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$225,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic and Disabling Conversion Disorder

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases. 49 Comments on $225,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic and Disabling Conversion Disorder

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a disabling conversion disorder following a motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Best v. Thomas) the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle when he was rear-ended by a van.  The Plaintiff suffered a spine injury at C-5 which required surgical correction.  He went on to suffer from a variety of disabling ailments.  Ultimately the Court found these were due to a conversion disorder.  The prognosis for recovery was poor.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $225,000 Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons:
[139]     I find on a balance of probabilities that the main cause of the plaintiff’s current condition, including the myoclonus, is conversion disorder. I come to this conclusion because of the relative rarity of propriospinal myoclonus and how it can be mistaken for psychiatric problems. The non-anatomical presentation was also persuasive. As early as Dr. Ho’s involvement, a strange kicking motion was noted, which was inconsistent with a neurological cause. Some of the plaintiff’s pain may well be as a result of the surgery on his C5/6 disc; however, the vast majority of his symptoms, in my view, are not organic or structural in cause.
[140]     Diagnosis of cause aside, what I glean from the experts is that nobody predicts anything close to a full recovery for the plaintiff. Dr. Hurwitz posited a 14% possibility of some recovery, though in light of the fact that the plaintiff has already been treated with a wide variety of anti-depressant drugs, this is a very optimistic prognosis. The other experts recommended various interventions in an effort to assist the plaintiff…
[161]     The plaintiff was almost 32 when the accident happened. The original injury was to his C5-6 disc. I find the following facts about the plaintiff’s condition have been established on a balance of probabilities.
[162]     Since the accident, the plaintiff has been in constant pain, notwithstanding an aggressive regime of pain treatment through medication and other therapies. He is disabled from competitive employment. While he can drive and walk, with some difficulty and with the assistance of a cane, he cannot engage in the activities he enjoyed before the accident. In terms of physical activity, he can do little more than walk very short distances and swim. He can no longer work at a job he enjoyed. His emotional suffering is extreme. He has given up hope of being a father and had a vasectomy as he would be unable to engage in play or chase a child. His enjoyment of sexual activity is significantly diminished as he has lost sensation in his penis during intercourse. His family and friends attest to the fact that he is not the same person as before the accident. He no longer laughs and jokes around. He is constantly fatigued. His family and two close friends remain engaged with him but his world has shrunk considerably from his pre-accident social activities and he has essentially lost a healthy, active, social lifestyle. He is not as mentally sharp as he was, whether by virtue of the injury or the associated medications he takes to manage his condition. None of the experts predicted anything remotely approaching a full recovery.
[163]     Taking into account all of the foregoing, as well as the range of cases provided by counsel, I award the plaintiff $225,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 

"There is No Deduction for Income Tax" For Diminished Future Earning Capacity Awards

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Wage Loss.

When Courts in BC assess damages for future ‘diminished earning capacity‘ no deduction is to be made for income taxes to be paid on those funds.  Although this is not a new legal development, it is nice when Courts summarize the law in a concise statement as was done in reasons released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry.
In this week’s case (Kelly v. Kotz) the Plaintiff was awarded $16,000 for diminished earning capacity following injuries sustained in a vehicle collision.  The basis of the award was that the Plaintiff needed to attend a rehabilitation program to address her injuries and this was an assessment of her anticipated lost earnings during this time.  ICBC argued the award should be reduced by tax obligations.  Madam Justice Hyslop rejected this argument and provided the following concise reasons:
[4]             The burden of proof is whether there is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff will suffer a future loss of income. Ms. Kelly has met that burden. Ms. Kelly seeks $16,000.00 as a loss of wages while she pursues the program recommended by Dr. Brownlee. This future loss of income is based on Ms. Kelly’s annual income of $60,000.00 and benefits roughly estimated at $500.00 per month. Ms. Kelly will need to take three months off to attend this program; this is the basis of the loss.
[5]             The defendants did not dispute these numbers, but disputed whether it should be a net amount as opposed to a gross amount.
[6]             Past loss of income is a net amount after deduction of income tax. Future loss of earnings is an assessment and there is no deduction for income tax: Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287…
[8]             I order that the plaintiff be awarded $16,000.00 for future loss of income.
 

$45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Pre-Existing Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases. 62 Comments on $45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Pre-Existing Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for the aggravation of pre-existing injuries.
In yesterday’s case (Pichugina v. Matula) the Plaintiff was involved in a T-bone type collision in 2010.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff had pre-existing symptoms in her neck, shoulder and back.  The collision aggravated these and her increased symptoms continued to the time of trial and were expected to linger on for several more years.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 Mr. Justice Cohen provided the following reasons:
[56]         On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that, as a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained aggravation to her already symptomatic neck, right shoulder, and low back and sustained aggravation to her pre-existing headaches.  In my opinion, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the accident caused the minimal winging of the plaintiff’s right scapula.  Although the plaintiff returned to work full-time by the end of two months following the accident, and experienced much improvement in her condition by the spring of 2011, she cannot take advantage of a flexible work schedule, and, while she remains physically active, some activities are no longer comfortable for her.
[57]         According to Dr. Vorobeychik, the plaintiff’s symptoms have improved, but she still experiences migraine headaches and problems with her right shoulder, neck, and back when she is active or upon exertion.  The overall medical evidence, and that of the plaintiff, is that there has been gradual improvement in her condition post-accident, and she appears to be handling her headaches better.  According to Dr. Robinson, the plaintiff will probably continue to have gradual improvement over the next three to five years, but she remains at risk for persisting neck and right shoulder pain, which would act as an aggravator to her migraine predisposition.
[58]         Upon my consideration of the whole of the evidence, the parties’ submissions, and the authorities relied upon by them, I find that a fair and reasonable award to the plaintiff for general damages is $45,000.
 

Court of Appeal Finds Insufficient Warning Sign Not Causative of Trip and Fall Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in Occupier's liability claims.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal overturning a trial judgement and dismissing a trip and fall lawsuit.
In today’s case (Simmons v. Yeager Properties Inc.) the Plaintiff injured herself at the Defendant’s bakery.  Outside the bakery was a concrete landing and a wooden patio deck.  There was a 2-4 inch height difference between these surfaces.  The Defendant marked this with paint and also with a sign that read “watch your step please“.  The sign faded over time with the words ‘watch‘ and ‘step‘ becoming ‘quite faded and difficult to see‘.
At trial the Court found the Plaintiff 75% at fault with 25% blame going to the Defendant’s on the basis of the faded sign.  The BC Court of Appeal outright dismissed the claim finding the faded sign was not causative of the injuries given that the Plaintiff was not looking in the direction of the sign and did not see it at all.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[12]Thus the judge determined the bakery owners’ maintenance was inadequate to refute the conclusion that the ineffective warning sign constituted a breach of the Occupiers Liability Act:
[42]      Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that by failing to maintain the outdoor waning sign, the defendants failed to take reasonable care to ensure the exterior area leading to the entrance of the bakery was reasonably safe.
[13]        This, however, is the extent of any finding the judge made of any breach of the Occupiers Liability Act or the standard of care attributable to the owners of the bakery and, in considering Ms. Simmons’ neglect for her own safety, the judge then went on to find that Ms. Simmons was not looking in the direction of the sign prior to her fall:
[45]      Here, I find that the patio step was there to be seen by the plaintiff had she paid attention to where she was going. It was demarcated by white paint that was generally visible to persons accessing the bakery entrance from the patio deck. The photographs of the area taken shortly after this incident show that the paint was not faded and worn as suggested by Mr. Murphy. It is questionable whether the faded outdoor warning sign was a significant factor in the circumstances since the plaintiff was not looking in that direction and did not see the sign at all.
[46]      If the plaintiff had been watching where she was walking, she would likely have seen that there was a difference in level from where she was to where she was going. I find her expectation that the entire walking surface would be level to be an unreasonable one, as she was not paying attention but was instead focused on the woman in front of her and on the front entrance to the bakery.
[14]        With respect, I am unable to see how it can be said the bakery owners’ breach of the Occupiers Liability Act renders them liable for the injuries Ms. Simmons suffered when she fell. The fact the sign was not properly maintained such as to have been readable cannot have caused Ms. Simmons to fall if, as the judge found, she was “not looking in that direction and did not see the sign at all”. Had the sign been readable it would have made no difference. Ms. Simmons would not have seen it. The bakery owners’ breach of the duty they owed to patrons like Ms. Simmons cannot have caused her fall.
[15]        Thus Ms. Simmons failed to “show on a balance of probabilities that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligent act, the injury would not have occurred” (see Clements at para. 8). The facts found by the judge do not provide a legal basis for determining the owners of the bakery to be liable for the injuries Ms. Simmons suffered when she fell.
 

Scale C Costs Awarded Following Injury Prosecution "Of More Than Ordinary Difficulty"

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases. 47 Comments on Scale C Costs Awarded Following Injury Prosecution "Of More Than Ordinary Difficulty"

Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, illustrating circumstances when increased “scale c” costs are appropriate.
In the recent case (Wallman v. Doe) the Plaintiff suffered a disabling brain injury following a motor vehicle collision and was awarded damages following a lengthy trial.  The Plaintiff was awarded costs on Scale C and in finding this increased scale was appropriate Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
6]             By any measure, this was a complex case that, although courteously and cooperatively fought, was nevertheless hard fought with little, if anything, conceded. The defendants’ position throughout was that the plaintiff’s alleged brain injury was not real. The trial occupied 29 days. Forty‑three witnesses were called by the parties, including 16 engineering and medical experts. Sixteen expert reports were exchanged.
[7]             The engineering experts provided opinions regarding the biomechanics of and the acceleration and other forces imparted upon a human body during a rear‑end collision, mechanical engineering, accident reconstruction, and Monte Carlo simulations to predict the probability of various accident scenarios.
[8]             The medical expert evidence included opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, neurologists, a neuro‑opthalmologist, physiatrist and a speech pathologist.
[9]             In addition, there was expert evidence from occupational therapists, rehabilitation and vocational consultants, and economists.
[10]         The defendants conducted several pre‑trial examinations of nine witnesses, conducted two and a half days of examinations for discovery of the plaintiff, during which he was asked 2,669 questions. Considerable steps were taken by the parties in an effort to prove or disprove the plaintiff’s claim that he had suffered a mild traumatic brain injury during the accident. Most, if not all, of the expert evidence was focused on whether the plaintiff sustained a mild traumatic brain injury as a result of a relatively minor rear‑end impact during the accident.
[11]         In addition, there were several pre‑trial applications, most of which were of ordinary difficulty, but one involved the plaintiff’s successful motion to strike the defendants’ jury notice on the basis that the case had become complex and would be too lengthy for a jury to retain the evidence. This application was the subject of two hearings in the Court of Appeal.
[12]         In my view, this action was plainly one of more‑than‑ordinary difficulty. The plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs at Scale C.
 

Costs Ordered Following "Unnecessary" Defence Case Planning Conference

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11, BCSC Civil Rule 5, Civil Procedure. 45 Comments on Costs Ordered Following "Unnecessary" Defence Case Planning Conference

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing when Case Planning Conferences are unnecessary and finding that a costs order is appropriate in the face of such a CPC.
In today’s case (Stewart v. Robinson) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages.  The Defendant set down a CPC seeking an order requiring the Plaintiff to reveal the “the areas of expertise” of the experts the Plaintiff would rely on at trial.  The Defendant also sought a few collateral orders such updated lists of documents and timelines for discoveries.  The Court held that the first order was one the Court had no jurisdiction to make and that the further orders were unnecessary given that the Plaintiff was fulfilling their disclosure duties under the Rules of Court.
Master Bouck dismissed the Defendant’s application and in doing so found it was an uncessary hearing and ordered that costs be paid.  In reaching this result the Court provided the following reasons:
[25]         Rule 5-3 (3) requires the court to make a case plan order following a CPC. In my view, that requirement presumes that the CPC served some purpose…
[28]         The plaintiff submits that the sole purpose of the case planning conference was an attempt by the defence to ferret out information about the plaintiff’s experts even though such a purpose is contrary to well-established law. The plaintiff also cites Galvon v. Hopkins, 2011 BCSC 1835, and Amezcua v. Norlander, 2012 BCSC 719 (Master)…
[34]         Read together, the above authorities stand for these propositions:
1.  rules of civil procedure do not trump substantive law, including the principle of litigation privilege;
2.  a party is not required to reveal, in a case plan proposal or order or otherwise, the name of any expert or the area of expertise of any intended expert before the 84-day deadline for the service of expert reports; but
3.  the court may order that the service requirements under Rule 11-6 (3) be abridged such that expert reports are to be served earlier than the 84 days before trial. Such an order will only be made in exceptional cases where a compelling reason for early disclosure is demonstrated.
[35]         While a party may volunteer details of their expert evidence in advance of the 84-day deadline, a CPC is not required for that purpose. The information can simply be provided in correspondence without the necessity of judicial involvement. As the court determined in Dhugha, the omission of the name of an expert or his or her area of expertise from a case plan order does not preclude the admission of that expert evidence at trial.
[36]         Thus, the order sought in the defendant’s case plan proposal with respect to experts could not be made by the court. The order proposed by the defence at the CPC with respect to experts is not necessary.
[37]         That leads to the next question: was a CPC necessary for any other purpose? In my view, it was not.
[38]         An order requiring the parties to exchange further amended lists of documents by certain dates is not necessary. Both counsel acknowledge the duty to provide ongoing document disclosure as required by theSCCR. The suggested deadlines micromanages a case that does not require such management.
[39]         An order requiring delivery of a certain therapist’s records by a specified date is also not required. The plaintiff has volunteered to provide those records.
[40]         An order identifying the timing and length of examinations for discovery is also unnecessary. The parties have agreed to examination dates. The length of these examinations was not seriously in dispute at this conference and did not require judicial management.
[41]         In short, I find that no case plan order ought to or need be made at this time…
[46]         Having already concluded that the CPC was unnecessary, I award the plaintiff costs related to counsel’s preparation and attendance and the conference. Those costs are fixed at $750 all inclusive, not payable forthwith.
 

$48,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Soft Tissue Injuries With Tinnitus

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for largely recovered soft tissue injuries with associated tinnitus.
In today’s case (Pichugin v. Stoian) the Plaintiff was involved in a modest rear end collision in 2010.  Fault was admitted.   The Plaintiff was uninjured at the scene but shortly thereafter started to experience neck and back pain.  These symptoms largely recovered by 2012.  In addition to the soft tissue injuries the Plaintiff suffered from tinnitus which was caused secondary to his whiplash injury.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $48,000 Mr. Justice Skolrood provided the following reasons:
[66]         I find on the evidence that Mr. Pichugin suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck and back as a result of the accident. Those injuries caused him pain and discomfort for approximately one and a half years after the accident but he improved steadily and his symptoms were largely resolved by the fall of 2012. However, I accept that he continues to experience periodic pain and discomfort in his neck and back, of relatively minor severity, largely related to physical activity…
 
[71]         I am satisfied that Mr. Pichugin’s tinnitus was caused by the accident. Dr. Longridge’s opinion to this effect is supported by the scientific literature as reflected in the Folmer and Greist paper. Even absent the findings in that paper, Dr. Longridge noted again that physicians have long recognized that whiplash can cause tinnitus. The defendant has not established any other likely, or even possible, cause that would serve to undermine Dr. Longridge’s opinion.
[72]         In terms of the impact of his condition on his activities and lifestyle, Mr. Pichugin testified that he is less able to help his wife with things like vacuuming and grocery shopping. However, it was also clear from the evidence that overall Mr. Pichugin is more active than he was prior to the accident as he has increased his activity level following his heart attack.
[73]         With respect to the tinnitus, he testified that while it sometimes causes him difficulty in getting to sleep, once he is asleep it does not interfere with the quality of his sleep. Moreover, he was unable to say with any degree of certainty how much sleep he loses as a result of the condition. Apart from some disruption while reading, there was no evidence that the condition otherwise interferes with his work or his recreational activities…
85]         In my view, the severity and effects of Mr. Pichugin’s tinnitus are less than what was experienced by the plaintiff in Yang and more in line with the condition suffered by the plaintiff in Maddex. However, Mr. Pichugin’s soft tissue injuries were more severe than those of the plaintiff in Maddex. Taking all of the circumstances into account, I find that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages is $48,000.
 

Summary Trials Are Not Trials For the Purpose of Discontinuing Lawsuits

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 9. 54 Comments on Summary Trials Are Not Trials For the Purpose of Discontinuing Lawsuits

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a Plaintiff can discontinue a lawsuit when a matter is set for summary trial.
In today’s case (Binary Environments Ltd v. Batyka) the Plaintiff brought a lawsuit which was set for a summary trial following a case planning conference.  Before the summary trial took place the Plaintiff unilaterally discontinued the lawsuit relying on Rule 9-8(1) which reads “At any time before a notice of trial is filed in an action, a plaintiff may discontinue it in whole or in part against a defendant by filing a notice of discontinuance in Form 36 and serving a filed copy of the notice of discontinuance on all parties of record.”.
The Defendant brought a motion seeking to set aside the discontinuance arguing “the Plaintiff cannot escape by the side door” on the cusp of summary trial.
Mr. Justice Ball dismissed the motion finding the Plaintiff was within their rights in discontinuing finding that a summary trial is not a notice of trial.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[25]         Additionally, setting aside the notice of discontinuance would also be contrary to Rule 9-8(1) as setting a matter for summary trial is not the same as setting a matter for a full trial: Strata Plan No. 36 v. Wilson, [1998] B.C.J. No. 308 (S.C.) at para. 12. A summary trial is a distinct mechanism with its own procedures and safeguards: Inspiration Mgmt. Ltd. v. McDermid St. Lawrence Ltd., [1989] B.C.J. No. 1003 (C.A.).
[26]         I therefore decline to set aside the plaintiff’s notice of discontinuance and dismiss that application.
The Court did, however, order that the discontinuance be with prejudice should the Plaintiff ever start similar litigation.  In exercising its discretion under Rule 9-8(8) the Court reasoned as follows:
[23]         Rule 9-8(8) provides:
Unless the court otherwise orders, the discontinuance of an action in whole or in part is not a defence to a subsequent proceeding for the same or substantially the same cause of action…
[31]         The final matter which must be decided here is whether the notice of discontinuance filed by the plaintiff be order to be a defence to any subsequent proceeding for the same or substantially the same cause of action. From the review conducted by counsel for defendant of the affidavits prepared support of the summary trial application taken together with the admission by counsel for the plaintiff that he was instructed to call no evidence in the event this matter did come forward for trial, the only rational conclusion can be drawn is that this matter must in fairness finally come to an end. I therefore pursuant to Rule 9-8(8) that discontinuance of action is a defence may subsequent proceeding or the same or substantially the same cause of action.
 

Case Planning Conference Transcripts Are Tough To Come By

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7.

BC Supreme Court  Rule 5-2(7) states that “proceedings at a case planning conference must be recorded, but no part of that recording may be made available to or used by any person without court order“.  The few cases released to date interpreting this rule have made it clear that the Court is reluctant to deviate from this fall back position.  Reasons for judgement were released today the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, following this trend.
In today’s case (Darel v. Samy) a variety of orders were made at a case planning conference.  The Plaintiff applied for reasons to be published arging that these were desirable “for the intended purpose of bringing the “conduct” of the defendants “to light”. ”
Master Bouck rejected this request and in doing so provided the following brief reasons:
[5]             The plaintiff’s request for release of the transcript is denied for the reasons articulated in Parti v. Pokorny. Firstly, a transcript is not required to resolve any dispute about the terms of the case plan order. Second, there is no precedential value in any of the terms of the order. Third, the court does not issue reasons for judgment at the request of a party. And finally, the comments of a presider are not rulings or reasons.
 

Excessive Drug Use Linked To Collision Related Injuries, Non-Pecuniary Loss Assessed at $100,000

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a Plaintiff’s drug abuse problems were caused by collision related injuries.
In today’s case (Fabretti v. Gill) the Plaintiff was 12 years old when involved in a serious head on collision which killed the occupants in the at fault vehicle.  The Plaintiff suffered a mild brain injury, a variety of soft tissue injuries and chronic, but not disabling, pain.  Subsequent to this the Plaintiff started abusing drugs which negatively impacted his life.  At trial the Court found that the Plaintiff’s substance abuse difficulties were linked to the collision related injuries.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Madam Justice Kloegman provided the following reasons:
[77]         Dr. Lu stated that it was impossible to know whether or not the plaintiff would have developed an addiction in the absence of the 2005 Accident. Once again, the plaintiff does not have to prove to a scientific certainty that he would not have developed a drug addiction but for the Accident, only that it is more likely than not it was caused by the Accident. On the totality of the evidence, I find on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff’s drug addiction was caused by the Accident.
[78]         ICBC argues that a causal connection between the Accident and the plaintiff’s addiction can be shown only if the plaintiff’s alleged reason for the drug use as a coping mechanism or reaction to the chaos that followed the Accident is found to be true. ICBC submits that this allegation can only hold true if the plaintiff and his family were found to be credible. I do find the evidence of the Fabrettis to be credible and consistent with the clinical records, so this submission fails.
[79]         ICBC points to evidence that the plaintiff might have started drugs before the Accident, and in response to peer pressure to which he would have been exposed in any event.
[80]         This proposition of ICBC was put to Dr. Lu during cross-examination. He explained that although prior use may increase risk, many people experiment with recreational drug use but only a small percentage go on to develop an addiction. By age 15, 60% of people living on the west coast in Canada have tried marihuana. More than 80% of people experiment with drugs, but less than 10% become regular users. Dr. Lu had no doubt that the Accident caused the plaintiff’s addiction.
[81]         Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff’s drug addiction was more likely than not caused by the Accident…
[91]         On a balance of probabilities, I find that the plaintiff has no permanent physical disability arising from his injuries. He has no lasting cognitive effects from the Accident. The impact of his chronic pain on his function does not amount to an impairment and should not disable him from employment, although his capacity to perform all forms of employment to the same degree as before the Accident may have been realistically affected. At present his marihuana consumption is a negative factor in his full functional recovery, and must be brought under control. From the evidence, the success of the plaintiff’s future is highly dependent on eradicating his excessive drug use. The plaintiff had the wherewithal to stop his cocaine and MDMI use in high school without assistance. I believe the plaintiff, with the help of his family and professional addiction treatment, has the fortitude to overcome his dependency on marihuana. Nonetheless, I am aware that like any other addict, he will always be at risk of relapse…
[97]         From the cases cited to me, I found the decisions of Houston v. Kine, 2010 BCSC 1289 and Parfitt v. Mayes et al, 2006 BCSC 125 to be the most helpful. In Parfitt, the court accepted that the plaintiff did not have a permanent disability. In Houston, the court found that the prognosis was favourable with appropriate treatment. I find the impact of the plaintiff’s injuries to be slightly less than both the plaintiffs in Parfittand Houston. Accordingly I award the plaintiff the sum of $100,000 for pain and suffering.