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Can I Get Fees With That? Law Firm Unsuccessfully Seeks Fees From Their Own Insurer's Negligence Payout

Reasons for judgement were released  this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a lawfirm that negligently failed to file a lawsuit before the expiry of a limitation period can then seek fees from their clients for the payout the client’s receive in successfully pursuing the lawfirm for damages stemming from their negligence.  Not surprisingly the answer was no.
In this week’s case (Taylor v. Brozer) the clients were injured in a 2006 Washington State collision.  The crash was caused by an underinsured motorist.  They had ICBC Underinsured Motorist Protection coverage and retained the lawfirm to represent them in their UMP Claim. They did so on a contingency basis.  The lawfirm “failed to file a writ in Washington State and missed the limitation period thus denying the clients their rights to seek UMP protection/damages from ICBC“.
The clients hired a new lawyer to sue the former firm.   Ultimately the former firms insurer paid out a $200,000 settlement “based on the clients’ expected recovery under UMP“.
The initial lawfirm then sought over $25,000 in fees from their former clients “in respect of the work it did for the clients” arguing that the work they did before missing the limitation period “was of value and the lawfirm ought to be compensated“.  Registrar Sainty dismissed the claimed fees finding they could not be recovered.  In reaching this decision the court provided the following reasons for judgement:
[49]         There is no dispute between the parties that these solicitors were retained by these clients for a single purpose: “to handle the client’s claim for damages arising from injury suffered in the [Accident]” (paragraph 1 of the retainer agreement). The retainer agreement between them is therefore an “entire contract” in accordance with the holdings in Ladner Downs v. Crowley (supra).
[50]         Since it is an “entire contract”, unless the solicitors had “good cause” to withdraw from acting for the clients, they are not entitled to any fees for the work done by them for the clients up to the time the retainer contract was terminated (Maillott and Morrison Voss v. Smith, 2007 BCCA 296).
[51]         Did they have “good cause” to withdraw? There is no doubt that it was their negligence (in missing the limitation period) that terminated the retainer. After realising their negligence, the solicitors were bound to withdraw and they could no longer act for the clients.
[52]         Can the solicitors own negligence constitute “good cause” as submitted by the law firm or must it be said that as the solicitors “caused” the termination (by their own negligence) therefore must be found not to have had good cause to withdraw (as submitted by the clients)?
[53]         In my view, the solicitors cannot be found to have “good cause” to withdraw. It is simply not proper to hold that a lawyer may find “good cause” for withdrawal in his own negligence and thus be entitled to claim a fee for work done for his clients before his negligence was discovered but may not find “good cause” for withdrawal in something completely beyond his control (e.g., an appointment to the bench, nonpayment of practice fees, death or the like) and lose his entitlement to claim a fee for work done up to the time of the involuntary act. My view is supported by the decision of District Registrar Blok (as he then was) in McVeigh v. Ewachniuk, 2003 BCSC 1328) wherein it was held that a solicitor’s disbarment was not “good cause” for terminating an entire contract retainer.
[54]         Even if I am wrong in this analysis, I find that the work performed by the law firm was of no value to the clients and therefore the clients should not be required to pay the law firm for any of that work. The failure of the law firm to file the action in Washington State defeated the whole purpose of the retainer. But for the assistance of New Counsel and the intervention of the law firms’ insurer, the clients were left with no remedy against the underinsured motorist and thus the work done by the solicitors must be said to have been of no value. Any value was lost once the limitation period was missed and the personal injury action became doomed to fail.

Rule 15 Costs Cap Applied to Settlement of a Non-Rule 15 Claim

Further to my previous posts on this topic (which can be found here and here), reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding that the Rule 15 costs cap can apply to a personal injury claim litigated outside of the fast track when a settlement below $100,000 is achieved.
In the recent case (Varga v. Shin) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  The plaintiff initially sought significant damages over $422,000 and the case was prosecuted in the usual course.  It was never put into the fast track rule.  Prior to trial the case settled for $65,000 plus costs “to be assessed or agreed“.  The parties could not agree on the costs consequences with the defendant arguing that the Rule 15 cap should apply.  Registrar Sainty agreed and in doing so provided the following reasons:
[27]         I prefer Ms Taylor’s submissions in relation to the application of the costs provisions of R. 15-1. In my view, this action, even though it was not declared to be a “fast track” action, is subject to the costs provisions of R. 15-1(15). I agree with Ms Taylor’s submissions that R. 15-1(1) is exclusive and not inclusive. In my opinion, if a matter settles for less than $100,000, R. 15-1(15) applies to the costs of the action. This is made clear, in my view, by the addition to the Rules of R. 14-1(1)(f). That subrule effectively fast tracks actions that were not fast tracked but should have been (see Axten, supra, and Affleck v. Palmer, 2011 BCSC 1366). The cases cited by Mr. Warnett (listed above) were all, in my view, decided per incuriam: without reference to either R. 15-1(1) or 14-1(1)(f) in relation to the issue of costs.
[28]         This interpretation is in keeping with the object of the Rules: “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” 
(R. 1-3(1)) and the proportionality provisions set out in R. 1-3(2).
[29]         Finally, I note that Mr. Warnett also suggested that, if the defendants wished the provisions of R. 15-1(15) to apply to the action, they ought to have applied to place it into fast track and as they did not do so, they should not be allowed to limit the plaintiff’s costs to the costs allowed under R. 15-1(15). This suggestion cuts both ways however. Just as it was open to the defendants to seek an order bringing the matter into fast track, it was also open to Mr. Warnett to seek an order (even at the trial management conference) that R. 15-1 not apply to the action. He did not do so and as the action is by operation of the Rules a fast track action, it attracts costs per R. 15-1(15).
[30]         As I have found that the action falls within the provisions of R. 15-1(15), thus the plaintiff is entitled to some proportion of the $6,500 “cap” available (see Duong v. Howarth, 2005 BCSC 128; and Anderson v. Routbard, 2007 BCCA 193 [Anderson]). In order to avoid a re-attendance before me (or some other registrar) to determine how much of that cap the plaintiff may claim, I am going to employ some “rough and ready justice” (see Anderson, at paragraph 49 and Cathcart v. Olson, 2009 BCSC 618 at paragraph 19) to this matter. I will set the amount at the full $6,500, plus tax. This matter settled some 15 days before trial. Likely a good deal of the trial preparation had occurred up to the settlement. It is therefore appropriate that the plaintiff receive the full amount of the cap: see Gill v. Widjaja, 2011 BCSC 951 (Registrar), aff’d 2011 BCSC 1822.

Cyclist Found 15% at fault For Collision While Riding in Cross-Walk

In my continued efforts to document BC decisions addressing fault for vehicle/cyclist collisions, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing an crosswalk collision involving such an incident.
In last week’s case (Callahan v. Kim) the Defendant motorist stopped at an intersection on a red light.  He intended to make a right hand turn.  At the same time the Plaintiff cyclist approached on the sidewalk to the motorist’s right.   The Defendant failed to see the Plaintiff who entered the intersection on his bicycle as the Defendant commenced his right hand turn.  The Court found both to blame with the motorist shouldering 85% of the fault.  In coming to this decision Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons:
[10]         As for Mr. Kim’s vehicle, I find that he stopped at the stop line on Riverwood Gate, intending to make a right turn north onto Coast Meridian. He looked quickly to his right and failed to notice the plaintiff who at that time was either at the pedestrian control button or approaching it. Thereafter, as Mr. Kim admitted, he was looking to his left and then ahead and did not check right again before moving into the crosswalk and colliding with Mr. Callahan…
[18]         In assessing whether Mr. Kim failed to meet his duty of care, a number of considerations come into play. First, Mr. Kim was proceeding against a red light. Second, Mr. Callahan was in a marked crosswalk with both a green light and a pedestrian walk sign in his favour. I find that, even though Mr. Kim acted within the law in making a right turn on a red light, he had a clear duty to give way to a user of the crosswalk. While Mr. Callahan contravened s. 183(2)(b) by not dismounting and walking his bicycle across the street as required by the Motor Vehicle Act, and therefore did not have the statutory right-of-way, he was nonetheless a user of the crosswalk. A crosswalk is precisely where other users of the roadway are expected to be, especially when the traffic signals are in their favour.
[19]         I conclude that Mr. Kim departed from the standard of care he owed in these circumstances when he failed to check again to his right before setting his vehicle in motion to start his right turn. Mr. Kim’s failure to do so was a direct cause of the accident…
[33]         In my view, the case before me is far more like Dobre. In that case, the plaintiff cyclist approached the intersection by riding on the wrong side of the street but stopped before entering the marked crosswalk, looked left and right and pushed the button to activate the pedestrian warning light. He was pedalling slowly across the intersection and was close to the centre of the road when the defendant’s car struck the rear wheel of his bicycle. As in the case at bar, the plaintiff in Dobre checked to his left and observed a car approaching but assumed it posed no hazard to him. In that case, N. Brown J. apportioned liability 85% to the driver and 15% to the cyclist.
[34]         I find Mr. Kim’s conduct in failing to observe the plaintiff in the crosswalk and in starting a turn without looking to his right to be far more blameworthy than Mr. Callahan’s failure to make eye contact. Taking into account all of the circumstances in the case before me, I conclude that liability should be apportioned 85% to Mr. Kim and 15% to Mr. Callahan.

"Fat Bottomed Girls": When Free Speech and Alleged Witness 'Victimization' Collide in the BC Supreme Court

This is a little off topic but thought this may be of interest for my readers.
Trials are a matter of public record and Canada’s open-court principle can sometimes create legitimate privacy concerns for litigants.  The BC Supreme Court published reasons for judgement today addressing such a concern.
In today’s case (Mainstream Canada v. Staniford) a blog entry was posted during a trial referring to two witnesses who testified that “It is not clear if they both cycled to the courtroom – but there were echoes of Queen’s classic 1978 hit “Fat-Bottomed Girls” playing as they both took the stand.
The Plaintiff’s lawyer brought an application for a direction that the Defendant “refrain from making postings referring to witnesses in any derogatory or disparaging fashion that may have the effect of victimizing a witness or witnesses who are testifying, or may have testified, at this trial.”  Madam Justice Adair refused to make such an order but in doing so provided the following reminder to the litigants:
[7]             I am going to quote from Lord Denning’s judgment in the case of Attorney-General v. Butterworth, [1962] 3 All E.R. 326 (C.A.).  This is a decision of the English Court of Appeal.  It is from 1962.  But in my view it is still well worth quoting, and well worth reminding counsel, parties and those present in this courtroom, concerning issues relating to the administration of justice and the appropriate and fair treatment of witnesses who come forward, often under the compulsion of a subpoena, to give evidence and perform their civic duty in a trial.
[8]             Lord Denning says (in the context of ruling on an application that individuals be found in contempt of court), at p. 329:
For there can be no greater contempt than to intimidate a witness before he gives his evidence or to victimize him afterwards for having given it.  How can we expect a witness to give his evidence freely and frankly, as he ought to do, if he is liable, as soon as the case is over, to be punished for it by those who dislike the evidence he had given?  After he has honestly given his evidence, is he to be liable to be dismissed from his office, or to be sent to Coventry [a reference that perhaps had more resonance in 1962 than it does now, but essentially meaning banished or punished] simply because of that evidence which he has given?  I decline to believe that the law of England permits him to be so treated.  If this sort of thing could be done in a single case with impunity, the news of it would soon get round.  Witnesses in other cases would be unwilling to come forward to give evidence, or, if they did come forward, they would hesitate to speak the truth, for fear of the consequences.
[9]             Further down at p. 329, Lord Denning says:
I have no hesitation in declaring that the victimization of a witness is a contempt of court whether it be done whilst the proceedings are still pending or after they have finished.
[10]         In my view, it is clear from Lord Denning’s remarks that the court takes the intimidation or the victimization of a witness extremely seriously and is willing to use its contempt powers to punish that conduct.
[11]         Having said that, in the light of the submissions made by Mr. Sutherland concerning the live issues in this case relating to the conduct of Mr. Staniford – his conduct of the case inside and outside the court – I am not going to give the direction sought by Mr. Wotherspoon.  However, my expectation is that the parties and those present in this courtroom will take very seriously Lord Denning’s comments which I have read out and which I adopt.
 

"Silence Does Not Mean Consent" – Examination for Discovery Caselaw Update


 
Adding to this site’s archived caselaw addressing examination for discovery, useful reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, making the following points:
1. silence (or even agreement) to a discovery request does not compel a party to comply with it
2. the court has no power to order that answers to questions outstadning at an examination for discovery be put in writing
3.  the narrower scope for document production requirements is not circumvented simply by asking for production of documents at an examination for discovery
In this week’s case (LaPrarie Crane (Alberta) Ltd. v. Triton Projects Inc.)Master Bouck provided the following reasons addressing these points:
[32]         As for the outstanding requests from the examinations, Triton submits that  when there is no objection to production on the record — or indeed, where a positive response from the examinee is made — such requests must be answered : Winkler v. Lower Mainland Publishing Ltd., 2002 BCSC 40 at para. 17. In other words, the party being examined is not able to reflect upon requests unless counsel states on the record that the request will be taken under advisement or an objection is raised. Nor can a party have a change of mind upon reflection, or upon taking legal advice.
[33]         The principle that a party should not be permitted to subsequently revoke agreements made at an examination for discovery is laudable. However, silence does not mean consent: Gellen v. British Columbia (Public Guardian and Trustee of), 2005 BCSC 1615 at para. 17 (S.C.). Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the principle enunciated in Winkler can be applied after the introduction of time limited examinations for discovery: Rule 7-2 (2).
[34]         If counsel is expected to pause and consider the relevancy of every question asked of the witness, the time allotted for a party’s examination might well be consumed by objections, interventions and even argument. In recent decisions, the court has strongly discourage such intervention at examinations for discovery: see More Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166 at para. 13 foll’g Kendall v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2010 BCSC 1556 at para. 18. Given this change in procedure, I decline to follow Winkler.
[35]         If a person declines to provide the additional information requested, the examining party is not without a remedy: Rules 7-2 (22)-(24). This appears to be the remedy pursued on this application. Nonetheless, the court has no power to order that answers to questions outstanding at an examination for discovery be put in writing: Diachem Industries Ltd. v. Buckman (1994), 91 B.C.L.R. (2D) 312 at p. 314 (S.C.) [my emphasis].
[36]         Finally, it is acknowledged that under the SCCR, the duty to answer questions at an examination is broader than the duty to produce documents: More Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., supra, at para. 7. However, a party does not get around the application of Kaladjian v. Jose principles by asking for the documents at these examinations: Maxam Opportunities Fund (International) Ltd. Partnership v. 893353 Alberta Inc., 2012 BCSC 553.
 

Travelling Expenses "An Integral Part" of ICBC Part 7 Benefits


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing benefits which ought to be covered under a plaintiff’s first party insurance (Part7 benefits) with ICBC.
In today’s case (Wepryk v. Juraschka) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision and sued for damages.  At trial the Plaintiff’s damages were assessed at just over $83,000.  The Defendant then applied to have some of the assessed damages deducted pursuant to section 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  In finding that mileage and parking expenses ought to be covered by ICBC’s no-fault benefits scheme (and therefore deductible from the tort damages) the Court provided the following findings:
[10]         I also agree that $22.50 for parking should be deducted as a component of travelling expenses for treatment. Travelling expenses are an integral part of necessary treatment and as such are a benefit subject to deduction:  Petersen v. Bannon, (1991) 1 C.C.L.I. (2d) 232 (B.C.S.C.).
[11]         The plaintiff also claimed car expenses for driving to and from medical appointments at a rate of .50¢ per kilometre, and I awarded the entire amount of $1,368.90 claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of her calculations. The defendants originally submitted that the entire amount of $1,368.90 should be deducted, but now say the deduction should be $684.45. According to ICBC’s Claims Procedure Manual for Accident Benefits, ICBC will only reimburse the use of one’s own vehicle at a rate of .25¢ per kilometre. Therefore, one half of the $1,368.90 awarded at trial, or $684.45, should be deducted for driving expenses.
 

ICBC Denied Access to Plaintiff's Vacation Photos


Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dismissing an ICBC application to compel production of a Plaintiff’s vacation photos.
In the recent case (Dawn-Prince v. Elston) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision.  In the course of her lawsuit she was examined for discovery where she “testified that she had been on these vacations…(and) about her activities on the vacations“.
ICBC brought an application to have access to any photos taken of these holidays.  The Court dismissed this application finding that while canvassing the scope of a Plaintiff’s vacation activities is fair game at discovery production of photos is not required.  In dismissing the application Master McCallum provided the following reasons:
[3]  In the authorities to which I was referred, the court has on some occasions ordered production of photographs in similar circumstances where on vacation…
[4]  The difference in this case is that the plaintiff acknowledges that she engaged in the sporting and physical recreational activities, including the very ones that are referred to in the Fric decision; hiking, scuba diving, and so on.  The photographs that are requested have been reviewed by counsel or someone in cosunsel’s office, Marler, who swears in her affidavit that she reviewed 23 photographs in which the plaintiff was shown and says that they do not depict the plaintiff in strenuous physical activities; rather they depict her standing, sitting, or walking, by the pool, or on the beach…I am satisfied from that evidence that production of this evidence, which is clearly the second stage of documentary discovery contemplated by the Rules, is not appropriate.  These photographs, from the evidence on this application, will not assist the defendant in defending the claim.  The evidence of the plaintiff, of course, with respect tow hat she did on her vacations nay well assist, but the photographs neither contradict nor confirm that.  They show the plaintiff on the evidence in activities that are not inconsistent with anything other than standing, sitting, or walking, none of which she says she cannot do,..
[6]  The application for production of photographs…is dismissed.

"Belt and Suspenders" Exam Denied in Face of Previous Opinion on Plaintiff's Medical Condition

As previously discussed, while the BC Supreme Court Rules permit multi-disciplinary defence medical exams in appropriate circumstances.  Once a Defendant obtains an opinion from a properly qualified expert with respect to the Plaintiff’s alleged injury, a further exam will not be ordered to bolster the opinion of the initial expert.  This is sometimes referred to as the “Belt and Suspenders” principle.  Reasons for judgement were recently published by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, further addressing this issue.
In the recent case (Knowles v. Watters) the Plaintiff alleged she suffered from balance issues including imbalance, dizziness and light-headedness due to a motor vehicle collision.  In support of her case the Plaintiff tendered reports from a neurologist  psychologist, an otolaryngolosit and a general practitioner    The Plaintiff’s otolaryngologist opined that the dizziness issues were “multifactoral” in origin   .
The Plaintiff agreed to see a defence expert who opined that “there was nothing in my evaluation to suggest that she has sustained any injury to her peripheral balance mechanisms, including the inner ear vestibular mechanisms“.  The Defendant then sought  an additional exam with an ENT to further address this issue.  Master McCallum dismissed the application finding the Defendant already had an opinion on the issue and a further expert was not warranted in the circumstances   In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:
[8]             The defendant says that Dr. Moll’s report is restricted to neurological functions, and is not a complete answer or a complete response, if it were looked at in that way, to what Dr. Noel had to say. The defendant says that can only be accomplished by an examination by Dr. Bell.
[9]             In this case the defendant has had the opportunity the authorities require to essentially balance the playing field. Counsel are agreed that the authorities I have been cited are to that effect. The court’s job is to ensure that there is a so-called level playing field or that the parties have the opportunity to deal with the case fairly on the merits.
[10]         The plaintiff here has, as is always the case, the opportunity to visit various specialists and get various reports. The defendant’s opportunity is limited to reports necessary to ensure that a fair trial can be obtained on the merits. In this case it is too fine a distinction to make to say that Dr. Moll, who made a comprehensive examination and gave a comprehensive report on the plaintiff’s balance complaints, can be distinguished from what Dr. Bell might or might not do as an otolaryngologist. There is no evidence to say that Dr. Moll was unable to make the report he did, that if he had had more information he might have made a different report, or indeed that if he had seen Dr. Noel’s report that he might have come to a different conclusion. None of that is the case. The plaintiff has disclosed its reports to date. The defendant has had a fair opportunity to respond to those reports. Dr. Moll’s report is indeed a complete response to Dr. Noel’s report. The plaintiff’s own report from Dr. Noel does not suggest that there is an underlying otolaryngological cause to the plaintiff’s symptoms. He says that the ENG test was normal except for one abnormality that he says is most likely due to other causes. Dr. Noel says the symptoms were multifactorial, not related to one issue. That is at odds with what Dr. Moll has to say, but that is what the jury will have to decide when the case comes to trial.
[11]         This is not a case where the defendant has made out the burden on him to demonstrate that this application is necessary. The application is dismissed. Costs should go as costs in the cause. There is no reason to depart from the usual rule.

Motorist With Right of Way Found 25% at fault for Speeding and Failing to Keep a Proper Lookout

The below decision was upheld in reasons for judgement released in February 2014 by the BC Court of Appeal
_________________________________
As previously discussed, having the right of way is not always enough to escape fault (or partial fault) for a collision.  If a dominant motorist fails to react reasonably in the face of an obvious hazard liability can follow despite having the right of way.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry.
In this week’s case (Currie v. Taylor) the Defendant was travelling down highway 97 near Vernon, BC.  The Plaintiff, approaching from the Defendant’s right, left his stop sign attempting a left hand turn.

The Defendant had the right of way and the Plaintiff’s actions were found to be negligent.  The Defendant, however, was also found at fault for speeding and failing to react reasonably to the obvious hazard that the Plaintiff created.  In assessing the Defendant 25% at fault Mr. Justice Armstrong provided the following reasons:
[48]         The defendant Sharp’s evidence is confusing. He saw the Taxi moving away from the stop line but he did not take any evasive steps during the 10 seconds the Taxi was travelling across Highway 97. He looked into his rear view mirror but he had no time to avoid the accident. He confirmed that his vehicle did not decelerate significantly when he took his foot off the brake before impact; there was no reason that he could not have gone into the right lane before reaching the Intersection…
[128]     The defendant Sharp, travelling 33 km/h over the posted limit, would have reduced the time available to take evasive action or stop and would not have collided with the plaintiff in any event. It seems to me that the defendant Sharp, having seen the plaintiff start before he left the stop line and after, neglected to keep a proper lookout for the emergency that was developing in front of him…
[131]     Neither the defendant Sharp nor Mr. Tuckey had any difficulty in identifying the bright yellow Taxi as it was stopped on Meadowlark Road. The defendant Sharp’s discovery evidence was equivocal as to what he saw before impact. He first testified that he saw the Taxi leaving the stop line and followed it across his path, but then he indicated he had not seen the Taxi after it left the stop line. At that juncture he ought to have been aware the plaintiff might cross over into his lane…
[150]     It is clear that if the defendant Sharp’s speed had been as little as 110 km/h, the plaintiff would have cleared the Intersection without incident. Although speed, in itself, is not necessarily a breach of the standard of care I have concluded that the defendant Sharp’s speed was more than one third higher than the posted limit and his speed that interfered with his ability to take evasive steps. He would have had more time to react to the hazard and could have avoided the accident by steering and/or braking. In the circumstances he could otherwise have performed those manoeuvres which a reasonably careful and skilled driver might have taken. I have concluded that his lack of attention to the Taxi after it left the stop line, coupled with his excessive and unsafe speed, were a breach of his duty of care to the plaintiff…
[183]     In my view the plaintiff was obliged to yield the right-of-way and failed to do so, likely because he did not see the Van which was clearly visible. The defendant Sharp travelled at a speed more than one third above the limit and failed to take any timely measures to avoid the collision. The defendant Sharp also failed to keep a proper lookout and that, combined with his speed, deprived him of the opportunity to avoid the collision. In the end, when he realised that the Taxi was moving in front of him he looked to the right to attempt a lane change but was travelling too fast to be able to change lanes. I conclude that the plaintiff was more blameworthy. I apportion the liability for this collision 75% to the plaintiff and 25% to the defendants.

Non-Pecuniary Assessments for Athletically Active Individuals Discussed


A common focus when assessing non-pecuniary damages deals with looking at recreational activities and how they have been curtailed as a result of physical injuries.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing this in the context of lingering soft tissue injuries.
In last week’s case (Travelbea v. Henrie) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.   Fault was admitted by the Defendant focussing the case on an assessment of damages.   The court found that the Plaintiff suffered a “mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back“.  Her symptoms remained “painful and limiting” at the time of trial and while there was room for further improvement the Court was satisfied that there would still be “residual pain and limitations“.
Prior to the crash the Plaintiff was very fit regularly training for and participating in endurance events.  The injuries had a “significant effect..(on the Plaintiff’s) reasonably demanding athletic endeavours“.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons addressing this loss:
[36]         From the foregoing I conclude the following. The plaintiff sustained a mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back. Now, some four years after the accident, it remains painful and limiting. I think it more likely than not that if she commits to the focused stretching that Dr. Laidlow recommended she will increase her level of functioning. I think it more likely than not that if she takes the course of medication, whether nortriptyline or Celebrex, that Dr. Travlos recommended, she will experience an even greater improvement in her functionality. She will, however, be left with residual pain and limitations. I think it unlikely she will ever be able to ride a road bicycle for any appreciable period of time. As a result both that training and triathlon racing will remain beyond her ability. She may be able to ride a bicycle that can be operated in a more upright posture. I think it more likely than not that she will be able to swim and run, albeit not at the level or for the distance she did previously. I think it also likely that with this improvement in function she will recover some of her self confidence and some of the depression which seems to have settled over her will lift.
[37]         Ms. Travelbea’s injuries have affected her much more significantly than they would someone whose life did not revolve around the kinds of athletic endeavours she and her husband enjoy. Ms. Travelbea enjoyed training and did it four, five or six days a week. She enjoyed training as much or more than competing. It was in the midst of athletic pursuits that she met her husband. Training was a significant part of their relationship. They trained together and often raced together. It was the focus of much of their social activity. Her ability to train and the level of fitness she was able to sustain as a result was an important aspect of her sense of self worth…
[54]         Taking all of the foregoing into account, and having regard to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out at paragraph 46 in Stapley v. Hejslet, I consider that an award of $50,000 is appropriate in this case. Included in this amount is $3,000 which I have determined is the appropriate compensation for the plaintiff’s lost capacity to perform housekeeping tasks.