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Future Care Claims: What Expert Evidence Is Needed?

Written by admin on . Posted in Cost of Future Care Cases, Uncategorized. 52 Comments on Future Care Claims: What Expert Evidence Is Needed?


Useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal discussing the type of expert evidence necessary to prove damages for cost of future care in a BC injury claim.
In this week’s case (Gregory v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision. At trial the Plaintiff sought damages including an award of $123,000 for cost of future care.  In support of this claim the Plaintiff relied on the opinion of an occupational therapist.  This aspect of the claim was largely rejected with the Court awarding just over $8,000 for this head of damage.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the evidence of the occupational therapist suggesting a medical doctors evidence was necessary for this aspect of the claim.   The BC Court of Appeal agreed in part and increased the assessment by $30,000.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons addressing the type of expert evidence needed to advance a future care claim:

[38] Courts do accept testimony from a variety of health care professionals as to necessary and reasonable costs of future care: Jacobson v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 63, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 377 (S.C.) at para. 182; in which Levine J. (as she then was) said:

[182]    The test she enunciated does not, in my view, require that the evidence of the specific care that is required by the plaintiff be provided by a medical doctor. In Milina v. Bartsch, McLachlin J. accepted the evidence of a rehabilitation expert as to the type of care that should be provided.

See also: Aberdeen v. Zanatta, 2008 BCCA 420 at paras. 43-53, 63; Rizzolo v. Brett, 2010 BCCA 398 at paras. 72-83.

[39] I do not consider it necessary, in order for a plaintiff to successfully advance a future cost of care claim, that a physician testify to the medical necessity of each and every item of care that is claimed.  But there must be some evidentiary link drawn between the physician’s assessment of pain, disability, and recommended treatment and the care recommended by a qualified health care professional:  Aberdeen at paras. 43, 63…

[46] And, there was a consensus among the physicians that Ms. Gregory has difficulty lifting above shoulder height, difficulty with prolonged heavy or repetitive motion above shoulder level, and that in general she will continue to have persistent pain and weakness.

[47] The evidence of the physicians does therefore provide some evidentiary basis for the recommendations for assistance with heavy housework, and yard maintenance.  In my view the trial judge fell into error by failing to consider these claims on the basis only that, “there are no recommendations from the medical practitioners for housekeeping assistance, or home and yard maintenance … ”.

[48] Rather than remit this question to the trial judge, I am of the view that it is appropriate for this Court to substitute an appropriate award under this head of damages.

[49] That part of Ms. Percy’s recommendations in which she estimated assistance for heavy home and yard maintenance is set out above.  I would substitute an award of $30,000 over and above the amount already awarded under this head of damages.  This represents a reasonable assessment of the present value of the cost of some modest assistance with the housework, and yard maintenance, that Ms. Gregory could not perform herself in a reasonable manner, as a consequence of the impairment in her shoulder.

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Assessment for Chronic Shoulder Tendonitis

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding damages for injuries and loss flowing from a BC motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Garcha v. Duenas) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision.  He was a passenger in a truck which was struck when the Defendant “made a sudden left hand turn across (the Plaintiff’s vehicles) path“.  Fault for the crash was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries, many of which recovered by the time of trial.  One injury unfortunately lingered on, specifically tendonitis in his shoulders.   This inflammation caused pain which limited the Plaintiff domestically, recreationally and vocationally.  The symptoms were not expected to improve with time.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $70,000 Madam Justice Boyd made the following findings:
[53] Dr. Parhar holds the opinion that since the accident the plaintiff has been suffering the ongoing effects of a shoulder tendonitis, that is an inflammation of the shoulder tendons, resulting from the acute trauma suffered at the time of the motor vehicle accident.  I note here that on cross examination, Dr. Tarazi also opined that the right shoulder complaints were likely related to the injuries suffered in the motor vehicle accident.  Even if the injury was related to repetitive movements, he believed that this was due to the fact that due to his injuries, the plaintiff was likely posturally over- compensating in some way, thus giving rise to the shoulder complaints.  In the absence of the motor vehicle injuries, he doubted the shoulder complaints would have arisen. ..
[58] On a review of all the evidence I am satisfied the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that his continuing complaints are legitimate and that they are indeed causally related to the injuries suffered at the time of this motor vehicle accident…
[67] Considering all of the evidence, I find that an appropriate award of general damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life is $70,000…
[78] In the end result, I am satisfied the plaintiff has proven that he is now permanently partially disabled.  Adopting the opinion of Dr. Parhar, I am satisfied that given the activation of his osteoarthritis, his condition will likely worsen over time.
For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC Court Cases assessing damages for shoulder injuries

Court Ordered Defence Medical Exams and the Right to Take Notes

Written by admin on . Posted in independent medical exams, Uncategorized. 45 Comments on Court Ordered Defence Medical Exams and the Right to Take Notes


It is not uncommon for discrepancies to arise about the exact details of an appointment following Court ordered medical exams.  These exams can last from several minutes, to several hours, or even (in the case of Functional Capacity and Neuropsychological Exams) to several days.  If a discrepencey arises as to what was said by the Plaintiff a Trial Judge can face a he-said she-said situation.  This can lead to serious disputes because the outcome of a personal injury trial can turn largely on a Plaintiff’s reliability and consistency.
When such a dispute arises the examining physician often has access to his or her notes detailing the examination.  This can sometimes work to the doctor’s advantage when a Court is asked to decide what was actually said.   To remedy this can a Plaintiff take their own notes while attending an independent medical exam?  Reasons for judgement were recently published on the BC Supreme Court website addressing this issue..
In today’s case (Makowsky v. Jawandha) the Plaintiff was involved in two separate motor vehicle collisions. He alleged injury including brain damage and memory problems.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was ordered to attend an independent medical exam with a psychiatrist.   Given the Plaintiff’s poor memory the Court further ordered that “someone invited by the plaintiff could observe the examination“.
The Plaintiff attended the exam with a friend.  During the exam the friend took extensive notes detailing the discussion between the Plaintiff and the Physician.  The Physician claimed this was distracting and put an end to the exam believing the extensive note-taking violated the general BC prohibition on recoding Court ordered medical exams.  The parties put the matter before the Court.
Ultimately the Court held that the Plaintiff’s observer could take notes so long as doing so did not interfere with the examination.  Madam Justice Gray provided the following useful reasons:

[15] There is a right, in my view, for the observer to take notes, but not in a manner that slows or interferes with the examination.  For example, the observer cannot ask someone to pause in what they are saying, or say, “Just a minute, I’m taking a note,” or make noise or gesture in a way that creates a distraction. …

[17] The examination can proceed on the basis that the doctor agrees that there can be an observer present and that observer can take notes, but on the basis that the observer will take notes quietly and out of view of the doctor and patient.

I should point out that although this decision was recently published it was decided in 2008 under the former BC Supreme Court Rules.  There is, however, no reason that I’m aware of to conclude that the Court’s reasoning would not apply to the current Rules.

Amending Pleadings and the New Rules of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 6, Uncategorized. 44 Comments on Amending Pleadings and the New Rules of Court


The first case that I’m aware of dealing with amendments of pleadings under the New Rules of Court was released earlier this week.  In short the Court held that the new Rules don’t change the law with respect to the Court’s discretion in permitting amendments.
In this week’s case (BRZ Holdings Inc. v. JER Envirotech International Corp.,) the Plaintiff sued various defendants for losses caused by alleged fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.  As trial approached the Plaintiff sought significant amendments to their pleadings.  The Defendant opposed these arguing the changes would cause prejudice.  Mr. Justice Smith ultimately allowed most of the proposed amendments and in doing so provided the following useful reasons confirming the New Rules did not alter the law with respect to amendments of pleadings:
6] Amendments to pleadings are now governed by Rule 6-1 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/ 2009 [Rules], which is similar to the former rule 24 in that amendments at this stage of the proceedings require leave of the court.  Cases decided under the former rule make clear that amendments will usually be allowed unless the opposite party can demonstrate actual, as opposed to potential, prejudice, or unless the amendments would be useless:  Langret Investments S.A. v. McDonnell (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 145 (C.A.) at paras. 34 and 43.  The court’s discretion is “completely unfettered and subject only to the general rule that all such discretion is to be exercised judicially, in accordance with the evidence adduced and such guidelines as may appear from the authorities” [emphasis added]: Teal Cedar Products v. Dale Intermediaries Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 282 (C.A.) at para. 45.  Nothing in the new Rules suggests any change in the court’s approach.

More on Canadian Insurance Fraud: Looking Beyond The Claimants

Written by admin on . Posted in Settlement Law, Uncategorized. 62 Comments on More on Canadian Insurance Fraud: Looking Beyond The Claimants


An interesting question was posed earlier this month by Alan Shanoff of the Toronto Sun when he canvassed a recent Ontario case where an insurance adjuster reached an “unconscionable” settlement with a claimant which was eventually set aside by Court order.  After detailing this case he asked “just how prevalent is this sort of practice? Unlike the Canadian insurance industry’s wild claim of $1.3 billion of insurance fraud per year, there are no estimates of how widespread abusive adjuster practices might be.”
Alan hypothesized as follows “Based purely on anecdotal accounts I suspect for every claimant who tries to exaggerate his injuries there’s an adjuster trying to minimize a claimant’s true injuries or deny a rightful claim.”
I can’t say whether this 1:1 ratio is right or wrong, however Alan’s question could be the beginning of an interesting discussion.  If anyone is aware of statistics addressing how often self-represented individuals receive unfair settlements and the global cost of “unconscionable” settlements on the public at large this information should be publicized.  If unfair adjusting practices short change deserving claimants anywhere near the figures the Canadian insurance industry claims fraud costs them then that is a story that needs to be told.
Now I’m no fan of insurance fraud, however, when reading stories of the high cost of insurance fraud it’s worth keeping in mind that, unlike the insurance industry, claimants who get stuck with an unconscionable settlement don’t have hundreds of millions of dollars in profits to offset the cost of a raw deal.   Also, the insurance industry (to their credit) has a good track record of pursuing civil damages to punish and discourage fraudulent conduct.  The same likely cannot be said about individuals who have their insurance claims processed in bad faith.  As always, comments and feedback are welcome.

ICBC Claims and UMP Arbitration Decisions

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC UMP Cases, Uncategorized. 62 Comments on ICBC Claims and UMP Arbitration Decisions


Most people that are injured in BC motor vehicle collisions have access to “Underinsured Motorist Protection Coverage” (“UMP” for short).   Vehicles licensed in BC must carry a minimum of $1 million in UMP coverage.   Some vehicles carry more UMP coverage than this.
In catastrophic injury claims it’s important to determine how much UMP Coverage is available as these claims can often exceed a Defendant’s policy limits.
Sections 148.1 – 148.4 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation deal with UMP Claims.  When disputes arise as to the availability or the amount of UMP coverage the matter needs to be resolved through private arbitration as opposed to a public lawsuit.   One of the difficulties with arbitrations is that they result in private reasons for judgement making it difficult to access precedents.
This difficulty was addressed by a 2007 amendment which requires “An arbitrator who adjudicates a dispute under this section must publish the reasons for the decision by forwarding a copy of the reasons, with personal information that would identify the parties deleted, to the corporation for publication on its website”
If you’re looking for UMP Arbitration Decisions ICBC has been posting these online since 2007.  It would be useful if this database was expanded to include decisions from prior to 2007 as UMP cases do not arise frequently compared to judicially decided personal injury claims and many useful precedents exist that are not publicly available.  However, this database is a useful starting point when researching UMP related issues and I thought I would point out this resource for those who were unaware of it.

Happy Birthday! The BC Injury Law Blog Turns Three

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With many legal blogs having the lifespan of a fruitfly I guess this blog is officially over the hill at the ripe old age of 3.
On March 23, 2008 the BC Injury Law Blog was launched with this initial post discussing tort claims linking MS to trauma in British Columbia.  Since then this site has grown to over 875 articles addressing personal injury law developments in BC and throughout Canada.
So how should I celebrate?  I won’t repeat my Clawbie runner-up jump in a partially frozen Canadian lake (I save that foolish move for New Year’s Day).  Instead I’ll just keep writing.  To all my visitors, thank you for making these efforts worthwhile.  I’m looking forward to another year!

Costs and Sufficient Reason to Sue in the Supreme Court: Clarity from the BCCA

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, Uncategorized.


Welcome reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing when a Plaintiff has ‘sufficient reason‘ for suing in the BC Supreme Court.  In short the top BC Court ruled that trial judges can look beyond the value of a claim when addressing this topic.  This issue is important because generally a Plaintiff who succeeds in a Supreme Court lawsuit but is awarded below $25,000 (the current monetary jurisdiction of the BC Provincial Court) will be deprived of costs unless they have ‘sufficient reason‘ for suing in the Supreme Court.
In today’s case (Gradek v. DaimlerChryster Financial) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  His lawsuit was successful and he was awarded damages of just over $9,000.  The trial judge also awarded costs of $6,600.  In doing so the trial judge made the following useful findings when individuals sue an insured defendant:

[42]      The plaintiff is who he is.  As such, he would have had extraordinary difficulty presenting a case on his own.  While the defendant, represented by the insurer, suggested that in Provincial Court it might, at times, be represented by an adjuster, in my view, whether the defendant was represented by an adjuster or a lawyer the plaintiff would have been outmatched.

[43]      In my opinion the plaintiff required counsel to obtain a just result. Costs are not awarded in Provincial Court.  [Emphasis added.]

ICBC Appealed this order arguing that a court can only look at the likely value of a claim when deciding whether there is sufficient reason to sue in the BC Supreme Court.  The Court of Appeal disagreed and dismissed the appeal.  In doing so the Court provided the following useful reasons addressing the scope of ‘sufficient reasons‘ under Rule 14-1(10) of the Civil Rules:

[16]        The words “sufficient reason” are not defined in the Rules of Court.  In their ordinary and grammatical sense, they do not suggest a specific limitation in terms of application, although it is clear that “any reason” will not do.  The reason has to be “sufficient”, but there is nothing in the Rule to suggest that it has to be connected solely to the quantum of the claim.  On the other hand, the words do not connote the exercise of a discretion, with its attendant deferential standard of review.  That point was made by this Court in Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, 72 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 13:

[13]      At the outset, I observe that the application of Rule 57(10) does not involve an exercise of discretion.  For a plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to recover more than disbursements, the court must make a finding that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Supreme Court.

[17]        In support of its position, the appellant relies on the nature and purpose of the legislative scheme which, he submits, reflect an intention on the part of the Legislature to confine the meaning of the words “sufficient reason” to reasons relating only to quantum as assessed at the outset of the claim.  In that respect, it is common ground that the primary purpose of denying costs in the Supreme Court to those with monetary claims of $25,000 or less is to encourage claimants to bring their claims in Small Claims Court, with its simplified procedures and greater accessibility to judicial dispute resolution.  Litigating in the Supreme Court when the amount of money involved is relatively small can be prohibitive for both the “winner” and the “loser”.

[18]        I am in general agreement with the appellant’s submission in its factum (at para. 33) that the object of the small claims procedures set out in the Small Claims Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 430 and Rules, B.C. Reg. 261/93 is “to provide parties, and lay litigants, in particular with an easily understandable, flexible, and less costly alternative to the Supreme Court”.  I am also prepared to accept that, in most cases, the pre-trial procedures, including pre-trial disclosure of documents and expert reports, mediation services, settlement conferences and recovery of such reasonable expenses as interpreter fees, provided in the Provincial Court, will enable the parties to proceed in a cost-efficient manner to a just result.  But, that will not always be the case.  In this instance, for example, the trial judge was satisfied that Mr. Gradek’s circumstances required the assistance of counsel to obtain a just resolution of his claim.  It is implicit in his reasons that he considered that it would be unjust to find that Mr. Gradek require counsel to properly present his claim, on the one hand, and to deny him costs which would partially offset the expense of retaining counsel, on the other.  It was on this basis, in part, that he found there was “sufficient reason” within the meaning of Rule 57(10) to bring the action in the Supreme Court with its attendant relief for the successful party in costs.

[19]        Without endorsing all of the factors relied on by the trial judge as constituting “sufficient reason” in this case, I am satisfied that there may be circumstances which may constitute sufficient reason for bringing an action in the Supreme Court, thereby triggering its costs provisions, despite the fact that it is apparent from the outset that the award will fall within the monetary jurisdiction of the Provincial Court.  It is open to a defendant who believes that the claim should not have been brought in the Supreme Court to apply under s. 15 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 443, to have the matter transferred to the Provincial Court.  Alternatively, if the matter proceeds in the Supreme Court, it is open to the defendant to ask that a successful plaintiff be denied costs on the basis that there was not sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court in the first instance.

[20]        I accept that the narrow interpretation of the words “sufficient reason” advocated by the appellant would provide greater certainty to litigants in knowing the consequences of proceeding in Supreme Court where the matter falls within the Small Claims monetary limit.  But I agree with the trial judge that if the Legislature had intended to limit the scope of the words “sufficient reason” to the extent suggested by the appellant, it could readily have done so.  While I am satisfied that the words, “sufficient reason” should not be interpreted in an expansive manner, but with restraint, I am also satisfied that they must be read in such a way that a trial judge is not forced to deny a party costs where he is satisfied, as here, that justice can only be achieved as between the parties by an award of costs to the successful party.

Unidentified Motorist Claims and the "Fixed Pie" of ICBC Funds

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 51 Comments on Unidentified Motorist Claims and the "Fixed Pie" of ICBC Funds


Reasons for judgement were released this week discussing the division of the limited funds available from ICBC when multiple parties successfully sue ICBC for damages as a result of injuries caused by an unidentified motorist.
In today’s case (Thoreson v. ICBC) the Plaintiff and his passenger were injured in a 2002 motorcycle accident near Vernon, BC.  Their motorcycle was run off the road by an unidentified driver.    ICBC was sued under s. 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act and after trial the Unidentified driver was found 85% responsible for the crash and the Plaintiff driver was found 15% responsible.

Both the Plaintiff and his passenger settled the value of the claims.  The Plaintiff’s claim was settled for $125,000 and the passenger’s claim for $935,521.  To satisfy the damages both the Plaintiff and the passenger claimed damages from ICBC under section 24.  Mr. Justice Cole of the BC Supreme Court was asked determine how much of the $200,000 available in the section 24 ‘pool’ the Plaintiff was entitled to.

Ultimately the Court noted that this pool of money needs to be shared proportionately to their claims leaving the Plaintiff with only 11% of the pool or some $23,000.   The Plaintiff appealed arguing this result was unfair as the passenger was able to collect her judgement from his insurer (as he was found partially to blame).  The BC Court of Appeal dismissed the matter and upheld the trial judgement.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons discussing the purpose behind the ICBC scheme of compensation for injury victims caused bu unidentified motorists:

[20]         Although I have some sympathy with the appellant’s predicament, in my view, his approach to the application of s. 24 ignores the legislative scheme of the applicable insurance coverage in this case and conflates a demand for payment with a claim under s. 24.

[21]         The appellant stresses that Ms. Schultz demanded payment only from Excellent.  The agreed facts for the stated case confirm this.  The judge referred to the appellant’s position in para. 15.  It was his opinion, with which I agree, that the fact Ms. Schultz demanded payment only from Excellent does not obviate the application of the plain language of s. 24.  She claimed against ICBC as a nominal defendant and obtained judgment against ICBC.  Section 24(8) states that ICBC “must” pay the amount authorized by the Act “towards satisfaction of the judgment”.  The fact Ms. Schultz demanded payment from Excellent does not alter the fact she engages s. 24 by claiming against ICBC as a nominal defendant.

[22]         There were three available coverages: no fault benefits; the s. 24 fund; Excellent’s third-party liability coverage.  Understandably, the appellant focuses on his situation, but it is mandatory to pay both no-fault benefits and the s. 24 fund.  In my view, considering the scheme of the legislation and the plain wording of s. 24, claims that attract the application of that section must be paid, and where there are multiple claims arising out of one accident, must be paid on a pro-rated basis.  This is consistent with I.C.B.C. v. Kushneriuk, 2004 BCCA 440 (the usual method of distribution is prorating).

SCC Gives Robust Interpretation To BC Consumer Protection Legislation

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Important reasons for judgement were released this week by the Supreme Court of Canada giving a robust interpretation to British Columbia’s Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the “BPCPA”).
In this week’s case (Seidel v. Telus Comminications Inc.) the Plaintiff was a customer with Telus.    Her contract with Telus purported to strip her right to sue if she had a dispute with the company and instead restricted her to “private, confidential and binding arbitration“.  In addition to this the contract purported to waive “any right (she) may have to commence or participate in any class action against Telus“.
The Plaintiff alleged that Telus engaged in deceptive billing practices.  She launched a lawsuit and intended to make it a class action.  She sued under s. 171 and 172 the BPCPA which in gave her the right to “bring an action in the Supreme Court” for damages and other relief in the face of “unconscionable acts or practices“.  Section 3 of the BPCPA states that “any waiver or release by a person of the person’s rights, benefits or protections under this Act is Void except to the extent that the waiver is expressly permitted by this Act.”
Telus relied on the waiver and argued that if it’s customers had complaints they had to participate in mediation or arbitration but could not sue nor participate in a Class Action.  In 5-4 split the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and held that the BPCPA was paramount and that her court action “must be allowed“.  The Court went further and allowed the Plaintiff to seek to certify the lawsuit as a class action holding that the class action waiver was part and parcel of the clause which violated section 3 of the BPCPA.  In striking down the waiver the Canadian high court provided the following useful reasons:
[5] …. My opinion is that to the extent Ms. Seidel’s claim in the Supreme Court invokes s. 172 remedies in respect of “rights, benefits or protections” conferred by the BPCPA, her court action must be allowed to proceed notwithstanding the mediation/arbitration clause.  This includes her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and, if granted, ancillary relief in the form of restoration to consumers of any money acquired by TELUS in contravention of the BPCPA.
[6]    The reason for this conclusion is simple.  Section 172 provides a mandate for consumer activists or others, whether or not they are personally “affected” in any way by any “consumer transaction”.  Section 172 contemplates such a person “bringing the action”.  The action is specified to be brought “in Supreme Court”.  The clear intention of the legislature is to supplement and multiply the efforts of the Director under theBPCPA to implement province-wide standards of fair consumer practices by enlisting the efforts of a whole host of self-appointed private enforcers.  In an era of tight government budgets and increasingly sophisticated supplier contracts, this is understandable legislative policy.  An action in the Supreme Court will generate a measure of notoriety and, where successful, public denunciation, neither of which would be achieved to nearly the same extent by “private, confidential and binding arbitration”….
[24]  ….from the perspective of the BPCPA, “private, confidential and binding arbitration” will almost certainly inhibit rather than promote wide publicity (and thus deterrence) of deceptive and/or unconscionable commercial conduct.  It is clearly open to a legislature to utilize private consumers as effective enforcement partners operating independently of the formal enforcement bureaucracy and to conclude that the most effective form is not a “private and confidential” alternative dispute resolution behind closed doors, but very public and well-publicized proceedings in a court of law…
[37]    As to statutory purpose, the BPCPA is all about consumer protection.  As such, its terms should be interpreted generously in favour of consumers: Smith v. Co-operators General Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 30, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 129, and ACS Public Sector Solutions Inc. v. Courthouse Technologies Ltd., 2005 BCCA 605, 48 B.C.L.R. (4th) 328.  The policy objectives of s. 172 would not be well served by low-profile, private and confidential arbitrations where consumers of a particular product may have little opportunity to connect with other consumers who may share their experience and complaints and seek vindication through a well-publicized court action…
[40]  In summary, s. 172 offer remedies different in scope and quality from those available from an arbitrator and constitutes a legislative override of the parties’ freedom to choose arbitration.  Unlike Quebec and Ontario, which have decided to ban arbitration of consumer claims altogether, or Alberta, which subjects consumer arbitration clauses to ministerial approval, the B.C. legislature sought to ensure only that certain claims proceed to the court system, leaving others to be resolved according to the agreement of the parties.  It is incumbent on the courts to give effect to that legislative choice, in my view.