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Expert Opinions and the Garbage In Garbage Out Principle

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 51 Comments on Expert Opinions and the Garbage In Garbage Out Principle

Much like the computer science principle of Garbage In Garbage Out, if an expert opinion is based on facts a Court does not accept than the opinions will ultimately be of little value.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this principle.
In this week’s case (Amini v.Khania) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision that the Defendant was at fault for.    The Plaintiff suffered from chronic neck pain and headaches following the collision.   The Defendant arranged a defense medical exam with a physician who minimized the connection of the collision to the Plaintiff’s chronic symptoms noting the plaintiff had degenerative changes and that “he likely would have become symptomatic regardless of the accident“.
In rejecting this opinion the Court noted that the physicians assumed facts differed from those accepted by the Court and provided the following reasons:

[33]         I prefer the diagnosis of Drs. Beheshti, Javidan, and Jordan over the diagnosis of Dr. Dommisse in this regard.  I make a number of findings of fact that are contrary to the facts assumed by Dr. Dommisse.  First, I cannot find that Mr. Amini worked seven days a week after the accident for a year doing gardening, paving and fence making.  I find as a fact that he did not return to his landscaping work immediately and, when he did, it was in a reduced capacity due to the physical limitations caused by the accident.  Second, the opinion of Dr. Dommisse appears to be based on very little knowledge of the pre-accident functioning of Mr. Amini.  It appears that Dr. Dommisse did not know how many days per week Mr. Amini worked delivering papers both before and after the accident and that he had “no idea” of the housekeeping duties of Mr. Amini before and after the accident.  In fact, Dr. Dommisse testified that, after the accident:  “… I would doubt that Mr. Amini does any housekeeping personally, but, again, as I said, I have – I have no idea.”

[34]         I also cannot conclude that the degenerative changes described by Dr. Dommisse would have become symptomatic inevitably.  I am satisfied that degenerative change is not an infrequent finding on an X-ray of a person in their mid‑50s and, despite the presence of such degeneration, it cannot be assumed to already be or to become symptomatic.  The opinion of Dr. Dommisse that the onset of Mr. Amini’s symptoms would have been present by his mid-50s was only what he referred to as “my guess”.

[35]         I accept the opinion of Dr. Fuller that the prognosis for spontaneous resolution of symptoms of Mr. Amini “… can be considered guarded, if not poor”.  I also accept his opinion that Mr. Amini has reached maximum medical recovery.  I further accept the opinion of Dr. Fuller that degenerative change evidence is a normal phenomenon of aging not related to the accident.  I find that Mr. Amini sustained a grade 2 strain of his cervical and thoracic spine and his lumbosacral spine as a result of the accident which has resulted in decreased flexion and extension, reduced rotation of the cervical spine, and reduced lateral flexion, and that these injuries have continued to cause pain and suffering and physical restrictions.

In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 for the collision’s role in the lingering symptoms Mr. Justice Burnyeat provided the following reasons:

[46]         Here, I find that there was little, although some, likelihood that Mr. Amini would have begun to experience some pain as a result of the degeneration noted in his x‑rays.  Having made that determination, I also have made the finding that the degeneration was asymptomatic by age 55 when the accident occurred, despite the fact that Mr. Amini had two strenuous, labour-intensive occupations.  While I am in general agreement with counsel for Mr. Amini that the appropriate range of awards for non-pecuniary damages would be $75,000 to $85,000, I take into account all of the factors noted above and award non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $70,000.

$75,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic but Not Disabling Thoracic Outlet Syndrome

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Thoracic Outlet Syndrome Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for Thoracic Outlet Syndrome caused and aggravated by a series of collisions.
In today’s case (Griffith v. Larsen) the Plaintiff was involved in three rear end collisions.  The Court found the first collision caused TOS or at least TOS like symptoms and this condition was aggravated by the subsequent collision.  The Court had some concerns about the plaintiff’s credibility noting “there was an element of embellishment” with some of the Plaintiff’s evidence.  The Court accepted the Defendants were responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries but found the condition was not particularly disabling.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Mr. Justice Affleck provided the following reasons:

[41]         Dr. Salvian has formed his opinions relying heavily on the plaintiff’s self-report of symptoms. This is not a criticism. Nevertheless, my conclusion is that it is appropriate to be cautious when relying on these reports. It is also my conclusion that the plaintiff, whether or not she has TOS, is gradually improving. I do not accept her symptoms are sufficiently severe or her disabilities so pronounced that she is likely to agree to surgery. Her evidence is that she would seek a second opinion from that of Dr. Salvian and in my view she will approach the question of surgery with considerable reluctance. In my view it is more likely that there will be no surgery of the type Dr. Salvian frequently undertakes with his patients.

[42]         As I have mentioned, Dr. McDonald, who knows the plaintiff’s condition, both from before and after the accidents, better than any of the other physicians who have testified, would not restrict the plaintiff’s activities in any way. I accept that evidence and it leads me to conclude the plaintiff has no present significant disabilities. Nevertheless, I find the plaintiff continues to experience symptoms, particularly from the first accident. In my view the second and third accidents were trivial but have had an exacerbating effect on the injuries from the first accident.

[43]         The “common sense” approach recommended by the defendants is that trivial collisions cause trivial injuries. That approach has superficial plausibility but no more. As Mr. Justice Thackray observed in Gordon v. Palmer, [1993] B.C.J. NO. 474 at para. 3:

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls. Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed. The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court.

[44]         I find the plaintiff will have had about four years of painful but gradually diminishing symptoms since the first accident until she recovers. I do not find that she is feigning her symptoms but that she has overstated them. It is likely that these symptoms will subside over the coming months, particularly if the plaintiff becomes more physically active as Dr. McDonald recommends.

[45]         I also believe the plaintiff has become overly absorbed by the effects of the accidents on her life and has erroneously come to believe she is disabled from pursuing many of her former physical recreational pursuits. This belief is not shared by Dr. McDonald, nor is it my assessment of the plaintiff’s condition on all of the evidence…

[50]         I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary general damages at the sum of $75,000.

Two Sets of Costs Approrpriate When Two Actions Are Combined for Trial

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 15.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing what costs are payable when two actions, set for trial at the same time, settle prior to trial.
In today’s case (Wang v. Dhaliwal) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and filed separate lawsuits both of which were set to be heard at the same time.  The cases settled for trial for an agreed sum plus costs.  The Plaintiff argued that two sets of costs were warranted while the Defendant suggested a single set of costs was appropriate given ‘the efficiencies achieved by having the cases joined“.  In agreeing that two sets of costs were appropriate District Registrar Nielsen provided the following reasons:
21]         Although the two actions were ordered to be tried together, by consent, they involved different defendants and the issues were not identical: liability had been denied in the December 15, 2010 action and an allegation of contributory negligence had been raised by the defendant in the June 14, 2011 action. Further, the defendants required two examinations for discovery of the plaintiff in the two separate actions and the plaintiff had to conduct an examination for discovery of each defendant in the two actions.
[22]         The only commonality in the two actions was the fact that they involved injuries to the same plaintiff. In the circumstances, it was appropriate to bring two separate legal actions involving the different defendants and circumstances. It was equally appropriate to eventually join the cases for the purposes of trial once it became apparent this approach was workable and efficiencies would be achieved…
[27]         There will be circumstances where two sets of Civil Rule 15-1 costs will not be appropriate. In the presence case, the defendants have had the benefit of the streamlined process of Civil Rule 15-1 and the benefit of the two actions having been combined for the purpose of being heard together. The defendants have also had the further benefit of two separate legal actions having been commenced, which allowed the plaintiff to be examined for discovery twice, once in each action. In both actions, trial preparation was substantially completed.
[28]         In the circumstances, the sum of $6,500 in fees is awarded for each action, with applicable taxes.
 

"Customer Safety" Based Incident Report Ordered Disclosed as Non Privileged

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Defendant in a personal injury lawsuit to disclose an incident report created following the incident at question.
In today’s case (Smith v. Air Canada) the Plaintiff “was in her seat when a bag allegedly fell on her after a fellow passenger failed to store it securely in the overhead compartment.“.  She sued Air Canada alleging negligence.  Following the incident Air Canada created an “incident report” but refused to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of this document alleging it was created for the dominant purpose of litigation.  Madam Justice Gropper disagreed finding it was instead created primarily with customer safety in mind and ordered it disclosed. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[24]         As noted, the first part of the test, whether the document was prepared in contemplation of litigation, must be satisfied before the court goes on to consider the dominant purpose of the creation of the document. Master Baker considered the first part of the test in light of the affidavits that were provided and as a matter of fact. He properly considered, in my view, that when Ms. Soroka prepared her incident report she was attempting to discover the cause of the accident, whether there were witnesses, and the nature of the injuries sustained by Ms. Smith. She said that her first concern was customer safety.
[25]         As with any claim of privilege, the trier of fact must assess whether the assertion that the document was prepared in contemplation of litigation is reasonable. He cannot simply rely on the statement that the document was prepared in contemplation of litigation. If that were so the mere assertion would determine whether the document was privileged.
[26]         Master Baker assessed the circumstances at the time the report was written and concluded that it was not reasonable to accept that Ms. Soroka prepared the incident report in contemplation of litigation.
[27]         As I stated, the Master applied the appropriate test and reached a reasonable conclusion. The Master’s view that litigation was not a reasonable prospect at the time the incident report was created is not clearly wrong.
[28]         Having reached that conclusion, it was not necessary for Master Baker to consider the dominant purpose test. He did not conflate the two-part test as Air Canada suggests. Air Canada did not clear the first hurdle.
 

$25,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Multiple Rib Fractures

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Rib Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, assessing damages for multiple rib fractures caused by a collision.
In today’s case (Bariesheff v. Bennett) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant.  The plaintiff  “fractured five of her left lower ribs, more particularly the 8th to the 12th rib of the left chest wall, for which the defendant has accepted responsibility.“.
The Plaintiff alleged the crash caused a chronic low back injury as well although this was rejected by the Court.  In assessing damages for the rib injuries at $25,000 Mr. Justice Cole provided the following reasons:
[55]         The following cases provide a range of between $15,000 and $35,000 for general damages: Sinnott v. Boggs, 2007 BCCA 267; Kapelus v. Hu, 2013 BCCA 86; Mak v. Eichel, 2008 BCSC 1102; Sun v. Sukhan, 2012 BCSC 365; Currie v. McKinnon, 2012 BCSC 698; De Abreu v. Huang, 2013 BCSC 398.
[56]         I have taken into account the relatively young age of the plaintiff, the fact that she missed her graduating ceremonies to a great extent, which was an important event of her life, and that the pain, though essentially gone, persisted for about three years and is still tender to the touch. I am satisfied that an appropriate award for general damages is $25,000.
 

$100,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Fractured Shoulder and Wrist

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Wrist Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing non-pecuniary damages for wrist and shoulder injuries, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for orthopaedic injuries to these areas.
In today’s case (Azam v. Bilaya) the Plaintiff was involved in two motorcycle collisions.  Fault was admitted in both.  In the first collision the Plaintiff suffered a broken shoulder and various soft tissue injuries.  These were aggravated in the second crash which also caused a broken wrist.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 then modestly reducing these to account for pre-existing conditions Madam Justice Gerow provided the following reasons:
110]     It is clear that Ms. Azam was injured in both motor vehicle accidents. In the first accident, she suffered a broken shoulder and a neck and back injury. In the second accident, she suffered a broken wrist, injury to her knees and an exacerbation of her pre-existing spine condition.
[111]     I accept she does have chronic pain in her back which is exacerbated by activity; however, I do not accept Ms. Azam’s evidence regarding the impact of her injuries. I did not find Ms. Azam a particularly credible witness, and there is evidence that she is able to function at a higher level than she testified to…
[126]     Having considered the extent of the injuries, the fact that she is still having chronic pain after the accident which flares up from time to time, the guarded prognosis for full recovery, as well as the authorities I was provided, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages would be $100,000, if the accidents were the only cause of Ms. Azam’s ongoing symptoms.
[127]     However, Ms. Azam must be put back in the position she would have been in if the two motor vehicle accidents had not occurred. The evidence establishes that Ms. Azam suffered from a pre-existing symptomatic spine condition which had caused her periodic back pain in the 10 years prior to the first accident. Although it was not symptomatic right before the first accident, is reasonable to infer Ms. Azam would likely continue to suffer from periodic back pain, regardless of the accidents. Having taken that into consideration, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $85,000.
 

BC Supreme Court Awards Damages for Cost of Medical Marijuana Program

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With medical marijuana gaining more acceptance as a prescribed treatment for a variety of health conditions, costs associated with such treatments are receiving judicial consideration in personal injury litigation.
In what is at least the second decision in BC to do so (click here for the first) reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for the cost of medical marijuana.
In today’s case (Amini v. Mondragaon) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2011 collision that the Defendant accepted responsibility for.  The Plaintiff suffered various lingering injuries and a medical marijuana program was recommended to address some of the Plaintiff’s symptoms.  Mr. Justice Greyell assessed damages of $6,500 to account for the cost of this recommendation and in doing so provided the following reasons:
[133]     Dr. Hershler strongly recommended Ms. Amini be put on the Medical Marijuana Program to assist in controlling her pain so as to allow her to work on strengthening exercises for her neck and back. He was of the view this would allow her a “good chance for effective pain management”. I accept his recommendation as a reasonable one.
[134]     Dr. Hershler recommended she be prescribed ten grams of cannabis per day to be used as an ointment. He recommended this be followed with 20 sessions with a physiotherapist to build core strength and range of motion.
[135]     Dr. Hershler estimated the cost of a six month program using a dosage of 10 grams per day to be approximately $9,000. In cross-examination counsel suggested the ointment could be made at considerably less cost if the plaintiff, as a Nurse, made her own. Dr. Hershler did not disagree.
[136]     I award the plaintiff $6,500 for a Medical Marijuana Program and $1,500 for the cost of 20 physiotherapy sessions (at $75 each) to follow the medical marijuana treatments.
 

Adverse Inference Drawn Following Defendant's Failure To Testify in Liability Trial

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Where fault for a collision is disputed it is very unusual for one of the parties to fail to testify.  Absent a good explanation the Court is free to draw an ‘adverse inference’ meaning an assumption that the party would not help their cause if they did indeed testify.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, discussing this principle.
In this week’s case (Solberg v. Carriere) the Plaintiff pedestrian was struck by the Defenant’s vehicle in a 2012 collision in Campbell River, BC.   The Plaintiff, was “acting in an animated and boisterous fashion” near the Defendant’s vehicle.   The Defendant put his vehicle in motion knowing the Plaintiff was in the vicinity who then “slipped and fell” and was run over by the vehicle’s trailer.  The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was fully at fault for the incident.  The Defendant, who was present during the trial, decided not to testify.  The Court drew an adverse inference from the Defendant’s failure and concluded that the Defendant “breached his duty of care by moving his vehicle forward without looking for himself to see that it was safe to do so, knowing that (the Plaintiff) was in the immediate area and acting foolishly”.
In drawing an adverse inference from the Defendant’s failure to testify Mr. Justice Johnston provided the following reasons:
[43]  Weighing the evidence in light of those criteria set out in McIlvenna, I conclude that in this case I will draw an inference that, if he had been called, Mr. Carriere’s evidence would not have tended to establish that he looked toward Ms. Solberg before he put his vehicle in motion.  I conclude that Mr. Carriere relied on his passengers to tell him if it were safe to move, whether it was good to go or clear.  This is consistent with his discovery evidence that no one was looking at Ms. Solberg as he was driving away, and consistent wit the evidence of his passengers who did testify.
 

History of Violence Not Necessary For Dog Injury Claim To Succeed

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, addressing liability when a dog leaves its owners property and causes harm to others.
In today’s case (Gallant v. Slootweg) “the defendants’ dog, “Rocky”, ran from their property, apparently unimpeded by the electronic fence that was intended to keep it within the property, towards the plaintiff and knocked him from his bicycle“.  The Plaintiff suffered orthopeaddic injuries and sued for damages.
The dog did not have a history of violence but did have “a propensity to chase cyclists”.  The Defendant’s argued that this was not sufficient to establish liability as the dog did not have a history “of a vicious or dangerous nature” and that installing an electronic fence was a sufficient step to prevent a finding of negligence.  Mr. Justice Joyce disagreed and found the defendants  liable in both negligence and under the principles of scienter.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
[24]         It is not necessary, however, for the plaintiff to show that the dog has actually caused the particular harm in the past; what is required is to show that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the dog had a propensity or manifested a trait to do that kind of harm. ..
[32]         I am satisfied that Rocky had a propensity to chase cyclists while barking and get as close to them as he could within the electronic restrain to which he was ordinarily subject, and to follow them as they traversed in front of the defendants’ yard. I am satisfied that Rocky’s actions constituted a propensity to cause harm to cyclists by knocking them from their bicycles if he was not restrained within the yard. I am further satisfied that the defendants knew, or ought to have known, that if not restrained, Rocky would run right up to a cyclist, barking at the cyclist and creating a very real risk that he would impede the travel of the bicycle. The defendants had watched Rocky run the length of the front yard getting as close to cyclists as he could within the boundaries of the electronic fence, which was the only method that they employed to restrain Rocky from going right up to the cyclists. The harm the Rocky caused on this occasion was the very kind of harm that, in my view, Rocky had demonstrated a propensity to inflict.
[33]         I conclude, therefore, that the defendants are liable on the basis of scienter.
[34]         I am also satisfied that the defendants are liable on the basis of negligence. In my opinion, they knew that the only thing that was keeping Rocky from running up to cyclists using the road in front of their property, and likely knocking them from their bicycles, was the electronic fence. It is my view, that a reasonable person would not place reliance solely on such a device to secure their dog and prevent it from causing harm to users of the road, when they were aware of the risk of harm if Rocky got free from the confines of the electronic fence. Unlike a physical fence or a large pen, it is not possible to readily observe that the electronic fence is in good repair.
[35]         Further, the operating manual that the defendants received when they purchased the fence warned them that the fence was a deterrent, not a barrier and advised that there was no guarantee that a pet could be trained to avoid crossing the boundary.
[36]         In order to meet a reasonable standard of care to ensure Rocky was kept within the property would not have required the defendants to incur the expense of fencing the whole of the property. They could have built a large “dog run” that would have provided Rocky with ample exercise room when not on leash, in the company of someone able to restrain him. Alternatively, they could have used a chain for Rocky that would not physically permit him to go beyond the property and onto the roadway.
[37]         Further, I find that having adopted the electronic fence as the only means of preventing their dog from escaping onto the road and charging passers-by, they were negligent in not ensuring that it was working properly by testing it on a frequent basis. While it is not known precisely when the receiver failed to operate, they had not tested it for months. They only checked the transmitter on a daily basis. Even when the defendants replaced the batteries and tested the receiver after the incident they found that did not operate consistently. If they had tested it regularly, it is likely that they would have discovered that it was not safe to rely on the electronic fence system to retrain Rocky.
 

Plaintiff Ordered To Produce Credit Card Statements In ICBC Brain Injury Claim

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff in an injury lawsuit to disclose credit card statements for a span of several years.
In today’s case (J v. K) the Plaintiff was involved in two motor vehicle collisions.  She allegedly suffered a head injury and the medical evidence noted that the Plaintiff “is probably suffering with residual frontal lobe dysfunction with respect to impulsive behavior, impulsive buying“.
The Defendant requested various financial records to explore the reported impulsive buying behavior.  Master Taylor agreed that this was a reasonable request and ordered that Visa records from a year prior to the collision onwards be disclosed.  In reaching this decision the Court provided the following records:
[24]         I am satisfied by the circumstances and the facts of this case that the request for the plaintiff’s credit card statements which will likely show her spending patterns, and that the information gleaned from the statements is relevant and material to the plaintiff’s claims. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff’s banking records are material to her claim or that her privacy with regard to those items should be breached, aside from one exception as set out in paragraph 26 below.
[25]         Accordingly, I order that the plaintiff disclose her Visa credit card statements and any other credit cards she may have used or statements related to any other credit cards, from one year pre-accident to the present. In this instance, it is one year prior to her first accident which occurred on September 13, 2010. The statements are to be unredacted except for those purchases made by the plaintiff’s brother which may be redacted.
[26]         In the event that the claimant intends to show any impulsive spending by way of debit card transactions, then those monthly statements should be provided to the defendants, but in this case only the monthly statements in which the alleged impulsive spending is to have occurred, and in an unredacted format.