Adding to this site’s archived posts highlighting judicially rejected expert witness evidence reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, criticizing the evidence of a defense medical opinion.
In last week’s case (Kristiansen v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision. Fault was admitted. The Plaintiff alleged a host of consequences from the crash. Although the Court found that some of the Plaintiff’s difficulties originated from issues other than the collision the crash was causative of some of her difficulties.
In the course of the trial the Court heard from a variety of physicians. Once expert, Dr. Koch, hired by ICBC, was found to be an advocate and his evidence was not accepted for this reason. In rejecting his evidence Mr. Justice Romilly provided the following brief comments: [14] Among the experts, I found that Dr. Koch’s report and his testimony in court seemed to lack objectivity. In fact, he seemed to be more of an advocate for the defendants and ICBC. I have difficulty accepting any of his evidence.
As previously discussed, when a formal settlement offer dealing with costs consequences is accepted the BC Supreme Court had no discretion to make a different order with respect to costs. Reasons for judgement were released this week confirming this principle.
In this week’s case (Tomas v. Mackie) the Defendant made a formal settlement offer $77,400. The offer included the usual term that, if accepted, the Plaintiff would be entitled to reasonable costs and disbursements up to the date of the offer and the Defendant would be entitled to their costs and disbursements from that time onward.
The Plaintiff accepted the offer 13 days after it was derived. During this period further costs were incurred. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant should be responsible for these as the Plaintiff should have the benefit of a reasonable period of time to consider the offer. District Registrar Cameron was sympathetic to this argument but ultimately disagreed noting there is no judicial discretion to deviate from the terms of the accepted formal offer. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons: [9] Mr. Loewen submitted that the acceptance of the settlement offer constituted a binding agreement and as a result the court has no discretion to vary the terms of that agreement under Rule 9-1 or 14-1 of theSupreme Court Civil Rules. [10] Mr. Loewen referred to a number of authorities in support of his argument that clearly were not before Registrar Sainty… [14] Applying these authorities, it is clear that I do not have the discretion to vary the terms of the settlement agreement made by the parties and they should obtain a date from the Registry for the assessment of both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ costs pursuant to Rule 14-1 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that an “all inclusive” formal settlement offer is capable of triggering costs consequences.
In today’s case (Wettlaufer v. Air Transat A.T. Inc.) the Plaintiff sued for damages after an “aircraft touched down and then braked, an unsecured food cart struck, with force,(struck) the back of the plaintiff’s seat.”. Prior to trial the Defendant made an offer, inclusive of costs and disbursements, of $250,000. The Plaintiff rejected this offer, proceeded to trial and sought damages of over $1 million. Much of the Plaintiff’s claimed damages were rejected with an award of approximately $110,000.
The Plaintiff argued the all inclusive offer should not trigger costs consequences. Mr. Justice Funt disagreed finding there is no prohibition to formal offers which have costs and disbursements built into them. In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons: [18] The present Rules of Court provide greater discretion to the Court and avoid the formulaic approach reflected in the older rules set forth above. Justice Masuhara in Dodge v. Shaw Cablesystems, 2009 BCSC 1765, described the rationale for the rejection of all-inclusive offers under Rule 37 (the old rule in Helm): [22] The old Rules provided a complete code which determined the costs consequences of an offer to settle: Cridge v. Harper Grey Easton, 2005 BCCA 33 at para. 20, 37 B.C.L.R. (4th) 62. Under the old Rule 37(24)(a), if the defendant made a monetary offer to settle which the plaintiff did not accept, and the plaintiff obtained a judgment equal to or less than the settlement amount, the defendant was entitled to costs from the date the offer was delivered. With such rigid cost consequences from which the judge had no discretion to depart, the rationale for the rule against “all-in” offers in Helm was engaged. Where the judge was unable to discern what part of the settlement offer was for costs and what part was for discharge of the action, the judge could not precisely evaluate whether or not the plaintiff obtained judgment more favourable than the settlement offer, leading to potentially drastic consequences. [Footnote omitted.] [19] In his October 18, 2012 letter, defendant’s counsel, Mr. Dery, rejected the plaintiff’s offer to settle for $996,025 plus taxable costs and countered with the $100,000 all-inclusive offer. The plaintiff did not provide a bill of costs and disbursements. [20] Absent a bill of costs, the defendant’s further all-inclusive offer of $250,000 is understandable. Most litigants seeking to resolve a dispute prefer finality. [21] With Helm decided on the significantly different rules, the Court is not bound by the rule in Helm that all-inclusive offers cannot be considered. The Court’s consideration of the $250,000 all-inclusive offer accords with the text, context and purpose of the current Rule 9‑1.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, outright rejecting a personal injury claim as a result of credibility concerns.
In today’s case (Fancy v. Gareau) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear end collision. Fault was admitted. At the time of the collision the Plaintiff was on a WCB claim. She claimed the collision caused a neck injury and that this was not a pre-existing problem. In the course of the trial this claim proved unreliable and the Court ultimately dismissed the claim. In reaching this result Mr. Justice Parrett noted as follows: [69] Perhaps the most startling reversal in her evidence was the cross-examination of the plaintiff about a portion of Exhibit 8. [70] This document was a spreadsheet prepared by the plaintiff and her husband as a part of their submission to the Workers Compensation Board to help establish that she had suffered “an upper back injury”. In item 11 on page 2 of the spreadsheet the plaintiff specifically refers to the August 5, 2008 Physiotherapy Initial Notification (Exhibit 10) referred to above. The excerpt contained in item 11 specifically notes that the “Injury Recorded on Claim: Neck” and then records the following submission regarding the document: Corroborating Documentation of stiff neck from workplace injury (July 8, 2008) – this injury is NOT from the MVA as suggested by CD in Item 32. [71] The last column of this spreadsheet is entitled “Proof of:” and is divided into two columns, the first of which is “Upper back/left arm injury”. [72] The plaintiff entered “Yes” in this column with respect to Item 11. [73] When confronted with this document the plaintiff conceded that when the Workers Compensation Board case manager said that the neck injury was not as a result of the workplace injury but from the motor vehicle accident she disagreed and said ‘no, I injured my neck in the workplace accident’. [74] When pressed on this point she advised the court that: The upper back, to me, includes the neck. [75] This evidence was given without the faintest embarrassment or apparent realization that the previous day she had testified that: When I say upper back I do not mean my neck. … [125] This is a personal injury action in which the issue is causation. Simply put the question amounts to this – Was the plaintiff injured or did she have existing injuries or conditions aggravated by the motor vehicle collision on September 30, 2008? [126] The evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff is devoid of medical evidence and opinion touching on the issue of causation. [127] The only expert opinion placed before the court is that of Dr. McKenzie who first saw the plaintiff some 28 months after the motor vehicle collision. In providing Dr. McKenzie with the history he used as the foundation of his opinion the plaintiff misrepresented and altered the facts and withheld critical information about her physiotherapy treatments and pre-existing symptomology. [128] The effect of her actions destroyed any value of Dr. McKenzie’s opinion… [139] The plaintiff’s action is dismissed.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In this week’s case (Lewis v. Scheer) the plaintiff was involved in a “significant” collision in 2010. The Defendant admitted liability. The collision caused various soft tissue injuries and headaches which lingered at the time of trial. The Plaintiff had some pre-existing symptoms which left her susceptible to developing chronic pain. Her symptoms were expected to carry into the future with optimism that they can be reduced with weight loss and exercise. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Mr. Justice Funt provided the following reasons: [9] In general terms, the plaintiff’s injuries involve her back, spine, shoulders and neck. She has daily headaches and has chronic pain… [18] The three doctors were in general agreement that the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms of daily headaches and pain affecting her neck, chest, shoulders and spine were caused by the MVA. Dr. Travlos noted in his November 14, 2011 report that the plaintiff “was likely vulnerable to injury and the development of more chronic symptoms, given some of the pre-accident complaints she had”… [22] The medical evidence recognizes that the pain will be ongoing although it may reduce as a result of the recommended steps to be taken. These steps include losing weight, a focus on functionality and not on pain, a regimen of exercise and activity, and the reduction of the medication the plaintiff is currently taking… [35] As noted, the plaintiff will have ongoing pain. The focus for the future is on improving function. In particular, the pain has affected and will affect her enjoyment of life, family and social relationships, and lifestyle. The Court will award $70,000 inclusive of housekeeping capacity. The plaintiff will be able to perform housekeeping functions, albeit with degrees of pain depending on the particular activity.
Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing bus driver liability for injuries to passengers, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding a bus driver partly liable after putting the bus in motion when an elderly passenger was attempting to exit.
In this week’s case (Bideci v.Neuhold) the 93 year old plaintiff boarded a bus. When the bus came to his stop he “spent several seconds in the process of attempting to rise from his seat“. The bus driver failed to see this, closed the door and put the bus in motion prior to the plaintiff exiting. This caused the Plaintiff to fall resulting in injury.
In finding the bus driver liable Mr. Justice Abrioux provided the following reasons: [72] The standard of care to which Mr. Neuhold was subject included taking a careful enough look into the rear-view mirror as was appropriate under the circumstances in existence at the time. As he candidly admitted in his evidence, he was under no specific time constraints: “If you’re late, you’re late”. Safety of his passengers was his primary consideration. [73] Mr. Neuhold’s evidence was that photograph 8 of Exhibit 7 was the most accurate approximation of what he would have seen as he looked in his rear-view mirror, with a caveat being that he would not have been able to see the wheel well on the passenger side of the bus. [74] Mr. Bideci’s seat is clearly visible in this photograph and there were no obstructions such as someone standing or moving which would have obscured Mr. Neuhold’s view of this area. [75] I appreciate that Mr. Neuhold is not subject to a standard of perfection nor is he the plaintiff’s insurer. But when I apply the legal principles to which I have referred above to my findings of fact, I conclude that the defendants have not satisfied the burden on them to establish that Mr. Neuhold used all due, proper and reasonable care and skill to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff. [76] Based on my review of the video, I am of the view that Mr. Neuhold did not look carefully enough in his rear-view mirror before deciding to perform his final outside mirror check, which preceded his putting the bus in motion. Had he in fact taken a “long hard look” or a “pretty significant look” in his rear-view mirror as Ms. Trott stated that he did, he would have seen his elderly, frail and “hunched” passenger in the process of slowly rising from his seat. [77] Accordingly, I conclude the defendants have not satisfied the burden on them to answer the prima facie case of negligence and I find them liable for the Accident.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, resulting in a nearly $1 million judgement following the RCMP’s negligent response to a ‘bait car’ theft.
In today’s case (Watkins v. Dormuth) the Defendant RCMP officer was responding to a bait car activation call. He proceeded North in the southbound lanes to get around traffic. At the same time the Plaintiff was making a left hand turn at an intersection. A t-bone collision occurred which resulted in serious injuries whith profound consequences and were expected to have a permanent disabling effect on the Plaintiff. Damages of close to $1 million were assessed.
The RCMP argued the Plaintiff was to blame for the collision. Mr. Justice Blok disagreed finding the RCMP were entirely at fault. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons: [78] The provisions show there are certain prerequisites that must be met before a police officer may exercise the privileges set out in s. 122 of the Motor Vehicle Act. In particular, the police officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the risk of harm to members of the public from the exercise of those privileges is less than the risk of harm to the public should those privileges not be exercised. Even where the prerequisites are met, the driving privileges afforded by the Motor Vehicle Act must be exercised with due regard for safety, having regard to certain factors. [79] I conclude that Cst. Dormuth did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the risk of harm to the public from exercising emergency vehicle privileges was less than the risk to the public should he not exercise those privileges. All he knew was that there had been a bait car activation. An activation did not mean that there was a risk of harm to the public because an activation signal could be caused by the mere opening of the bait car door or trunk. It did not necessarily mean the car was being driven, let alone driven in a manner dangerous to the public. [80] This conclusion is consistent with the detachment’s bait car policy, which provides that the normal response level to a bait car activation is Code 2, that is, by proceeding immediately but without using lights or siren. In other words, the detachment’s own policy recognizes that a bait car activation is a non-emergency event. [81] The defendants assert that Cst. Dormuth was not negligent in responding at a Code 3 level because that is how he had been trained, erroneous as it was. However, I do not see that this absolves the defendants of liability since it is plain that the training given to Cst. Dormuth was faulty…. [95] Emergency vehicles do not have free rein in exercising the driving privileges accorded by s. 122 of the Motor Vehicle Act. They may only do so within the limits set by the Emergency Driving Regulation and they are constrained by the duty to drive with due regard for safety: Frers, at para. 89. I conclude that Cst. Dormuth had no basis to exercise any emergency vehicle driving privileges, and I conclude that in exercising those privileges he did not drive with due regard for safety in the circumstances of this case. [96] For these reasons I conclude that the responsibility for this accident rests entirely with the defendants.
Reasons for judgment were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for breast implant disruption and a voice injury following a collision.
In last week’s case (Giczi v. Kandola) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision. The Defendant admitted fault. The collision resulted in chronic soft tissue injuries, a dislodged breast implant requiring surgical correction and muscle spasms leading to voice disruption. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $120,000 Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following reasons: [120] In the instant case, the subject accident caused the plaintiff injuries, including: soft tissue injuries to her neck, jaw, and upper back which caused her chronic pain, functional thoracic outlet syndrome, and damage to her breast implant necessitating surgery months later. The plaintiff’s injuries have resulted in symptoms that are significantly worse than her pre-accident condition and have affected her ability to cope and function. [121] I find the plaintiff suffers from a chronic pain condition which was caused by the subject accident. Not only is the condition painful in the neck, arm and jaw, but the accident dislodged a breast implant requiring further surgery and a painful period of recovery. The chronic pain condition has also had a negative impact on the plaintiff’s relationship with her partner and the intimacy that the couple enjoyed. [122] In addition, the accident has also caused difficulty in the plaintiff’s singing from muscles spasms as a result of her injury. I find the accident’s effect on the plaintiff’s ability to sing has been profound, given the importance of singing to the plaintiff throughout her life. The expert evidence of Ms. Davies and Dr. Morrison convinces me that her voice is impaired. I think that this is a significant factor apart from its effect on her income earning capacity. [123] In all the circumstances, I find that the appropriate award of general damages is $120,000.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a chronic knee and shoulder injury.
In today’s case (Hart v. Hansma) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions. The Defendants admitted fault for both. The Plaintiff suffered a variety of injuries including a torn meniscus, a labral tear and a variety of soft tissue injuries. These continued to post problems at the time of trial with a poor prognosis.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $95,000 Mr. Justice Verhoeven provided the following reasons: [54] I find that the most significant injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the accidents are as follows: 1. soft tissue injuries to his neck, particularly the right side, resulting in chronic neck pain;
chronic headaches, associated with the neck pain;
3. right shoulder injury, including a labral tear and tendonitis with a partial rotator cuff tear; and 4. left knee injury, including a meniscus tear. The foregoing injuries continue to cause significant ongoing pain and disability currently. [55] I find that the plaintiff also suffered from the following, less serious injuries sustained in the accidents: 1. right upper limp numbness and pain; 2. low back injury, and associated pain (that is not presently bothering him) in the right hip and buttock area; 3. right knee pain (although it is now substantially resolved); and 4. lefthip pain(although it is now substantially resolved)…. [65] The prognosis for full recovery is negative. It is unlikely that his neck injury will ever fully recover. There is a risk that his neck condition will deteriorate to the point where cervical discectomy surgery will be required. The headaches he suffers from are related to his neck injury. The plaintiff finds that treatment such as acupuncture, physiotherapy and the prolotherapy provide short term relief for his neck pain and headaches. He takes a variety of medications in order to allow him to cope. The planned knee surgery may provide some benefit for his left knee pain, but may have long term negative consequences, such as the risk of osteoarthritis. His shoulder condition is also chronic. The plaintiff has the choice of enduring the pain and limitation of function in his shoulder, or undergoing surgery which may offer some benefit… ] Taking into account the factors in Gillam as they apply to Mr. Hart’s circumstances, and the above awards in Prince-Wright, Hanson, Steward, and the cases cited by the defendants, adjusting for inflation, I find that an award of $95,000 is appropriate in this case.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that Saskatchewan’s restrictive ‘no-fault’ auto insurance scheme strips the right of out of Province visitors from seeking tort compensation when injured through the wrongful driving of another in Saskatchewan.
In this week’s case (Ngo v. Luong) the parties were BC residents driving in Saskatchewan. The Defendant lost control of the vehicle flipping over and causing injury to the passenger. The Plaintiff started a lawsuit in BC Supreme Court hoping to get around Saskatchewan’s no-fault system. Mr. Justice Ehrcke found that Saskatchewan’s laws applied and stripped the Plaintiff’s right to seek damages in tort. In dismissing the claim the Court provided the following reasons: [1] Are British Columbia residents who are involved in a motor vehicle accident in Saskatchewan able to sue for damages in tort in British Columbia, or are they bound by Saskatchewan’s no-fault insurance scheme?… [27] The substantive rights of a person who is injured in a motor vehicle accident in Saskatchewan after 2002 and who did not make a tort election prior to the accident are those rights set out in Part VIII. That is true for anyone who did not make a prior tort election, regardless of whether that person is a Saskatchewan resident or not. The only difference is that the out-of-province claimant never had the possibility of making such an election. But once the accident has occurred and the claimant, whether from Saskatchewan or not, has not previously made a tort election, the claimant’s rights are those defined by Part VIII of the AAIA. Thus, the statute does not, as submitted by the plaintiff, set out a procedural election by which a claimant who has been injured in an accident can then select the means by which he or she enforces his or her rights. The rights are already defined by the statute at the moment the accident has occurred. Since the AAIA defines what the claimant’s rights are and not the means of their enforcement, the AAIA is substantive, not procedural law. [28] This categorization of the AAIA has the consequence that a British Columbia plaintiff who is injured in a Saskatchewan motor vehicle accident is in no better position bringing his or her suit in British Columbia than in Saskatchewan. The fact that this categorization eliminates a motive for forum shopping is an additional indicator that the categorization of the law as substantive is the correct categorization… [30] As I have found the AAIA to be substantive, rather than procedural law, and as the AAIA is therefore applicable to the plaintiff’s claim regardless of the fact that it is brought in a British Columbia court, the plaintiff’s request for a declaration that this action is not barred by the provisions of the AAIA is dismissed.
