upheld a jury’s damage award of $35,000.
In today’s case (Paskall v. Scheithauer) the Plaintiff was involved in a pedestrian/vehicle collision. She sustained serious injuries including a left temporal skull fracture, a basal skull fracture and a traumatic brain injury. The only expert evidence the jury heard from were independent medical examiners hired by the Plaintiff. The Defendant conducted a defense medical examination but did not produce a report. The Plaintiff did not call any of her treating physicians. The Defendant argued that while the injuries were severe they recovered well, a conclusion the jury may have accepted.
In upholding the “low” assessed non-pecuniary damages the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons: [42] The injuries sustained by the appellant were significant, but there is no schedule for an award of non-pecuniary damages based on the nature of the injuries sustained. The function of damages in tort is to put the claimant into the position she would have been in had the tort not occurred. Compensation for the trauma and pain of her injuries is required, but further compensation requires proof of ongoing adverse effects. It is apparent that the jury, in its award of non-pecuniary damages, did not accept that the appellant has serious, ongoing adverse effects. [43] Although the award for non-pecuniary damages appears to be low, in my view, it was open to the jury to make it. It reflects the jury’s consideration of the fact the appellant was injured seriously and its assessment that her injuries did not have a long-term serious effect. I see no basis on which this Court could interfere with it.
In concurring reasons Madam Justice Saunders commented as follows: [97] My second comment is in respect to the award of non-pecuniary damages. Damages are a question of fact, as to which this court owes deference to the fact finder. The classic statement of our role as an appellate court found in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Company Ltd., [1951] A.C. 601 at 613-14, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 705 (P.C.), has equal force today: … Whether the assessment of damages be by a judge or a jury, the appellate court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded below simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. Even if the tribunal of first instance was a judge sitting alone, then, before the appellate court can properly intervene, it must be satisfied either that the judge, in assessing the damages, applied a wrong principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one); or, short of this, that the amount awarded is either so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage (Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, approved by the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ld., [1942] A.C. 601). The last named case further shows that when on a proper direction the quantum is ascertained by a jury, the disparity between the figure at which they have arrived and any figure at which they could properly have arrived must, to justify correction by a court of appeal, be even wider than when the figure has been assessed by a judge sitting alone. The figure must be wholly “out of all proportion” (per Lord Wright, Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ld., at 616). [Emphasis added.] [98] While the award is very much at the low end of those amounts awarded for traumatic brain injury in many other cases, we cannot say, on the evidence the jury could have accepted, that the award is a “wholly erroneous estimate of her loss of amenities and enjoyment of life”. [99] Accordingly, I, too, would dispose of the appeal and cross appeal in the manner described by Mr. Justice Chiasson.
The BC Court of Appeal addressed the fair scope of witness cross examination with respect to alleged bias in reasons for judgement released last week.
In last week’s case (Mazur v Lucas) the Plaintiff was employed as a legal secretary for a Vancouver law firm. While on disability leave she was involved in a collision. She sued for damages alleging the collision related injuries prevented her from returning to work.
The Plaintiff was represented by a lawyer from the firm that she worked at. In the course of the trial the firm’s Human Resources Manager testifed with respect to the Plaintiff’s “excellent work performance“. The Defendant’s lawyer cross examined this witness, suggesting bias in that the firm may financially gain if the jury awarded significant damages as the claim was likely being prosecuted by the firm on a contingency basis. Although this evidence did not lead to any harmful admissions the Plaintiff argued the cross examination was prejudicial. The BC Court of Appeal found that this line of questioning was fair game and in reaching this conclusion provided the following reasons: [21] The respondents’ cross-examination opened by noting that Ms. Mazur was being represented by a lawyer from Clark Wilson. The respondents’ counsel put the suggestion to Ms. Morrison that personal injury cases are generally dealt with by contingency fee agreements and that Clark Wilson possibly stood to gain from any award Ms. Mazur received. Ms. Morrison stated she had no knowledge of the fee arrangement. Ms. Mazur’s counsel did not object to this line of questioning and even re-examined the witness in this area. [22] After the witness and the jury were excused, Ms. Mazur’s counsel asserted the questions were improper, suggesting counsel was insinuating that Ms. Morrison’s testimony was influenced by the likelihood that her firm had a financial interest in the outcome of the trial. He asked the judge to tell the jury to disregard this evidence in her charge. Counsel did not make a mistrial application. [23] In her final charge to the jury, the trial judge referenced the cross-examination of Ms. Morrison and instructed the jury as follows: …The defendants say there is reason for Ms. Morrison to be biased in her evidence. I should note, however, that while it is entirely up to you to decide if you thought Ms. Morrison had any reason to be biased in her evidence, that not only is there no evidence to support a suggestion that the law firm of Clark Wilson might benefit from this lawsuit, such a consideration is not relevant to your deliberations. I do not believe [counsel for the respondent] was suggesting through her questions that you should draw such an inference. She was merely reciting a number of factors that you might properly consider as to bias. In any event, such a consideration, that is, whether Clark Wilson might benefit from this lawsuit, is irrelevant to your considerations. [24] There was no objection to this instruction. However, on appeal, Ms. Mazur submits this instruction was ambiguous, confusing and insufficient. She contends that the comments resulted in placing an irrelevant and highly prejudicial notion in the minds of the jury that any award would benefit Ms. Mazur’s lawyer. Ms. Mazur believes the jury was influenced by the suggestion that the law firm stood to gain financially. [25] I agree with the respondents that the questions put to Ms. Morrison on cross-examination appropriately probed any potential bias arising out of her dual role as a witness from the law firm employing Ms. Mazur and as a management employee of the law firm representing Ms. Mazur. The cross-examination of a witness with respect to potential bias is a legitimate subject of questioning. [26] The judge’s instructions were straightforward and correct in law. She properly left the jury with the task of evaluating Ms. Morrison’s evidence and, in particular, of assessing whether her interest in portraying her firm in a favourable light compromised her objectivity. The judge also explained to the jury that there was no evidence to suggest that Clark Wilson had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case and, in any event, no basis on which it could find that any such interest might have influenced Ms. Morrison’s testimony. [27] I am of the view that the impugned instructions were comprehensible and unobjectionable. I am strengthened in this view by the fact that the appellant’s trial counsel raised no objection to them. Counsel was in a good position to assess the adequacy of the instructions in the context of the evidence and of the charge as a whole, and his failure to object is, in my opinion, telling. I would not accede to this ground of appeal.
I can put it no better myself than the beginning of the judgement which reads “Occasionally a seemingly innocuous event can have tragic consequences“. This passage is taken from reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such consequences after a seemingly minor collision.
In today’s case (Wallman v. John Doe) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear end collision in 2006. It was by all accounts a modest collision however it caused a concussive injury. The Plaintiff went on to suffer from profound post concussive symptoms. He was a doctor and these symptoms disabled him from his own profession. Due to this lost income earning ability the assessed damages were high. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $200,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons: [465] Dr. Smith opined that post-concussion syndrome is not a valid medical diagnosis. Drs. Teal and Prout opined that it is not only a valid, but also a generally recognized diagnosis. I accept the opinions of Drs. Teal and Prout and reject those of Dr. Smith. [466] In my view the plaintiff has established beyond the balance of probabilities that the dramatic and sudden onset of symptoms of headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, physical and mental fatigue, confusion, sensitivity to noise and light, irritability, depression and anxiety and problems with vision, concentration, multi-tasking and speech and communication, are the result of him having suffered a MTBI (concussion) caused by the Accident. [467] Moreover, I find that the plaintiff continues to suffer from post-concussion syndrome as a direct result of his Accident-related concussion… [470] Prior to the Accident, the plaintiff was a confident, decisive, energetic individual with an excellent memory and a penchant for detail. He was able to identify a problem facing him, define the options available for resolving the problem and choose from among them. He loved challenge and loathed routine. He felt he could accomplish anything he wanted to. He was the hardest-working emergency room physician at WHCC. He loved and was passionate about his work. He thrived on the stimulation and the trauma of the emergency room. He was happy with his life and enjoyed helping others. [471] At the time of the Accident, the plaintiff was at the height of his medical career. He had a very good reputation as an emergency room physician and was well respected in the Whistler community. His reputation was important to him and he was proud of his accomplishments. He had no plans to retire. [472] There is no question that the plaintiff’s life has changed profoundly as a result of the Accident. His ability to function in everyday life has been significantly impaired. He has considerable cognitive challenges that will likely affect him for the rest of his life. He has lost his overall confidence. He struggles to make decisions and initiate activities. He is inattentive and displays poor judgment. He has withdrawn socially. His thresholds for mental and physical activities are limited to approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes, respectively, beyond which he becomes symptomatic. He is no longer able to practice as an emergency room physician, a job he was passionate about and proud of. His ability to interact with and enjoy his children has been impaired. The medical experts are of the opinion that his recovery has likely plateaued. [473] As a result of the Accident, the plaintiff’s ability to work in the job he loved has been taken from him. He has lost his sense of purpose in life. He no longer feels that he is a contributing and productive member of society. The realization that he will be unable to return to his profession and that his life as it was prior to the Accident is gone has been devastating to him. [474] He wanted to engrain in his children the values of hard work and reputation in the community. It is devastating to him that he cannot show his children that he works hard. [475] He has difficulty identifying problems facing him and defining his options. He cannot seem to understand the problem and make a decision. He does not trust his own judgment either medically or as it relates to his real estate investments. He has trouble making day-to-day life decisions. Although the plaintiff realizes that he must learn to allow others to help him, he has a great deal of difficulty accepting that fate… [484] Having considered the principles set out in Stapley, the ordeal that the plaintiff has gone through, the impact the Accident has had on the plaintiff’s life including the loss of a vibrant medical career that was very important to him, as well as the cases relied upon by counsel, I find that an award of $200,000 for non-pecuniary damages is appropriate.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that it is an abuse of process to deny liability in a civil lawsuit for damages following a criminal conviction related to the same incident.
In today’s case (McCaffery v. Arguello) the parties were involved in a road rage incidence during which the Defendant “proceeded to intervene in the fight between Mr. McCaffery and Mr. Segundo by repeatedly striking Mr. Mccaffery with the baseball bat, causing him serious but non-life-threatening injuries to his head and wrist.”
The Defendant was criminally convicted of assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm. The Plaintiff sued for damages and the Defendant denied liability. In summarily finding the Defendant civilly liable Mr. Justice Sewell provided the following reasons: [33] Mr. Arguello’s counsel submits that as provocation may affect the quantum of damages It will still be necessary to hear viva voce evidence about the circumstances leading up to the assault at the assessment. That may be so. But the evidence will have no bearing on liability. I am also of the view that evidence restricted to the limited issue of provocation will not materially lengthen or complicate the assessment process. [34] I am also satisfied that I should grant judgment on liability notwithstanding the fact that this amounts to a severance of the issues of liability and assessment. Rule 9-7(2) permits a party to apply for judgment on an issue or generally. In my view this is an appropriate case to dispose of liability before assessing damages. Mr. Arguello clearly has no defence on the issue of liability. There is no reason to require him to re-litigate that issue. [35] Finally, I conclude that there is no merit in the argument that judgment cannot be granted in the absence of the defendant Mr. Segundo. I was not referred to any authority for the proposition that the plaintiff is not permitted to pursue judgment against one defendant in an assault case. If Mr. Arguello wishes to pursue a claim against Mr. Segundo for contribution, he is at liberty to do so. However I see no reason why that possibility should delay the plaintiff’s claim against him. [36] Accordingly I find that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment finding the defendant liable for his injuries, with damages to be assessed.
Typically the BC Supreme Court rules allow examinations for discovery to last up to 7 hours unless a case is put into the fast track Rule 15 in which case examinations are capped at 2 hours. What happens when a case is prosecuted and discoveries take place under the fast track and then the case shifts into conventional litigation? Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with such a scenario.
In this week’s case (Brown v. Dhariwal) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. She sued under Rule 15 and a discovery of under 2 hours was conducted which was adjourned subject to requests. The matter then was removed from the fast track and a further discovery was sought. The parties disagreed on the timelines and entitlement to further discovery. In concluding that the appropriate time was 7 hours of total examination counting the time already spent Madam Justice Fleming provided the following reasons: [20] The question then becomes did the Master err in concluding the defendants did not have a right to a further seven hours of discovery in the circumstances? In my view he did not and decided this aspect of the application correctly. The Rules of Court do not specify what happens when a case is removed from fast track. Any reconvening or continuation of the first discovery, however, would have to occur pursuant to Rule 7-2. There is no dispute that both Rules 7-2 and 15-1 provide a party to an action with a right to one examination for discovery of a party adverse in interest. [21] The import of the defendants’ argument that they are entitled to seven hours as a right, is that in every case where an action moves from fast track to regular and discoveries have been adjourned as opposed to finished, parties are then entitled to an additional seven hours of discovery. [22] Bearing in mind the object of the Rules and the implications of such an interpretation for parties who begin under the regular track, I cannot agree with this interpretation. What the defendants are entitled to is a continuation of the adjourned discovery without the constraint of the two-hour time limit that applies in the fast track.