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$140,000 Non Pecuniary Assessment for Brain Injury With Lingering Post Concussive Symptoms

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases. 52 Comments on $140,000 Non Pecuniary Assessment for Brain Injury With Lingering Post Concussive Symptoms

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a brain injury caused by a collision.
In today’s case (Curtis v. MacFarlane) the Plaintiff suffered a brain injury in a 2006 assault when he was struck with a baseball bat.  He was then involved in a 2009 collision where he sustained further head trauma.  The Defendant motorist tried to blame the Plaintiff’s deficits on the previous assault although the Court found the collision indeed caused a head injury with prolonged post concussive issues.  Prior to assessing damages Mr. Justice Crawford provided the following useful comments regarding head injury litigation:
[1]             The human brain is approximately three pounds of jelly containing more than 100 billion neurons and more than 100 trillion synapses. Our knowledge of its workings has vastly increased in the last 50 years, but man knows more of the universe than the workings of the human mind.
[2]             Only recently has the sporting world come to grips with the reality that splendid, strong athletes whose brain gets shaken up are in fact sustaining irreparable brain damage, revealed not only by the changes in the athlete’s performance and behaviour, but the ghastly findings of the autopsies upon the athlete’s death.
[3]             In the context of motor vehicle accident litigation, I have heard lawyers move from “emotional overlay” to describe the changed behaviour of their clients, to the realization that brain injury is unchartered territory, sometimes susceptible to a medical finding or organic damage that may show on an MRI, but more often diagnosed by behavioural changes of the client. The difficulty facing the finders of fact listening to learned medical professionals is pinpointing what got damaged, how that damage affects the working of the brain and the behaviour of the client, and how those behavioural, cognitive, and intellectual changes can be treated. Those difficulties simply reflect the fact that medical and scientific research is in a very early stage of finding out how the human brain works.
[4]             The dilemmas in the litigation context are many, particularly when there is testimony of memory loss and the plaintiff answers many questions with answers such as “I can’t remember” or “I can’t say when”…
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $140,000  Mr. Justice Crawford provided the following reasons:
[728]     I am satisfied that Mr. Curtis had made a full recovery from the effects of the bat injury as clearly demonstrated by the witnesses who spoke of his daily life before  the car accident; his 2007 visit to Greece; and his training, competition and coaching in 2008. All of that evidence speaks to a fit, strong and healthy young man as of January 2009.
[729]     The subsequent concussion symptoms, ongoing depression, and anxiety led to a downward spiral through 2009 and 2010. He has had some improvement since seeing Dr. Ancill in December 2010 but the evidence is clear that the hardworking, energetic, calm, upbeat, and outgoing Mr. Curtis has become reclusive, dull, lethargic, moody, anxious and easily agitated.
[730]     I found a large amount of Mr. Curtis’ self-worth is bound up in his physical strength and Brazilian jiu-jitsu fighting competitions. That self-worth has been lost, but he maintains his love of his sport and his wish to continue to contribute to it.
[731]     Financially, however, it was not rewarding.
[732]     His cognitive defects or deficits; his loss of fighting abilities; and his decreased affection and libido all severely compromise his enjoyment of life.
[733]     I read the cases both sides submitted and no two cases are alike.
[734]     One stark factor in some of the plaintiff’s cases shows what I would call a fighting ability – i.e., a demonstrated wish by a young athletic person to try and fight to regain their previous abilities. The depression found by all experts is perhaps the explanation for Mr. Curtis’ failure to try to rebound, to bring his fighting qualities to restoring his life…
[736]     It is Mr. Curtis’s misfortune that he did not have that initial intellectual capital that has made it more difficult to see a forward path, an issue that Dr. Ancill will have to deal with directly, through psychological and psychiatric therapies and medications as he deems appropriate.
[737]     In the circumstances, I set general damages at $140,000.

Proving Fault After A Transit Bus Collision – The Reverse Onus

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Proving Fault After A Transit Bus Collision – The Reverse Onus

If you are injured while a passenger in a transit bus British Columbia law requires the bus driver to prove they were not at fault.  This is a ‘reverse onus’ from most personal injury claims where the Plaintiff must prove the Defendant was at fault.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this.
In last week’s claim (Tchir v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority) the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a bus “when an unidentified driver came to an abrupt stop in front of the bus“.  The bus driver was forced to brake hard to avoid collision and the Plaintiff was thrown from her seat and injured.
The Court found both motorists were to blame for the incident.  In discussing the reverse onus in proving fault, Mr. Justice Davies provided the following summary of the law:
[38]         The standard of care owed by the Transit Defendants to Mrs. Tchir as a passenger is a high one. Also, once it is proven that a passenger is injured while riding on a public transit vehicle, a prima facie case of negligence is made out and the onus then shifts to the carrier to establish that the injuries suffered by the passenger occurred without fault on the carrier’s part.
[39]         Those principles were summarized by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Planidin v. Dykes, [1984] B.C.J. No. 907 (S.C.) [Planidin] at pages 3 and 4 as follows:
There is little dispute as to the legal principles applicable in this case. The standard of care imposed on a public character is a high one. This standard has been established in the Supreme Court of Canada decision Day v. Toronto Transportation Committee [1940] S.C.R. 433, 4 D.L.R. 485 . At page 439 of that report of that case Davis, J. said:
·        ” The duty of the respondent to the appellant, its passenger, was to carry her safely as far as reasonable care and forethought could attain that end.”
·        At page 441 Hudson, J. in an oft-quoted passage, stated:
·        ” Although the carrier of passenger is not an insurer, yet if an accident occurs and the passenger is injured, there is a heavy burden on the defendant carrier to establish that he had used all due, proper and reasonable care and skill to avoid or prevent injury to the passenger. The care required is of a very high degree.”
These, and other cases, establish that once an accident occurs and a passenger is injured, a prima facie case in negligence is raised and the onus shifts to the public carrier to establish that the passenger’s injuries were occasioned without negligence on the company’s part. The question then is: What suffices to discharge this onus?
[40]         Concerning the last question posed, McLachlin J. went on to say:
This has been considered in at least two British Columbian cases and I refer to Lawrie v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority (unreported, May 31st, 1876, B.C.S.C. Vancouver Registry No. 32708/74) and Fischer v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority (unreported, February 19th, 1980, B.C.S.C. B781446). In the latter case, at page 8, Taylor, J., set out what the defendant must show to discharge the onus upon it in the following terms:
·        ” Thus there is in this case an onus on the defendants to show that the plaintiff came by her injury without negligence on their part or as a result of some cause for which they are not responsible. That is to say they must show that the vehicle was being driven carefully at the time of her fall, or that her fall resulted from some cause other than the manner in which the bus was being driven.”
[41]         Also instructive on the issue of the standard of care expected of the Transit Defendants in this case is the decision of Dardi J. in Prempeh v. Boisvert, 2012 BCSC 304 [Prempeh] at para. 15, in which she wrote:
… The standard of care owed to a plaintiff passenger by a defendant bus driver is the conduct or behaviour that would be expected of a reasonably prudent bus driver in the circumstances. This is an objective test that takes into consideration both the experience of the average bus driver and anything the defendant driver knew or should have known: Wang v. Horrod (1998), 48 B.C.L.R. (3d) 199 at para. 39 (C.A.); Patoma v. Clarke, 2009 BCSC 1069 at para. 6.
 

Low Velocity Impact Strategy Judicially Rejected

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases.

Adding to this site’s archived judicial commentary on low velocity impact claims, reasons for judgement were released this week addressing and dismissing evidence seeking to minimize an injury claim based on the severity of the force of impact.
In this week’s case (Dunne v. Sharma) the Plaintiff sued for damages as a result of two collisions.  She alleged both physical and psychological consequences following these collisions.  The Defendant argued that any injuries the collisions caused were relatively minor as the collisions were modest.  In support of the Defendant’s argument accident reconstruction evidence was introduced which discussed the forces of the collision.  In rejecting the Defendant’s argument Mr. Justice Williams provided the following reasons:
[90]         Dealing first with the low velocity and minimal material damage aspect, I note that the defendants have tendered a report prepared by an engineer with expertise in the field of accident reconstruction. The essence of his opinion is that in each of the subject collisions, the velocity change experience by the plaintiff’s vehicle was probably less than about 12 km. per hour. The photographs contained in his report also demonstrate that the damage done to the cars by the collision was quite modest.
[91]         I appreciate that to have to been the case and I accept that common sense might generally dictate that a minor collision would not be expected to result in significant injuries. However, there is simply no basis upon which I am able to extrapolate the information concerning the velocity of the collision to a conclusion that the plaintiff’s injuries must therefore necessarily be of a certain type and degree. As has been judicially observed in a multitude of cases, the court cannot conclude that because the impact of the collision was relatively minor, then any resulting injuries must necessarily be minor as well. Justice Thackeray noted in Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236, 38 A.C.W.S. (3d) 924 (S.C.):
Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls. Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed. The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court. Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.
The magnitude of the collision is one factor the court will take into account, but it will be considered in the totality of the evidence. Generally, its effect with respect to determination of resultant injuries will not be great.
 

BC Supreme Court Comments on Expert Report "Appendices"

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 11. 107 Comments on BC Supreme Court Comments on Expert Report "Appendices"

Sometimes expert witnesses attach lengthy appendices to their reports setting out the materials they have reviewed or interview summaries.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this practice.
In today’s case (Maras v. Seemore Entertainment Ltd) a variety of expert reports were challenged prior to a lengthy jury trial.  The Court struck several reports and in doing so provided a good overview of the law addressing admissibility of expert reports at paragraphs 9-20 of the reasons.  In addressing the issue of expert report appendices Mr. Justice Abrioux provided the following comments:
[29]         As outlined in Rule 11-6(1)(e) and (f), an expert’s report should clearly delineate between “facts and assumptions” and “opinion”. To the extent there is information in an appendix that is a fact or assumption upon which an expert relies, then that should be contained in the “facts and assumptions” section of the report itself. Likewise, to the extent an appendix contains an opinion, then that should be set out in the “opinion” section of the report. Generally speaking, appendices to the report should be streamlined, and only include what is necessary for the formulation of the expert’s opinion and/or the facts and assumptions upon which it is based.
[30]         An appendix containing summaries and comments, to the extent that it does not contain an opinion or underlying facts and assumptions, is no more than a working paper which does not need to be included in the report itself. It should remain in the expert’s file, which is producible pursuant to Rule 11-6(8). As with any other document forming part of the expert’s file, it can be the subject of cross-examination.
[31]         In deciding the threshold question of admissibility, I am also of the view that there is some assistance to be obtained from decisions of this court or administrative tribunals which consider the reasonableness of an expert’s fee on an assessment of costs. Although I recognize that the purpose of the analysis is different, the underlying issue is similar, that is, the necessity of the expert’s report and its assistance to the trier of fact.
[32]         In that regard, there have been many instances in which Registrars or Masters of this court, when considering whether the amount charged by an expert is properly payable by the opposing party, have commented as to whether the charges were reasonable in the circumstances. Experts’ charges have been disallowed or reduced for a variety of reasons, including when the expert’s report contained improperly extensive narrative: Wheeldon v. Magee, 2010 BCSC 491 at paras. 20-29; Bodeux v. Tom, 2013 BCSC 2327 at paras. 20-23.
[33]         Certain British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal (“WCAT”) decisions have also discussed the usefulness, or lack thereof, of lengthy appendices to expert reports. These comments appear within the context of WCAT’s discretion to order reimbursement for expert reports on the basis of a “reasonableness” analysis. For example, in WCAT-2013-02657 at paras. 75-85, it was said:
[85]      In summary, although Ms. Gallagher’s report was helpful in my deliberations, and it was reasonable for the worker to obtain it, I find the reasons for its expense to be inadequate. The appendices to the report detailing the worker’s test results were not helpful to lay person. This information is summarized (or should be) in the body of the report. A summary of the evidence contained in the appendix, again, is not useful or appropriate considering it is on the claim file, and in the body of the report. …
[Emphasis added.]
Similar examples commenting on the reasonableness of lengthy appendices include WCAT-2012-01770 at paras. 105-107, and WCAT-2012-02617 at paras. 53-58.
[34]         In a decision rendered since my oral ruling in this case, Madam Justice Russell recently summarized the law in this province regarding the scope of disclosure of an expert’s file pursuant to Rule 11-6(8): Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia (Education), 2014 BCSC 741 at paras. 25-51 [CSF]. After a thorough review of the relevant jurisprudence, she held:
[41]      With regard to the scheme of the R. 11-6(8), I note that R.11-6(8)(a) enumerates a number of documents that must be served on a requesting party immediately, namely written statements or statements of facts on which the expert based his or her opinion; records of independent observations made by the expert in relation to the report; data compiled by the expert in relation to the report; and the results of any tests conducted by the expert or inspections conducted by the expert.  Rule 11-6(8)(a) thus already requires production of the observations and analysis underlying the expert’s opinion.  Rule 11-6(8)(b) should therefore be read as requiring production of something more than the underpinning of the report.
…
[44]      My interpretation of R. 11-6(8)(b) thus takes a middle road between the broad scope of disclosure at common law and the narrow view asserted by the plaintiffs.  As I see it, on request pursuant to R. 11-6(8)(b), an expert must produce the contents of the expert’s file that are relevant to matters of substance in his or her opinion or to his or her credibility unless it would be unfair to do so.
[Emphasis added.]
[35]         The CSF decision, in my view, supports my conclusion that an expert’s report should be limited to the requirements set out in Rule 11-6(1). To the extent the recipient of the report requires production of further documents, then he or she is to follow the procedure in Rule 11-6(8).
[36]         I would add that if a party seeks production of the contents of the expert’s file earlier than the 14 days before trial provided for under Rule 11-6(8)(b)(ii) and meets resistance in that regard, this could form the basis for a disclosure application at a trial management conference pursuant to Rule 12-2(9)(q).

$55,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Bursitis

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries and bursitis following a motor vehicle collision.
In today’s case (MacDonald v. Kemp) the Plaintiff was involved in a serious highway collision in 2010.  Fault was admitted.  She was 25 at the time and suffered a variety of injuries to her neck and shoulder which were not expected to fully heal.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $55,000 Mr. Justice Baird provided the following reasons:
[3]             As a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered a number of soft tissue injuries. To this day she continues to experience pain in her lower back, neck and shoulders, primarily the left shoulder. Following the accident and as a result of her injuries she also developed bursitis in her left shoulder. She experiences a consistent dull pain in these locations throughout the day and finds it is aggravated and flares up following strenuous physical activity, thereby requiring that she take non-prescription pain medication. She has suffered occasionally from headaches and tingling in her arms, and sometimes experiences anxiety when she is in a motor vehicle on a busy highway. She had no pre-existing injuries and enjoyed good health before the accident.
[4]             The plaintiff has taken massage, physiotherapy and acupuncture treatments in an effort to rehabilitate these injuries. These passive interventions have afforded her a measure of relief. She also takes Advil to manage her pain and exercises in a home gym to the increase her strength and fitness. The plaintiff’s consulting orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Markland, recommends that these treatments continue.
[5]             Dr. Markland also recommended that the plaintiff avoid “forceful activities” at or above shoulder level, but observed that she “is fortunate that her work is not physically demanding, and that she finds her workstation well adapted. She is still able to pursue many of her pre-accident activities, although at a lower level than before.” While acknowledging that there is still a chance that the plaintiff’s condition may improve, Dr. Markland indicated that, almost four years after the accident, the likelihood is that her back, neck and shoulder pain and weakness are here to stay…
[22]         In my view, the appropriate award is somewhere in the range delineated by these two cases. I intend to emphasize the upper end of that range, primarily because, as previously mentioned, the plaintiff has been compromised in her physical health during the years of her life when she should be enjoying peak strength and functionality. I award $55,000 under this heading.
 

$120,000 Non Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Myofacial Pain Syndrome

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries which developed into a chronic myofascial pain syndrome.
In today’s case (Kirkham v. Richardson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision.  She was 26 years old at the time and was pursuing a PhD and competed as a professional triathlete.  She sustained soft tissue injuries which impacted her education and training.  Her symptoms lingered to the time of trial and were expected to continue.  The injuries were complicated by a subsequent bike collision although the Court was able to divide the injuries from the separate incidents. In assessing the collision related injuries at $120,000 Madam Justice Warren provided the following reasons:
[182]     In summary, and having taken into account all the evidence, I make the following findings:
·       Ms. Kirkham suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, shoulders and upper back as a result of the car accident.
·       Those injuries have resulted in myofascial pain syndrome, cervical facet arthropathy, and chronic pain syndrome, all of which continue to affect Ms. Kirkham.
·       Ms. Kirkham suffered a concussion and abrasions in the bike crash which are divisible injuries for which the defendant is not liable.
·       Ms. Kirkham did not exacerbate or aggravate her soft tissue injuries in the bike crash and the bike crash did not contribute to Ms. Kirkham’s myofascial pain syndrome, cervical facet arthropathy, or chronic pain syndrome.
·       Ms. Kirkham’s soft tissue injuries and the concussion she suffered in the bike crash both resulted in deconditioning that, in turn, caused Ms. Kirkham’s left hip girdle pain, which is an indivisible injury.
·       Ms. Kirkham took a leave of absence that delayed the completion of her PhD studies by a year. The leave was required for Ms. Kirkham to focus on rehabilitation of the injuries caused by the car accident. The concussion did not contribute to Ms. Kirkham’s leave of absence from her PhD studies.
·       As a result of the concussion, Ms. Kirkham did not compete in any triathlons during the summer of 2011. The concussion and the soft tissue injuries both contributed to her decision not to compete in any triathlons over the rest of 2011.
…
[195]     Having regard to the case law cited and the Stapley factors, I assess Ms. Kirkham’s non-pecuniary damages at $130,000, but reduced by $10,000 to reflect the possibility that the deconditioning associated with the concussion would have caused her hip pain in any event.
 

$225,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic and Disabling Conversion Disorder

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases. 49 Comments on $225,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic and Disabling Conversion Disorder

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a disabling conversion disorder following a motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Best v. Thomas) the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle when he was rear-ended by a van.  The Plaintiff suffered a spine injury at C-5 which required surgical correction.  He went on to suffer from a variety of disabling ailments.  Ultimately the Court found these were due to a conversion disorder.  The prognosis for recovery was poor.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $225,000 Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons:
[139]     I find on a balance of probabilities that the main cause of the plaintiff’s current condition, including the myoclonus, is conversion disorder. I come to this conclusion because of the relative rarity of propriospinal myoclonus and how it can be mistaken for psychiatric problems. The non-anatomical presentation was also persuasive. As early as Dr. Ho’s involvement, a strange kicking motion was noted, which was inconsistent with a neurological cause. Some of the plaintiff’s pain may well be as a result of the surgery on his C5/6 disc; however, the vast majority of his symptoms, in my view, are not organic or structural in cause.
[140]     Diagnosis of cause aside, what I glean from the experts is that nobody predicts anything close to a full recovery for the plaintiff. Dr. Hurwitz posited a 14% possibility of some recovery, though in light of the fact that the plaintiff has already been treated with a wide variety of anti-depressant drugs, this is a very optimistic prognosis. The other experts recommended various interventions in an effort to assist the plaintiff…
[161]     The plaintiff was almost 32 when the accident happened. The original injury was to his C5-6 disc. I find the following facts about the plaintiff’s condition have been established on a balance of probabilities.
[162]     Since the accident, the plaintiff has been in constant pain, notwithstanding an aggressive regime of pain treatment through medication and other therapies. He is disabled from competitive employment. While he can drive and walk, with some difficulty and with the assistance of a cane, he cannot engage in the activities he enjoyed before the accident. In terms of physical activity, he can do little more than walk very short distances and swim. He can no longer work at a job he enjoyed. His emotional suffering is extreme. He has given up hope of being a father and had a vasectomy as he would be unable to engage in play or chase a child. His enjoyment of sexual activity is significantly diminished as he has lost sensation in his penis during intercourse. His family and friends attest to the fact that he is not the same person as before the accident. He no longer laughs and jokes around. He is constantly fatigued. His family and two close friends remain engaged with him but his world has shrunk considerably from his pre-accident social activities and he has essentially lost a healthy, active, social lifestyle. He is not as mentally sharp as he was, whether by virtue of the injury or the associated medications he takes to manage his condition. None of the experts predicted anything remotely approaching a full recovery.
[163]     Taking into account all of the foregoing, as well as the range of cases provided by counsel, I award the plaintiff $225,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 

"There is No Deduction for Income Tax" For Diminished Future Earning Capacity Awards

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Wage Loss.

When Courts in BC assess damages for future ‘diminished earning capacity‘ no deduction is to be made for income taxes to be paid on those funds.  Although this is not a new legal development, it is nice when Courts summarize the law in a concise statement as was done in reasons released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry.
In this week’s case (Kelly v. Kotz) the Plaintiff was awarded $16,000 for diminished earning capacity following injuries sustained in a vehicle collision.  The basis of the award was that the Plaintiff needed to attend a rehabilitation program to address her injuries and this was an assessment of her anticipated lost earnings during this time.  ICBC argued the award should be reduced by tax obligations.  Madam Justice Hyslop rejected this argument and provided the following concise reasons:
[4]             The burden of proof is whether there is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff will suffer a future loss of income. Ms. Kelly has met that burden. Ms. Kelly seeks $16,000.00 as a loss of wages while she pursues the program recommended by Dr. Brownlee. This future loss of income is based on Ms. Kelly’s annual income of $60,000.00 and benefits roughly estimated at $500.00 per month. Ms. Kelly will need to take three months off to attend this program; this is the basis of the loss.
[5]             The defendants did not dispute these numbers, but disputed whether it should be a net amount as opposed to a gross amount.
[6]             Past loss of income is a net amount after deduction of income tax. Future loss of earnings is an assessment and there is no deduction for income tax: Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287…
[8]             I order that the plaintiff be awarded $16,000.00 for future loss of income.
 

$45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Pre-Existing Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases. 62 Comments on $45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Aggravation of Pre-Existing Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for the aggravation of pre-existing injuries.
In yesterday’s case (Pichugina v. Matula) the Plaintiff was involved in a T-bone type collision in 2010.  The Defendant admitted fault.  The Plaintiff had pre-existing symptoms in her neck, shoulder and back.  The collision aggravated these and her increased symptoms continued to the time of trial and were expected to linger on for several more years.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 Mr. Justice Cohen provided the following reasons:
[56]         On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that, as a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained aggravation to her already symptomatic neck, right shoulder, and low back and sustained aggravation to her pre-existing headaches.  In my opinion, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the accident caused the minimal winging of the plaintiff’s right scapula.  Although the plaintiff returned to work full-time by the end of two months following the accident, and experienced much improvement in her condition by the spring of 2011, she cannot take advantage of a flexible work schedule, and, while she remains physically active, some activities are no longer comfortable for her.
[57]         According to Dr. Vorobeychik, the plaintiff’s symptoms have improved, but she still experiences migraine headaches and problems with her right shoulder, neck, and back when she is active or upon exertion.  The overall medical evidence, and that of the plaintiff, is that there has been gradual improvement in her condition post-accident, and she appears to be handling her headaches better.  According to Dr. Robinson, the plaintiff will probably continue to have gradual improvement over the next three to five years, but she remains at risk for persisting neck and right shoulder pain, which would act as an aggravator to her migraine predisposition.
[58]         Upon my consideration of the whole of the evidence, the parties’ submissions, and the authorities relied upon by them, I find that a fair and reasonable award to the plaintiff for general damages is $45,000.
 

Court of Appeal Finds Insufficient Warning Sign Not Causative of Trip and Fall Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in Occupier's liability claims.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal overturning a trial judgement and dismissing a trip and fall lawsuit.
In today’s case (Simmons v. Yeager Properties Inc.) the Plaintiff injured herself at the Defendant’s bakery.  Outside the bakery was a concrete landing and a wooden patio deck.  There was a 2-4 inch height difference between these surfaces.  The Defendant marked this with paint and also with a sign that read “watch your step please“.  The sign faded over time with the words ‘watch‘ and ‘step‘ becoming ‘quite faded and difficult to see‘.
At trial the Court found the Plaintiff 75% at fault with 25% blame going to the Defendant’s on the basis of the faded sign.  The BC Court of Appeal outright dismissed the claim finding the faded sign was not causative of the injuries given that the Plaintiff was not looking in the direction of the sign and did not see it at all.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[12]Thus the judge determined the bakery owners’ maintenance was inadequate to refute the conclusion that the ineffective warning sign constituted a breach of the Occupiers Liability Act:
[42]      Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that by failing to maintain the outdoor waning sign, the defendants failed to take reasonable care to ensure the exterior area leading to the entrance of the bakery was reasonably safe.
[13]        This, however, is the extent of any finding the judge made of any breach of the Occupiers Liability Act or the standard of care attributable to the owners of the bakery and, in considering Ms. Simmons’ neglect for her own safety, the judge then went on to find that Ms. Simmons was not looking in the direction of the sign prior to her fall:
[45]      Here, I find that the patio step was there to be seen by the plaintiff had she paid attention to where she was going. It was demarcated by white paint that was generally visible to persons accessing the bakery entrance from the patio deck. The photographs of the area taken shortly after this incident show that the paint was not faded and worn as suggested by Mr. Murphy. It is questionable whether the faded outdoor warning sign was a significant factor in the circumstances since the plaintiff was not looking in that direction and did not see the sign at all.
[46]      If the plaintiff had been watching where she was walking, she would likely have seen that there was a difference in level from where she was to where she was going. I find her expectation that the entire walking surface would be level to be an unreasonable one, as she was not paying attention but was instead focused on the woman in front of her and on the front entrance to the bakery.
[14]        With respect, I am unable to see how it can be said the bakery owners’ breach of the Occupiers Liability Act renders them liable for the injuries Ms. Simmons suffered when she fell. The fact the sign was not properly maintained such as to have been readable cannot have caused Ms. Simmons to fall if, as the judge found, she was “not looking in that direction and did not see the sign at all”. Had the sign been readable it would have made no difference. Ms. Simmons would not have seen it. The bakery owners’ breach of the duty they owed to patrons like Ms. Simmons cannot have caused her fall.
[15]        Thus Ms. Simmons failed to “show on a balance of probabilities that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligent act, the injury would not have occurred” (see Clements at para. 8). The facts found by the judge do not provide a legal basis for determining the owners of the bakery to be liable for the injuries Ms. Simmons suffered when she fell.