If a party to a lawsuit is ordered to attend an independent medical exam can a Court hear an appeal of the order after the examination is complete? The BC Court of Appeal addressed this in reasons for judgement released today and the answer is yes.
In finding that an appeal of an IME order is not moot even after the examination takes place the Court provided the following reasons: [23] The Insurers submit that the appeal is moot because prior to commencement of his appeal Dr. Wright attended the IME, answered the questions posed by Dr. Connell, completed and submitted the 13-page questionnaire referenced in the order, and completed and submitted the Authorization and Consent form and the Governing Law and Jurisdiction Agreement form referenced at para. 4 of the order. In consequence, the respondents say Dr. Wright has now complied with all of the substantive provisions of the order and given that compliance, the appeal should be quashed as moot… [29] Items 7 to 11, generally speaking, deal with the consequences of the IME order and seek certain specific relief arising out of that order. For example, item 8 seeks that the expert witness report prepared by Dr. Connell, together with copies of his notes and medical records, be destroyed. These issues give life to the appeal and items 1 and 2 which seek to set aside the order granting the IME. Given that the Insurers may rely on that report at trial, it cannot be said that the issue is moot. If this Court concludes that the IME order should not have been made, it will be necessary to determine what relief, if any, is available to Dr. Wright and that relief could arguably include some prohibition or restriction on the use of Dr. Connell’s report. [30] In the circumstances therefore I would dismiss the application to quash.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a defence application for double costs after a Plaintiff’s personal injury claim was dismissed.
In this week’s case (Miller v. Emil Anderson Co. Ltd.) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision alleging that an unidentified vehicle contributed to the incident. Prior to trial the Defendant made a formal settlement offer of $1 which “expressed the defendants’ belief that the Court would conclude that Mr. Miller had suffered no compensable injury.”
Ultimately the Plaintiff’s claim was rejected with the Court concluding that “memory and perception of the key events preceding his loss of control of his vehicle were not reliable.”. Despite this the Court found the walk-away offer was not reasonable as the plaintiff had a sincere belief in his perception of the event and that “ had he accepted the defendants’ offer, he would have been giving up, without adjudication, a claim that he believed had merit“.
In dismissing the Defendant’s request for double costs Madam Justice Ballance provided the following reasons: [15] In the present case, Mr. Miller proceeded upon his hypothesis as to how the accident occurred, including the purported role of another vehicle. He tendered no expert evidence in the field of engineering and/or accident reconstruction in support of his theory. In weighing the evidence, I concluded that Mr. Miller had not proved his case on a balance of probabilities. In reaching that conclusion, I found that his memory and perception of the key events preceding his loss of control of his vehicle were not reliable. [16] Despite the frailties in Mr. Miller’s testimony and his faulty recall of events, I did not doubt that Mr. Miller’s perception of events, including his theory as to how the accident occurred, was sincere. He did not attempt to mislead or deceive the Court. Had he accepted the defendants’ offer, he would have been giving up, without adjudication, a claim that he believed had merit. A belief that was neither groundless nor frivolous… [18] The Offer is to be considered in the context of a serious liability issue where neither side called expert engineering or accident reconstruction evidence in relation to the pivotal issue of what had caused the accident. Mr. Miller was aware that he and the defendants held conflicting versions of the material events and that there was a risk that, if the Court found that the evidence did not support his case, his action would be dismissed. However, it does not follow that the nominal Offer ought reasonably to have been accepted by Mr. Miller at any time. As was the case in Stuart, the Offer provided nothing to Mr. Miller in relation to the claim itself and proffered little meaningful benefit to him. [19] The evidence indicates that Mr. Miller was in his early 70s at the time of the accident and was retired or semi-retired from prospecting. Beyond that, there was no cogent evidence of his financial circumstances and I am therefore unable to agree with his counsel’s submission that it was clear he is impecunious. [20] Although Mr. Miller ultimately failed to make out his case on a balance of probabilities, I would not characterize his refusal to accept the Offer as unreasonable. [21] Weighing the pertinent factors and giving the most weight to the fact that I am unable to say that it was unreasonable for Mr. Miller to refuse the Offer, I consider it a fair exercise of my discretion to decline to order double costs. An award of costs at Scale B in favour of the defendants is appropriate in this case and will likely be of significant consequence to Mr. Miller. [22] Accordingly, the defendants’ application for double costs is dismissed. They will have their costs at Scale B.
Corrected reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing fault between a pedestrian and a bus driver.
In today’s case (Whelan v. BC Transit) the Plaintiff pedestrian “was struck and had his foot run over by a BC Transit bus driven by the defendant Henry Kobbero, after Mr. Whelan had stepped onto the road to avoid some other pedestrians on the sidewalk.”
The bus was stopped shortly before the incident dropping off passengers and moved forward with the driver seeking to merge back with traffic. Mr. Justice Schultes found both parties were to blame with the Plaintiff bearing the lion’s share of fault. In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons: [71] On all the evidence I am satisfied that there was a period of time, of more than transitory length, during which the bus was travelling forward, still in the curb lane, but the focus of Mr. Kobbero’s attention was on his left mirror and the act of merging. It was during this period that Mr. Whelan stepped out on the road and, had Mr. Kobbero’s attention been prudently apportioned between merging and the curb lane in front of him, he could have seen and reacted to the pedestrian in time of avoid a collision. His focus on merging reflected an assumption, which I find was not reasonable in light of his overall awareness of the range of pedestrian hazards, that his forward check earlier in the process was sufficient. However briefly, I conclude that he did fall below his required standard of care. [72] As was obvious from my earlier comments in this discussion, Mr. Whelan was himself contributorily negligent in this accident. In addition to his disregard for the bus’s right of way and his needless decision to place himself onto the travelled portion of the roadway simply to avoid a moment’s pause in his progress, he made an assumption that was even less grounded in objective fact than Mr. Kobbero’s — that the driver checking his shoulder meant that the bus would have moved into the left lane before it reached the area where he stepped off the sidewalk… 75] I would characterize Mr. Kobbero’s lapse of care in conduct as falling more towards the momentary or minor end of the spectrum than towards the extremely careless end. I have found that it was a decision to focus his attention fairly briefly on an admittedly more pressing task, based on the faulty assumption that there were no risks directly ahead of him. This was not the kind of lapse that was inevitably going to cause harm; it required a pedestrian to do one of the foolish things that Mr. Kobbero has been trained to expect in order for that to happen. I conclude that Mr. Kobbero should bear 40% of the liability for this accident. [76] Mr. Whelan’s actions conversely, demonstrate a higher degree of carelessness. As a pedestrian he was extremely vulnerable to the oncoming bus and there were no safe circumstances under which he could have stepped on the road with it still moving forward in that curb lane. It was in essence a gamble on things playing out as he assumed they would, with a large downside, fortunately only a small part of which materialized here, to being wrong. Accordingly I fix his liability at 60%.
Adding to this site’s archives addressing non-pecuniary assessments for traumatic brain injury, reasons for judgement were released today addressing a brain stem injury.
In today’s case (Van v. Howlett) the Plaintiff was a passenger involved in a 2007 collision. The force of the collision ejected the plaintiff causing various injuries inclucing a brain stem injury. Her prognosis for meaningful recovery was poor and in fact her functioning was expected to deteriorate as time went on. In assessing damages at the maximum amount of $351,000 Mr. Justice Grauer provided the following reasons: [26] Dr. Jason Clement, a radiologist and a specialist in neuroimaging, provided the lead opinion concerning Ms. Van’s brain injury, and I do not hesitate to accept his evidence. He noted that MRI investigation disclosed severe diffuse axonal injury (“DAI”) including grade 1, 2 and 3 lesions, as well as additional intracranial injuries in the form of subdural and subarachnoid haemorrhage. A grade 3 DAI lesion involves the brainstem and is the most severe grade. These lesions act as markers for diffuse underlying injury throughout the brain resulting in significant chronic cognitive dysfunction and impairment in all cognitive domains. In fact, Dr. Clement explained, this type of injury is more consistent with people in a persistent vegetative state, which Ms. Van is not. [27] The severe DAI sustained by Ms. Van is also known to trigger progressive cerebral atrophy leading to an increased risk of progressive cognitive decline and premature dementia. In addition, the multiple focal brain injuries have left her with a lifelong increased risk of seizures. [28] Dr. Clement explained that people do not recover from this sort of injury, and that the treatment focus must be on reducing further decline to the extent possible… [50] On the evidence before me, I have no difficulty in concluding that the injuries suffered by Ms. Van are catastrophic. We are, in any practical sense, our brains. A brain injury of this degree of severity is a loss of one’s very self. Like Ms. Spehar, Ms. Van “has lost what to many is one of the most valuable aspects of being an adult human — the ability to have control over one’s own life” (Spehar at para 13). No aspect of her life, including her closest relationships, has been left unimpaired. Her outlook for the future is dismal. Her days are filled with pain and frustration. There is no possibility of recovery. The best she can hope for is that her deterioration will be slowed, and that her anger, frustration and depression can be addressed through medication and distraction. At worst, she will experience a premature and accelerated descent into dementia, losing what little has been left to her. [51] In these circumstances, I conclude that Ms. Van is entitled to an award at the upper limit. I assess her non-pecuniary damages at $351,000.
Adding to this site’s archived posts addressing damages for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing such an injury.
In this week’s case (Field v. Bains) the Plaintiff was 7 year old when her vehicle was struck by a semi trailer and dragged along the highway. She suffered from PTSD which had some lingering symptoms by the time of trial some 10 years later. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons: [44] Rebecca was a seven-year-old child when she was involved in a frightening car accident with her mother. She suffered from recurrent nightmares about the accident for approximately a year and intermittent nightmares for some time after. She would not get in a car for a number of months after the accident. When she finally did she was hypervigilant, on the lookout for large trucks. The sight of a large truck near the family car caused her to go into a severe anxiety phase. She would curl up in a ball in the back of the car and obsessively talk about the truck. Rebecca also had a fear of loud noises from buses and trucks, which at its most severe caused her to run and hide or avoid taking the school bus for outings with her classmates. She never returned to ballet classes. [45] Rebecca is now a mature and well-spoken 17-year-old. She has worked very hard to overcome the effects of the accident by seeking out counselling and successfully integrating coping techniques into her daily life. [46] I accept the opinions of Dr. Weiss and Dr. Kaushansky that the plaintiff developed PTSD as a result of the accident. I accept their opinions that Rebecca’s fear of large trucks spilled over into a generalized anxiety about a number of different things. While it appears Rebecca has recovered from the psychological effects of the accident, the PTSD and anxiety are in remission rather than completely eradicated. [47] As for the plaintiff’s prognosis, I prefer Dr. Kaushanky’s opinion over that of Dr. Weiss. Dr. Kaushansky was of the view that Rebecca would live quite a normal life but be significantly more affected by life stressors than other people. He described it as a waxing and waning effect which would necessitate periodic visits with a counsellor. This appears to have been the case, as Rebecca sought out assistance from Ms. Hildebrandt when her stress and anxiety levels over the accident as well as family matters became too much for her to deal with on her own. Ms. Hildebrandt’s intervention appears to have been successful in assisting Rebecca with an abatement of her anxiety. [48] Dr. Weiss’s prognosis that the plaintiff would have marked functional impairment in her life as a result of the PTSD has not, in my view, come to fruition. Rebecca has managed to attain her driver’s licence despite the frightening after-effects of the accident. She graduated from high school, has a positive group of friends and has realistic ambitions for future career paths which she will further investigate after a year off… [55] Taking into account the findings of fact in this case, the factors in Stapley, and the comparable authorities involving children with PTSD, I award the plaintiff $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
Although damages for past loss of income can be assessed even if a Plaintiff does not accurately report income to Revenue Canada, the figures reported on tax filings have a high evidentiary value in Court. This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In this week’s case (Saadati v. Moorhead) the Plaintiff was involved in a number of collisions. The Plaintiff worked as a truck driver and advanced a claim for lost income of $6,000 per month for a period of two years. Prior to trial the Plaintiff was declared mentally incompetent and could not testify on his own behalf. The Court was presented with evidence addressing the Plaintiff’s claim for past loss of income, most notably evidence of very low reported earnings in the years prior to the collision. The Court relied heavily on this, accepting the reported earnings as accurate, and dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim for past loss of income. In reaching this decision Mr. Justice Funt provided the following reasons: [74] It is also clear that the plaintiff earned very little income during his 2001 to 2004 taxation years. The plaintiff did not report any income for his 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years and for 2004 only $12,796 in taxable capital gains was reported. In sum, his tax returns for the years prior to the accident show very little income. I note that in 2007 the plaintiff reported $22,500 in employment income. [75] There was evidence that the plaintiff during the years prior to the July 5, 2005 accident did not appear to be in financial difficulties and was able to provide for his wife and two sons. The Court will not impute income to the plaintiff for these years. He filed tax returns which he would have certified to be correct (the Income Tax Act, RSC, 1985, c. 1(5th supp.) also provides significant penalties for a false tax return). As many people do, he may have kept his financial affairs to himself. The imputation of income would be tantamount to finding possibly gross negligence or tax evasion which is unwarranted, especially having regard to the fact that the plaintiff is not able to testify to explain matters and defend his reputation. [76] In Hoy v. Williams, 2014 BCSC 234, Justice Kent set forth the test to determine whether an award for past income loss should be made. [141] Compensation for past loss of earning capacity is to be based on what the plaintiff would have, not could have, earned but for the injury that was sustained: Rowe v. Bobell Express Ltd., 2005 BCCA 141 at para. 30; M.B. v. British Columbia, 2003 SCC 53 at para. 49. The burden of proof of actual past events is a balance of probabilities. An assessment of loss of both past and future earning capacity involves consideration of hypothetical events. The plaintiff is not required to prove these hypothetical events on a balance of probabilities. The future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation: Athey v. Leonati at para. 27; Morlan v. Barrett, 2012 BCCA 66 at para. 38. [77] As stated previously, I have found that the July 5, 2005 accident did not aggravate the plaintiff’s pre-existing physical injuries but that it did cause a personality change and cognitive difficulties. [78] The plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence that “by reason of his [psychological] injuries, [he was] unable to do many things that, but for his injuries, he could have done to earn income” (Rowe v. Bobell Express Ltd., 2005 BCCA 141, at para. 34) or would have earned income. [79] The Court, therefore, dismisses the plaintiff’s claim for an award for past wage loss.
Update February 6, 2015 – This week the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed ICBC’s bid to appeal this decision.
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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal confirming that plaintiff lawyers can use “ICBC” in their website domain name and that this does not lead to consumer confusion.
In this week’s case (ICBC v. Stainton Ventures) ICBC alleged that the use of ‘icbc’ in a domain name used as a marketing tool for personal injury lawyers was misleading and in breach of ICBC’s intellectual property rights. This argument was dismissed at trial. ICBC appealed arguing “the relevant consumer, having the familiarity but imperfect recollection of the ICBC Official Marks, would likely be led to believe that ICBC itself is offering advice on its business, wares and services, when viewing such marks as a matter of first impression”.ICBC
The BC Court of Appeal disagreed and dismissed ICBC’s appeal. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons: [37] I am unable to accept this argument as it fails to give the “relevant consumer”, i.e., an Internet user, credit for even the most basic understanding of the function of a domain name. Even though there is some resemblance between ICBCadvice.com and ICBC’s family of marks, the average Internet user with an imperfect recollection of ICBC’s marks would not likely be mistaken by the domain name. They understand, for example, that a domain name which, in part, contains the name of a business or its acronym will not necessarily be affiliated with or endorsed by that business and may, instead, be the subject matter of the website or entirely unrelated to that business. As well, they understand that it is necessary to view a website to determine whose site it is. While I appreciate that Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, involved a dispute over a trade-mark rather than an official mark, it is noteworthy that the Court attributed a reasonable level of intelligence to “the casual consumer somewhat in a hurry”: paras. 56-58. In the present context, to paraphrase a passage from Michelin & Cie v. Astro Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. (1982), 69 C.P.R. (2d) 260 (F.C.T.D.), quoted with approval in Mattel, Inc., one must not proceed on the assumption that average Internet users are completely devoid of intelligence or of normal powers of recollections or are uninformed as to what goes on around them. [38] ICBC submits this Court must be cautious to avoid failing to differentiate the test applicable to official marks from the “source confusion” test applicable to trade-marks under s. 6 of the Trade-marks Act. In its oral submissions it repeatedly adverted to the need to avoid applying the “source confusion” test in the context of official marks. While different tests do apply, it must be kept in mind that any mark, including an official mark, serves an identification function, whether as to source, endorsement, or otherwise. ICBC’s submission that “the relevant consumer, having the familiarly but imperfect recollection of the ICBC Official Marks, would likely be led to believe that ICBC itself is offering advice”, suggests that ICBC appreciates that one of the objectives of the official-marks regime is to protect the public by prohibiting the use of a mark which so nearly resembles an official mark that a person seeing that mark would mistakenly believe it to be the rights-holder’s mark. [39] As indicated above, I am unable to accept that the average Internet user does not appreciate that domain names—which are limited to short combinations of alphanumeric characters—are often merely descriptive of the subject matter of the website to which the domain name resolves, rather than indicating affiliation, source, or endorsement. Put otherwise, a person who conducted a search—using, for example, the terms “ICBC” and “advice”—which returned ICBCadvice.com in its list of results would not, based solely on observing that domain name, mistakenly believe that the “advice” referred to is provided or endorsed by ICBC. Neither would they, as a matter of first impression, be mistaken by the fact that the domain name starts with “ICBC”. The most that person would conclude is that the website likely had something to do with the corporation. [40] In the result, I agree with the trial judge that the website ICBCadvice.com and its related domain names do not contravene ss. 9 and 11 of the Trade-marks Act.
Adding to this site’s archived cases criticizing expert witnesses for advocacy, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, criticizing the evidence of a defense hired psychiatrist.
In today’s case (Yang v. Engen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2011 intersection collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff suffered moderate soft tissue injuries but her recovery was complicated by “ever-increasing emotional difficulties and mood disorders“.
The Defendant retained a psychiatrist who minimized the connection between the collision and these psychological difficulties. In finding the expert witness crossed the line into advocacy Mr. Justice Davies provided the following comments: [53] After hearing those submissions and reviewing Dr. Levin’s original and rebuttal reports, I concluded that it was necessary to excise as inadmissible the following parts of his reports: 1) The observation in the body of his opinion that: It should be mentioned at the beginning of this summary that Ms. Yang’s diagnostic formulation should be viewed in the context of her interview in my office that revealed numerous discrepancies and inconsistencies between her subjectively-reported complaints of anxiety and her virtually-unimpaired social, occupational and interpersonal functioning. Ms. Yang initially omitted and under-reported her pre-existent history of psychological/emotional disturbances, attributing her current subjectively-presented complaints of “generalized” anxiety specifically and selectively to the subject MVA. 2) The observation in Appendix C of his opinion that: From a diagnostic perspective, however, the above-reviewed psychological clinical notes do not identify any specific PTSD symptomatology or reports of any type of generalized anxiety described by Ms. Yang during the interview in my office. It seems that Ms. Yang’s “generalized anxiety” disturbances had a somewhat rapid onset following her reported psychiatric consultation with Dr. Lu (organized by her lawyer). [54] I excised those paragraphs because: 1) The excised observations in the body of his opinion not only crossed the line into an improper assessment of credibility but also constituted advocacy in the guise of expertise; and 2) The excised observations in Appendix C demonstrated an unwarranted and unsubstantiated personal attack not only on the credibility of the plaintiff but also upon a well-qualified psychiatrist and upon plaintiff’s counsel. [55] I did not, however, rule that the totality of Dr. Levin’s reports should be determined to be inadmissible at that stage of the proceeding because I was satisfied that fairness to the impugned expert and to the defendant who had relied upon his evidence required that such a ruling should not be made without the benefit of hearing Dr. Levin’s evidence in chief and in cross-examination [56] I reached that conclusion also because of the complexities of the subject matter on which Dr. Levin was seeking to opine and in the context of the breadth of the attack by counsel for Ms. Yang upon not only his substantive opinion but also the methodology employed by Dr. Levin in rendering it. [57] After hearing his evidence at trial and having the opportunity to consider the totality of his evidence, including both written opinions and the entirety of his testimony at trial, I have concluded that Dr. Levin’s opinion presents a distorted recording of his interview with Ms. Yang by failing to identify with preciseness the questions which he asked of her and by his interspersed editorializing as to what answers he would have expected, all of which constituted his assessment of her lack of credibility which he then used as the basis for his diagnosis. That in turn resulted in a resort to advocacy on behalf of the defendant in relation to issues of causation and, in my view, demonstrated a personal investment in the litigation sufficient to constitute bias. [58] Those concerns were even more dramatically highlighted by a highly personalized, and, in my view, entirely unwarranted attack upon Dr. Lu’s opinion and professionalism in Dr. Levin’s rebuttal report delivered in response to Dr. Lu’s critique of Dr. Levin’s analysis. [59] In result, I have concluded that Dr. Levin’s opinions suffer so greatly from overstepping the proper bounds of opinion evidence into the assessment of credibility (a function for the trier of fact), advocacy and bias, that they are inadmissible. [60] I must also observe that even if I had concluded that some part or parts of his opinions could be determined to be admissible, I would in any event have been required to give such opinions little or no weight because of the many shortcomings to which I have adverted. [61] That conclusion is also mandated because while Dr. Levin improperly questioned the veracity of many of Ms. Yang’s responses to his questions and offered his versions of what responses he would have “expected,” counsel for the defendants did not confront Ms. Yang with the alleged “inconsistencies” and “discrepancies” relied upon by Dr. Levin in rendering his opinions. [62] What is left is simply an array of unfounded and untested allegations of dishonesty and exaggeration that do not accord with my own assessment of Ms. Yang as a witness. [63] Notwithstanding that English is Ms. Yang’s second language she is fluent in it and well able to express herself. She impressed me as a stoical, careful and honest witness who listened carefully to the questions asked of her and responded without exaggeration. [64] Although the anxiety she testified about now suffering related to seemingly common everyday life situations may seem wholly disproportionate to the circumstances she related in her evidence which manifest in those reactions, the totality of the evidence, including most importantly the psychological evidence of Dr. Lu to which I have referred in detail, convinces me that the anxiety she expresses is genuine. [65] In summary, I find that I can safely rely on the veracity of Ms. Yang’s testimony concerning the injuries she suffered in the collision, the progress of those injuries and the extent to which they have impacted her life both on a physical and emotional level.
Reasons for judgement were released today addressing damages for lingering soft tissue injuries compounded by pre-existing emotional distress.
In today’s case (Adkin v. Grant) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 rear end collision. She was 66 at the time of the crash and 69 at the time of trial. She suffered a variety of soft tissue injuries and some of her symptoms continued to the time of trial. A perpetuating factor for this was pre-existing emotional distress which exacerbated her symptoms. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Mr. Justice Halfyard provided the following reasons: 209] As mentioned, I find that the motor vehicle accident of September 3, 2010 caused injury to the soft tissues of the plaintiff’s neck and upper back and that the injury was of moderate degree. As a result of this injury, the plaintiff suffered pain in these areas and, for a limited period of time, suffered headaches. I find that the injury did not aggravate or worsen the plaintiff’s pre-existing physical conditions, but was super-imposed over them. There may have been minimal injury to the soft tissues of the plaintiff’s lower back, but if so, that injury had healed within six weeks of the accident… [212] Both Dr. Salvian and Dr. Kemble agree that the plaintiff is still suffering some neck, upper back and shoulder pain as a result of the soft tissue injury she received in the car accident. It is implicit in Dr. Salvian’s opinion that he says the accident is still causing all of the pain that the plaintiff continues to experience in the soft tissues of her neck, upper back and shoulders. I have rejected that all-encompassing opinion. Dr. Kemble seems to say that most of the soft tissue pain that the plaintiff continues to experience in her neck, upper back and shoulders is being caused (intensified and perpetuated) by her emotional distress (and he says that the emotional distress was a pre-existing condition and was not caused by the accident). I have not accepted those opinions of Dr. Kemble where they conflict with the opinions of Dr. Allison. [213] Both Dr. Salvian and Dr. Kemble agree that the plaintiff will continue to suffer physical symptoms as a result of her injury, for an indefinite period of time into the future (although they differ as to the frequency and intensity of such symptoms). [214] I accept Dr. Kemble’s opinions to the extent previously identified. I find that some of the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms of pain in her neck, upper back and shoulders are being caused by the injury from the accident. And I find that she will continue to experience episodes of increased pain in the future, as a result of her injury on September 3, 2010. [215] I find that the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition of emotional distress which was affecting her to some extent at the time of the accident. I find also that the plaintiff’s experience of being involved in the motor vehicle accident, her physical injury, and her emotional reaction to that injury caused additional emotional distress to her. That emotional distress adversely affected the plaintiff’s powers of concentration and memory for at least a year, and perhaps longer. However, the effects of the plaintiff’s distress on her memory and concentration was minimal (almost non-existent) by the end of May 2011 when she was examined by Dr. Allison. The plaintiff was continuing to feel emotional distress at the time of trial, and I find that some of that ongoing stress is being caused by the accident of September 3, 2010… [233] In all of the circumstances, it is my opinion that a fair and reasonable amount of damages for non-pecuniary loss would be $70,000, and I order that the plaintiff be awarded that amount.
Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing whether ICBC should lose the right to trial by jury due to a letter they sent their policy holders blaming increased insurance rates on ‘rising injury costs’.
In today’s case (Yates v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured in a 1998 collision. He was 6 years old at the time. His matter was set for trial in February, 2015 and ICBC, the insurer for the Defendant, elected to proceed via jury trial. The Plaintiff argued that the Court should use its inherent jurisdiction to strip ICBC of their right to jury trial suggesting that the letter ICBC sent their policy holders “has tainted the jury pool by creating a real potential for bias against plaintiffs among jurors who are policy holders“. Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed finding there was no reason for the Court to use its inherent jurisdiction and the trial judge could deal with any suggestion of bias. In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons: [12] Shortly after November 1, 2013, ICBC began including in the insurance renewal notices sent to each of its policy holders the following statement: ICBC Rate Changes: Rising injury costs mean we’re asking the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) for 4.9% increase to Basic insurance rates. The BCUC has approved an interim rate increase of 4.9% effective November 1, 2013 and will make a final decision after a public hearing process. If a final approved rate differs from the interim rate, your Basic premiums will be adjusted for the difference, subject to the BCUC’s final Order. We are also able to reduce our optional rates to lessen the impact on you. [13] The renewal reminder also included a statement of the insured’s estimated total premium for the year… [53] Here, at best, the material filed by the plaintiff goes no further than establishing a possibility for bias on the part of some prospective jurors who are ICBC policyholders. In addition to relying on the renewal notice itself, the plaintiff referred to Norsworthy v. Green, (30 May 2009), Victoria Registry 06 2644 (B.C.S.C.). There, Macaulay J. commented, obiter, that every potential juror knows that ICBC funds damages awards, and that this creates the risk that prospective jurors may believe the higher an award in a given case, the greater the likelihood that their own insurance premiums may rise. Macaulay J. observed that such thinking is improper, and would, if disclosed, demonstrate bias. The plaintiff also filed newspaper and Internet articles referring to Shariatamadari v. Ahmadi (4 May 2009), Vancouver Registry S061583 (B.C.S.C.), where the trial judge’s investigation into complaints of juror misconduct revealed that one of the jurors, during deliberations, had expressed concern that a high damage award would drive up their own auto insurance rates. This material falls well short of establishing that a real potential exists in the circumstances of this case that some jurors may be incapable of setting aside any prejudice they may have as a result of the renewal notice, and deciding this case impartially, after receiving appropriate instructions from the trial judge. [54] Even if this court had the inherent jurisdiction to strike a jury notice for juror partiality, I would decline to exercise that jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case for the following reasons: (a) the court is asked to find that ICBC’s communication to its policy holders through the renewal notices constitutes prejudicial pre-trial misconduct in the absence of an adequate evidentiary foundation; (b) to grant the relief sought would skirt the challenge for cause process by having the court make a determination of juror partiality without requiring the plaintiff to satisfy both branches of the well-established test for juror partiality, and without any inquiry to determine whether particular members of the juror pool selected for this case could not serve impartially; and (c) another decision-maker, the trial judge, has all the powers necessary to ensure trial fairness… [59] Chester provides further support for my conclusion that the plaintiff’s assertion of juror partiality is a matter which, if pursued, must be raised before the trial judge for determination through the challenge for cause process, rather than before a chambers judge who has neither the inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, nor an adequate evidentiary foundation on which to do so.