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BC Personal Injury Claims Round-Up

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Dizziness Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on BC Personal Injury Claims Round-Up

On Friday the BC Supreme Court released reasons for judgement dealing with awards for pain and suffering in 3 separate motor vehicle accident cases.
In my continued efforts to create an easy to access data-base of ICBC related claims for pain and suffering here are the highlights of these cases:
In the first case (Driscoll v. Desharnais) the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck, back and shoulder in a 2003 BC motor vehicle collision.  In justifying an award for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) of $55,000 the court summarized the injuries and their effect on the Plaintiff’s life as follows:

[101]        The trial occurred about five years following the accident.  Mr. Driscoll continues to suffer pain, significant sleep disturbance, and restrictions on his activities.  He is stoic and is inclined to push through pain until it becomes intolerable.  He has a reduced capacity to work, and despite his preference for working alone, he cannot operate his business without hiring other workers.  He is no longer able to participate in some of the activities he enjoyed, such as motorcycle riding, full-contact ball hockey, golf, and rough-housing with his children.  

[102]        The evidence demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that these problems were caused by the accident.  Although Mr. Driscoll had received physiotherapy prior to the accident, the treatments were all at least 18 months prior to the accident, and were for short periods.  All the problems had resolved prior to the accident.  The injury he suffered on the toboggan appeared to be a brief flare-up of his back symptoms, rather than a new injury.

A highlight of this decision for me was the court’s discussion of credibility.  One of the tricks of the trade for ICBC defence lawyers in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Claims is to challenge the credibility of the Plaintiff.   That appeared to be a tactic employed in this case and the Defendant asked the court to consider the following well-known principle often cited in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases:

[6]                The case of Price v. Kostryba (1982), 70 B.C.L.R. 397 (S.C.), is often cited as a reminder of the approach the court must take to assessing injuries which depend on subjective reports of pain.  I quote portions of pages 397-399 of those reasons for judgment:

The assessment of damages in a moderate or moderately severe whiplash injury is always difficult because plaintiffs, as in this case, are usually genuine, decent people who honestly try to be as objective and as factual as they can. Unfortunately, every injured person has a different understanding of his own complaints and injuries, and it falls to judges to translate injuries to damages.

Perhaps no injury has been the subject of so much judicial consideration as the whiplash. Human experience tells us that these injuries normally resolve themselves within six months to a year or so. Yet every physician knows some patients whose complaint continues for years, and some apparently never recover. For this reason, it is necessary for a court to exercise caution and to examine all the evidence carefully so as to arrive at a fair and reasonable compensation. Previously decided cases are some help (but not much, because obviously every case is different). …

In Butler v. Blaylock, decided 7th October 1981, Vancouver No. B781505 (unreported), I referred to counsel’s argument that a defendant is often at the mercy of a plaintiff in actions for damages for personal injuries because complaints of pain cannot easily be disproved. I then said:

I am not stating any new principle when I say that the court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods extending beyond the normal or usual recovery.

An injured person is entitled to be fully and properly compensated for any injury or disability caused by a wrongdoer. But no one can expect his fellow citizen or citizens to compensate him in the absence of convincing evidence — which could be just his own evidence if the surrounding circumstances are consistent – that his complaints of pain are true reflections of a continuing injury.

Fortunately for the Plaintiff a positive finding was made as to his reliability and damages were assessed accordingly.

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The second case released on Friday (Eccleston v. Dresen) involved a 2002 collision which took place in Salmon Arm, BC.  The injuries included chronic soft tissue injuries of moderate severity and a chronic pain syndrome.  Both liability and quantum of damages (value of the ICBC Injury Claim) were at issue.   The Plaintiff was found 60% at fault for the collision.

In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $108,000 Mr. Justice Barrow made the following findings:

[127]        I am satisfied that the plaintiff suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back.  Further, I am satisfied that she developed and continues to suffer chronic pain as a result.  I am also satisfied that she is depressed and that the proximate cause of her depression is the pain she experiences.

[128]        I am not satisfied that her complaints of pain are motivated by any secondary gain; rather, I am satisfied that she has met the onus of establishing that, as Taylor J.A. in Maslen v. Rubenstein (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 131, 33 B.C.A.C. 182, at para. 8 put it:

…her psychological problems have their cause in the defendant’s unlawful act, rather than in any desire on the plaintiff’s part for things such as care, sympathy, relaxation or compensation, and also that the plaintiff could not be expected to overcome them by his or her own inherent resources, or ‘will-power’.

[129]        Further, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s condition is likely permanent; although it is more likely than not that it will moderate if she follows the advice of Dr. O’Breasail.  He is of the view that with intensive psychotherapy for at least a year, followed by two further years of less intensive therapy coupled with a review of her medications and particularly anti-depressant medication, there is some hope that she will either experience less pain or be better able to cope with the pain she does experience, or both.

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The final motor vehicle accident case addressing pain and suffering released on Friday (Murphy v. Jagerhofer) involved a Plaintiff who was injured in a 2004 rear end collision in Chilliwack, BC.   The injuries included a moderate to severe whiplash injury with associated chronic pain, disturbed sleep and headaches.  In justifying a non-pecuniary damages award of $100,000 Mr. Justice Warren made the following factual findings after a summary trial pursuant to Rule 18-A:

[112]        The issue of causation in this case is determined by applying the factors in Athey.  Here the defendants argue that there were pre-existing conditions that would have affected the plaintiff in any event.  I disagree.  I find on the evidence of both Dr. Porter and Dr. Bishop that the plaintiff was asymptomatic of the complaints he now has which have arisen from the injuries he suffered in this accident.  Using the rather macabre terms found in other cases, this plaintiff had a “thin skull” rather than a “crumbling skull” and on my reading of those medical opinions I prefer, I find there was no “measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future. . . .” Athey, per Major, J. at para. 35. 

[113]        Accordingly, I find that the presenting complaints of the plaintiff were caused by the negligence of the defendant driver and I turn to address the issue of appropriate compensation.  In this, I am strongly influenced by the opinions of Drs. Porter and Longridge and the opinion of Mr. Koch.  The plaintiff suffered a moderate to severe whiplash type injury which had a significant physical and emotional effect upon him some of which have persisted to the day of trial and will continue into the future.  The back and neck pain caused him considerable pain and caused sleeplessness, headaches and general body pain for which he was prescribed pain medication.  Many of these symptoms continued well into 2005 despite his participation in a Work Hardening Programme in the fall of 2004.  I accept that he has tried every mode in an effort to alleviate his symptoms.  In his opinion, Dr. Bishop dismissed passive therapies, but I conclude it was understandable that the plaintiff would follow other professional advice and give these therapies every chance to help.  I say that with the exception of the later cortisone injections, which are painful and of very limited result, and also the later chiropractic attention.

[114]        Added to his back and neck pain, the plaintiff has experienced some hearing loss, tinnitus and episodes of dizziness.  These are frustrating and to some extent debilitating.  He also has jaw, or temporal mandibular joint arthralgia and myofascial pain.  He was given an oral appliance which he is to wear on a daily basis yet he continues to experience jaw stiffness and fatigue. 

[115]        It is understandable that these conditions have affected him emotionally.  The opinion of Mr. Koch corroborates the plaintiff’s evidence.  I accept the opinion of Mr. Koch that the plaintiff “downplays” the difficulties in his life and that the plaintiff has a phobia of motor vehicle travel, post-traumatic stress disorder and related repressive symptoms. 

I hope these case highlights continue to be a useful resource for my readers in helping learn about the value of non-pecuniary damages in ICBC Injury Claims.  As always, I welcome any feedback from all my visitors.

ICBC Injury Claims, Past Wage Loss and Income Tax

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized. 112 Comments on ICBC Injury Claims, Past Wage Loss and Income Tax

I normally don’t blog about tax law but in certain circumstances the interplay of tax law and personal injury law can have very significant consequences in ICBC Injury Claims.
If you are injured through the fault of another in a motor vehicle collision in BC and advance a tort claim for your past wage loss you need to be familiar with s. 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act which limits past income loss awards to past ‘net’ income loss.
Serious injury claims usually take many years before making their way to trial, mostly because it is important for injuries to reach a point of maximum medical improvement before trying to value them.
As a result of this Plaintiffs with serious injuries such as brain or spinal cord injuries often have several years of past wage loss by the time their claim gets to trial.   How then, should s. 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act operate for past wage loss in these circumstances?  Take the following example:
Imagine a Plaintiff who earned $50,000 per year had 4 years of income loss before his ICBC Injury Claim got to trial.  His gross income loss would be $200,000.  What would the net loss be?  Would it be the income tax on $200,000 at today’s rate or would the income be taxed at the lower rate (the taxes payable on a salary of $50,000 in each calaner year)?  
In a 2003 decision named Hudniuk, the BC Supreme Court stated that taxes must be assessed “as if the past income had all been earned at the effective date of the jury’s assessment namely, the first day of trial”  Since 2003 this approach has been generally accepted as being correct.  This approach, in my opinion, unfairly penalized Plaintiffs by taking an amount off their award for taxes far greater then what they actually would have paid in taxes had they earned the income year by year.  Fortunately, very important reasons were released today by the BC Court of Appeal (Lines v. Gordon) adding clarity to the application of section 98. 
In today’s case the BC Court of Appeal weighed in how s. 98 of the Insurance Vehicle Act should be applied.  In doing so the Court first reaffirmed the important principle in tort law that:
Damages should, so far as any monetary award can do so, restore the plaintiff to the position in which he would have stood but for the defendant’s wrongdoing. On this basis they should represent compensation for loss of earning capacity and not for loss of earnings. In a case of personal injuries, what the plaintiff has lost is the whole or part, as the case may be, of his natural capital equipment and to tax him on this is contrary to generally accepted principles of taxation.
The Court then went on to decide that the approach taken by the trial judge in Hudniuk was not inflexible and not appropriate in all circumstances and stated as follows:

[181]        Although the wording of ss. 95 and 98 contemplates the possibility of calculating net income loss for multiple periods between the date of the accident and the date of trial, it is my opinion that the Legislature did not intend to require in every case that gross past income loss be allocated to each of the calendar years between the date of the accident and the date of trial and to never allow net income loss to be calculated on the basis that the compensation for it was all received on the first day of trial.  If the Legislature had so intended, it would not have used the words “for any period” in the introductory portion of the s. 95 definition of “net income loss”.  Rather, if that had been the intention, the Legislature would have used words to the effect of “for each calendar year”.

[182]        In my opinion, the Legislature recognized that there may be difficulties in allocating gross income loss to particular periods between the date of the accident and the date of trial.  For example, as in Hudniuk, a jury may make a finding as to the gross income loss without being asked to allocate the loss to any calendar year or other period, and the judge may consider it inappropriate to speculate on the jury’s reasoning process.  The difficulty could be compounded if, again as in Hudniuk, the tax rules applicable to the income earned in a particular year are different from the tax rules applicable to the income allocated to that year.

[183]        Another example is a situation where the plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the accident and had no imminent prospects of employment.  The judge or jury could make an award for loss of past earning capacity, but it would be artificial to allocate it among different periods.

[184]        In my opinion, by the use of the phrase “for any period”, it was the intention of the Legislature to give a discretion to the judge to determine what period or periods are appropriate for the determination of net income loss in all of the circumstances.  In the two examples I have given, it would be appropriate for the judge to use only one period for the calculation of net income loss (namely, the entire period from the date of the accident to the first day of trial).  In such a case, net income loss would be calculated as if the gross income award was received by the plaintiff on the first day of trial.

[185]        By way of contrast to the two examples I have given, in the situation where, at the time of injury, the plaintiff was working at a job and returned to that job after sufficiently recovering from the injuries, it would be appropriate, absent any complications, for the judge to allocate the gross income loss to the calendar years between the date of the accident and the date of trial as if the plaintiff had continued working.  This would accord with the principle that, insofar as is possible, the plaintiff should be put in the position he or she would have been in if not for the injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence.

[186]        There will be a wide variety of circumstances facing trial judges.  In each case, the trial judge will have to decide whether it is appropriate in the circumstances before him or her to calculate net income loss on the basis of one period, calendar-year periods or other multiple periods.  In making a decision in this regard, the trial judge should consider all of the circumstances and apply s. 98 in a manner that is most consistent with the principles of damage assessment to which I have referred.

[187]        The application of s. 98 in jury trials should be consistent with its application in trials by judge alone.  The judge will typically consult with counsel as to whether the jury will be requested to only make an award for the gross amount of the loss of past earning capacity or to also make a finding of fact with respect to the net income loss prior to trial.  Whether the jury will be requested to provide a lump sum amount of the past gross income loss, or will be requested to provide periodic gross amounts, for use in calculating the net income award, will depend on the circumstances of the case.

[188]        In the present case, the plaintiff did not earn any income between the date of the accident and the date of trial, with the result that there is no complication of using different tax rules for actual and allocated income.  Although the trial judge made a global assessment of the past income loss, he specifically accepted a scenario which allocated projected income among the calendar years between the accident and the trial, and he then applied contingencies to arrive at the award he made.  In the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that he applied the contingencies to the projected annual incomes on a pro rata basis.

[189]         In addition, it is apparent from the supplementary reasons for judgment that the trial judge felt constrained to follow what he understood to be the inflexible approach of Hudniuk in circumstances where he felt that approach diverted from the damage assessment principle that a plaintiff should be made whole.  It is reasonable to conclude, in my opinion, that if the judge appreciated that he had a discretion to allocate the gross income loss to more than one period, he would have allocated it to each of the calendar years between the accident and the trial on a pro rata basis according to the incomes projected in the scenario he accepted.

This case is certainly good news for any Plantiffs injured in BC motor vehicle collisions.  The flexibility the Court of Appeal has given trial judges in the applicaiton of s. 98 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act will result in more fair assessments in past income loss by not penalizing plaintiff’s with a tax rate that they never would in reality be exposed to.

Another interesting highlight of this judgement was the Courts comments on past wage loss awards being in reality awards for a diminished capital asset, specifically the court said:

 

[172]        I have already alluded to the principle that past income loss is properly characterized as loss of past earning capacity or loss of a capital asset.  Mr. Justice Pitfield made a similar point when he made reference in para. 40 of Hudniuk to the fact that the jury award was an assessment of damages and not a mechanical calculation. 

[173]        Despite the fact that past income loss is an assessment of damages for loss of a capital asset, there is normally a correlation between the time worked by a person and the amount of income earned by them.  In the majority of personal injury cases, the plaintiff, at the time of the injury, will have been working at a job and will return to the same job when he or she has recovered sufficiently from the injury.  Although it is technically an assessment of damages for loss of capital asset, there is no suggestion that the plaintiff would have worked at a different job if he or she had not been injured, and the assessment of damages does involve a calculation of the income the plaintiff would have earned at the job had he or she not been injured.

ICBC Injury Claims, Video Surveillance and Mistrials

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Jury Trials.

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court ordering a mistrial following a trial by jury.
In today’s case (Oberreiter v. Akmali) the Plaintiff sued for injuries after she was struck by a vehicle while riding her bicycle in North Vancouver in 2004.  Fault was not at issue, rather the trial focused solely on quantum of damages (value of the ICBC Injury Claim).  Following trial the jury awarded the Plaintiff approximately $118,000 in damages.  Prior to having the judgement entered the Plaintiff applied for a mistrial.  
The key facts giving rise to the application for a mistrial are as follows:

              After the trial was completed and the jury had been discharged, the plaintiff’s counsel discovered that the DVD contained approximately ten minutes of video which had not been shown to the jury.  Through an unintentional error in editing, the DVD which was marked as an exhibit contained images which had not been shown to the jury; had not been seen by counsel or myself; and had not been admitted into evidence. 

[7]                The issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a mistrial because material not admitted into evidence was inadvertently included in an exhibit available to they jury during its deliberations.

In granting the mistrial, Mr. Justice Kelleher of the BC Supreme Court gave the following reasons:

 

[10]            Where an irregularity such as the inadvertent inclusion of non-admitted material in exhibits left with the jury occurs, it is usually identified during the course of the trial.  When that occurs, the court must consider all possible actions to remedy potential prejudice before ordering a mistrial.  It may be that such an irregularity could be corrected with an instruction to the jury: seeGemmell v. Reddicopp, 2005 BCCA 628, 48 B.C.L.R. (4th) 349.

[11]            Where the irregularity cannot be cured and the trial judge is satisfied that it may have a prejudicial effect impacting the result of the trial, a mistrial is the appropriate remedy: see de Araujo v. Read, 2004 BCCA 267, 29 B.C.L.R. (4th) 84.  In that case, Mr. Justice Thackray observed at para. 68:  “…a new trial may be ordered where trial irregularities may have influenced the verdict or award of the jury… “.

[12]            Here, of course, there was no opportunity to correct the irregularity.  Neither of the parties was aware of the inadvertent inclusion of material not admitted as evidence in the exhibit until the trial had ended and the jury had been discharged. 

[13]            It may be that the irregularity and any resulting prejudice could have been corrected easily if it had been noticed before the jury’s deliberations had come to an end.  Perhaps the jury could have been instructed not to have regard to the footage. 

[14]            It is not known what the jury viewed.  What is certain is that the jury was provided with material relevant to the case that was not evidence and was not led in court.  This raises concerns about trial fairness and potential prejudice to the plaintiff.  An important factual issue in the trial was the extent and severity of the plaintiff’s injuries.  Thus, the video surveillance footage is highly relevant and potentially prejudicial.

[15]            Notwithstanding the general principles of respect for jury secrecy, there is jurisdiction to make some inquiries of a jury: see R. v. Pan, 2001 SCC 42, [2001], 2 S.C.R. 344.  However, I am not persuaded that asking the foreperson to appear in court and to advise the court whether the jury viewed the DVD is appropriate.  Many weeks have passed since the trial.  Recall of a juror for these purposes is impractical and of questionable reliability.

[16]            It is clear that a trial judge has the power to order a mistrial if the judge concludes there is no other option to remedy an irregularity.  After the jury has been discharged, I am satisfied there is nothing further that can be done by the court.

[17]            Both parties are entitled to have the jury decide the case solely on the evidence properly admitted during the trial.  That is fundamental to a fair trial.  It is my duty as a trial judge to ensure that this is safeguarded.  Here, it is accepted by both parties that there was extraneous material made available to the jury that was not evidence admitted during the trial.  This material is relevant to the issues in the trial and is potentially prejudicial.  Since this irregularity cannot be corrected I conclude it would be unjust and unfair to let the verdict stand. 

[18]            A mistrial is appropriate where necessary to ensure that justice is done between the parties: see de Araujo v. Read.  The plaintiff’s application for a mistrial is allowed.

More on Rule 37B and ICBC Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 112 Comments on More on Rule 37B and ICBC Injury Claims

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court providing more interpretation to Rule 37B in the context of ICBC Claims.  (for background on Rule 37B and ICBC Claims see my former blog posts).
In today’s case (Jacobs v. McLaughlin) the Plaintiff sued 3 separate Defendants as a result of 3 separate accidents.  All 3 Defendants made formal settlement offers before trial.   2 of the Defendants bested their formal settlement offers at trial.  At issue was what costs consequences should follow as a result of this.
The court summarized the case law to date interpreting Rule 37B with the following analysis:

[20]            The new rule broadens the discretion of the court, permitting it “to take offers to settle under the rule into account based on the factors set out later in the rule”:  Cowichan Bay Contractors Ltd. v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (29 July 2008) Victoria 05/1639, at para. 5 [Cowichan Bay]. 

[21]            Unlike its predecessor, Rule 37B does not mandate outcomes; if the plaintiff fails to beat an offer to settle, it does not mean that the plaintiff will automatically be deprived of costs, as this “interpretation would fetter what is clearly intended to be an unfettered discretion”:  Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1952, at para. 19 [Bailey].

[22]            In addition to providing for the court’s discretion to consider offers to settle, the new rule is permissive in its effect:  British Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Baker, 2008 BCSC 947, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1635 [B.C.S.P.C.A.].  Subrule (5) empowers the court to deprive a party, in whole or in part, of costs to which it would otherwise be entitled, or award double costs of all or some steps taken in the proceedings.

[23]            The policy underlying the new Rule 37B remains the same as under the former Rule 37:  to encourage reasonable early settlement of disputes “by providing that there will be consequences in the amount of costs payable when a party fails to accept an offer that ought reasonably to have been accepted”:  Arnold v. Cartwright Estate, 2008 BCSC 1575, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 99, at para 16; Abma v. Paul, 2009 BCSC 60, [2009] B.C.J. No. 87, at para. 23.  The rule also exists to “deter certain kinds of conduct”:  Bailey, at para. 18. 

Rule 37B(6)(a):  Reasonableness of the Offers to Settle

[24]            The onus is on the defendants to establish that the offer was one that the plaintiff ought reasonably to have accepted:  B.C.S.P.C.A., at para. 36.

[25]            The plaintiff submits that this Court should not give any weight to the defendants’ offers to settle not solely because they were unreasonable, but because she was incapable of accepting any of the offers in isolation of the others.  The plaintiff relies on Carvalho v. Agnotti, 2008 BCSC 386, [2008] B.C.J. No. 559 [Carvalho], to support her argument.

[26]            In Carvalho, the defendants made separate offers related to two separate car accidents involving the plaintiff.  Mr. Justice N.H. Smith held that the substantial overlap in damage claims precluded acceptance of only one of the offers; instead, the plaintiff had to consider the two offers together.  In this case, each of the three accidents caused separate and discrete injuries to Ms. Jacobs.  Plaintiff’s counsel had overwhelming evidence prior to the onset of Ms. Jacobs’ MS that there were no “overlapping” injuries.  Carvalho is distinguishable on this basis. 

[27]            I am satisfied that the factual evidence before the plaintiff should have led her to conclude that the offers could have been accepted in isolation of each other.  This is not the imposition of hindsight reasoning, as argued by the plaintiff.  Rather, it is the fair assessment of the factual evidence before the plaintiff as it related to her claim. 

[28]            Ms. Jacobs submits that at the date of delivery, following so soon after the third motor vehicle accident and the definitive diagnosis of her MS, she did not have an opportunity to obtain medical and legal opinions respecting the role of the trauma in the exacerbation of her MS.

[29]            Under Rule 37B, a party must be afforded a reasonable period of time to “consider an offer and decide in the circumstances existing at the time of the offer whether it should be accepted or rejected”:  Coquitlam (City) v. Crawford, 2008 BCSC 1507, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2095, at para. 17 [Coquitlam].

[30]            All parties agree that the plaintiff required a reasonable opportunity to investigate this allegation before deciding to reject the offers to settle. 

[31]            The defendants state that there should have been a reasonable time period in which to investigate the MS causation issue after July 17, 2006, when the issue became “alive”.  The defendants submit that by December 31, 2006 the plaintiff should have been able to fully assess the legal principles and scientific research on the MS causation analysis as it related to her claim.  Thus, they submit, it would have been reasonable for Ms. Jacobs to accept their offers to settle by that time.

[32]            I note that the plaintiff amended her statement of claim to include the MS causation issue in October 2006.

[33]            The plaintiff submits that it was reasonable for her to advance the MS causation issue up until a few weeks before trial, as her particular claim was supported by medical science, her physicians, and the law in British Columbia. 

[34]            At a pre-trial settlement conference on September 27, 2007, Mr. Justice Halfyard commented that the defendants’ defenses on the MS causation issue were strong and it would be difficult for the plaintiff to prove this allegation on a balance of probabilities. 

[35]            The plaintiff argues that it was unreasonable to accept the offers to settle after the settlement conference because it would have had serious cost implications for the plaintiff, ultimately leaving her with no compensation and in a deficit position, notwithstanding the admitted negligence of the defendants.  Thus, the plaintiff submits, at no time was it reasonable for her to accept the offers to settle.

[36]            The trial commenced on October 14, 2007. 

[37]            The plaintiff appears to have initiated the investigation into her injuries and their relationship to her MS around November 16, 2006, which is the date of Ms. Jacobs’ first appointment with Dr. Devonshire.  However, any serious evaluation into this claim occurred much later; all reports relating to the plaintiff’s MS were dated July 2007 (Devonshire report) and August 2007 (Rathbone, Freeman, and Bateman reports), with the requests for these reports dated between two and four months prior to their receipt.  The majority of Ms. Jacobs’ appointments related to these reports took place in the late spring and early summer of 2007. 

[38]            I find it difficult to accept Ms. Jacobs’ argument that it was unreasonable at essentially all times to accept the offers because she expected to succeed on the MS causation issue, given that she ultimately abandoned the argument.  At some point, the medical and legal research done by counsel should have suggested that the factual and scientific evidence linking Ms. Jacobs’ injuries and her MS were not sufficient to bring to trial.  As Mr. Justice Hall noted at para. 16 of Catalyst Paper Corporation v. Companhia de Navegação Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16, [2009] B.C.J. No. 52:

[16]      It seems to me that the trend of recent authorities is to the effect that the costs rules should be utilized to have a winnowing function in the litigation process.  The costs rules require litigants to make careful assessments of the strength or lack thereof of their cases at commencement and throughout the course of litigation.  The rules should discourage the continuance of doubtful cases or defences.  This of course imposes burdens on counsel to carefully consider the strengths and weaknesses of particular fact situations.  Such considerations should, among other things, encourage reasonable settlements.

[39]            I accept the defendants’ submission that at some point before the settlement conference, neither the factual nor the scientific evidence supported the MS causation issue allegation.  Knowing this, plaintiff’s counsel took the gamble anyway.

[40]            Taking into consideration when the statement of claim was amended to include the MS causation issue, and the plaintiff’s receipt of her experts reports, I am satisfied that the plaintiff should have been able to evaluate her claim by August 15, 2007.  At this point, the MS causation issue should have been abandoned, and the McLaughlin and Meehan offers ought reasonably to have been accepted.

[41]            The plaintiff further submits that accepting the two offers which exceeded the judgment in this case would have saved neither time nor money, as the case against Ms. Moyer would have commenced in any event, and this court would have been required to hear all the evidence related to the three accidents. 

[42]            There are two difficulties with this submission.  First, the injuries sustained in the accidents were discrete, thus, a claim against Ms. Moyer would not have required any evidence pertaining to the accidents involving Ms. McLaughlin and Ms. Meehan.  Second, there are multiple purposes for assessing offers to settle in the award or deprivation of costs under Rule 37B, only one of which is indemnification.

Rule 37B(6)(b):  Relationship Between the Terms of 
Settlement Offered and the Final Judgment of the Court

[43]            Subrule 37B(6)(b) could be used to assess, among other things, whether an offer is strategic (MacKinlay v. MacKinlay Estate, 2008 BCSC 1570, 44 E.T.R. (3d) 48) or confers a significant benefit aside from costs:  B.C.S.P.C.A., at para. 34. 

[44]            The plaintiff submits that this Court should look at the difference between the global amount offered by the defendants and the global damages awarded by this Court and hold that the amount is insignificant.  However, the offers were not made globally. 

[45]            I find that the differences between the offers to settle and the awards of both defendants are significant.  The plaintiff recovered approximately 60% of the amount on offer by the defendant McLaughlin and precisely 60% of the amount on offer by the defendant Meehan. 

Rule 37B(6)(d):  Any Other Factor the Court Considers Appropriate

[46]            The defendants argue that the old Rule 37(24) and the plaintiff’s unreasonableness should be considered.

[47]            First, the defendants point out that they had no ability to structure offers with regard to the current rule, as they were made two years before it came into effect.  The issue of the application of Rule 37B in the context of settlement offers made prior to its enactment was considered by Mr. Justice Macaulay in Cowichan Bay, who stated the following at para. 12 of his oral judgment:

[12]      Finally, I take into account that at the time the offer was made in this case, the parties then reasonably expected that the rule in its then form would govern the consequences of the offer.  Accordingly, there is no question that the plaintiffs have had notice of the potential consequences throughout the proceedings.

[48]            I agree with the defendants that there was an expectation at the time the offers were made that success on the part of the defendants would inevitably give rise to an award of costs.  This factor will diminish in significance over time, but so long as there is litigation involving offers to settle under the former rule, the consequences under that regime are factors to consider.

[49]            The defendants also argue that the court should impose a penalty on Ms. Jacobs.  The plaintiff caused a great deal of unnecessary costs and resources, which were expended by both sides in this litigation.  In particular, the defendants prepared for a 30-day trial, and then had to modify this preparation after the plaintiff abandoned the MS causation issue on the first day of trial.  This, alone, added significant costs to the defendants. 

[50]            The purposes of Rule 37B, to promote settlement, prevent unnecessary claims, and deter poor conduct, will lose its efficacy if a reasonable party is denied relief after attempting to resolve the case by settlement.

 

ICBC Claims, Future Wage Loss and the Ability to Work in Your Chosen Profession

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.

Imagine sustaining permanent and partially disabling injuries in a BC Car Accident through the fault of another.  Despite your permanent injuries you are able to carry on in your own chosen profession.  Are you entitled to be compensated for future wage loss in your ICBC tort claim or does the fact that you can work in your own occupation restrict such an award?  Reasons for judgement were released by the BC Supreme Court today dealing with this issue.
In today’s case (Ayoubee v. Campbell) the now 34 year old Plaintiff was injured in a multiple vehicle collision which occurred in September, 2003.    The Plaintiff sustained serious injuries including a herniated disc (at the L5 / S1 Level) with associated pain down his leg and mechanical back pain in the collision.  At the time of the accident he had just begun a computer course at BCIT and intended to make a career from the opportunities that this education would provide.  Despite his serious injuries he was able to complete his studies then found and maintained employment in his chosen field.
In awarding $100,000 for non-pecuniary damages the court accepted that the Plaintiff will have some permanent pain and made came to the following conclusion with respect to his injuries:
[104]        I accept Mr. Ayoubee’s evidence that he has never been pain free since the accident, although he has managed to control the level of pain through exercise and stretching.  He has attempted to function as fully as he can, despite the limitations he now contends with.  In the past year, however, his leg has deteriorated and the quality of his life has diminished even further.  Surgery may help with the pain, but he will likely be left with residual numbness and discomfort, and the back pain will remain.  As a result of the accident, he has lost the quality of life of an active young man.
Madam Justice Humphries engaged in a lengthy discussion addressing the Plaintiff’s loss of future earning capacity.  The court found that given the Plaintiff’s permanent injuries certain occupations will be closed to the Plaintiff, however, the Plaintiff ‘is not foreclosed form the type of job he was training for at the time of the accident, obtained after the accident, and has held full-time employment ever since.’
In assessing the Plaintiff’s impaired earning capacity (future wage loss) at $80,000 Madam Justice Humphries made the following analysis:

[89]            In my view, this is a case in which it would be more appropriate to award a lump sum for loss of capacity.  There are a significant number of jobs that Mr. Ayoubee can no longer do, jobs of the type he once held and which could still provide him with opportunities for part time income enhancement that he now must forego.

[90]            As well, he is not as attractive an employee on the open labour market as he once was, given his chronic pain and inability to work without breaks.

[91]            He will also be unable to work while he recovers from surgery, which it is likely he will undergo once he has seen Dr. Dommisse.  Dr. Yu suggests the recovery time would be two or three months.  The defendants calculate the loss attributable to those months, reduced by the possibility that Mr. Ayoubee might decide not to have the surgery, and suggested that the applicable rate should be his salary level in 2005 when, in their position, he should have mitigated his damages.  The defendants arrived at a figure of approximately $7,700.  The plaintiff did not address that issue.

[92]            Surgery may improve Mr. Ayoubee’s leg pain, although the doctors differ on whether this is still realistic.  In any even he will be left with back pain.  I take into account that, of the two, the leg pain has always been the most severe, and is the cause of his greater restrictions at present.  On the other hand, given the back pain, there is no suggestion that he will be able to undertake moderate to heavy physical employment again.

[93]            An important factor that distinguishes Mr. Ayoubee’s case from those in which very high awards have been made for future loss is that he is not foreclosed from the type of job he was training for at the time of the accident, obtained after the accident, and has held full-time ever since.  He does not require retraining.  His employability does not depend on his ability to do heavy physical labour and he never intended that it should, although there is a substantial possibility that he might have supplemented his income occasionally with the type of job he held at Rona, if he were still able to do so.  

[94]            Considering that some future wage loss will be attributable to the surgery, and considering the diminution in the capital asset of his employability generally, I set his future loss, including his loss of capacity, at $80,000.

Loss of Commission Income and ICBC Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today (Tong v. Sidhu)awarding a Plaintiff $30,000 for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) as a result of injuries sustained in a 2007 BC Car Accident.  
Mr. Justice Cohen of the BC Supreme Court made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries:
[40]            In my opinion, the medical evidence and the plaintiff’s testimony supports the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries, and that he has made an overall improvement to a level where if he dedicates himself to learning and correctly performing the exercises recommended by Dr. King he will probably experience a full recovery within six to twelve months.
[52]            Upon a consideration of the severity and duration of the plaitniff’s accident related injuries and symptoms, and upon a review of the authorities on the range of the general damages submitted by the parties, I find that an award of $30,000 is a fair and appropriate sum to compensate the plaintiff for his general damage claim.
The Plaintiff, who was a commodities broker, also alleged a past and future loss of income although these claims were dismissed.   The Plaintiff sought approximately $50,000 for past income loss and $44,000 for future income loss.
In dismissing these damages Mr. Justice Cohen found that the Plaintiff ‘has not proven on the requisite standard that he has suffered past or future income loss‘.  Following this conclusion Mr. Justice Cohen engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Plaintiff’s claim for lost income and stated as follows:

[63]            First, the only documentary evidence the plaintiff has brought forward to support his claim are his income tax returns and payroll slips for 2007 and 2008.  Although he signed an authorization for release of employment information to the defendant, the onus remains on the plaintiff to bring to court any records which would help him to identify the details of his earnings history.  He has not produced any employment records to indicate or establish a month over month or year over year trend based on details of income from client or personal trading accounts.

[64]            Moreover, the plaintiff did not elicit evidence from Mr. Mok on his commission earnings to provide some comparative evidence regarding the level of earnings from commissions experienced by commodities brokers at Union Securities, or for that matter evidence of the earnings of brokers in other firms with a similar level of experience and client base as that of the plaintiff.

[65]            With respect to Mr. Mok, he and the plaintiff were performing the same work and both were earning income from commissions generated by client trades, as well as income from self trades.  Mr. Mok did say that he had two streams of earnings and that while his earnings from trades in his own account would not be shown on his T4, both streams of income were shown on his income tax returns.  He said that earnings from trading on his own account would be declared under the item of “business income” in his income tax returns.

[66]            I find that the plaintiff’s evidence on his precise earnings was at times both contradictory and confusing.

[67]            For example, the plaintiff was asked in chief about the line in his 1999 income tax return for “business income”, which shows an amount of $20,805.89 gross and a net loss of $8,323.15.  Although the plaintiff initially testified that the loss amount was due to amounts that he had to pay out of his pocket for losses sustained by his clients due to his trading errors, he later changed this testimony to say that the business income item related to a tax shelter investment that he had made, and that this was the amount reported to him by the company as a unit holder.  With respect to where he reported his income from self trades he said that he did not report this income in his income tax return as the earnings had gone into his RSP account, although he produced no records to substantiate his evidence on this point.

[68]            Finally, I think that there is evidence that completely undermines the plaintiff’s assertion that he is entitled to damages for loss of income, past or prospective.

[69]            In cross-examination, the plaintiff agreed with defence counsel that it was not common for him to make earnings in excess of $100,000.  He agreed that his earnings jumped substantially in 2004 because of the financing he worked on.  He also agreed with the figures from his income tax returns that since 2001, with the exception of 2004, he has earned in the range of $40-50,000 annually.  He agreed that 2004 was unusual, adding that it was unusual in the sense that his hard work paid off.  He also agreed with counsel that the last year he earned a figure in the same range was in 1996.  He agreed with counsel that his average income for the past 7 years has not been in the $80,000 range, but rather closer to $50,000.

[70]            The plaintiff agreed with counsel that based on his average earnings over the period leading up to the accident that his income in 2007 was similar to what he had earned in earlier years, with the exception of the year 2004.

[71]            The plaintiff testified that for the years 2001-2008 he would rank himself against his peers as being in the middle of the pack, and not on average a top performer.  He agreed that his assessment of his ranking has not changed since the accident, and also agreed that essentially, with the exception of 2004, his income has not significantly changed.

[72]            Counsel reminded the plaintiff of his evidence that his focus and concentration had been affected by the accident and he was asked whether it had affected his number of clients, to which he replied that he gained and lost clients for all kinds of reasons.  When counsel suggested to the plaintiff that he had not lost clients as a result of the accident, he replied that he may have lost or gained clients during the period following the accident.  He was not able to say whether in fact the accident related injuries had resulted in a loss of clients.

[73]            Mr. Steven Engh is manager of sales at Union Securities.  He met the plaintiff when they both worked at C.M. Oliver.  He was asked how he would rank the plaintiff as a commodities broker. He replied that the plaintiff would fall in the middle of the pack, and that as far as he knew this had been the case for the past five years.  He also said that all of the brokers in his firm have been affected by the current securities market conditions and that this would include the plaintiff’s area of trading.  He did agree with plaintiff’s counsel in cross-examination that the securities business is very demanding and that it takes a focused person to succeed.

[74]            In the result, I find that on the whole of the evidence the plaintiff has failed to prove his income loss claim. With the exception of the year 2004, the plaintiff’s history of earnings in the seven years leading up to the accident disclose a trend of income much closer to the $50,000 range than his claim of $80,000.  This is clearly borne out by his income for the year 2006, a year in which he was completely healthy, had his list of prospects, and presumably was focused and determined to increase his income to a level closer to his exceptional result in the year 2004.  Yet, his income for the year 2006, at least from commissions on trades, was not very far off his usual annual earnings in the $50,000 range.

[75]            In my opinion, the evidence falls far short of the claim that the plaintiff is making for income loss, past and prospective, and therefore this head of damage must be rejected.

This case is worth reviewing for anyone on commissioned or self employed basis who suffers a wage loss in an ICBC Injury Claim to see how courts scrutinize such claims and to get some insight into the factors and the type of evidence courts find useful in determining whether there has been a past loss of income.

More Snow in BC….More Advice in dealing with ICBC

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC No-Fault (Part 7) Benefits. 60 Comments on More Snow in BC….More Advice in dealing with ICBC

Its now mid March and like many others I welcome Spring coming and coming fast but its snowing again in Victoria, BC.
With yet another snowfall I thought I’d repost a previous blog entry dealing with single vehicle weather related collisions and ICBC claims. 
Snow in BC has two reliable results 1. Car Accidents, 2. Phone call to BC personal injury lawyers about those car accidents. The second is particularly true for Victoria personal injury and ICBC claims lawyers because of the local populations relative inexperience dealing with winter driving conditions.
In anticipation of the almost certain phone calls I will receive this week as a Victoria ICBC claims lawyer I write this post.
If you are the driver involved in a single vehicle accident in British Columbia, and you lost control due to the weather, all you can likely claim from ICBC are Part 7 Benefits (also referred to as no fault benefits). There is (except in some unusually peculiar situations such as an ICBC insured driver contributing to the road hazards) in all likelihood no claim from ICBC for pain and suffering (non-pecuniary damages) in these circumstances. A person’s right to claim pain and suffering and other “tort” damages only arises if someone else is at fault for your injuries. In these single vehicle accidents you usually only have yourself or the weather to blame, and last time I checked you can’t sue mother nature.
If someone else contributed to the accident (perhaps the road maintenance company for failing to act in a timely fashion or perhaps a mechanic for failing to bring your vehicle up to snuff last time you had it inspected) you will have to make a claim against them. Chances are they are not insured through ICBC for such claims and instead you will have to go against their policy of private insurance.
Now, if you are a passenger in a single vehicle, weather related accident, you may very well have a claim for pain and suffering. This claim would be against your driver (except perhaps in the unusual circumstances mentioned above). If your driver did not operate the vehicle safely in all the circumstances (for example driving too fast for the known or anticipated poor road conditions) and this caused or contributed to the collision then you have a tort claim. Assuming the driver is ICBC insured then you have the right to apply for both no-fault benefits from your own insurance and make a tort claim against the driver that will be covered through his third party liability ICBC insurance.
If you are advancing a tort claim against a driver be weary of the defence of “inevitable accident”. ICBC defends claims. One of the best defences to a weather related accident is that it was “inevitable”. What this means is that the driver, operating safely, could not have avoided losing control of his vehicle. If this can be proven than the tort claim can be defeated.
People naturally don’t want to get those known to them in trouble and it is all too common that when reporting such a claim to ICBC passengers too readily agree to how unexpected the accident was and how the driver was operating the vehicle very carefully. If this is true that’s fine. My words of caution are as follows: If the driver was not safe (I’m not talking about driving like a maniac here, I’m talking about driving less than carefully for the winter driving conditions) and you give ICBC the alternate impression with a view towards helping the driver out, the result may be severely damaging your ability to bring a tort claim.
Tell the truth and know what’s at stake when doing so. If ICBC gets the false impression that the accident was inevitable you will have a much harder time advancing or settling your ICBC tort claim.
The bottom line is this: If an accident truly is inevitable and there is no tort claim so be it, but, don’t lead ICBC to this conclusion if it isn’t true. Doing so will hurt your claim for pain and suffering.

Special Costs Awarded for 'Reprehensible' Behaviour by Law Firm

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Special Costs Awarded for 'Reprehensible' Behaviour by Law Firm

In reasons for judgement released today (Chudy v. Merchant Law Group) the BC Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s award for special costs.
The Plaintiff was involved in a serious motor vehicle collision in 1995.  The Plaintiff hired a lawyer and ultimately a $860,000 settlement was reached.
A fee dispute arose after this settlement and litigation ensued.   At trial the Plaintiff’s were granted judgement in the sum of $300,404.17 against the law firm.  This award included a punitive damages award of $50,000 finding that the law firm acted in a ‘malicious, oppressive and high-handed‘ manner to their client.
The lawfirm appealed for various grounds.  In a split decision handed down several months ago, the BC Court of Appeal dismissed the major grounds of appeal but did reduce the over-all judgement by $27,413.58.
Today’s appeal provided supplemental reasons dealing with the narrow issue of whether the trial judge was correct in awarding special costs against the law firm.  In upholding the award, the Court of Appeal said the following with respect to the law of ‘special costs’ and to the behaviour of the Defendant Law Firm:

[6]                The trial judge discussed the claim for special costs at some length at paras. 216 to 261 of his reasons for judgment which are indexed as 2007 BCSC 279.  It is not disputed that he correctly stated the applicable law: 

[255]    In Garcia v. Cresbrook Industries Ltd. (1994), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d) 242 (C.A.) [Garcia], the Court of Appeal considered the type of conduct required for an award of special costs under the Rules of Court, B.C. Reg. 221/90.  After reviewing decided cases and the relationship of “special costs” to the concept of “solicitor-and-client costs”, Lambert J.A. (for the Court) stated at ¶ 17:

Having regard to the terminology adopted by Madam Justice McLachlin in Young v. Young, to the terminology adopted by Mr. Justice Cumming in Fullerton v. Matsqui, and to the application of the standard of “reprehensible conduct” by Chief Justice Esson in Leung v. Leung in awarding special costs in circumstances where he had explicitly found that the conduct in question was neither scandalous nor outrageous, but could only be categorized as one of the “milder forms of misconduct” which could simply be said to be “deserving of reproof or rebuke”, it is my opinion that the single standard for the awarding of special costs is that the conduct in question properly be categorized as “reprehensible”.  As Chief Justice Esson said in Leung v. Leung, the word reprehensible is a word of wide meaning.  It encompasses scandalous or outrageous conduct but it also encompasses milder forms of misconduct deserving of reproof or rebuke.  Accordingly, the standard represented by the word reprehensible, taken in that sense, must represent a general and all encompassing expression of the applicable standard for the award of special costs.

[7]                Davies J. stated his conclusion on the costs issue thus: 

[257]    I am satisfied that the conduct of the Merchant Law Group in this case was reprehensible within the meaning attributed in Garcia.  The conduct and actions of the Merchant Law Group would be deserving of rebuke in an ordinary commercial transaction.  In the context of litigation involving its own clients and the integrity which the Court and the public are entitled to expect from those who are privileged to be members of the legal profession, it was both outrageous and scandalous.

[258]    I order that the plaintiffs recover special costs from the Merchant Law Group from the commencement of this litigation and throughout, including all costs related to the third party proceedings brought against Mr. Shaw.  Those proceedings were, in my view, not only devoid of evidentiary substance but also unnecessarily added to the length of these proceedings.

[259]    Any costs that were paid to the plaintiffs pursuant to previous orders of the Court shall, of course, be deductible from the award of special costs.

[8]                Before stating the above conclusion, the judge described the conduct of the appellant law firm.  In the court’s view, the bad conduct began with a pre-litigation letter from Mr. Merchant to the Law Society of British Columbia dated 2 December 2003 in which he falsely claimed for the appellant a solicitor’s lien on the Chudy file.  He also prepared a fictitious fee account to the Chudys.  This “foreshadowed the way in which the Merchant Law Group was prepared to defend against the plaintiffs’ claims” (para. 251).  In our opinion, this did not amount to a colouration of the judge’s assessment of litigation conduct.  It was properly seen as an attempt by the appellant to put a chill on the appellant’s unsophisticated former clients.  This conduct was not a factor in the assessment of punitive damages.  Rather, the award of punitive damages was based on an earlier breach of fiduciary duty.  In these circumstances, an improper attempt by a legal professional to discourage a claim against that professional, although done before commencement of the action, is properly taken into account when considering litigation conduct.  The trial judge’s conclusion at para. 225 that Mr. Merchant’s evidence about the draft account and an accompanying letter to the respondents “was a disingenuous attempt to cover up the fact that he did not want the plaintiffs to have the file and that he was prepared to go to unethical lengths to avoid delivering it to them” is unassailable.  It was bad enough that Mr. Merchant improperly claimed the lien.  But he exacerbated that conduct by offering an explanation at trial that was contrived.  That was litigation conduct properly considered on the claim for special costs. 

[9]                The appellant has not demonstrated error on the part of the trial judge in his conclusion that the conduct of the appellant during this litigation, both pre-trial and during the trial, was reprehensible as that term is used in Garcia.  The evidence abundantly supports the conclusion.  The appellant brought pre-trial motions that were without merit; it brought a specious application, based in part on false evidence, challenging the jurisdiction of the court to try the matter; it avoided a peremptory trial date by adding Mr. Shaw as a third party but did not require him to file a defence, did not examine him for discovery, did not cross examine him at trial with respect to its allegations against him, and in a lengthy written submission at the end of the trial, did not refer to its claim over against Mr. Shaw (the trial judge tersely dismissed the third party claim); it brought a motion (returnable on the date scheduled for the hearing of a R. 18A application for a summary trial brought by the respondents) for removal of the respondents’ counsel on ridiculous grounds, a tactic which the trial judge at para. 236 stated, with the benefit of his unique perspective of the appellant’s entire conduct, “was not only without merit but was calculated to prevent the Rule 18A application from proceeding as ordered”; on the hearing of the respondents’ R. 18A motion, Mr. Merchant produced a large number of documents, not previously disclosed and not sworn to, in support of his position that the action could not be determined on a summary basis; and, finally but of most significance, Mr. Merchant offered evidence at trial that the trial judge determined was false and misleading.

[10]            As to the final point, the respondents refer to Brown v. Lowe, 2002 BCCA 7, in which Southin J.A. said (at para. 149):  “To give false evidence relating to the matters in question at any stage of the proceedings is a grave matter.  By “false”, I do not mean “erroneous”; I mean knowingly untrue.”  The falsity of Mr. Merchant’s evidence is commented on by the trial judge at several points in his judgment and is referenced by the majority judgment in this court.  There is no need to particularize it here.

[11]            The evidence as a whole clearly supports the conclusion of the trial judge that the legal basis for the awarding of special costs was established in this case. 

How Much is the Pain and Suffering Worth in my ICBC Injury Claim?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases. 56 Comments on How Much is the Pain and Suffering Worth in my ICBC Injury Claim?

One of the most frequent questions I get asked as a BC Personal Injury Lawyer is ‘how much is my pain and suffering worth?’.
This is an important question for anyone injured through the fault of another in a BC motor vehicle collision.  When negotiating with ICBC the playing field is typically imbalanced in that the ICBC claims adjuster has lots of experience in valuing personal injury claims.   Unless you are an injury claims lawyer you understandably would have little experience in valuing pain and suffering and may need help valuing this loss.  
It is important to empower yourself for the negotiation because in tort claims ICBC is negotiating on behalf of the person that injured you (the tort claim is, after all, made against the other persons policy of insurance). Practically speaking, this means that this imbalance in experience can work as a huge disadvantage, particulary if you think the ICBC adjuster is ‘your’ adjuster.  
With this in mind, here is some basic informaiton on paind and suffering and ICBC tort claims.  Pain and Suffering is awarded under the legal head of damages called ‘non-pecuniary loss’.  One of the best ways to value pain and suffering in an ICBC tort claim is to find cases with similar circumstances and injuries to see what damages were awarded.  When you find several similar cases a range of damages starts to become apparent and this range can serve as a useful guide in helping you understand the potential value of your ICBC personal injury tort claim.
Reasons for judgement were released today (Hoang v. Smith Industries Ltd.) dealing with the issue of pain and suffering in a BC motor vehicle collision tort claim.  In awarding the Plaintiff $19,000 for his non-pecuniary loss as a result of soft tissue injuries Madam Justice Russell summarized the law of non-pecuniary damages as follows:

[32]            The purpose of non-pecuniary damage awards is to compensate the plaintiff for “pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”: Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023, B.C.J. No. 1535 at para. 134; see also Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Kuskis v. Tin, 2008 BCSC 862, B.C.J. No. 1248.  While each award must be made with reference to the particular circumstances and facts of the case, other cases may serve as a guide to assist the court in arriving at an award that is just and fair to both parties: Kuskis at para. 136. 

[33]            There are a number of factors that courts must take into account when assessing this type of claim.  Justice Kirkpatrick, writing for the majority, in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 19, outlines the factors to consider, at para. 46:

The inexhaustive list of common factors cited in Boyd [Boyd v. Harris, 2004 BCCA 146] that influence an award of non-pecuniary damages includes:

(a)  age of the plaintiff;

(b)  nature of the injury;

(c)  severity and duration of pain;

(d)  disability;

(e)  emotional suffering; and

(f)  loss or impairment of life;

I would add the following factors, although they may arguably be subsumed in the above list:

(g)  impairment of family, marital and social relationships;

(h)  impairment of physical and mental abilities;

(i)   loss of lifestyle; and

(j)   the plaintiff’s stoicism (as a factor that should not, generally speaking, penalize the plaintiff: Giang v. Clayton, [2005] B.C.J. No. 163, 2005 BCCA 54 (B.C. C.A.)).

$75,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for Frozen Shoulder, STI's and Headaches

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 119 Comments on $75,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for Frozen Shoulder, STI's and Headaches

In lengthy reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court (Peake v. Higo) Mr. Justicer Brown awarded a 52 year old Plaintiff approximately $170,000 in total damages as a result of a 2003 motor vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff had pre-existing pain in her neck and back and these were aggravated as a result of this collision.  Additionally, the Plaintiff suffered a frozen left and right shoulder as a result of this collision.
In justifying a non-pecuniary damages award (pain and suffering) of $75,000 the court summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:

[145]        Considering all the pertinent evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff suffered an aggravation of pre-existing neck and low back pain that she had been experiencing at the time of the accident, together with the imposition of some new soft tissue injuries in those areas.  I find that when she was experiencing neck and back pain in the month or so preceding the accident, she was in a highly emotional psychological state that was magnifying her perception of pain at that time.  To take her symptoms at this time as representative of her physical health would be inaccurate and unfair, given her medical history as a whole and the accepted evidence of witnesses who testified about her pre-accident functioning and activities.  The plaintiff herself acknowledges that 90% would be a fair representation of her pre-accident health.  The evidence of Dr. Regan, which I have accepted with some minor qualification, is clear that the 2003 accident cannot be burdened with all of Mrs. Peake’s on-going post accident neck and back symptoms and headaches.

[146]        Mrs. Peake exhibited pre-accident degenerative changes in her cervical spine.  Dr. Webb commented that Mrs. Peake’s degenerative cervical spine, exhibited by x-ray and MRI imaging, pre-disposes her to more intense symptoms and prolonged recovery.  Just the same, she had already experienced symptoms in the neck (and low back) together with headaches pre-accident, with no recent physical trauma and only a heightened emotional state to partly explain the intensity of her symptoms at that time.

[147]        Further, the effect of Mrs. Peake’s emotional state in May 2003 on her symptoms, and the fact that, as Dr. Webb comments, Mrs. Peake has suffered depressed mood, anxiety and frustration in relation to her symptoms since the accident, is a factor that I should take into account in assessing the extent to which her symptoms have been influenced by her emotional state post accident—and that this bodes positively for further future improvement as her emotional state continues to improve.

[148]        Both Dr. Regan and Dr. Sovio’s opinions negate a direct relationship between Mrs. Peake’s lower back flare-ups and the accident.  This is a mechanical condition and the plaintiff has not established that her ongoing back flare-ups, certainly past the summer of 2006, are attributable to the accident.  At the same time, Mrs. Peake testified that her low back symptoms are different and more intense then those experienced pre-accident.  I find that some small portion of Mrs. Peake’s ongoing lower back symptoms relate to the 2003 accident.

[149]        There is little question that the 2003 accident caused Mrs. Peake’s left shoulder injury and frozen shoulder.  I accept Mrs. Peake’s sworn testimony that she continues to experience mild periodic situational discomfort and some functional limitation in the use of her left shoulder.

[150]        With respect to the more problematic question of the causation of Mrs. Peake’s right frozen shoulder, with recovery from that predicted to extend to some time in 2010, albeit in a less problematic way then was the case for the left shoulder, I find that the plaintiff has proven that her right shoulder injury and eventually frozen state was caused by the accident….

[154]        Turning to Mrs. Peake’s neck symptoms and headaches, and Mr. Pankratz’ submission that “but for the subsequent traumatic events of 2006, this condition “would have” resolved completely,” Dr. Regan did not testify that the condition “would” resolve; but “should” resolve.  I note that when he wrote his second report, he was aware of ongoing neck complaints and headaches; but made no skeptical comments about their having continued her he last saw Mrs. Peake.  Mrs. Peake continues to experience neck pain and headaches that frequently cause her to awaken in the middle of the night with a “terrible headache” that can last for a few days – bearing in mind that Mrs. Peake has a history of pre-accident headaches.  Further, Mrs. Peake confirms ongoing improvement; and indeed in the summer of 2006 experienced extended pain-free periods, as stated earlier.  I bear in mind as well that she has suffered a right frozen shoulder, but  that continues to improve and should resolve completely by 2010; and with improvement in that condition she should see further relief in her neck, noting that she saw considerable improvement when her left shoulder pain and limitation more or less resolved.

[155]        The evidence does not support the gloomier aspects of Dr. Webb’s prognosis considering Dr. Regan’s expectations that Mrs. Peake’s neck pain and accompanying headaches, should eventually recover and Dr. Regan’s opinion that negates a continuing connection between her lower back symptoms and the accident.  In my assessment of non-pecuniary damages, and considering Mrs. Peake’s pre-accident condition, I see the medical and other evidence going so far as to support a finding of a possibility that Mrs. Peake will in future continue to suffer some minor residual neck sequelae and headaches that are attachable to the accident, although the most likely outcome is complete recovery from those within two years, insofar as the effects of the 2003 accident are concerned.