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"It Is No Impediment That The Offer Was Withdrawn" In Triggering Costs Consequences

Written by admin on August 10, 2012. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9. 49 Comments on "It Is No Impediment That The Offer Was Withdrawn" In Triggering Costs Consequences

Last month I discussed the fact that withdrawn formal settlement offers are capable of triggering costs consequences. Reasons for judgement were released recently confirming this fact and awarding a Plaintiff double costs after besting a formal settlement offer which was withdrawn in the course of trial.
In the recent case (Pitts v. Martin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. The injuries included chronic soft tissue injuries and post traumatic stress which limited the Plaintiff in physical tasks.
Prior to trial she provided a formal settlement offer of $100,000. During the course of the trial the Plaintiff withdrew her formal offer. The trial judgement exceeded her offer by $7,500. The Plaintiff asked for double costs. The defendant objected arguing a withdrawn offer could not trigger costs consequences. Mr. Justice Dley disagreed and awarded double costs. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[68] …I am satisfied that in a case like this, an offer made on May 15th would have given the defendant sufficient time to make a reasoned analysis and respond in a timely fashion. It is not an offer that was made on the eve of the trial commencing, without an opportunity to have it fully considered. It is no impediment that the offer was withdrawn at the close the the Plaintiff’s case. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for double costs following the offer…
To my knowledge this judgement is not publicly available. As always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

No Liability For Motorist Struck While Stopped on Painted Stop Line

Written by admin on August 10, 2012. Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering sections 129 and 186 of the Motor Vehicle Act and liability for a crash based on the positioning of a stopped vehicle at an intersection.
In this week’s case (Eissfeldt (Guardian ad litem of) v. Eissfeldt) the Defendant was stopped “on..the painted stop line” in a desginated left hand turn lane at an intersection.

An intersection collision occurred between other motorists propelling one of the vehicles into the stopped Defendant’s truck. The Plaintiff, a passenger in one of the other vehicles, sued the drivers of all three vehicles arguing all were to blame. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant truck driver was negligent in improperly stopping his vehicle “on rather than behind the painted stop line” arguing that this was in breach of section 186 of the Motor Vehicle Act.
Mr. Justice McEwan disagreed and dismissed the claim against the motorist. In doing so the Court found that section 186 was limited only to stop sign controlled intersections (as opposed to traffic light controlled intersections) but in any event the Defendant’s actions were not negligent. The Court provided the following reasons:

[18] …. Section 186 applies to intersections controlled by stop signs, not traffic control signals. The duty outlined in s. 129 is to stop before the marked crosswalk. There is no question that Mr. Brown did so, as can be seen in the photographs. There is no suggestion in the Act, and none of the case law supports the notion that where stop lines are painted in the left turn lane ahead of a crosswalk, there is a duty to stopbefore rather than on them, as long as the vehicle does not enter the marked crosswalk. In this regard Mr. Brown’s acknowledgment that he intended to stop before the line may mark a slight deviation from the standard he meant to achieve, but it is not evidence that obliges the court to impose a higher standard on Mr. Brown than that set out in the section. It is not at all clear that the stop lines are anything more than guides to ensure that vehicles do not encroach the crosswalk and the intersection, which are the duties imposed by the section.

[19] As the cases show, statutory duties have been superimposed on the common law duty of care and may create a modified standard in the circumstances to which they pertain. The context remains important, however. The concern of a motor vehicle operator at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal is for pedestrians and traffic lawfully crossing or turning in the intersection. The assessment of risk begins with the premise that one may rely on other drivers to obey the rules of the road, subject to the qualifications set out in the cases. (See paras. 8 and 9 herein).

[20] The occurrence of a random event precipitated by the failure of others to obey the rules of the road (I do not know which of the other defendants this may be or to what degree they may share liability), is not the sort of harm that could be described as foreseeable by Mr. Brown. In the circumstances it is obvious that he was in no position to react as the collision transpired.

[21] There is simply no basis, in my view, for a finding that Mr. Brown failed in his statutory duty, which was to avoid the crosswalk and the intersection at the red light. That duty did not extend to anticipating the possibility that a vehicle might suddenly lose control as a result of a collision and veer into his path, obliging him to guess where to place his vehicle in order to avoid such a contingency.

[22] Giving full consideration to the fact that the court must be very careful not to permit litigating in slices and the risk of embarrassing consequences as a result of ruling on an incomplete view of the case, I consider this to be an example of a circumstance where it is appropriate to apply Rule 9-7(15). Mr. Brown was not in breach of the relevant statutory duty found in s. 129. Section 186 of the Motor Vehicle Act does not apply. Whether or not the impact with his vehicle contributed in any respect to the plaintiff’s claims, Mr. Brown’s vehicle was not where it was as a result of any negligence on his part.

"The Vagaries of Analyzing and Predicting the Deterioration of the Human Spine"

Written by admin on August 9, 2012. Posted in ICBC Spine Injury Cases.

The BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement yesterday addressing the difficulty of assessing damages for personal injuries to the spine when a pre-existing deteriorating condition is in play.
In yesterday’s case (Bouchard v. Brown Bros. Motor Lease Canada Ltd.) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 rear-end collision. He was faced in an awkward position when his vehicle was struck and he sustained injuries.
Although there was competing medical evidence, the Court ultimately found the collision was a cause of a L4-5 disc herniation which required bilateral discectomies and foraminotimies at the L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels of the spine. The Court found that while the collision was a cause of the injury, that there was “a very significant risk” that the Plaintiff’s back problems would have developed even absent the collision and the damages were reduced by 40% to take this risk into account. The BC Court of Appeal held that this reduction was too drastic and reduced the global damages by 20% instead of 40%. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[1] The vagaries of analyzing and predicting the deterioration of the human spine as it ages are a source of difficulty not only for the medical profession but for anyone involved in resolving personal injury claims. This appeal reflects that difficulty: it involves a plaintiff who at the age of 20 was diagnosed with a narrowing of the L5-S1 disc, then experienced a period of apparent recovery, and then suffered an injury in a motor vehicle accident in 2005 that was found to have been a “significant factor contributing to the herniation of [his] disc at L4-L5, and the development of … symptoms of severe and disabling lower back pain”. No challenge is made to this finding of causation. Rather, the plaintiff challenges the trial judge’s conclusion that there was a “very significant risk” he would have “gone on to suffer serious low back problems” in the absence of the injury in 2005, and that therefore, all the damages that would otherwise have been awarded against the defendants should be reduced by 40%…

[20] I agree that it was open to the judge to reduce those damages which were awarded in respect of future loss, to reflect the possibility that “ultimately”, Mr. Bouchard would in any event have experienced serious lumbar problems. There was, however, no evidence to suggest that absent the 2005 accident, Mr. Bouchard would have experienced serious and symptomatic degeneration of the spine at the age of 31 (his age at the date of trial) or within a brief time thereafter. Indeed, all the expert evidence suggested such deterioration occurs gradually, subject to specific incidents such as the one that occurred in October 2007. Dr. Hepburn used the word “ultimately” and was not asked to elaborate. Had he been asked, I expect he would have said that one cannot predict with certainty at what age disc degeneration would (or might) have become symptomatic and disabling to Mr. Bouchard, or even that it would necessarily have done so by a particular age.

[21] Similarly, the trial judge did not describe any time line over which he found there was a 40% chance Mr. Bouchard’s spine would have degenerated to its present state. Obviously, the process could not be projected with exactitude, but the reduction of damages by 40% suggests a very steep upward line on a graph. That line is contrary to the notion of gradual deterioration. If there was a 40% chance Mr. Bouchard would have deteriorated to his present condition by, say, age 50, the chance between ages 31 and 50 would have been less than 40%. This must as a matter of logic be reflected in the percentage by which the damages are reduced…

[23] I am also of the view that the trial judge erred in applying the 40% reduction to all heads of damage, including those that refer only to past loss and expenses. Obviously, the damages given for past income loss and special damages would not be affected by the future contingency posited by the trial judge. As for non-pecuniary damages, since the trial judge did not consider the contingency in his initial assessment of the award of $160,000, I am of the view that this court’s comments at para. 25 of York v. Johnston (1997) 37 B.C.L.R. (3d) 235 are not applicable. There is authority for reducing damages under this head to reflect a pre-existing condition: see Zacharas v. Leys 2005 BCCA 560, at paras. 25-6. I would therefore also reduce the award for non-pecuniary damages by 20% rather than 40%.

Contingency Fees and Catastrophic Infant Claims Discussed

Written by admin on August 8, 2012. Posted in Shaken Baby Cases, Uncategorized.

Section 40 of the BC Infants Act requires judicial approval of injury claim settlements involving infants with claims settled at over $50,000. The approval of legal fees is part of the judicial scrutiny process. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing such a settlement and further setting out a useful chart summarizing previous judicially approved fees.
In this week’s case (E.B. v. Basi) the infant plaintiff was catastrophically injured while in foster care during an alleged intentional “shaken baby” assault. This resulted in severe traumatic brain injuries requiring one-to-one care on a daily basis for the duration of the child’s life.
A settlement of $13,000,000 was judicially approved. The decision is worth reviewing in full for Mr. Justice Macaulay’s careful analysis of the factors that need to be considered when approving fees in such claims given the non-binding nature of infant contingency fee agreements. At the conclusion of the reasons for judgement the Court set out the below useful chart of previously approved infant settlements.

Case	Nature of Claim	Settlement Amount	Settlement Timing	Legal Fee Sought	Hours Estimated	Fee Awarded
Harrington v Royal Columbia 1995 CanLII 2345 (BCCA)	Medical malpractice	$1.5 million and costs	3 days < trial	$500,000	Estimate of 800 hours not accepted by trial judge; 280 hours accepted	$175,000
Richardson v Low 1996 CanLII 571	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$2.27 million	Settled well before trial	$897,750	Court says no basis to estimate time but must be less than 260 hours	$325,000
Cook v Mission 1996 CanLII 1394	Medical malpractice	$2.6 million	Settled on 1st day of trial	$850,000	Non recorded	$650,000
Adams v Emmott 1997 CanLII 746	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$3 million	Settled Thursday before Tuesday trial	$725,000	300 hours estimate by Court	$600,000
Chong v Royal Columbia 1997 CanLII 4362	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$2.5 million	After 1 week of trial	$750,000	2131.2 hours for counsel and 654.9 for paralegals and students	$750,000
Renaerts v Korn 1998 CanLII 4979	Medical malpractice (birth and abandonment; intentional infliction of harm)	$8 million and $500,000 costs	Settled weekend before trial (numerous pretrial motions and limitation defence)	$2.2 million	Hours for 3 counsel valued at $825,000	$1.8 million
Duchene v Woolley 2002 BCSC 1878 (CanLII)	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$3.6 million	Settled 2 days before trial although defendants did not serve liability reports	$1.244 million	167 hours estimated but Court notes more was probably spent	$900,000

Bizove v Cornish 2003 BCSC 1615 (CanLII)	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$3.566 million	3 days before trial	$750,000	740 hours (3 senior counsel)	$750,000
Makowsky v Jaron 2004 BCSC 419 (CanLII)	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$3.2 million	4 months before trial but liability ceased to be issue several months before trial	$900,000	136 hours recorded but Court suggests they must have exceeded 200 hours	$600,000
Strachan v Winder 2005 BCSC 59 (CanLII)	Medical malpractice (birth case)	$4 million	2nd day of 2 week trial	$862,500	Recorded time for 3 senior counsel 484 hours	$800,000
Delaronde v. HMTQ 2000 BCSC 1626	MCFD shaken baby case	$5.448 million	Settled after 4 weeks of evidence and 3 days of submissions	$1.347 million	None mentioned	$1.347 million
B.M. (Guardian ad Litem of) v R.M. 2011 BCSC 64	MCFD shaken baby case	$5.35 million	Liability trial (8 days) and appeal then settled several months before trial	$1.7 million	Hours valued at $607,320	$1.475 million

Punishing Costs Orders Should Not "Unduly Deter" Meritorious but Uncertain Actions

Written by admin on August 8, 2012. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9, Uncategorized.

Further to my previous posts detailing the potential costs consequences following trials with formal settlement offers in place, reasons for judgement were released last week addressing this topic finding that costs consequences should be applied in an “even-handed” way and further should not unduly deter Plaintiff’s from bringing meritorious, but uncertain claims “because of the fear of a punishing costs order“.
In last week’s case (Currie v. McKinnon) the Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries in a collision which substantially recovered within one year. Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $40,000. The Plaintiff rejected this offer and proceeded to trial where he was awarded $22,000 in damages.
ICBC applied for double costs from the time of the offer onward. Madam Justice Adair found that such a result was unwarranted and instead stripped the Plaintiff of post offer costs and disbursements. In doing so the Court provided the following sensible comments:

[18] I think it certainly can be argued that if a defendant who has made an offer to settle in an amount higher than the amount awarded to the plaintiff at trial (and that is what has been done in this case) was then awarded double costs, this would skew the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly penalize and pressure plaintiffs. This is because a plaintiff who rejected an offer to settle would potentially risk a triple cost penalty if he or she were to win at trial an amount less than the offer. The plaintiff would suffer loss of the costs that he or she would normally receive on obtaining judgment at trial, and face double costs payable to the defendant.

[19] In my view, there is a good reason to apply Rule 9-1 in a way that is even-handed, or more even-handed, as between plaintiffs and defendants. I would say for this reason one would expect to see double costs awarded to a defendant, using the offer to settle procedure, in exceptional circumstances only, such as a situation where the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed all together after a plaintiff rejected an offer to settle.

[20] That is not the case here. In my view, Mr. McKechnie, despite his able arguments, simply did not identify for me how the circumstances here were so exceptional as to justify an award of double costs against Mr. Currie. While the purpose of the Rule is to encourage reasonable settlements, parties should not be unduly deterred from bringing meritorious, but uncertain, claims because of the fear of a punishing costs order…

[36] Having considered all of the factors in this case, I am not satisfied that it would be appropriate to award the defendants double costs as sought by Mr. McKechnie. I have discussed earlier in these reasons my concerns about how that can have the effect of skewing the procedure in favour of defendants and unfairly pressurize and penalize plaintiffs, and I think that would be the result in this case. Liability was admitted by the defendants. Mr. Currie’s case was not dismissed. Rather, he recovered judgment for non-pecuniary damages in an amount that was greater than what the defendants argued at trial he should recover.

[37] However, in my view, the defendants’ offer to settle cannot be ignored. That would undermine the purpose behind the rule…

[39] In my view, therefore, the double costs sought by the defendants are neither a fair nor just result. However, in my view, it is not a fair or just result for Mr. Currie to recover costs after he had had a reasonable opportunity with his counsel to review and consider the defendants’ offer to settle. I would say that by November 30, 2011, Mr. Currie and his counsel had had a reasonable opportunity to review and consider the defendants’ offer and ask any questions they deemed necessary if they thought clarification was necessary.

[40] In my view, the defendants should not have to pay Mr. Currie’s costs after November 30, 2011. However, I do not think it a fair result that Mr. Currie should have to pay the defendants’ costs after November 30, 20011, given his success ultimately at trial.

[41] My order then, with respect to costs, is that Mr. Currie will recover his costs and disbursements up to and including November 30, 2011, and that each side bear their own costs thereafter.

Courts Do Not Share ICBC's Views About Low Velocity Impact Injuries

Written by admin on August 7, 2012. Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

As discussed many times, the ‘low velocity impact‘ defence is not particularly compelling and is often judicially frowned upon. Certainly there is no legal principle which states that minimal impact forces result in no compensable injuries. This was demonstrated yet again in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In last week’s case (Sourisseau v. Peters) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant. The Defendant advanced the LVI Defence highlighting that the impact caused under $1,000 in repair costs to both vehicles and further that the impact was likely at speeds below 8 kmph. With this evidence in hand the Defendant argued that the plaintiff “sustained no compensable injury“.
Mr. Justice Greyell rejected this line of reasoning and found the Plaintiff was indeed injured in the low velocity impact and awarded $22,5000 for her non-pecuniary damages. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[54] While the significance of the damage sustained in a collision may be a factor with which the Insurance Corporation is concerned it is not a matter which necessarily has a direct relationship to the plaintiff’s injuries. The issue for determination is whether the plaintiff’s injuries were caused or contributed to by the accident, Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (BCSC); Boag v. Berna, 2003 BCSC 779.

[55] In this latter connection, the defendant called Mr. Goudie an engineer who testified the change of velocity at the time of the collision was probably less than 8 km/h.

[56] In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, the change of velocity alone is of little significance. At the time of impact Ms. Sourisseau had her head turned sideways. The evidence clearly establishes she had had pre-existing difficulties with neck and back pain. It likely took very little by way of an impact to trigger a recurrence of that pain. The defendant called no medical evidence to suggest otherwise…

60] Accordingly, I find the plaintiff suffered pain and suffering from soft tissue injuries for approximately 14 months with the odd flare-up continuing thereafter until early 2010 when she testified she felt she had returned to her pre-accident status.

[61] After reviewing the authorities submitted by counsel I award the plaintiff $22,500 for non-pecuniary damages.

Defence Expert Criticized; $60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Lingering STI's and PTSD

Written by admin on August 3, 2012. Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, independent medical exams. 59 Comments on Defence Expert Criticized; $60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Lingering STI's and PTSD

Unreported reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, addressing damages for “chronic, but not disabling” soft tissue injuries and post-traumatic stress arising from a motor vehicle collision.
In the recent case (Pitts v. Martin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant. The extent of the Plaintiff’s damages were at issue. As is common in personal injury litigation, the Defendant produced an expert witness who provided evidence disagreeing with the Plaintiff’s physician as to the extent of the ongoing injuries and their connection to the collision. Mr. Justice Dley was not receptive to this evidence preferring the Plaintiff’s treating physicians. In rejecting the Defendant’s expert Mr. Justice Dley provided the following criticism:
[31] Dr. Dommisse provided an opinion that confirms the soft tissue injury. However, he opines that stress aggravates the physical injuries and that with proper counselling the stress would ease off; that would improve the physical injuries. Dr. Dommisse agreed that the stress affectibng Ms. Pitts resulted from the collision.
[32] His opinion ignores the fact that Ms. Pitts has had counselling and that she has been provided with coping techniques. Dr. Dommisse was not critical of the counselling that had been provided and deferred that aspect of the injuries to the counsellors who had previously treated Ms. Pitts.
[33] His opinion failed to consider that Ms. Pitts required some assistance at work. He conceded that to be a significant factor.
[34] Dr. Dommisse noted muscle spasm in the trapezius muscle. However, in his opinion as to whether the collision caused Ms. Pitts’ disabilities, he did not include any reference to the spasms. Instead, he referred to Ms. Pitts’ complaints as being subjective. He did not provide a satisfactory answer as to why such an objective symptom would have been left out of his analysis.
[35] Dr. Dommisse failed to consider the fact that Ms. Pitts suffers pain and discomfort from some of her work-related activities, particularly heavy lifting. Those symptoms are brought on without any stress. That significant omission from his report destroys any reliability that might be attached to his opinion that “it is unlikely that Ms. Pitts’ current disabilities were caused by the accident”.
[36] Dr. Dommise commented that counselling from Ms. Pitts’ stress and anxiety will likely improve her symptoms. His evidence did not provide any basis for that opinion to be reliable. It ignores the reality that counselling has already been provided and there is no suggestion that the treatment was in any way lacking. I am not satisfied that any further counselling is likely to resolve or further improve Ms. Pitts’ present condition.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Mr. Justice Dley provided the following reasons:
[47] It is now four years post-accident. Ms. Pitts has been diligent in pursuing rehabilitation measures. Ms. Pitts still has some lingering injuries – they are chronic, but not disabling. Ms. Pitts can carry on with her everyday life and work, but she has limitations because she must be careful so as not to aggravate her injuries. She continues to suffer from the post-traumatic stress of the collision. She has learned coping techniques, but that has not eliminated the disorder.
[48] Taking into account the injuries sustained and the impact they have had and will continue to have, I assess general damages at $60,000.
As noted this judgement is not reported therefore not publicly available. As always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Claim Dismissal For Failure To Comply With Rules A "Particularly Draconian" Remedy

Written by admin on August 3, 2012. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 22, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on Claim Dismissal For Failure To Comply With Rules A "Particularly Draconian" Remedy

Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that having a Plaintiff’s claim dismissed for failing to discharge obligations under the BC Supreme Court Rules is a ‘draconian remedy‘ which will not lightly be granted in a personal injury action where liability is admitted.
In the recent case (Breberin v. Santos) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision. Fault was admitted by the offending motorist. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff failed to provide “very basic information” to the Defendants, “refused to obey court rules” and had “been found in contempt of court“.
The Defendants applied to strike the Plaintiff’s claim. Mr. Justice Willcock noted that, although this was a borderline case and a remedial costs order was appropriate to emphasise “the Court’s concern with respect to the conduct of the Plaintiff” outright dismissal of the claim was too harsh a result in the circumstances. In dismissing the Defendant’s application the Court provided the following reasons:

[36] The Rules of Court are designed to permit parties to obtain full disclosure of relevant materials far in advance of trial so as to avoid unnecessary litigation, to make or seek admissions, and to settle claims that ought to be settled. Despite numerous case planning conferences and previous orders in this case, the plaintiff at the most recent case planning conference appeared to appreciate for the first time that she is not entitled to hold medical information in her hands and to refuse to disclose it until she is satisfied with her diagnosis. She appeared to understand for the first time that it is not open to her to produce only that portion of her medical file that corresponds with her own diagnosis or that which she prefers.

[37] It is difficult to determine whether the plaintiff’s suggestion at the most recent case planning conference that she only now appreciates the nature of her obligations is genuine. On previous occasions when this Court directed Dr. Breberin to attend in Vancouver for an independent medical examination, gave explicit reasons for doing so, and noted that there was insufficient medical evidence to permit the Court to accede to her argument that she was unable to travel, Dr. Breberin later continued to question the Court’s jurisdiction to make such an order. She continues to resist attempts to have her attend here for a medical examination. That resistance speaks of an unwillingness to accept the Court’s jurisdiction and authority.

[38] Having said that, I am of the view that dismissal of the claim would not be proportional to the nature of the ongoing default. Dr. Breberin has now, finally, produced the authorizations for production of medical records and provided them to defence counsel. She advised me during the course of submissions on May 22, 2012 that she was prepared to permit defence counsel to use the authorizations without attaching any conditions to their use. She should be satisfied with the implied undertakings as to the confidentiality of evidence obtained on discovery. Defence counsel may now use those authorizations unimpeded by any undertaking or condition other than that implied by law.

[39] The Plaintiff is prepared to attend at a continuation of her examinations for discovery. She should promptly make arrangements to attend at such an examination once the defendants have obtained the medical records they seek.

[40] She is right to say that there has been no previous order that she attend at an independent medical examination by an orthopedic surgeon. Given the evidence she herself has filed with respect to the nature of her ongoing complaints, it is my view that it is appropriate for the defendants to seek that she be examined by an orthopedic surgeon, and there will be an order that she attend at an examination by an orthopedic surgeon in Vancouver, at a date to be selected by defence counsel. If Dr. Breberin is unable to attend on the date selected by defence counsel, she should promptly notify defence counsel, and may apply, within seven days of receipt of the appointment, for an order adjourning the date of her examination to another date available to her.

[41] Once these measures are taken, the defendants will be in a position to more adequately assess the plaintiff’s claim. The dismissal of an action where there has been an admission of liability, as in in this case, would be a particularly draconian remedy for the contempt that has delayed the defendants acquisition of evidence to which they are entitled. In my view, although this is a borderline case, such a measure would, now be disproportionate to the plaintiff’s conduct.

BC's Electronic Device in Courtroom Policy Soon to be in Force

Written by admin on August 2, 2012. Posted in Uncategorized.

Next month the new policy addressing use of electronic devices in BC Courtrooms will come into force. In short lawyers and “accredited media” will be permitted to “use electronic devices to transmit and receive text” in the BC Supreme Court and BC Provincial Court.
The Court of Appeal is more liberal allowing not just lawyers and media to have this privilege but extending it to “any person“.
You can click here to read the policy in full.

Welcome Supreme Advocacy Newsletter Readers

Written by admin on August 2, 2012. Posted in BC Injury Claims Media Archives, Uncategorized.

To my pleasant surprise this blog was named “website of the week” in Eugene Meehan’s Supreme Advocacy newsletter.
For those of you visiting this site for the first time welcome! I canvass Canadian personal injury legal developments here with a particular focus on British Columbia and claims involving the Insurance Corporation of BC (ICBC).
For my regular readers not familiar with Mr. Meehan’s newsletter it is worth checking out. It provides ‘hot off the presses‘ coverage of decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada along with other useful material. You can subscribe to his newsletter here.