Defence Psychatric Exam Request Dismissed for Being Brought Too Late
Reasons for judgment were released last month dismissing an ICBC request to have a Plaintiff examined by a psychiatrist finding that the application was brought too late in the litigation and would unfairly balance the playing field should the Plaintiff need to respond to the examination.
In last month’s case (De Corde v. De Corde) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision. She alleged physical injuries, a head injury and also “emotional distress“.
In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff agreed to be assessed by three physicians chosen by the Defendant (or their insurer ICBC). Specifically a general practitioner, a neurologist and an orthopaedic surgeon. The Defendant brought an application for the Plaintiff to also be assessed by a psychiatrist. The application was brought with just barely sufficient time to have a report generated to comply with the time lines set out in the Rules of Court.
Master Bouck dismissed the application finding the medical playing field was already balanced and an additional report by a psychiatrist served on the cusp of the deadline set by the Rules of Court would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff. The Court provided the following reasons:
 The overriding principle is that an independent medical examination ought to be permitted if necessary to ensure reasonable equality between the parties in their preparations for trial.
 In this case, there are at least two considerations that compelled the dismissal of the application.
 First, there is no basis to suggest that the defendant is at a disadvantage in terms of evidence.
 Second, the application is brought so close to trial that the plaintiff might be prejudiced (by the adjournment of the trial) if the order was granted.
 This is not a case where a new diagnosis or symptom has arisen since the last independent medical examination. Indeed, much of the information that is relied on by defence in this application was in that party’s possession before the plaintiff attended the examinations by Drs. Wahl and Moll.
 The plaintiff’s mental health is commented upon in all of the reports presented to the court. None of the various medical professionals have recommended psychiatric treatment or diagnosis. It is appreciated that the diagnosis of the plaintiff’s symptoms differs as between these medical professionals. However, regardless of the diagnosis, all of these professionals suggest a treatment plan. That plan ranges from simple reassurance to medication to counselling to future neuropsychological reassessments…
 In short, there is simply no basis to suggest that the evidence presented to date requires a psychiatric opinion in order to “level the playing field”. Experts on both side of this case make certain treatment recommendations that will probably lead to some resolution of the plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. Whether the plaintiff follows those recommendations goes to the question of mitigation.
 Another important factor to consider is the timeliness of the defendant’s request, particularly when the opinions of the three defence experts (let alone those of the plaintiff) have been known for several months.
 I accept the submission that given the type of specialist involved, the plaintiff would have been hard pressed to answer Dr. Solomon’s opinion in time for trial. Thus, the plaintiff may be compelled to seek an adjournment of the trial which is scheduled to occur nearly five years after the accident. Such a result would hardly be in keeping with a speedy resolution to the claim: Rule1-3.
 In considering the question of prejudice, I presumed that Dr. Solomons would be able to comply with the 84-day deadline. But that deadline is not really the issue. It is the deadlines that the plaintiff must meet that leads to the possible prejudice.
 The plaintiff need only demonstrate that an adjournment of the trial is a possibility: Critchley v. McDiarmid, 2009 BCSC 134 at paras. 21 and 22…
 Given the timelines that must be met under SCCR together with the common acknowledgment that psychiatric assessments are not so easily obtained on short notice, there appeared to be a real possibility that the trial would be adjourned to allow the plaintiff to address the defence’ s new expert evidence.
 Thus, an order requiring the plaintiff’s attendance at a psychiatric independent examination would result in an inequality of evidence favouring the defence. I have already made the same finding in the case at bar.