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Liability Discussed Following Parking Lot Collision

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing fault for a parking lot collision involving two vehicles.
In yesterday’s case (Sheikh v. Struys) the Plaintiff and Defendant were both attempting to leave a busy parking lot following a Canucks game.   A truck has stopped leaving a gap in the travelled laneway.  The Defendant drove into the gap and at almost the same time the Plaintiff “reversed back into (the Defendant’s) Jeep“.  The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant was wholly or at least partially at fault alleging the gap was left for him to fill.  Madam Justice Fitzpatrick disagreed and provided the following reasons in dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim:

[47] I find as a fact that Dr. Sheikh’s SUV reversed back into Mr. Struys’ Jeep while Mr. Struys was partially into the laneway and had stopped there. I also find as a fact that Dr. Sheikh could not see Mr. Struys’ Jeep at the time of the collision. Further, I find that Dr. Sheikh could not see what was happening behind his vehicle as he was reversing into the laneway and, therefore, he has no knowledge as to how the collision occurred.

[48] Dr. Sheikh contended that Mr. Struys should have paid more careful attention as to what was going on in front of him. Mr. Struys was said to have mistakenly assumed, without any eye contact with the driver of the Dodge truck, that the Dodge truck had stopped for him, which resulted in him colliding with Dr. Sheikh’s SUV.

[49] In my view, it does not matter which party was the one being allowed to enter the laneway by the driver of the Dodge truck. The driver of the Dodge truck may in fact have been stopping for both of their vehicles in that respect. There is no evidence one way or the other as to whether the Dodge truck had stopped for Dr. Sheikh, Mr. Struys or both of them. The point is that the Dodge truck had stopped and both parties assumed, based on their contact with the driver of the Dodge truck, that he or she was stopped for them. As such, it has not been shown that Mr. Struys “mistakenly” assumed that the Dodge truck had stopped for him…

[53] The Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c .318 addresses the duty of care owed by a driver who is reversing his vehicle:

Caution in backing vehicle

193 The driver of a vehicle must not cause the vehicle to move backwards into an intersection or over a crosswalk, and must not in any event or at any place cause a vehicle to move backwards unless the movement can be made in safety.

…

[62] I find that Dr. Sheikh has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, any negligence on the part of Mr. Struys. Nor did Dr. Sheikh discharge the burden under the Motor Vehicle Act in proving that he was able to move back “in safety” while reversing his vehicle.

[63] Accordingly, I find Dr. Sheikh entirely responsible for the collision. As such, there will be no apportionment of liability between the parties pursuant to the Negligence Act.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Frozen Shoulder and Chronic Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Wepryk v. Juraschka) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  She was a passenger and the driver of her vehicle lost control resulting in a roll over collision.  Liability was admitted.  The 43 year old Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries and while she was able to continue working as a hairdresser these injuries limited her abilities to do so.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Ehrcke provided the following reasons:

[9] All of the doctors are agreed that Ms. Wepryk suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, left shoulder, and upper back as a result of the accident, and that she continues to experience pain, discomfort and occasional headaches from these injuries at the time of trial, three and one-half years after the accident.

[10] In addition, Dr. Chan was of the opinion that Ms. Wepryk suffered adhesive capsulitis or frozen shoulder as a result of the accident. Dr. Loomer did not agree with that conclusion. Dr. Chu had no opinion on the causation of the adhesive capsulitis. Dr. Smith agreed with the opinion of Dr. Chan. On a balance of probabilities, I accept the opinion of Dr. Chan, although not a great deal turns on this, since, as Dr. Chu expressed it, the left adhesive capsulitis is “the least of her problems”.

[11] There was also a disagreement between Dr. Smith and Dr. Tessler regarding the causation of left C-8 sensory neuropathy. Again, I find that nothing of significance turns on this, as these symptoms were minor and transient.

[12] The important fact is that the defendants accept that Ms. Wepryk suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, her left shoulder, and between her shoulder blades, and that she continues to experience pain to this day. As Dr. Smith put it in his report dated February 26, 2012:

More than three years have passed since Ms. Wepryk’s motor vehicle accident of December 5, 2008. In terms of prognosis, Ms. Wepryk unfortunately has fallen into the 10% of patients still with symptoms more than two years after their motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Ms. Wepryk’s prognosis to return to pre motor vehicle accident levels of functioning is poor, and Ms. Wepryk must now learn to cope with what I believe is a permanent functional impairment.

[13] I accept that conclusion, notwithstanding that Dr. Loomer expressed a “hope” of improvement. In cross-examination, even he agreed that there is no definite evidence that she will get better.

[14] It is likely, therefore, that Ms. Wepryk will continue to suffer from the pain to her neck, left shoulder and upper back, along with occasional headaches. Her symptoms are aggravated when she has to perform activities that require her to raise her arms, or to use her left shoulder. This has an impact on her work as a hairdresser, which requires such activities. It also has an impact on her recreational activities and activities of daily life….

[35] While reference to previous cases provides useful guidance, every case must be assessed on its own particular facts. Here, the plaintiff, who was 43-years-old at the time of the accident and who enjoyed an active lifestyle, suffered soft-tissue injuries to her neck, left shoulder, and upper back. Now, more than three and one-half years after the accident, her pain and discomfort have not fully resolved, and she is likely to have some residual effects for the indefinite future. She continues to have headaches three or four times a month, and she cannot engage in vigorous physical activities, particularly those that require her to raise her left arm above her shoulder-level, without experiencing pain. She therefore finds it difficult to be as physically active as she was before the accident. She says that she has gained some weight as a result, although the medical evidence suggests that any weight gain has been modest.

[36] In the circumstances of this case, on the facts as I have found them, and considering the factors set out in Stapley v. Hejslet, I find the proper assessment of non-pecuniary damages to be $50,000.

Costs Update: More on Rule 15 and Pre Trial Settlement Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 15. 57 Comments on Costs Update: More on Rule 15 and Pre Trial Settlement Costs

Last year reasons for judgement were released discussing the lump sum costs available to parties under Rule 15.  Reasons for judgement were recently published by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that the quantum pre trial Rule 15 settlement costs should remain a matter of discretion.
In the recent case (Benz v. Coxe) the parties settled a personal injury claim for an undisclosed quantum plus costs.  The parties could not agree to the amount of costs and the issue was put before the Court.  Ultimately Registrar Sainty held $6,5000 was an appropriate quantum of costs on the facts of the case (settled in the mature phase of litigation) but held that no hard and fast rule should exist making this amount appropriate across the board.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[15] I appreciate the submissions of counsel. I have found those of Mr. Jeffrey to be more persuasive than those of Mr. Cope. I am going to continue to support my decision in Cathcart No.1 for a variety of reasons.

[16] Firstly, I think it is important to note, as Harvey J. confirmed in Gill v. Widjaja, supra, that Rule 15-1(15) gives the Registrar wide discretion in determining the appropriate tariff amount. If I were to accede to Mr. Cope’s submission — that in every case you get the cap unless there are special circumstances — I believe that, would be taking away from the discretion given to the Registrar to make these types of decisions.

[17] Secondly, I think Mr. Cope’s approach, rather than taking away from confusion, makes matters more confusing. I do not think one can draw a line in the sand and decide, for example, that where there has been discovery and there are no other special circumstances, you get the cap. However, If there has been no discovery and there are no other special circumstances (yet to be decided and which must be argued), you will probably get some proportion of the cap. One might still end up in the same position. Because whether you call it special circumstances, parsing out, or rough and ready, the parties will still end up assessing costs before a registrar who would then decide where the case was, in terms of preparedness, and who would also have to decide if there are (or are not) special circumstances such that the cap or something less might be awarded.

[18] I agree with Mr. Jeffrey, who submitted that the fairest approach in these types of circumstances is to consider all of the circumstances of the action. I also agree that the fact Harvey J. says one should not get bogged down in the details does not take away from the rough and ready approach, which is actually more fair, I think, to all the parties, because to make discoveries, say, the arbitrary line in the sand could result in some injustices. For example, there may be those odd circumstances where no discoveries have been conducted and were set for a week or two before trial for some reason or other. In those circumstances, using Mr. Cope’s “line in the sand”, a plaintiff might have to apply to a registrar to find special circumstance so that they might get the full cap amount (or something approximating it) if the case settled before the discoveries had been conducted but still, essentially, on the eve of trial.

[19] On the basis of all of the above, I stand by my decision in Cathcart No.1.

ICBC Ordered to Cover Damages for Corvette Crash at Western Speedway

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 95 Comments on ICBC Ordered to Cover Damages for Corvette Crash at Western Speedway

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, discussing the limits of the ICBC coverage exclusion for crashes which occur during “performance driver training”
In today’s case (Nye v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was the owner of a Corvette.  He joined the Victoria Corvette Club which arranged for a private autocross event at the Western Speedway.  While participating in this event the Plaintiff crashed his vehicle with the Court summarizing the collision as follows:
[13] The plaintiff experienced no problems with the course until he came to a series of turns around some pylons placed several metres apart.  He entered that part of the course without difficulty and he safely manoeuvred around all of the pylons except for the last one.  As he attempted to complete his turn around the last pylon he felt he was too close to it and he said that when he attempted to put his foot on the brake pedal to slow down his foot slipped off the brake pedal and onto the accelerator causing his vehicle to lurch forward.  As a result he momentarily lost control and the vehicle collided with a concrete retaining wall.  The plaintiff was shaken up, but not injured; however, his car was severely damaged.
The Plaintiff had collision coverage with ICBC but they refused to cover the loss arguing the crash occurred during a ‘speed test‘ during ‘performance driver training‘.  Mr. Justice Bracken rejected ICBC’s arguments and ordered the damages to be covered finding that while the collision did occur during ‘advanced driving training‘ there was no element of a speed test at the time.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[19] Section 2(1) of the Regulation states:

Unless otherwise provided in a special coverage certificate, the Act and this regulation do not apply in respect of

…

(f)         a vehicle being used in a contest, show or race, or in advanced or performance driver training, if

(i)         the activity is held or conducted on a track or other location temporarily or permanently closed to all other vehicle traffic, and

(ii)        there exists an element of race or speed test.

…

(2)        In subsection (1)(f), “element of race or speed test” means driving at high speed, and includes passing manoeuvres, driving in close proximity to another vehicle or assessing vehicle limitations in speed, acceleration, turning or braking…

[37] On the evidence, I am satisfied that the activity in which the vehicle was used was an event that can fairly be described as advanced driver training.  An instructor was available and did introduce the plaintiff to the course in his first slow drive around the course.  A club session was held in advance to provide guidance to participants on how to drive the course.  The plaintiff did not actually receive any direct instruction on how to handle his vehicle on the course; however, there was some general guidance on what he should expect…

[39] I am also satisfied on the evidence that the event was held on a closed track.  While there was evidence of one non-participating vehicle intruding onto the track during the plaintiff’s first run, it was clear that the vehicle should not have been there and that the driver had proceeded past a flag person or club member stationed at the entry point for the purpose of keeping non-participants off the course…

[41] The remaining issue is whether the defendant has proven that there was an element of race or speed test in the event.  To repeat, the defendant must establish that

… there exists an element of race or speed test, which means driving at a high speed, and includes passing manoeuvres, driving in close proximity to another vehicle or assessing vehicle limitations in speed, acceleration, turning or braking…

[49] Here, the evidence does not support the conclusion that the plaintiff was assessing his vehicle’s limitations in speed, acceleration, turning or braking.  I find he was driving his vehicle well within its limitations of speed and turning, and I accept his evidence that the accident resulted when his foot slipped from the brake to the accelerator, causing the vehicle to accelerate directly into the retaining wall.

[50] In the result, I find the defendant has failed to establish that the plaintiff was operating his vehicle in breach of the Regulation or his insurance policy.  I find that he is entitled to coverage under his own damage provisions of the policy of insurance issued by the defendant.

Turning Motorist Found Fully At Fault For Striking Pedestrian in Marked Crosswalk

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, assessing fault for a collision involving a vehicle and pedestrian.
In yesterday’s case (Culos v. Chretien) the Plaintiff was struck by a right hand turning vehicle as he was crossing a street in Kamloops BC.    The Plaintiff entered “a zebra crosswalk that was painted on the surface of Lorne Avenue at its intersection with 3rd Avenue.“.  At the same time the Defendant  was attempting a right hand turn onto Lorne Avenue.  Neither parties saw each other and a collision occurred.

The Defendant admitted fault but argued the Plaintiff was partly to blame for the collision.  In rejecting this argument Mr. Justice Rogers provided the following reasons:

[45] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that he was at or very near the edge of the end of the sidewalk on 3rd Avenue when the unknown lady finished crossing Lorne Street and walked past him. I also accept the defendant’s evidence that she was stopped at the stop line on 3rd as she watched the same unknown lady finish crossing the street. Given those findings, it follows that at the same moment that the plaintiff was standing at the edge of the sidewalk on 3rd, the defendant was stopped at the stop line on 3rd. At that moment, the defendant’s car was behind the plaintiff and somewhat to his left.

[46] I find that when the unknown lady finished crossing Lorne, both parties began to move. The plaintiff entered the crosswalk. At the same time, the defendant moved into the intersection with her car angled to its right. The plaintiff carried on while the defendant stopped briefly at the thin white line painted across the extreme end of 3rd where it joins Lorne. Neither party saw the other. The defendant looked to her rear left to check for traffic on Lorne. At that moment, the plaintiff was established in the crosswalk and was directly in front of the defendant’s car. The defendant then began to move her car forward without first looking in the direction that she was traveling. In the result, the front of her car struck the plaintiff.

[47] The defendant’s submission that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent is superficially attractive – after all, her car was there to be seen. The presence of her car in the intersection at the same time that the plaintiff was in the crosswalk could be thought to constitute an immediate hazard for the plaintiff.

[48] The flaw in the defendant’s argument is this: the plaintiff was established in the crosswalk before the defendant got underway from her second stop to check for traffic. Had the plaintiff seen the defendant, he would have seen her move forward from the stop line, stop at the thin white line, and look back over her left shoulder to check for traffic on Lorne. Given his position in the crosswalk, the plaintiff was entitled to assume that a motorist would give way to him. He could only be found to be careless for his safety if he had stubbornly insisted on maintaining his right?of?way in the face of knowledge that an oncoming motorist was behaving in a way that indicated the motorist would not yield to him. Had the plaintiff been looking at the defendant, he would not have seen anything about her behavior that would have led him to believe that she would not yield to him. That is because he would have seen her move from the stop line on 3rd to the thin white line and stop again while looking over her left shoulder. No one in the plaintiff’s position would have had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant, whose driving up to that moment had been careful and considerate, would nevertheless go forward without first looking at where she was going.

[49] In short: the defendant’s behavior ahead of the collision was not such as to put a reasonable pedestrian in the plaintiff’s position on notice that the defendant was not going to yield to the pedestrian. That hypothetical pedestrian would have reasonably assumed that if the defendant was careful to check for traffic before entering Lorne, she would likewise be careful to look in front of her before she put her car in motion and moved out onto Lorne. Nothing in the evidence suggested that the plaintiff ought to have appreciated that the defendant would do as she did.

[50] Consequently, I find that the collision was entirely the fault of the defendant.

Worker Ordered To Pay $561,000 in Damages for Assaulting Former Supervisor

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases.

In a compelling illustration of the potential civil consequences following criminal behaviour, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a brain injury following an assault at over $561,000.
In the recent case (Weber v. DeBrouwer) the Plaintiff worked as a supervisor of the Defendant at the Village of Harrison Hot Springs.   The Plaintiff “suspended the defendant several times” and over the course of their overlapping employment “relations between the two worsened“.   In the summer of 2007 the defendant approached the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff was out for a walk and “brutally assaulted” him.
The assault led to various physical injuries including a mild traumatic brain injury and further led to ongoing psychological difficulties.  Global damages of over $561,000 were assessed with non-pecuniary damages assessed at $150,000.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Greyell provided the following reasons:
[72] In this case, Mr. Weber was 49 years old at the time he was assaulted. The assault caused him significant injury and pain and suffering. He suffered facial injuries, including several fractures, dental injuries, bruising, rib and chest injuries, knee and hand injuries, soft tissue injuries to his back and neck, and a mild traumatic brain injury with ongoing cognitive and speech difficulties which took some time to resolve. Mr. Weber remains affected by depression, anxiety, and post traumatic stress disorder. He avoids confrontational situations…

[75] In the present case, Mr. Weber is now 54 years old. A number of his injuries, including his headaches, bruising and soft tissue injuries cleared up after several months. For a considerable time after the assault he was bothered with nightmares and had difficulty sleeping. He is left with a number of problems. He has difficulty with the alignment of his jaw; he still is clumsy and, while greatly improved, he has difficulty finding and pronouncing some words. Mr. Weber remains anxious and fearful of the defendant and avoids going places where the defendant might be. He avoids situations with guests at the motel where any type of conflict could arise, deferring to his wife to handle such matters. Dr. Smith says he will remain permanently impaired by symptoms of anxiety.

[76] Mr. Weber’s injuries and the residual effects of those injuries are significant, however, in my view, each of the cases cited by counsel for Mr. Weber involve circumstances where the injuries and residual effects to the plaintiffs were more significant. After a consideration of the factors outlined above in Stapley, I conclude $150,000 is an appropriate and fair amount to award for non-pecuniary damages.

Medical Record Relevance To Be Determined on Entry by Entry Basis

Written by admin on . Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were published last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that in the context of personal injury claims, the relevance of clinical records should be determined on an entry by entry basis.
In last week’s case (Hyvarinen v. Burdett) the Plaintiff claimed permanent physical disability as a result of a 2008 collision.  In the course of the litigation the Defendant requested various records the Plaintiff refused to produce.  A court application was brought resulting in mixed success with some of the withheld documents being ordered to be produced.  In adjudicating the matter Master MacNaughton provided the following sensible reasons addressing the vetting of irrelevent medical records:

[18] While I accept that when a document is produced by a party, it should generally be produced in its entirety, the exception is where a party is able to establish a good reason for a document not to be produced. In North American Trust Co. v. Mercer International Inc. (2000) 71 B.C.L.R. (3d) 73 (BCSC), Justice Lowry, then of this court, reiterated the general principle but said:

…But where what is clearly not relevant is by its nature such that there is good reason why it should not be disclosed, a litigant may be excused from having to make a disclosure that will in no way serve to resolve the issues. In controlling its process, the court will not permit one party to take unfair advantage or to create undue embarrassment by requiring another to disclose part of a document that could cause considerable harm but serve no legitimate purposes in resolving the issues. (para. 13)

[19] In this case, there are two reasons why the general rule about redacted documents should not apply. The first is because the documents sought in unredacted form are not, although generally listed as such, single documents. Rather, they are a series of records compiled over time from a number of interactions with the plaintiff. These records should not be approached globally as if they were a single document. Each entry requires a separate analysis as to whether it may prove or disprove a material fact or relate to a matter in a question in this action.

[20] Second, and importantly in this case, the court must be careful not to unnecessarily infringe on the plaintiff’s privacy interests. Recently, in Kaladjian v. Jose, 2012 BCSC 357, Justice Davies reiterated the importance of a plaintiff’s privacy interests in a personal injury action. He said:

Every individual’s health and the medical treatment of it is a personal and private matter that should not be lightly interfered with. In today’s world of medical specialization, disclosure of even the name of a medical professional consulted by an individual for reasons wholly unrelated to a defence plea of a prior existing condition is an unwarranted and unnecessary invasion of privacy. (para. 75)

$90,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Labral Tear Requiring Surgery

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Hip Injury Cases. 118 Comments on $90,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Labral Tear Requiring Surgery

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a hip injury sustained in a vehicle collision.
In yesterday’s case (Combs v. Moorman) the Plaintiff was involved in an “extensive” rear end collision in 2007.   The Defendant was found wholly at fault for the crash.  The Plaintiff, a 38 year old massage therapist, suffered a labral tear (a tear of the cartilage cushioning the hip socket).

This injury caused ongoing problems and needed future surgical intervention.  It caused limits in the Plaintiff’s domestic and vocational abilities.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 Madam Justice Humphries provided the following reasons:

[19] Pain in her left hip is her primary concern presently.  She says it is very painful and affects every treatment she gives.  The pain makes her put her weight on her right leg, and consequently her right leg has begun to hurt as well.  After an MRI, it was determined that she has a labral tear, that is a tear in the material cushioning her hip socket.  A bone scan showed some tenderness on the left trochanter, that is the top of the femur.

[20] Dr. Smit, Ms. Combs’ treating orthopaedic surgeon, recommended freezing injections into the hip and the trochanter respectively as a diagnostic device to determine where the pain was coming from.  That is, if one area were frozen and the pain continued, it would show that the source was the other area.  Dr. Smit said the injections give temporary relief, but symptoms would return in 6 – 8 weeks.  He said in “a distinct minority” of cases the pain does not return.  Ms. Combs declined this procedure…

[27] Ms. Combs was a straightforward witness.  She is obviously used to coping with life in a businesslike manner and does what she has to do.  She works hard, runs a successful clinic, and looks after two children and the home with the help of her mother, her mother-in-law, and her husband.

[28] Ms. Combs suffered fairly extensive injuries in this accident, some of which are permanent.  The hematoma in her knee and the damage to her finger, though not interfering with her activities, will not improve.  She deals with daily neck, back and hip pain and has done so for four years.  While surgery will likely improve her hip pain, it is not likely that her neck and back pain will resolve.  Her prognosis is poor.

[29] She still works long hours, but only with pain, and foregoes activities she used to enjoy in order to work those hours.  Her social life has been impacted because she is too tired to participate.  She cannot sit up on the bed and read to her daughter because of her back pain…

[33] I am of the view that it would have been helpful for Ms. Combs to have the injections for diagnostic purposes and for temporary relief.  Her failure to do so was unreasonable, but although some of her pain may have been relieved temporarily by this procedure and diagnosis of the source of the pain would likely have been facilitated, failure to undergo this procedure does not affect any long term outcome.  Dr. Smit said the cases in which pain does not return after the injections are “a distinct minority”.  In any event, Ms. Combs must still face hip surgery, and according to the medical evidence, delay in having the surgery does not affect its success rate.  Her refusal to undergo months of recovery from surgery while running a busy practice and taking care of young children is simply a matter of weighing how much pain she could cope with and still carry on.  I cannot see her refusal to have the surgery until now as unreasonable.

[34] Obviously each case has distinctive facts, and it is often difficult to reconcile them as awards for pain and suffering are inherently individual.  The cases cited by the plaintiff involve considerably more severe and wide ranging symptoms that Ms. Combs has.  The cases cited by the Third Party involve symptoms that resolved faster than Ms. Combs’ have.  She is not a complainer, but four years post accident, she is still coping daily with its effects and now has to undergo the surgery and recovery time.  The effect of the chance of the early onset of arthritis in the distant future is not great, given the scant evidence that it is likely to occur.

[35] Considering the evidence and the cases cited to me, I set non-pecuniary loss at $90,000.

The Mystery of the Vanishing Blog Posts…

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized.

If you regularly follow this blog you may have noticed my burst of activity today is nothing more than a re-posting of a handful of articles I published earlier this week.  Apparently my web hosting company experienced  a server problem resulting in several lost posts.  Fortunately, thanks to some quick help from Steve Matthews of Stem Legal I was able to retrieve (and repost) these lost articles.
To my frequent readers, sorry for the re-posts.  To Steve, thank you!

Vancouver Jury Awards Canadian National Boxing Champion $1,023,000 In ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Hand Injury Cases, Jury Trials.

While an injured hand would effect most individuals in a negative fashion the consequences can be far more severe depending on the nature of your occupation.  Illustrating that an injury’s valuation largely depends on the unique circumstances of a Plaintiff, a recent Vancouver Jury verdict valued a Boxer’s ICBC claim involving a right hand injury at just over $1,000,000.

In the recent case (Albert v. Politano) the Plaintiff Jegbefumere ‘Bone’ Albert was involved in a 2008 collision.  He was a professional cruiser weight boxer at the time with a 4-0 professional record and a 251-3 amateur record.  The collision caused a chronic right hand injury.  This injury flared with training/fighting.  The Plaintiff had 3 more professional contests post crash and despite his hand injury he won all these contests.  The chronic nature of the injury, however, interfered with his abilities and required the Plaintiff to take early retirement in 2009 at the age of 29.

After a 5 day trial before Mr. Justice Greyell the Vancouver Jury awarded the Plaintiff just over $1 million for his losses including the following damages:

Non-Pecuniary Damages: $125,000

Past Diminished Earning Capacity: $60,000

Future Diminished Earning Capacity: $868,000

As with all Jury verdicts, there are no ‘reasons for judgement’ to publish.  I would like to thank Vancouver lawyer John Cameron for sharing this result with me for publication on this blog.