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ICBC Injury Claims, Trials and Disbursements

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on ICBC Injury Claims, Trials and Disbursements

Generally speaking it can be very expensive to bring an ICBC injury claim to trial in British Columbia.  I’m not talking about lawyers fees here.  There are many very well qualified personal injury lawyers in BC who handle ICBC injury claims on a ‘contingency basis’ and most Plaintiffs with a good claim have the luxury of shopping around finding a lawyer that is the right fit for them.  What I’m referring to is the actual out of pocket cost of bringing a case to trial in the British Columbia Supreme Court.  These are called ‘disbursmemnts’.
Most ICBC injury claims focus heavily on the nature and extent of car accident related injuries.  To properly present such a case in court expert opinion evidence is necessary.  Doctors are entitled to charge fees for providing this service and these fees can quickly get into the thousands of dollars, particularly with complex injury cases such as brain injury claims and chronic pain disorders.  Other fees, such as court filing fees, witness fees, process servers fees, photocopying expenses (these can quickly add up particularly in ICBC jury trials where multiple copies of all exhibits must be made) are also commonly incurred.
Most lawyers that advance ICBC injury claims on a contingency basis fund the disbursements to bring the case to trial.  After judgement the court has certain powers set out in the Rules of Court to award the victorious party their ‘costs and disbursemnts’.  If the parties can’t agree on which disbursements were reasonable an application can be made to the Court to make a ruling.
Reasons for judgment were released today dealing with the issue of ‘reasonable disbursements’ following a BC personal injury claim.  Some of the more interesting expenses allowed, from my perspective, were 3 MRI scans paid for privately through Canadian Medial Imaging.  These were allowed because “(a doctor) clearly did recommend an MRI to try to assess the cause of (the Plaintiff’s) ongoing problems”.  Also, the Trust Administration Fee (a fee lawyers must charge in BC when opening a new file) was held to be reasonable and the Defendant was ordered to pay this cost.  
While this judgement does not create any new law it is worth reviewing to see the types of expenses that are sometimes incurred in prosecuting ICBC injury claims and to see how the BC Supreme Court deals with the issue of reimbursement of these expenses.  If you are advancing an ICBC injury claim in the BC Supreme Court you should keep judgement such as this one in mind when deciding what expenses you will incur while preparing your case for trial.

ICBC Injury Claims "Collateral Benefits" and the Rule Against Double Recovery

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 66 Comments on ICBC Injury Claims "Collateral Benefits" and the Rule Against Double Recovery

Imagine if you are injured through the fault of another BC motorist and become disabled from work.  You are lucky enough to have wage loss disability benefits through your employment (or your spouse’s employment). When you advance your ICBC injury claim are you entitled to claim your past wage loss or will you be prohibited in claiming this money from ICBC because you already received money for past wage loss from your private insurer?  The short answer is you can claim this money provided that you paid some consideration for receipt of your private insurance benefits.  
Reasons for judgment were released this week by the BC Supreme Court dealing with the ‘private insurance’ exception to the rule against ‘double recovery’ in BC tort claims.
In this case the Plaintiff was injured in a BC car crash.  She needed therapies to treat her injuries.  The cost of these therapies were covered largely through an extended health plan through her husband’s employment.   The issue to be decided at trial was whether the Plaintiff could recover the actual costs of her therapies or only that portion not covered by the private insurer.
Madam Justice Bruce summarized the law addressing the ‘private insurance’ exception to the rule against double recovery as follows:

[7]                The general rule in an action for damages arising out of negligence is that the plaintiff is only entitled to be restored to the position she would have been in had the accident not occurred. The plaintiff is awarded damages for her actual loss and no more: Cunningham at para. 5 per McLachlin J. (dissenting in part)

[8]                The law has recognized a limited exception to the rule against double recovery which is referred to as the “private insurance” exception. In Cunningham at para. 75 Mr. Justice Cory, speaking for the majority, adopts the following passage from Bradburn v. Great Western Rail Co., [1874-80] All E.R. 195 as accurately describing the underlying rationale for the exception:

… I think that there would be no justice or principle in setting off an amount which the plaintiff has entitled himself to under a contract of insurance, such as any prudent man would make on the principle of, as the expression is, “laying away for a rainy day”. He pays the premiums upon a contract which, if he meets with an accident, entitles him to receive a sum of money. It is not because he meets with the accident, but because he made a contract with, and paid premiums to, the insurance company, for that express purpose, that he gets the money from them. …and I think that it ought not, upon any principle of justice, to be deducted from the amount of damages proved to have been sustained by him through the negligence of the defendant.

[9]                Whether the plaintiff has paid for private insurance or has obtained these benefits through an employment contract, the exception will apply. It is also irrelevant that it is the plaintiff’s husband who secured these benefits. See, Brennan at para. 182-3. However, the onus rests with the plaintiff to prove he or she has paid for the provision of insurance benefits in some fashion. As Cory J. says in Cunningham at para. 94:

In my view, Ratych v. Bloomer, supra, simply placed an evidentiary burden upon plaintiffs to establish that they had paid for the provision of disability benefits. I think the manner of payment may be found, for example, in evidence pertaining to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement just as clearly as in a direct payroll deduction.

[10]            There is no evidence before the court as to what, if any, consideration passed between Mr. Napoleone and his employer in respect of the extended health benefits. There is no evidence of whether Mr. Napoleone pays all or a portion of the insurance cost or whether it was negotiated as a part of a collective bargaining scheme. The only evidence before the court is that the plan was secured through Mr. Napoleone’s employer and it covers 80% of Mrs. Napoleone’s health related expenses.

[11]            Without an evidentiary foundation to support the claim, I am unable to apply the private insurance exception to the case at hand. As Cory J. says at para. 93 of Cunningham, it is only when this evidentiary requirement is met that the court may be satisfied the plaintiff has shown the prudence and corresponding deprivation that underlies the exception and permits double recovery.

[12]            For these reasons, I must dismiss Ms. Napoleone’s claim for the gross cost of the special expenses.

This case shows that it is essential to lead evidence at trial that there was some cost associated with being entitled to receive the collateral benefits to be able to receive compensation for the losses those benefits covered in an ICBC tort claim.  This can be done in any number of ways such as showing deductions from a paycheque to pay for a private insurance plan or showing that the private insurance was negotiated from the employer at the expense of some salary.  This is a particulary important matter to think about when preparing for trial if you signed a ‘reimbursement agreement’ with you private insurer to pay back the benefits.  

Pain and Suffering and Your ICBC Claim

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One of the most common questions asked of me through this blog is “how much is my Pain and Suffering worth in my ICBC personal injury tort claim?”.  The answer to this, of course, depends on various factors and who better to discuss these than a BC Supreme Court judge?
On that point, reasons for judgement were released today discussing the law of ‘pain and suffering’ in tort claims.  Pain and Suffering is awarded under the legal head of damage called “Non-Pecuniary Loss”.  Non Pecuniary Loss includes damages for “pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”.
In today’s case $70,000 was awarded in non-pecuniary damages as a result injuries sustained in a 2005 BC car crash.  In doing so Madam Justice Russell summarized the law of non-pecuniary damages ar paragraphs 104-105 of the judgment as follows:

Non-pecuniary damages

[104]        The purpose of non-pecuniary damage awards is to compensate the plaintiff for “pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”: Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023, B.C.J. No. 1535 at para. 134; see also Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Kuskis v. Tin, 2008 BCSC 862, B.C.J. No. 1248.  While each award must be made with reference to the particular circumstances and facts of the case, other cases may serve as a guide to assist the court in arriving at an award that is just and fair to both parties: Kuskis at para. 136. 

[105]        There are a number of factors that courts must take into account when assessing this type of claim.  The majority judgment in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 19, outlines a number of factors to consider, at para. 46:

The inexhaustive list of common factors cited in Boyd [Boyd v. Harris, 2004 BCCA 146] that influence an award of non-pecuniary damages includes:

(a)      age of the plaintiff;

(b)      nature of the injury;

(c)      severity and duration of pain;

(d)      disability;

(e)      emotional suffering; and

(f)      loss or impairment of life;

I would add the following factors, although they may arguably be subsumed in the above list:

(g)      impairment of family, marital and social relationships;

(h)      impairment of physical and mental abilities;

(i)       loss of lifestyle; and

(j)       the plaintiff’s stoicism (as a factor that should not, generally speaking, penalize the plaintiff: Giang v. Clayton, [2005] B.C.J. No. 163, 2005 BCCA 54 (B.C. C.A.)).

Cases such as this one are key in helping one understand the principles behind awards for pain and suffering in ICBC tort claims.  Once the general principles of this head of damage are understood, the extent of injuries and prognosis known, and cases with similar injuries are canvassed the easier it will be to value the potential range of damages for pain and suffering in an ICBC personal injury (tort) claim.

ICBC Personal Injury Claims, Lawyers and Trust

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I have previously written about some practical things to consider for people wishing to  fire their ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer.

Today while stuck at the Kelowna Airport waiting to fly back to Victoria and got to chatting with a fellow traveler who was contemplating firing his accountant.  Hearing this and the reasons for it made me think of sharing some further thoughts on the topic of hiring/firing an ICBC Claims Lawyer.  And being stuck in an airport I have plenty of time to do so!

Trust.  Trust is the most important factor in having a successful relationship with your ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer.  Trial experience, past settlement results, experience with your type of case, whether your lawyer sometimes acts for ICBC, whether your lawyer signed the SAA are all very important factors to consider when hiring an ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer but nothing can undo a relationship between a lawyer and client faster than lack of trust.

Your ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer will have to give you advice on many topic most importantly, advice on what a fair range of settlement is.  If you don’t trust that your lawyer is taking your claim seriously and don’t trust his/her advice it will be difficult if not impossible to make an informed decision regarding whether to settle your ICBC injury claim or proceed to trial.

Settlement offers are made in almost all ICBC personal injury claims.  Your lawyer’s job is to give you advice on the merits of any offer and to offer a ‘risk assessment’ about the potential benefits and pitfalls of trial.  You must trust that your ICBC Injury Lawyer is giving you good advice otherwise you risk making a poor decision.  If you don’t trust your lawyer your decision-making ability will be compromised and this can lead to very unfair results.  For example you may take a settlement offer that your lawyer says is unfair because you don’t trust his/her judgment or on the other hand you could proceed to trial, lose and face significant ‘costs’ consequences after failing to heed advice that an ICBC settlement offer is fair and should be seriously considered.

Trust goes to the heart of a lawyer/client relationship and if this is missing then a claim may be compromised.  So what can be done?  If there is a lack of trust the first and most important thing you should do is communicate this to your lawyer.  Try to work through the problem.  Make your lawyer make time for you.  Most ICBC Injury Claims Lawyers work on a contingency basis meaning they don’t bill you for every phone call, e-mail or meeting.  Make time to sit down and speak with your lawyer and work through any perceived problems.  This will likely cost you nothing and can go a long way to building up a mutual trust which will help your lawyer get a good result for you.

 If, after all reasonable efforts, you still can’t build a level of trust in your lawyer you will need to seriously consider retaining new counsel.

The bottom line is this: If you run into problems in your legal relationship you should talk to your lawyer.  He/she works for you and you are entitled to have all of your questions answered.  Put effort into working things through.  If things can’t be worked out consider moving on.  You don’t want to second guess yourself when you decide if and how you resolve your ICBC Personal Injury Claim.

Rule 37 Dies a Natural Death

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 43 Comments on Rule 37 Dies a Natural Death

As most frequent visitors to this blog know, Rule 37 of the BC Supreme Court Rules (the rule that dealt with formal settlement offers and costs consequences in BC Supreme Court trials including ICBC personal injury claims) was replaced this summer with Rule 37B.  Rule 37B builds in a lot of judicial discretion in the process of awarding ‘costs’ to litigants where a formal offer was made compared to the old Rule 37 which had strict consequences resulting when a formal offer was made and beat at trial.
In what will likely be one of the last BC court cases dealing with the old Rule 37, unanimous reasons for judgment were released today by a 5 member panel of the BC Court of Appeal ruling that the old Rule 37 is not incompatible with the Negligence Act and both can work in harmony.
In this case the Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision.  Pre-Trial the Defendant made a settlement offer under the old Rule 37 for $150,000.    The Plaintiff rejected this offer and proceeded to trial.  The trial judge found that the Plaintiff was 50% at fault and awarded damages of just over $56,000.
Having found that the Plaintiff was 50% at fault he awarded her 50% of her costs to the date the formal offer was made by the Defendant.  Since the Defendants ‘beat’ their formal offer the Court ordered that the Plaintiff pay all of the Defendants Tariff costs from the date of the formal offer through to trial.   This award of costs was apparently so significant that the Plaintiff ended up owing the Defendant money.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing that Rule 37 was in conflict with the Negligence Act, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

2.         The awarding of damage or loss in every action to which section 1 applies is governed by the following provisions:

(a)        the damage or loss, if any, sustained by each person shall be ascertained and expressed in dollars;

(b)        the degree to which each person was at fault shall be ascertained and expressed as a percentage of the total fault;

(c)        as between each person who has sustained damage or loss and each other person who is liable to make good the damage or loss, the person sustaining the damage or loss shall be entitled to recover from that other person the percentage of the damage or loss sustained as corresponds to the degree of fault of that other person;

(d)        as between 2 persons each of whom has sustained damage or loss and is entitled to recover a percentage of it from the other, the amounts to which they are respectively entitled shall be set off one against the other, and if either person is entitled to a greater amount than the other, he shall have judgment against that other for the excess.

3.         Unless the court otherwise directs, the liability for costs of the parties to every action shall be in the same proportion as their respective liability to make good the damage or loss. The provisions of section 2 governing the awarding of damage or loss apply, with the necessary changes and so far as applicable, to the awarding of costs, with the further provision that where, as between 2 persons, one is entitled to a judgment for an excess of damage or loss and the other to a judgment for an excess of costs there shall be a further set off of the respective amounts and judgment shall be given accordingly.

The relevant of the old Rule 37 read as follows:

R. 37(24) read:

37(24)  If the defendant has made an offer to settle a claim for money, and it has not expired or been withdrawn or been accepted,

(a)        if the plaintiff obtains judgment for the amount of money specified in the offer or a lesser amount, the plaintiff is entitled to costs assessed to the date the offer was delivered, and the defendant is entitled to costs assessed from that date.

(b)        if the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, the defendant is entitled to costs assessed to the date the offer was delivered and to double costs assessed from that date.

The Plaintiff asked the Court of Appeal to find that Rule 37 was trumped by the Negligence Act and to adjust the costs award accordingly.
The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument finding that Rule 37 and the Negligence Act are not in conflict with each other and can stand together.  The Courts key analysis is set out at Paragraph 29 of the Reasons which I set out below:
[29]            I do not find this analysis altogether persuasive.  I would have thought that the Act, as superior legislation to the Rules, would be looked to first to determine each parties’ liability for costs in a situation to which s. 2 of the Act applies, and that R. 37, as an item of subordinate legislation, would then be applied if possible. Applying the classic definition of “conflict” – whether the two laws can “stand together and … operate without either interfering with the other” (see Tabernacle Permanent Building Society v. Knight [1892] A.C. 298 (H.L.) at 302, and the leading Canadian case, Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 42) – however, I agree with the Court’s conclusion in Smith v. Knudsenthat s. 3 of the Negligence Act and R. 37(24) do not conflict.  I reach this conclusion not only on the basis of the opening phrase of s. 3, but also on a close construction of the Act.  As was held in Flatley, the phrase “person sustaining the damage or loss” in s. 2(c) is apt to refer only to the plaintiff in any case in which the defendant sustained no injury or damage.  Section 3 states that each party’s liability for costs shall be in the same proportion as his or her liability to make good the damage or loss.  Having sustained no damage or loss, the defendant has no ‘entitlement’ to recovery under s. 2(c) and thus his or her liability for costs does not “track” under s. 3.  As McFarlane J.A. stated in Lutes, s. 2(c) “does not provide for the awarding of damages as between persons who are at fault.  This sub-section cannot apply to entitle [a defendant] to recover anything because he has sustained no damage or loss.”  (Supra, at 466.)
This will be, in all likelihood, one of the last judgements dealing with the old Rule 37.  I look forward to continue reporting on judgements dealing with the new Rule 37B particularly in the context of ICBC injury claims.

ICBC Injury Claims, the Low Velocity Impact Program, and Human Rights in BC

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized.

Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court dealing with ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Program (LVI Program) and Human Rights complaints.
The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle collision 2004.  This collision fell into ICBC’s LVI program and they defended the claim of the Plaintiff in accordance with that LVI program that ICBC had in place at the time.  Mr. Justice Wilson, summarized the program as follows:

[5]                On 12 March 2004, Mr. Yuan was involved in a road traffic incident.  A vehicle driven by another motorist collided with the rear end of Mr. Yuan’s vehicle while Mr. Yuan was stopped at a red light.  The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia is the liability carrier for the other motorist.

[6]                It appears to be common ground that, in addition to a contractual duty the Corporation had to its insured other motorist, to adjust this claim, there was a statutory duty the Corporation owed to Mr. Yuan to adjust the claim.  Mr. Yuan did make a claim for personal injuries he alleged he received as a result of the incident.  The Corporation, therefore, commenced its adjustment of Mr. Yuan’s claim.

[7]                At all material times, the Corporation had a policy, among others, based upon an analysis of the physical forces generated by the collision of motor vehicles.  The Corporation determined that in the ordinary course of events, a collision which resulted from a deceleration of less than eight kilometres per hour would not cause damage or injury to human tissue.  That was a rebuttable presumption.  But if a collision was determined by the Corporation to involve what is called a “low velocity impact” phenomena, then it was adjusted according to, among other things, an expedited procedure.

[8]                In this case, the Corporation did determine that the collision involved a low velocity impact between the two motorcars.  Accordingly, Mr. Yuan’s claim was assigned to the procedures and practices applicable for low velocity impact claims.  It is a part of the policies and practices that once the matter is precipitated into this low velocity impact procedure, that the adjuster go about determining whether or not there is information or evidence that will rebut the presumption.  That is to say, could the injury complained of be plausibly caused by the collision.

[9]                In this case, the Corporation determined that there was no information which rebutted the presumption at the time of the investigation and on 4 May 2004, the Corporation’s representative informed Mr. Yuan by letter that the Corporation would not consider any payments with respect to his claim against its insured for injuries arising from the incident.

The Respondent brought a human rights complaint alleging that the LVI program constituted ‘discriminatory practice‘.
ICBC brought a motion to dismiss the human rights complaint on the basis that the complaint was filed out of time and that ‘the complaint had no reasonable prospect for success‘.
The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed ICBC’s application.  ICBC appealed to the BC Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Wilson agreed with ICBC and concluded that the Respondent’s application had no reasonable prospect of success.  His key findings were made at 46-52 which I reproduce below:

[46]            As the tribunal said in Ingram, there would have to be some allegation that the complainant “has been discriminated against on the basis of disability in order for a potentially valid human rights complaint to exist.  In other words, a complainant must allege facts that, if proven, would establish that they have been in some way adversely affected by reason of their disability.”  The member did not do that analysis.  I do.  There is no evidence that Mr. Yuan had his claim adjusted under the low velocity impact guidelines because he was physically or mentally disabled.  Indeed, the member found that any information or evidence with respect to his then existing state of health was not relevant to his considerations.

[47]            Second, the information before me, which was the same as the information before the member, is that Mr. Yuan was placed into the low velocity impact adjustment guidelines because the Corporation determined that the collision was a low velocity impact type.  It had nothing to do with any physical or mental characteristic of Mr. Yuan.

[48]            Third, there is no evidence of specifically how this particular method of adjusting a claim adversely affects Mr. Yuan.  The evidence is clear.  The complaint was received.  The determination was made that it was a low velocity impact.  Inquiries were made into the nature of the injury complained of, and a determination was made that it was implausible that this kind of a collision would cause the injuries complained of.  It was simply a matter of causation.  Based on the analysis the Corporation had done, it made a rebuttal presumption that there probably would not be injury to human tissue in the ordinary course of events, but if there was evidence to rebut the presumption, it was open to the complainant to bring that evidence forward.  Which Mr. Yuan eventually did do.

[49]            This complainant, Mr. Yuan, will not be able to establish that this Corporation put him into the low velocity impact adjustment process on the basis of his physical or mental disability or on the basis that it perceived him to be not disabled.  Therefore, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect that his complaint against the Corporation will succeed under s. 27(1)(c) of theHuman Rights Code.

[50]            What the member did, however, as I say, was to set up a straw man.  What he said was, Mr. Yuan is treated differently because the Corporation perceives that he is not, or is less likely to be, injured or disabled.  So what attracts s. 8, according to the member, is not that there is discrimination against Mr. Yuan because of physical or mental disability but, rather, Mr. Yuan is discriminated against because the Corporation perceives him to not be physically or mentally disabled.

[51]            I agree with Ms. Westmacott.  That is to tip the analysis on its head.  To accept that notion seems to me to pound another nail into the coffin of common sense.

[52]            Those are my reasons.

I don’t write this post to support ICBC’s LVI program in any way.  I strive to have this blog comment on all ICBC cases of interest whether or not the results are pro Plaintiff or pro ICBC.  In my opinion the LVI program is designed to minimize claims costs and has little connection to whether or not injuries occur in a collision.  
Our courts deal with ICBC LVI claims frequently and the LVI archives of this website provide a good glimpse into how BC courts deal with LVI tort claims.  Nonetheless, this is an interesting judgement dealing with the unique allegation that the LVI program is somehow discriminatory. 

Loss of Vehicle Control due to Medical Issues and ICBC Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, Uncategorized.

In my years of practice as an ICBC Injury Claims lawyer I have seen my share of unique cases.
One type of case that I have always found interesting and challenging are those dealing with the issue of fault when someone becomes ill behind the wheel and as a result is involved in a motor vehicle collision.
What if a driver loses control of a vehicle due to a heart attack and injures others?  What if the driver has a stroke or a seizure?  What if a driver blacks out due to a medical condition and injures others?  Can the innocent victims make an ICBC tort claim for pain and suffering in these circumstances?  The answer is it depends.
The ability to make a tort claim in negligence for pain and suffering revolves around the issue of fault.  If someone loses control of their vehicle due to a medical condition they may not be at fault for the collision.  The issue is whether the driver who lost control knew or should have known that he/she was at risk for losing control of their vehicle.  If a driver has every reason to believe he/she is medically fit when getting behind the wheel and then suffers an unexpected medical event which leads to a car accident they may not be at fault.  This can be contrasted where someone forgets to take prescription medication which exposes them to the risk of seizure and then ends up in a car accident.  In the latter case liability is much more likely.  The challenging cases lie in the big grey area in between these 2 hypothetical scenarios.
There are many details that need to be explored when determining whether a driver who injures others due to a medical condition is at fault.  When ICBC tort claims are denied in such circumstances it is important to explore the drivers fitness to drive and get to the bottom of what he/she knew or should have known about their fitness prior to getting behind the wheel.

$30,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages awarded in Minimal Damage Collision

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court awarding a Plaintiff just over $40,000 in total damages as a result of a 2003 motor vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff was stopped at a stop sign in Surrey, BC when her vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant.  The issue of fault was not disputed.  What was disputed was whether the Plaintiff was injured in this crash and if so what the amount of her damages ought to be.
This case seems to be one that fit ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact (LVI) criteria.  The vehicles involved had very little damage.  Evidence was called from an insurance estimator who testified that there was nothing more than cosmetic damage to the vehicle and the repair estimate was slightly more than $500.  It is a frequent strategy of ICBC defence lawyers to focus on the amount of vehicle damage in LVI cases and this strategy appears to have been employed in this trial.
Despite the LVI-nature of this crash the Plaintiff satisfied the court she sustained injuries.  The Court was impressed with the Plaintiff and made the following finding:
[43]            I find that Ms. Orrell is an honest witness and accept her evidence of the event and the injuries that she sustained.  I am satisfied that she was injured in the collision, and that, as a consequence, she experienced pain and discomfort and disruption to her usual activities.  Those have not fully resolved at the time of trial.
Mr. Justice Williams summarized the injuries as follows in concluding that $30,000 was fair for the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering (non-pecuniary damages) 
[51]             The accident and the resultant injuries caused a reasonably significant measure of pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life for Ms. Orrell following the event.  Considering both her evidence and the first report of Dr. Miki, that effect was most pronounced for a period of approximately six months, but continued, albeit in a less debilitating way, up to the point of trial.  It has impacted on her participation in many endeavours, including being physically active in such pastimes as running, going to the gym, gardening, ordinary household tasks and, importantly, being as active with her son as she otherwise would have been. As I have indicated earlier, there are however other factors that must be taken into account, including her pre-accident status and her pregnancy in 2006.  Both of those contributed to her discomfort too.
Cases like this one show time and time again that the extent of vehicle damage does not determine what a person’s tortious injuries are worth in British Columbia, rather medical evidence is key in valuing ICBC injury tort claims.

ICBC Claims and Litigation Privilege

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on ICBC Claims and Litigation Privilege

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court ordering the production of certain documents that the defendants claimed were exempt from disclosure due to ‘litigation privilege.’
The Plaintiff suffered severe head injuries when struck as a pedestrian in 2006.   In the course of her lawsuit her lawyer served the defendants with a Demand for Discovery of Documents.  In exchanging their List of Documents the Defendants claimed ‘litigation privilege’ over some of the documents.  The Plaintiff brought motion to compel production of these documents and largely succeeded with the court holding that:
the defendants failed to provide sufficient information to enable the plaintiff to assess whether the defendants were correctly claiming litigation privilege over each of the documents found in P3 to P9 of their list of documents.
In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Blair provided a great overview of the legal principles relating to a claim of litigation privilege which I reproduce below:

[5]                Litigation privilege extends to those documents prepared for the dominant purpose of preparing for ongoing or reasonably anticipated litigation as discussed in Hamalainen (Committee of) v. Sippola, [1991] B.C.J. No. 3614; 2 W.W.R. 132; 9 B.C.A.C. 254; 62 B.C.L.R. (2d) 254.  Wood J.A. (as he then was) for the Court of Appeal stated at ¶18 that the two following factual findings required answering to determine whether litigation privilege applied to a document:

(a)        Was litigation in reasonable prospect at the time the document was produced, and

(b)        If so, what was the dominant purpose for the document’s production?

[6]                Wood J.A. held that the onus is on the party claiming privilege to establish on a balance of probabilities that both tests are met in connection each of the documents for which the party claimed litigation privilege.  With respect to the first factual finding, Wood J.A. wrote at ¶20 that

. . . litigation can properly be said to be in reasonable prospect when a reasonable person, possessed of all pertinent information including that peculiar to one party or the other, would conclude it is unlikely that the claim for loss will be resolved without it. The test is not one that will be particularly difficult to meet.

[7]                With respect to the second factual finding Wood J.A. wrote:

21.       A more difficult question to resolve is whether the dominant purpose of the author, or the person under whose direction each document was prepared, was “… [to use] it or its contents in order to obtain legal advice or to conduct or aid in the conduct of litigation …”.

22.       When this Court adopted the dominant purpose test, it did so in response to a similar move by the House of Lords in Waugh v. British Railways Board, [1980] A.C. 521. In that case the majority opinion is to be found in the speech of Lord Wilberforce, who agreed “in substance” with the dissenting judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in the Court below. While the Court of Appeal judgments do not appear to have been reported, some excerpts from Lord Denning’s opinion are to be found in the speech of Lord Edmund-Davies, including the following at p.541 of the report:

If material comes into being for a dual purpose — one to find out the cause of the accident — the other to furnish information to the solicitor — it should be disclosed, because it is not then ‘wholly or mainly’ for litigation. On this basis all the reports and inquiries into accidents — which are made shortly after the accident — should be disclosed on discovery and made available in evidence at the trial.

23.       At the heart of the issue in the British Railways Board case was the fact that there was more than one identifiable purpose for the production of the report for which privilege was claimed. The result of the decision was to reject both the substantial purpose test previously adhered to by the English Court of Appeal and the sole purpose test which by then had been adopted by the majority of the Australian High Court in Grant v. Downs.

24.       Even in cases where litigation is in reasonable prospect from the time a claim first arises, there is bound to be a preliminary period during which the parties are attempting to discover the cause of the accident on which it is based. At some point in the information gathering process the focus of such an inquiry will shift such that its dominant purpose will become that of preparing the party for whom it was conducted for the anticipated litigation. In other words, there is a continuum which begins with the incident giving rise to the claim and during which the focus of the inquiry changes. At what point the dominant purpose becomes that of furthering the course of litigation will necessarily fall to be determined by the facts peculiar to each case.

[8]                The dominant purpose test in the context of litigation privilege came before the Supreme Court of Canada in Blank v. Canada, 2006 SCC 39.  Fish J. for the majority noted at ¶60 that the dominant purposes standard was consistent with the notion that the litigation privilege should be viewed as a limited exception to the principle of full disclosure.

More on BC Supreme Court 'Costs' and ICBC Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

Except in certain circumstances (such as where formal settlement offers are bested at trial under Rule 37B) a Plaintiff who succeeds in an ICBC injury claim in the BC Supreme Court is entitled to ‘costs’ (money paid under a Tariff system to compensate the successful litigant for the fact that they had to engage the BC Supreme Court process to achieve justice).  However, if a Plaintiff receives a sum of money within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court (currently set at $25,000) then they typically are not entitled to costs.  Specifically, BC Supreme Court Rule 57(10) reads as follows:
A plaintiff who recovers a sum within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act is not entitled to costs, other than disbursements, unless the court finds that there was sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court and so orders.
Today, reasons for judgement were released awarding a Plaintiff Costs even though the judgement received was below $25,000.
The Plaintiff claimed injuries as a result of a BC motor vehicle accident.  After trial the claim succeeded and damages just below $25,000 were awarded.  In finding that the Plaintiff had ‘sufficient reason for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court’ and thus entitled to costs Madam Justice Dardi held as follows:

[10]            Accordingly, the plaintiff must establish that as at May 31, 2007 when she commenced her action, she had sufficient reason for bringing the claim in the Supreme Court.  When these proceedings were issued, the plaintiff was working full-time but continued to attend at physiotherapy treatments prescribed by her doctor.  She attended 13 treatments from May 4, 2007 to September 5, 2007.  On May 7, 2007, Dr. McGregor continued to note a decrease in neck flexion and tenderness to palpitation of the left shoulder muscles.  The medical-legal report tendered by plaintiff’s counsel is dated September 15, 2007.  In that report, the prognosis was that the plaintiff’s condition would gradually settle over the next 12 to 24 months and her injury was not likely to cause any permanent disability.

[11]            Given that the plaintiff did not have a medical-legal report at the time of the initiation of the action, nor had the defendant tendered any expert medical opinion, her counsel was not in a position to assess the quantum of general damages that may be awarded: Tucker v. Brown, 2008 BCSC 734.  As at May 31, 2007, in all the circumstances, there was a real and reasonable prospect that the plaintiff’s recoverable damages would exceed the Provincial Court jurisdiction.  Furthermore, unlike Walia, at the time of filing the proceedings, liability was not admitted; rather, the plaintiff had been informed that her claim was denied pursuant to the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia Low Velocity Impact Guidelines.

[12]            I have also considered the following comments of Mr. Justice Chiasson in Reimann at para. 35:

In my view, the approach generally taken by the Supreme Court is too limited.  It overemphasizes the policy of encouraging parties to proceed in the Provincial Court, but fails to consider the equally compelling policy consideration that parties are entitled to have respected their legitimate choice of forum.

[13]            In Bhanji v. Quezada, 2003 BCCA 445, 185 B.C.A.C. 301 at para. 9, the Court provided some guidance as to what would justify a plaintiff’s decision to proceed in the Supreme Court:

The purpose of R. 57(10) is to encourage actions to be brought and continued in Provincial Court when there is no sufficient reason to expect that the claim might give rise to damages in excess of $10,000.  That is sometimes a difficult decision for a plaintiff or his solicitor to make.  If the plaintiff decides to proceed in Supreme Court he must be prepared to justify that decision in the event he recovers less than $10,000.  In many cases, where there is sufficient medical or other evidence capable of supporting the larger claim, it will not be too difficult to justify the decision, especially if the damage award approaches the Provincial Court limit.  [emphasis added]

[14]            The award in this case is $24,263.47 prior to pre-judgment interest.

[15]            In summary, I have concluded that at the time the proceedings were commenced, there was a real and reasonable prospect that the plaintiff’s recoverable damages would exceed the Provincial Court jurisdiction.  The fact that the actual amount of the damages awarded to the plaintiff is very close to the Provincial Court limit supports this conclusion.  I am satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient reason for bringing her action in the Supreme Court.  I order that the plaintiff is entitled to costs under Appendix B at Scale B.