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Circumstantial Evidence and ICBC Unidentified Motorist Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases. 54 Comments on Circumstantial Evidence and ICBC Unidentified Motorist Claims

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a Plaintiff’s ICBC Claim alleging that an unidentified motorist caused a significant collision.
In last week’s case (Paguio v. Fraser) the Plaintiff was injured when his scooter collided with another vehicle.  The Plaintiff suffered a “serious head injury” and his ability to give evidence surrounding the circumstances of the crash were limited.
The Plaintiff conceded that the vehicle he collided with did nothing wrong but alleged that an unidentified motorist cut the plaintiff off forcing him into the other vehicle.  Mr. Justice Williams rejected this argument concluding that on a balance of probabilities the evidence did not support such a finding.  Prior to doing so the Court listed the following applicable principles when faced with a claim based on circumstantial evidence:

[60] …I must be guided by certain basic concepts that govern the approach that must be taken to the proof of a plaintiff’s case where it rests on a base of circumstantial evidence. In Tweedie v. ICBC, 2002 BCSC 1937, Mr. Justice Wilson provided a helpful discussion of the approach that must be taken to the proof of a plaintiff’s case where it rests on a base of circumstantial evidence and provided reference to the applicable authorities.

[61] The principles as I understand are these:

(a)      Where a case is not proved by direct evidence, the court will carefully examine and consider the relevant circumstantial evidence.

(b)      Circumstantial evidence derives its effect through the process of the trier of fact drawing reasonable inferences. That is a cognitive process whereby, once certain facts are established or proven, then a logical conclusion is considered. It is the process of reasoning from a proven fact or facts to a reasonable, rational and logically legitimate conclusion.

(c)      The drawing of an inference is different than mere conjecture or a guess, no matter how shrewd or plausible that guess might be.

(d)      An inference, once properly drawn, must give rise to a reasonable conviction in the mind of the trier of fact that the element of which proof is necessary is at least more likely than not, or to some greater degree of certainty.

(e)      The plaintiff can succeed in proving his case on the strength of a reasonable inference which gives rise to a conclusion that the element has been proven on a balance of probabilities. If the inference does not support the conclusion to that standard, then the proof is not made out.

[62] In the final analysis, applying these guiding principles, and having examined the evidence carefully, I have concluded that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the plaintiff does not enable me to find that the case has been proven to the necessary standard. The plaintiff has not met the onus of proof he bears to establish his claim and it must therefore stand dismissed.

"Very Faint Small" Waiver Agreement Held Unenforceable

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgment were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that a waiver of a Plaintiff’s right to sue was not enforceable where the agreement was set out in a “very faint small red type“.
In this week’s case (Arndt v. The Ruskin Slo Pitch Association) the adult Plaintiff joined a recreational soft ball league.   Prior to playing the Plaintiff filled out and signed a roster.  At the bottom of the roster was a clause stating “I agree to waiver” the terms of which were set out on the back of the roster.
The Plaintiff was injured in the course of one of her games.  She sued for damages.  The Defendant applied to dismiss the claim relying on the waiver arguing that “the Plaintiff cannot escape from the consequences of the waiver merely by stating that she thought she was signing a roster and did not appreciate it was also a waiver“.
Madam Justice Humphries disagreed and found in these circumstances the waiver should not be enforceable.  In dismissing the Defendant’s motion the Court provided the following reasons:
[36] On the affidavit and discovery evidence before me, I accept that the plaintiff thought she was signing a team roster and that she did not know it was a waiver of liability.  However, the defendants are correct in stating that that is not the end of the enquiry. ..

[44] The document, looked at on its face, does not appear to be a waiver.  It appears to be a roster.  The attention of the person asked to sign it as a roster would inevitably be drawn to the lines in the box for the team signatures and information.  While there is red type above the box requiring the person to “READ AND UNDERSTAND BACK OF PAGE BEFORE SIGNING” there was, on the evidence on this application, no direction or information given by the coach who presented the document attached to a clipboard, to be handed around and signed by the team at the first practice.  The words “I agree to waiver” on the signature lines are so faint as to almost undetectable.  Unlike the waivers that have been held to be enforceable in the cases referred to above, the release is not a separate sheet and the waiver and signature are not on the same page.  The back of the form requires the coach to advise the people on the list that they are fully responsible for any damages “incurred by them”.  That was not done, nor was any step taken by the defendants to ensure it had been done.

[45] If the defendants wanted to ensure that they were released from liability it would be a simple matter to have individual release forms prepared and signed by each player.  The defendants had no means of determining if the plaintiff understood the document because they did not present it to her, leaving its nature to be explained by coaches or managers who did not do so.  The form of the document itself and the circumstances under which it was presented for signature are not such that a reasonable observer would understand its nature.  I am unable to conclude that the defendants took reasonable steps to have the nature of the document as a waiver rather than a team roster brought to the plaintiff’s attention.

[46] I conclude, on the information before me, that the waiver is not enforceable against the plaintiff.  It is not necessary to deal with the plaintiff’s additional arguments respecting consideration and the failure to date the document.

Paragraph 27 of this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s short and helpful summary of 8 other BC cases dealing with waivers.

Left Hand Turning Vehicle Found Faultess for Intersection Crash

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases. 54 Comments on Left Hand Turning Vehicle Found Faultess for Intersection Crash

Motorists are entitled to commit to an intersection and wait until its safe to proceed prior to making a left hand turn.  If the light turns red prior to a safe moment arriving it is appropriate for a motorist to wait that long prior to completing their turn.  In such circumstances a turning motorist can be found fully faultless if a collision occurs which was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released last month by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In last month’s case (Henry v. Bennett) the Defendant was driving NorthBound on King George intending to make a left hand turn on 68th Avenue.  At the same time the Plaintiff was travelling Southbound on King George intending to drive through the intersection.

The Court found that the Defendant entered the intersection on a green light.  She waited for a gap in traffic.  The light eventually turned amber and then red.   Southbound traffic visible to the Plaintiff stopped.  She began her turn when the Plaintiff came through the intersection and the collision occurred.  The Plaintiff sued for damages but the claim was dismissed with the Court finding him fully at fault for entering the intersection on a red light when it was unsafe to do so.  In finding the Defendant faultless Madam Justice Ballance provided the following reasons:






[72] Ms. Bennett was in a position remarkably similar to that of the plaintiff in Kokkinis. Although she did not see Mr. Henry prior to the collision, Kokkinis indicates that it does not necessarily follow that she was in any way negligent. Having said that, I wish to clarify that I do not read Kokkinis as standing for the proposition that left-turning drivers are entitled to proceed blindly on the assumption that oncoming drivers will obey the rules of the road, without regard to their concurrent obligation to act reasonably as the circumstances dictate. In my view, Ms. Bennett was entitled to proceed on the assumption that oncoming traffic, including Mr. Henry, would act in accordance with the law and come to a stop on the late amber, absent any reasonable indication to the contrary and provided she comported herself with reasonable care. Here, there was no contrary indication from Ms. Bennett’s standpoint. Indeed, she could see that the SUV across from her had complied with the rules and she was aware as well that the flow of straight through traffic had ceased some seconds earlier. She had no reasonable indication that oncoming traffic in the form of Mr. Henry would proceed through the intersection in clear violation of the rules of the road. Moreover, I find that in all the circumstances she conducted herself prudently and with reasonable care in negotiating her left turn. In contrast, Mr. Henry knew or reasonably ought to have known that in all likelihood Ms. Bennett would have carried through with her left turn at the final stage of the amber light, and most assuredly when the signal turned red. He created an extremely unsafe situation in failing to come to a stop.

[73] I endorse the case authorities that cast doubt over the legitimacy of portraying a driver in Mr. Henry’s shoes as having the presumptive right-of-way or otherwise qualifying as the dominant driver for the purposes of assessing liability using the Walker paradigm: see, for example, Snow v. Toth, [1994] B.C.J. No. 563 (S.C.); Shahidi v. Oppersma, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2017 (S.C.); Ziani v. Thede, 2011 BCSC 895. The dominant/servient driver analysis in Walker is predicated on the footing that the dominant driver has proceeded lawfully and, it seems to me, is of utility in that circumstance only. I, therefore, question whether that framework is of any assistance to a driver like Mr. Henry, who has acted in breach of his statutory duty. In any case, it cannot be said that Ms. Bennett attempted to execute her turn in complete disregard of her statutory duty to yield, which is an integral component of the Walker analysis. Indeed, it is my view that Ms. Bennett can be validly characterized as the dominant driver in the circumstances. There is no cogent evidence to remotely suggest that she could have avoided Mr. Henry by the exercise of reasonable care. To formulate it in the terms of s. 174, Ms. Bennett posed an immediate hazard to Mr. Henry, which he should have appreciated, and it is he who ought to have yielded the right-of-way.

[74] Based on the foregoing, I am satisfied that the accident was caused solely by the negligent driving of Mr. Henry. As he is entirely at fault for the accident, his claim is dismissed.







More on the Prohibition of Written Arguments in Chambers

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 8.


Earlier this year Master Bouck released reasons for judgement discussing the Rule 8-1(16) prohibition of written argument in Chambers applicaitons finding as follows:
Since July 1, 2010 and pursuant to Rule 8-1(16), a written argument may only be presented to the court if the application consumes more than two hours.  There is no discretion under the Rule to receive written argument in other circumstances.  This application was estimated to be heard in 35 minutes but took one hour.
Thus, no written argument can or should have been considered by the court.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, taking a less restrictive view.  In this week’s case (Simon Fraser University v. A & A Plumbing & Heating Ltd.) Master McDiarmid provided the following feedback about this limitation recognizing that appellate intervention or rules revision may be necessary:

[9] At the outset of the applications, plaintiff’s counsel handed me a 10-page document entitled “Plaintiff’s Submissions”.

[10] Defendant’s counsel objected.

[11] Her objection arises from Rule 8-1(16), which reads:

Unless an application is estimated to take more than 2 hours, no party to the application may file or submit to the court a written argument in relation to the application other than that included in the party’s notice of application or application response.

[12] The “Plaintiff’s Submissions” document was essentially the oral submissions I heard, written out. I found it helpful to have the document which included references in the affidavits to the facts set out in the notice of application.

[13] The concern, of course, is that the plaintiff had an unfair advantage. I was alive to that concern.

[14] I interpret “written argument” to refer to an expansion of Parts 2 and 3 of the notice of application by the addition of facts and/or by the raising of legal issues which takes the opposition by surprise.

[15] The “Plaintiff’s Submissions” document did not in my view raise additional facts; nor raise additional legal issues, and thus was not “written argument” within the meaning of Rule 8-1(16).

[16] This is a new provision in the Rules designed to ensure that sufficient details of the applicant’s argument are disclosed in the notice of application so that the response can deal with all points sought to be argued by the applicant. Presumably, the subrule is also aimed at reducing costs.

[17] The question is: does Rule 8-1(16) prevent the presentation of helpful written submissions which do not create surprise arguments and issues?

[18] I have decided it does not.

[19] Counsel’s objection raises a point which may need to be dealt with further, either by appeal from this decision or, preferably, clarification to the Rules. Provision of these sorts of documents is quite common. I will bring this matter to the attention of the Rules Committee. That does not, and is not intended to, forestall an appeal.

Tort Reform For The Better: Adding Liquidity to Dry Judgements

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, Tort Reform, Uncategorized. 61 Comments on Tort Reform For The Better: Adding Liquidity to Dry Judgements


Below is a brief article which was first published yesterday at Slaw.ca, one of Canada’s best read and most recognized legal blogs.  For your convenience I republish the article here in its entirety.  If you find this topic of interest I suggest you visit the original article and weigh in on the comments that follow.
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I’ve written many times that the phrase tort ‘reform‘ is often used in association with efforts to strip the rights of injury claimants.  Reform, however, is a neutral concept in and of itself.  Reform simply means change and the change could be for better or worse.  With this in mind  I’d like to share a tort reform idea for the better which recently crossed my mind.  In short the idea is to add a pool of liquidity to rectify the injustice of dry judgement.
The thought crossed my mind as I was reading reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry.  In this week’s case (Saether v. Irvine) the Plaintiff was injured when the Defendant battered him.  The consequences were “profound and catastrophic” causing a brain injury that “severely compromised (the plaintiff) in virtually all facets of his life“.  Damages of $1,075,000 were assessed to cover the Plaintiff’s anticipated future care costs alone.  Given the fact that this case involves an intentional tort it is a safe bet that this judgement will be uninsured and likely (at least partially) dry.
Reading this reminded me of a 2005 case (Chow v. Hiscock) where the Court expressly recognized the injustice of dry judgement facing a plaintiff left “in a permanent semi-vegatative state” following a “brutal, unprovoked assault“.  The Plaintiff’s future care costs were anticipated to exceed $4,000,000.  Madam Justice Koensberg made the following comments hoping the Plaintiff would some day be able to receive some of these funds from the uninsured defendants:
[40]           Can I say that this is still a case where punitive damages should be awarded?  If I were to award punitive damages, it would be purely symbolic.  I have heard nothing which indicates that the magnitude of this award or even some small part of it is likely to be payable by any of these three young men.  One can hope that they find a straight path to earn a significant amount of money or that one even wins the lottery, so that the earnings could be available to increase Mr. Johnson’s quality of life.
The law recognizes that those harmed through the fault of others are entitled to reasonable compensation.  When it comes to negligently caused harm defendants are often insured and plaintiffs can collect their judgements.
In cases where Defendants hold inadequate insurance examples can be found where legislatures have intervened to ensure victims can collect on their judgments.  For example, in BC, Section 20 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act provides a pool of $200,000 of available compensation from ICBC for damages caused by uninsured motorists.  A further example is the requirement for BC motorists to purchase a minimum of one million dollars of under-insured motorist protection coverage.
When plaintiffs suffer harm through intentional torts, however, there often is no insurance to protect the wrongdoer or compensate the victim.  This is an unfair reality in Canadian law.  Victims harmed through assault, battery, sexual molestation and other intentional acts are often faced with dry judgments.  When they seek legal advice they are often turned away being told that litigation may not be worth the effort unless the Defendant has deep pockets
There is no justification I can think of making it fair for a car crash victim to be able to collect their judgement from a pool of money created by the government when the victims of crime are left with dry judgments.
The financial well being of a defendant has no bearing on a victim’s right to damages.  If the government has seen fit to create a pool of funds for victims of motor vehicle collisions to collect from surely a similar system can be created to allow victims of intentional torts facing dry judgments.  This is a rough idea.  Thoughts and feedback are welcome from lawyers and non-lawyers alike.

Woodlands Survivor Class Action Application Deadline Extended to September 2012

Written by admin on . Posted in Sexual Assault Civil Cases, Uncategorized.

Earlier this year the BC Supreme Court refused to approve a class action settlement involving historic sexual abuse claims where the proposed settlement would impose a limitation period for class members where one would not otherwise exist.  Further reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the balancing act of sexual abuse class action settlements and imposed limitation periods.
This week’s case (Richard v. British Columbia) involved the Woodlands school class action settlement which was initially approved on July 7, 2010.  One of the terms of the settlement required class members to advance their claims by September 19, 2011.  The deadline came and went and due to the complexity of the claims only a handful met the filing deadline.  An application was brought to extend this deadline.  Such applications were contemplated in the original settlement agreement.
Mr. Justice Bauman agreed that an extension was appropriate although declined the Plaintiff’s request for an indefinite extension.  Instead the Court moved the claims deadline to September 19, 2012 “without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ right to apply for further extensions“.  In striking this balance the Court provided the following comments seeking to reconcile the need for certainty in resolution against the need to protect BC sex abuse victims who generally aren’t faced with a limitation period in advancing their civil claims for damages:
[17]         I agree with the defendant that the application requires the Court to strike a balance between the parties which recognizes that in the give and take of the settlement negotiation process, each side made compromises to achieve their respective goals. It would be unfair, after the fact, to effectively take from one party a critical part of what it gained in the process through negotiation and compromise.
[18]         But in all the circumstances of this settlement, I do not believe that a substantial extension of the claims deadline can be so construed (especially in light of the fact that no limitation period attaches to these claims or at least a very substantial number of them). Still, an indefinite extension is not appropriate. I would, at this time, extend the claims deadline by one year to 19 September 2012, without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ right to apply for further extensions. It is not appropriate to condition this extension, as the defendant proposes, by requiring the Class Members to file a so-called “without prejudice interim claim” within three months. In my view, such a condition would effectively make the claims deadline extension illusory in the circumstances of the difficulties facing the plaintiffs and their counsel in advancing the claims process.

Pre-Trial "Borrowing" Not Relevant in Costs Assessment

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized. 55 Comments on Pre-Trial "Borrowing" Not Relevant in Costs Assessment

Section 3 of BC’s Negligence Act reduces a Plaintiff’s entitlement to costs recovery to the same proportion as a Plaintiff’s degree of fault following a collision.   Reasons for judgement were released last month by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the factors a Court can consider in deviating from this typical result and further finding that pre-trial borrowing is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis.
In last month’s case (Gowler v. Ngo) the Plaintiff was injured in two motor vehicle collisions.  Following a 13 day trial a Jury found the Plaintiff 50% at fault for the first of the collisions.  Damages of $250,000 were assessed and these were cut in half to take the Plaintiff’s degree of fault into consideration.  The Plaintiff’s costs for proceeding to trial were over $100,000.   Neither party beat their pre-trial settlement offer leaving the Court to apply section 3 of the Negligence Act.
Madam Justice Gray found it would be unfair to strip the Plaintiff of 50% of his costs given their magnitude and instead reduced the Plaintiff’s entitlement by 35%.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[14] The factors to take into account in considering the court’s discretion are discussed in my decision in Moses v. Kim, 2007 BCSC 1820. I will talk about the Court of Appeal decision in a moment, but I will ask that the reasons for judgment, if they are reproduced, will now include paragraph 13 of the Moses v. Kim decision.

[13]   The authorities demonstrate many factors the court has considered in exercising this discretion. Among them are the following:

(a)  the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries;

(b)  the difficulties facing the plaintiff in establishing liability;

(c)  the fact that in settlement negotiations the amount offered was substantially below the ultimate amount;

(d)  whether the plaintiff was forced to go to trial to obtain recovery;

(e)  the costs of getting to trial;

(f)  the difficulty and length of the trial;

(g)  whether the costs recovery available to the plaintiff, if costs are apportioned according to liability, will bear any reasonable relationship to the party’s costs in obtaining the results achieved;

(h)  the positions taken by the parties at trial, in particular whether the positions taken were appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances;

(i)  whether the defendants made any settlement offers;

(j)  the ultimate result of the trial; and

(k)  whether the plaintiff achieved substantial success that would be effectively defeated if costs were awarded pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Negligence Act…

[35] In my view, in this case the most important factors are the costs of proving damages for an injury of this type, the fact that there is a very significant claim for disbursements, and the fact that the amount of the award is $125,000 and the costs claimed are about $104,000.

[36] Mr. Mussio asked me to take into account some borrowing that Mr. Gowler did prior to the trial. In my view, that is not a factor I can take into account, nor can I take into account the legal fees, based on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Moses v. Kim case.

[37] Looking at all the applicable factors, in my view it would be unjust to award the plaintiff only 50 percent of his costs. That is because his award would be so diluted by the need to pay his disbursements that he would not have a sufficient recovery. However, it is not a case where Mr. Gowler’s damages were so significant as in the Moses case.

[38] Looking at the cases and all the applicable factors, in my view, the appropriate award is that the plaintiff should recover 65 percent of his costs.

Documented "Prior Inconsistent Statements" Need To Be Listed Under the New Rules of Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with document listing obligations under the new Rules of Court.
In last week’s case (Tran v. Kim Le Holdings Ltd.) the Plaintiff sued for damages as a result of personal injuries.  In the course of trial the Defendant called a witness who gave evidence as to the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s injury which were not favourable to the Plaintiff’s case.  The same witness had provided the Plaintiff’s lawyer a statement years before the trial with a different version of events.  The Plaintiff failed to disclose the existence of this document in her list of documents.  The Plaintiff argued that the new Rules of Court don’t require such statements to be listed as they only go to credibility which is a collateral matter.
Mr. Justice Harris disagreed finding that statements containing prior witness inconsistencies can go beyond the issue of credibility and therefore need to be listed.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[13] Counsel submits, first, that a prior inconsistent statement is not a document that could be used to prove or disprove a material fact. It is a document relevant only to credibility. Therefore, it is not required to be listed. Secondly, counsel submits that until the contradictory evidence was given by the witness, counsel had no intention of using the document at trial. The use of the document has only become necessary because of the surprise in the evidence that was given.

[14] I turn to deal with this point. I must say that I am sceptical that the plaintiff’s argument is correct. It is common ground that the document here is covered by litigation privilege, which necessarily ties it into relevant issues in the litigation. Rule 7?1(6) governs the listing of privileged documents. It is not obvious to me from the wording of the rule that the scope of the obligation set out in Rule 7?1(6) is qualified or limited by Rule 7?1(1).

[15] More importantly, however, prior inconsistent statements can be used, in my view, to prove or disprove material facts. Depending on how a witness responds to the statement when put to the witness, the effect of the use of the statement may well go beyond merely affecting credibility. The witness may adopt the content of the statement insofar as it relates to material facts; in that sense, at least, statements can facilitate the proof of material facts. Statements can facilitate the proof of material facts even if the witness does not adopt them, because findings on material facts may be affected by findings on credibility. But if a witness does adopt a prior inconsistent statement and accept the truth of it, that statement may be used as proof of the truth of its contents, and thereby be used to prove or disprove material facts.

[16] A fine parsing of the obligation to list documents is, in my view, contrary to the policy of disclosure which is exemplified by the Stone decision in the Court of Appeal.

Mr. Justice Harris agreed that while the document should have been listed, it could be used in cross examination as the failure to list was done in good faith and further there was no real prejudice to the Defendant.  In doing so the  Court applied the following factors in exercising its discretion:

[19] … What is clear, however, from these cases is that my discretion has to be exercised on the basis of the following principles:

(a)      whether there is prejudice to the party being cross-examined ?? in this case, of course, it is a witness who is being cross-examined, but the relevant prejudice is to the defendants;

(b)      whether a reasonable explanation of the party’s failure to disclose has been provided;

(c)      whether excluding the document would prevent the determination of the issue on its merits; and

(d)      whether, in the circumstances of the case, the ends of justice require the documents to be admitted.

[24] It is evident that there is a policy against insulating a witness from cross-examination on prior inconsistent statements, because to do so would undermine the search for truth. It is also evident that requiring listing can be seen in some respects as being inconsistent with the purpose of litigation privilege. Both of these points were accepted in the Cahoon decision, in the context of a discussion of the limitation, or explanation, of the scope of the Stone decision…

[33] I observe further, with respect to prejudice, that the defendants could readily have determined whether or not the witness had given a statement. The fact of the existence of the statement was within the knowledge of the defendants. It is not a situation quite like Stone where there would simply be an assumption by counsel that a pain journal had likely been kept and that the fact of the existence of the document could not be verified without the document having been listed. In my view, this mitigates the prejudice, to some degree, that is associated with the use of the document.

[34] Weighing and balancing these conflicting principles, I have reached the conclusion that, in the interests of justice, counsel ought to be permitted to use the document for the purpose of cross-examination.

Interest on Disbursements Allowed in Significant Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, Uncategorized.

Update – May 17, 2013 – the below decision was upheld on appeal this week. You can click here to read about this development
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A developing area in BC relating to personal injury law is the ability of a Plaintiff to recover interest charged on disbursements.  Prosecuting personal injury claims, particularly claims with complex injuries, can be an expensive business.  Disbursements can quickly add up to tens of thousands of dollars.  These expenses are often financed through a line of credit which can accrue significant interest over time.
Although the BC Court of Appeal has yet to weigh in on this subject, it appears the law is shifting to allow interest on disbursements to be recovered in personal injury litigation in this Province.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, allowing such a result.
In today’s case (Chandi v. Atwell) the infant Plaintiff was severely injured in a 2004 collision.  The case settled for $900,000 plus costs and disbursements.  Following settlement ICBC took issue with many of the Plaintiff’s disbursements.  The parties had these assessed by the BC Supreme Court.  While some reductions were made the Court ultimately upheld many of the Plaintiff’s disbursements including a medico-legal assessment which alone cost almost $17,000.
The Plaintiff incurred over $25,000 in disbursement interest.  In allowing this expense the Court provided a useful summary of the law at paragraph 71 of the reasons for judgement with District Registrar Cameron coming to the following conclusion:
[73]         While the current state of the law mandates that I make some allowance for the interest expense in my view I am not bound to award full indemnity for the amount of interest charged to the Plaintiff. I am not bound by Basi v. Atwal and with the greatest of respect I decline to follow it.
[74]         In the law of costs it is still only in the relatively rare case that full indemnity is provided to the successful party. Only disbursements that are necessary and reasonable in amount are recoverable.
[75]         In my view the Registrar should endeavour, wherever possible, in assessing the amount to allow for a specific type of disbursement to strive for consistency unless the application of that principle would work a real hardship or unfairness in a particular case. To attain that consistency I will make an allowance for disbursement interest based upon Registrar’s rates with the calculation of the total amount to be akin to the calculation of interest payable on special damages pursuant to the relevant provisions of Court Order Interest Act.
For more on this topic you can click here to accessed my archived ‘interest on disbursement’ posts.  This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s comments at paragraphs 49-53 on ‘transcription fees‘ finding that this is a disbursement of convenience, not necessity, and therefore not allowable.

Plaintiff Awarded $9,500 Costs Despite $4,000 Damage Assessement

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 14, BCSC Civil Rule 15.


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, with the “curious result” of costs recovery at over double the amount of assessed damages.
In last week’s case (Kargbo v. Chand) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision.  ICBC disputed both fault and injury.  At trial the Plaintiff’s claim was accepted and modest damages of $4,000 were awarded.  The Plaintiff sought her costs.  ICBC opposed arguing the Plaintiff did not have sufficient reason to sue in Supreme Court.
Earlier this year the BC Court of Appeal made it clear that more than the value of an ICBC Claim can be considered in deciding whether there is sufficient reason to sue in the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Williams went on to canvass factors other than value and concluded that the Plaintiff was entitled to $9,500 in costs under Rule 15-1(15).  The Court provided the following reasons:

[9] The problem ultimately reduces to this: If the Court determines that the plaintiff had sufficient reason for commencing or proceeding in the Supreme Court, she should be entitled to recover costs in accordance with Rule 15-1(15). If the Court finds that there was not sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in this Court, then she is not entitled to recover her costs.

[10] In Reimann v. Aziz, 2007 BCCA 448, the Court of Appeal clarified that the issue has to be analyzed as at the point in time that the plaintiff initiated the action; there is no ongoing obligation to assess the quantum of claim.

[11] I have been provided with a number of decisions where judges of this Court have assessed the circumstances of cases to decide whether or not an order for costs is warranted. Obviously, the plaintiff bears the onus of establishing that there was sufficient reason for filing in the Supreme Court. It is not simply a matter of assessing the anticipated value of the claim. A number of factors have been identified in the cases as being relevant to the issue. These include the following (the list is not intended to be exhaustive):

1.         the legal or factual complexity of the case;

2.         the need for discovery of documents and examinations for discovery;

3.         the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia;

4.         a bona fide preference for a jury trial;

5.         access to the summary trial procedure available in Supreme Court; and

6.         the need for the plaintiff to have legal counsel, in light of the defendant’s denial of liability, dispute as to causation, injury or loss and allegations of contributory negligence, pre-existing conditions, previous causes and a failure to mitigate.

[12] In the present case, liability was denied and in the circumstances could reasonably have been expected to represent a challenge to prove. As well, the issue of damages had the real potential of being a problem. The plaintiff had a history of prior accidents and had been hospitalized shortly after the accident in question for matters not related to the accident. She was also injured in another more serious accident some several months after the accident at bar. It was the sort of case that a self-represented plaintiff would find daunting no doubt.

[13] Taking those considerations into account, it is my view that this plaintiff had sufficient reason for bringing her proceeding in the Supreme Court.

[14] As a parenthetical observation, it is true that a party such as this plaintiff could elect to pursue the claim in the Provincial Court with legal counsel, although the prospect of incurring the expense to do so without any right to recover court costs is a legitimate factor to consider. As well, where the plaintiff elects to bring suit in the Supreme Court, she runs the real risk of an adverse costs outcome if the action is unsuccessful.

[15] In the circumstances, it is my view that the plaintiff should be entitled to costs in accordance with the Rules of Court. I recognize that might appear to produce a curious result in that the award of costs is substantially greater than the damages that she recovered. However, if the matter is considered fairly and objectively and the relevant rule applied, that result follows.

[16] There is no question that the policy which underpins Rule 14-1(1) is to encourage parties with claims of modest value to bring their action in the Provincial Court, and to provide for a penalty against one who does not. That is consistent with the concept of proportionality which is a foundational consideration of the Court’s Rules.

[17] The clear default position will be that, with respect to claims where the award is less than $25,000, the plaintiff will not be entitled to an award of costs. Nevertheless, there will be situations where there is sufficient reason to bring the action in the Supreme Court. It will be for the Court to examine the circumstances of each particular case to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason.

For more cases addressing sufficient reasons to sue in Supreme Court you can click here to access my archived posts on this topic.