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ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Claims Round Up

As usual its been a busy week with ICBC Injury Claims in the BC Supreme Court.  In addition to the previous claims I’ve posted about this week the BC Supreme Court released reasons for judgement on 3 ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Claims late this week.
The first case (Jacobsen v. Beaton) involved a 66 year old Plaintiff who was involved in an intersection crash in Smithers, BC.  This was a significant crash which caused the Plaintiff’s vehicle to spin 270 degrees before coming to a stop.
All that was at issue in this claim was the value of the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages.  The Court made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries:

(a)        That posterior ligament damage to the neck may be caused by sudden hyperflexion from a high impact blow;

(b)        That the collision in question was sudden and high impact, causing Mr. Jacobsen’s neck to flex and extend;

(c)        That post-collision x-rays showed a widening between two vertebrae consistent with torn posterior ligaments;

(d)        That post-collision range-of-motion testing showed increased neck flexion relative to neck extension, consistent with torn posterior ligaments;

(e)        That when posterior neck ligaments are ruptured, the neck is destablized and the trapezius muscles are overworked to compensate for the damaged ligaments;

(f)        That when the trapezius muscles in the neck are overworked they become stiff and painful;

(g)        That after the collision Mr. Jacobsen suffered from tight and sore trapezius muscles, for which massage provided only temporary relief;

(h)        That torn ligaments do not spontaneously heal; and,

(i)         That prior to the collision Mr. Jacobsen did not suffer from neck pain.

In making an award of $50,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages the court made the following analysis:

[26]            In the instant case the two most compelling facts are the permanence of the injury and the pervasiveness of the impact of the pain upon Mr. Jacobsen’s enjoyment of life.

[27]            Mr. Jacobsen will live with the injury and the pain it causes for the rest of his days.  He is a fit and healthy senior citizen who clearly anticipates living many more years.  The pain he suffers from his neck injury has a pervasive effect on his life because it chronically deprives him of a restful sleep.  He begins his days feeling weary and drained rather than rested and energetic.  This compromised start affects all aspects of his daily life.  It has taken the lustre off his so-called golden years.

[28]            In all the circumstances, and with due regard for the awards in other cases, I am satisfied that $50,000 would represent a fair non-pecuniary damages award for Mr. Jacobsen.

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The second ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Case released this week(Rochon v. Mott) involved a 36 year old Plaintiff who was involved in an intersection crash in December, 2005.  The Plaintiff suffered mild – moderate soft tissue injuries and the court made the following findings with respect to these:

[29]            At the time of trial Ms. Rochon was 4 years post-accident and still experiencing intermittent pain in her neck, mid back and low back.  There are no objective findings with respect to her injuries.

[30]            I found Ms. Rochon to be a straight-forward witness and she was unshaken on cross-examination. 

[31]            While she had moved from a more physical, demanding position at the Hart Wheel Inn, going first to a different restaurant and then to her present employment with the Credit Union, it is somewhat noteworthy that after commencing employment in September 2008 at the Credit Union she took on 1 shift per week, again at the Hart Wheel Inn, where she testified she had experienced pain as a result of the additional physical work required at that location.  She works 1 shift on Sunday and, although describing the work as quite physical and aggravating to her neck, she took the job because of financial need….

[33]            I have concluded that the plaintiff suffered mild to moderate whiplash as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident.  The plaintiff took a month off from a physically demanding job and completed the minimum number of physiotherapy treatments at the CBI program.  While there are minor inconsistencies in her testimony, I do not find any hidden agenda on the part of the plaintiff but the fact remains that physical observations by her family doctor and by the personnel at the CBI centre indicate more progress than what the plaintiff has testified to in her oral testimony. 

[34]            She has been able to continue to live her life despite some ongoing pain that occurs occasionally when she is physically active.  While she has had to give up the stress releasing activity of belly dancing she has not, since the accident, attempted to replace it with something else, although to some extent she may have replaced it with her involvement in her fiancé’s car racing.  One concern is that following her attendance on Dr. Mah in August 2006 no other appointment was made with respect to her complaints relating to the motor vehicle accident following September 5, 2006 when an ICBC report was completed until March 5, 2008, which I infer from Dr. Mah’s letter was made as a result of Ms. Rochon’s counsel requesting a medical report on January 23, 2008.

On these facts the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages were assessed at $23,000 by Mr. Justice Chamberlist.

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The last ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Claim judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court (Hutchinson v. Cozzi) involved a rear-end collision in June, 2005.   The Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries throughout his back which continued to flare up occasionally by the time of trial.  The court summarized the injuries as follows:

[25]            I find that the plaintiff sustained significant injury to his neck, mid-back, and lower back.  He has testified to these injuries and much of what he says is supported by other testimony.  Several practitioners found objective signs upon palpitation.  Two found his body type susceptible to such injuries.  I find that he has, despite his frequent tardiness and some missed appointments, worked hard at following his health practitioners’ advice about exercise and treatment directed at significant recovery.  I also find that the injuries were disabling for a period of approximately six months, and continued on for some time thereafter, limiting him to light forms of work.  

[26]            I am satisfied that he is now able to perform the tasks necessary for a gas fitter.  I conclude he is not completely recovered, for he now has occasional or sporadic pain which has become chronic.  While compensable, it is no longer significant in the sense of significant impact upon his ability to work or his recreational activities….

[34]            Taking into account the injuries to the plaintiff in this case, the fact that they are almost completely resolved but for periodic flare-ups of pain which I have concluded will not result in any significant loss of work, I assess non-pecuniary damages at $40,000.

ICBC Injury Claims and Future Wage Loss

One of the most difficult types of damages to value when a person sustains serious and permanent injuries through the fault of another in a BC Car Crash is that of ‘Future Wage Loss’.
Courts in British Columbia often view a person’s ability to earn a living as a ‘capital asset’ and if disabling injuries are sustained then that capital asset becomes diminished.  Accordingly BC Courts often assess damages for future wage loss as damages for a ‘diminished earning capacity’.
The basic principles that courts consider in awarding damages for ‘diminished earning capacity’ were set out almost 25 years ago in a BC Supreme Court case named Brown v. Golaiy,  These factors are as follows:

The means by which the value of the lost, or impaired, asset is to be assessed varies of course from case to case. Some of the considerations to take into account in making that assessment include whether:

1.      The plaintiff has been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment;

2.      The plaintiff is less marketable or attractive as an employee to potential employers;

3.      The plaintiff has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have been open to him, had he not been injured; and

4.      The plaintiff is less valuable to himself as a person capable of earning income in a competitive labour market.

In 2007, in a case named Steward v. Berezan, the BC Court of Appeal rejected a trial judges award for diminished earning capacity stating that “… The claimant bears the onus to prove at trial a substantial possibility of a future event leading to an income loss, and the court must then award compensation on an estimation of the chance that the event will occur…

Ever since Berezan many ICBC Injury Defence Lawyers have argued that the law has changed since Brown v. Golaiy and that there is a higher burden to reach before damages for future wage loss can be awarded.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Ashmore v. Banicevic) dealing with this argument and concluding that the factors set out in Brown v. Golaiy remain good law.  In a thorough analysis Madam Justice Smith gave the following reasons:

[140]          While a literal reading of that statement might indicate a change in the law, embodying an express direction to inquire first into whether there is a substantial possibility of future income loss before embarking on assessment of the loss (see Chang v. Feng, 2008 BCSC 49; 55 C.C.L.T. (3d) 203, and Naidu v. Mann, 2007 BCSC 1313, 53 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1), the Court of Appeal inDjukic v. Hahn, 2007 BCCA 203, 66 B.C.L.R. (4th) 314 (at para. 14) limited Steward v. Berezan to its facts, stating: 

…The error of the trial judge in Steward was in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity based on the plaintiff’s inability to work as a carpenter in circumstances where he had not worked as a journeyman carpenter for twenty years prior to the trial and, at age 55, did not contemplate any return to the trade.  The case turned on its facts and did not establish any new principle of law.  Conversely here, the assessment was based on a business actively pursued by both respondents when the accidents intervened and not on any long abandoned occupation without a prospect of their return to it.  I am satisfied that Steward has no application in the case at bar. 

[141]        In Sinnott v. Boggs, the plaintiff was a 16-year-old girl who had been 11 at the time of the accident.  The medical prognosis was that she would continue to suffer neck and shoulder aches, ongoing discomfort and intermittent headaches.  The trial judge assessed non-pecuniary damages of $35,000, past wage loss of $2,400 and lost earning capacity of $30,000 “for being less marketable as an employee because of the limitations on her ability to work competitively in all jobs previously open to her”.  The assessment of damages was upheld on appeal.  Mackenzie J.A. referred to the submission of the defendant on appeal that since there was no finding that any particular types of work were foreclosed to the plaintiff, no award for lost earning capacity could be made.  He referred to a number of authorities, including Steward v. Berezan, at para. 11, and stated:

All of those cases involved middle-aged plaintiffs in settled occupations.  Their continuing symptoms resulted in continuing pain and occupational discomfort but they did not reduce the plaintiffs’ ability to earn income in their chosen occupations.  There was no prospect that they would change employment to occupations where their earning capacity would be impaired.

[142]        MacKenzie J.A. then stated at para. 13 – 17:

In my view, the limitation on loss of earning capacity awards advanced by the appellant is not supported either in logic or by the authorities.

Three of the four factors outlined in Brown are broad enough to support an award in circumstances where a plaintiff is able to continue in an occupation but the ability to perform and the earning capacity resulting from that ability are impaired by the injury.

The line between non-pecuniary damages and damages for loss of earning capacity is between losses that sound in pain and suffering and loss of non-remunerative amenities on the one hand, and pecuniary losses in the form of a reduced ability to earn income on the other. There is no reason why an injury which permits a plaintiff to continue in a particular occupation but at a reduced level of performance and income should not be compensated for that pecuniary loss through damages for loss of earning capacity.

In the case at bar, Ms. Sinnott is a young person who has not yet established a career and has no settled pattern of employment. In such circumstances, quantifying a loss is more at large. Southin J.A. commented on this distinction in Stafford

[42]  That there can be a case in which a plaintiff is so established in a profession that there is no reasonable possibility of his pursuing, whether by choice or necessity, a different one is obvious. For instance, on the one hand, if a judge of this Court were to be permanently injured to the extent that he or she could no longer do physical, in contradistinction to mental, labour, he or she would have no claim for impairment of earning capacity because the trier of fact gazing into the crystal ball would not see any possibility that the judge would ever abandon the law for physical labour, assuming that immediately before the accident the judge was capable of physical labour. But, on the other hand, if a plaintiff is young and has no trade or profession, the trier of fact gazing into the crystal ball might well consider whether the impairment of physical ability will so limit his future employment opportunities that he will suffer a loss. See e.g. Earnshaw v. Despins (1990), 45 B.C.L.R. (2d) 380 (C.A.).

[43] There is, if I may use the word, a continuum from obviously no impairment of earning capacity from a permanent physical impairment, no matter how serious the impairment, to a very large potential loss which must be based on all the circumstances of the particular plaintiff.

I agree with those observations.  Ms. Sinnott is in a category of those who are young and without a settled line of work. The trial judge has found that Ms. Sinnott faces limitations on her ability to work competitively in jobs that were previously open to her. In my view, that finding is an adequate foundation for the trial judge’s award. I am satisfied that there was evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusions on the facts and there is no palpable and over-riding error of fact which would permit this Court to disturb her conclusion or award.

[143]        I conclude that the approach I should take to the assessment of lost earning capacity has not changed.  Accordingly, I must consider, with reference to the factors listed in Brown v. Golaiy, whether the evidence establishes the basis for an award in this case, and if so, at what level.

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On another note, today’s case dealt with chronic soft tissue injuries and serious headaches.  In awarding $80,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary losses, the court made the following findings of fact about the Plaintiff’s injuries and prognosis:

[113]        I have considered all of the evidence given by treating physicians and other health care practitioners, as well as the evidence of Dr. Jung and Dr. Schweigel, who saw the plaintiff for the purpose of providing medical-legal reports.  Dr. Schweigel deferred to the expertise of Dr. Blasberg with respect to the jaw injury; as well, he saw the plaintiff on only one occasion, while Dr. Bowlsby and Dr. Condon both saw him on a number of occasions.  Both Dr. Bowlsby and Dr. Condon are very experienced practitioners and struck me as fair-minded witnesses who were not advocating for their patient.  Dr. Jung’s two examinations of the plaintiff were thorough and well-documented.  I accept the evidence of Dr. Condon, Dr. Bowlsby and Dr. Jung, who all had extensive contact with the plaintiff, and do not accept the evidence of Dr. Schweigel where it is in conflict with their evidence.  I also accept the evidence of Dr. Blasberg.

[114]        Upon consideration of all the evidence, I find that Mr. Ashmore suffered a whiplash injury in the motor vehicle accident affecting his jaw, neck, shoulders and back.  I find that he suffers a continuous low-grade headache and serious headaches at least twice weekly, and that he continues to experience right-sided neck and upper back pain, pain with swallowing, and pain in the region of the jaw joint.  There is no evidence that he suffered from these symptoms prior to the motor vehicle accident.  I do not find on the evidence that stress causes his symptoms, although it may exacerbate them.  I find that but for the accident Mr. Ashmore would not experience the persistent headaches which I find are his worst ongoing symptom, and that but for the accident he would not suffer the other symptoms I have referred to.  I find that the plaintiff has met the burden of showing on the balance of probabilities that the defendant’s negligence caused his injuries.

[115]        The plaintiff’s symptoms arising from the injuries caused by the accident have caused him frequently to require rest in the middle of the day, necessitating work late into the night.  The extent of those symptoms is shown by the fact that they have caused him to give up most of the very active sports he formerly enjoyed, and have constrained his ability to assist with the care of his young children and to enjoy the kind of life he led before the accident.  As well, these symptoms have reduced the amount of time and energy he has available for work outside his regular employment.  Finally, the symptoms have led him to spend considerable time pursuing relief through various forms of treatment.

[116]        Taking into account the opinion evidence of all of the expert witnesses as to the likelihood of further recovery, I find that Mr. Ashmore is not likely to make a full recovery, although he may experience some improvement to the point where he will be able to manage his symptoms better. 

A Busy day with ICBC Injury Claims

Several Judgements were released today by the BC Supreme Court addressing quantum of damages in ICBC Injury Claims.  Here are the highlights of these judgements
In Guilbault v. Purser, Mr. Justice Blair from Kamloops, BC awarded a Plaintiff $75,500 in total damages as a result of an ICBC Claim arising from a August 2004 collision.  The key findings of fact were as follows:

30]            Ms. Guilbault describes the complaints which she attributes to the August 29, 2004 accident as including her right hip, neck and shoulder pain and her headaches as having slowed her down and preventing her from doing things that she has wanted to do.  Her horse breaking and wakeboarding activities have largely ended because both activities cause her neck problems.  Ms. Guilbault also testified that although her participation in many other outdoor pursuits has been diminished as a result of the injuries she has been able over time to return to those activities, just not as actively as before.  She continues to suffer some neck pain and headaches, but not to the same extent as previously and she appears to have developed mechanisms to cope with and diminish her neck pain and headaches.

[31]            I am satisfied that as a result of the August 29, 2004 accident Ms. Guilbault suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, shoulder and right hip.  I accept that her right hip complaint was an exacerbation of a pre-existing condition which followed her being kicked by a horse approximately 10 years before.  I also find that as a result of the accident, Ms. Guilbault suffered from particularly distressing headaches.  However, I also conclude that over time the complaints emanating from the accident have been largely resolved, although she continues to suffer the occasional headache and some neck pain.

[32]            Ms. Guilbault has taken her pleasure in life from the outdoors and has enjoyed a physically active life, whether in her recreational or her employment pursuits.  I consider it likely that those interests developed in part because of her dyslexia and attention deficit disorder which made scholastic endeavours difficult to pursue, but that had no or little impact on her ability to perform and thrive on physically demanding work around her family’s farm and her recreational pursuits.  Her complaints following the August 2004 accident have impacted, I conclude, on her physical capabilities over the past four and a half years and will continue to impact on those capabilities to some degree into the future.  To Ms. Guilbault, who so relies on her physical capacities for her enjoyment of life, such injuries have a more significant impact than on those whose lifestyle is more sedentary.  The greater impact of the injuries to Ms. Guilbault and her lifestyle must be reflected in the measure of the non-pecuniary damages to which she is entitled.

The following damages were awarded:

Non-pecuniary damages:

$35,000.00

Special damages:

$8,500.00

Past loss of wages:

$12,000.00

Loss of capacity:

$20,000.00

TOTAL:

$75,500.00


 
In another ICBC Injury Claim Judgement released today (Haag v. Serry) Just over $120,000 in total damages were awarded to a Plaintiff injured in a 2005 collision which occurred in Surrey, BC.  
The Injuries included soft tissue injuries and the onset of symptoms in the Plaintiff’s arthritic facet joints.  Damages were awarded as follows:

[109]        In summary, my conclusions are as follows:

(a)        The accident on October 9, 2005 caused Mr. Haag to suffer soft tissue injuries and activated facet joint arthritis which has resulted in Mr. Haag suffering chronic lower back pain.

(b)        I award Mr. Haag non-pecuniary damages in the sum of $63,000, which takes into account a reduction to reflect my conclusion that Mr. Haag comes within the “crumbling skull” rule.

(c)        Mr. Haag’s claim for past income loss is dismissed.

(d)        I award Mr. Haag $60,000 for loss of earning capacity.

(e)        Mr. Haag is entitled to recover special damages in relation to the cost of physiotherapy treatments (including mileage) and for mileage in relation to his visits to Dr. Rebeyka up to the end of 2007 only.  I will leave counsel to calculate the dollar amount.  The claims for the cost of physiotherapy treatments (including mileage) and mileage in relation to Mr. Haag’s visits to Dr. Rebeyka in 2008 are dismissed.

(f)        With respect of the balance of special damages claimed, Mr. Haag is entitled to recover these amounts. 

The third ICBC Injury Claim judgement released by the BC Supreme Court today (Majewska v. Partyka) involved a 2007 collision which occurred in Coquitlam, BC.   The Plaintiff suffered a soft tissue injury to her neck, lower back and a concussion.   Her syptmoms improved by about 80% by the time of trial.  The court was unable to conclude whether the symptoms would fully recover or not.

General Damages were assessed as follows:

 

(a)

Non-Pecuniary Damages

$30,000

(b)

Loss of Income to Trial

$15,000

(c)

Loss of Earning Capacity

$15,000

(d)

Future Care

$     500

The last auto injury judgement released by the BC Supeme Court today was Moore v. Brown from the Victoria Registry.  This case involved serious orthopaedic and soft tissue injuries in a 2005 motorcycle accident.   Damages were assessed as follows:

1.

Pain and suffering

$115,000

2.

Past wage loss (gross)

$75,000

3.

Impairment of earning capacity

$262,000

4.

Special damages

$47,400

5.

Future care

$75,000

Whew!  Now back to work.

$40,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded in ICBC Injury Claim Involivng Soft Tissue Injuries

I am in trial this week and am a little short on time so this ICBC Injury Law update will be a little light on my desired level of analysis. 
Reasons for judgement were released today (Lai v. Wang) compensating a Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a 2004 motor vehicle collision in Vancouver, BC.
In this ICBC Claim the Court found that the Plaintiff sustained various soft tissue injuries which plateaued after several months leaving the Plaintiff with occasional pain.  The Court’s key findings and assessment of damages can be found at paragraphs 34-38 which I reproduce for your convenience:

[34]            I am of the view that the plaintiff has suffered significant, but not disabling, pain, which should largely be compensated in damages for loss of enjoyment of life.  I expect it will continue for some time into the future on an annoying, but not disabling basis, but that he will likely recover as Dr. Fenton suggests.  The cases which seem to me to offer the best guidance are Hubbard v. Saunders, 2008 BCSC 486, and Jackson v. Gow, 2001 BCSC 54.  I am of the view that $40,000 is an appropriate amount for these damages.  I should add that there was some evidence of pre-accident complaints of pain requiring treatment.  I do not think it was demonstrated that any of those problems were aggravated in a sense that required them to be taken into account.

[35]            I do not accept the mathematics offered by the plaintiff for past income loss.  I accept that the plaintiff may have lost some work due to pain while he worked at the Face Shop, but do not accept that he was disabled in relation to the jobs he chose to do.  I estimate the actual interference with work he was available for and willing to do at $1000.

[36]            With respect to loss of future earning capacity, I accept that the injuries the plaintiff suffered may affect his income earning capacity on the basis outlined in Palmer v. Goodall, [1991] 53 B.C.L.R. (2d) 44 (C.A.):

…Because it is impairment that is being redressed, even a plaintiff who is apparently going to be able to earn as much as he could have earned if not injured or who, with retraining, on the balance of probabilities will be able to do so, is entitled to some compensation for the impairment.  He is entitled to it because for the rest of his life some occupations will be closed to him and it is impossible to say that over his working life the impairment will not harm his income ability.

[37]            Mr. Lai is not disabled from the kind of work he has chosen in the past to do, and the kind of work he expects to qualify for in the future.  He does, nevertheless, have a level of pain that Dr. Condon considers chronic and Dr. Fenton believes will ultimately resolve, particularly if the plaintiff works through the pain in the short term.  I think it likely that the plaintiff will ultimately reach a point where he is only occasionally troubled by pain.  When that may be is unknowable.  In the meantime, although the plaintiff is unlikely, in any event, to work in fields imposing significant physical demands, he will suffer a loss of capacity to do such work, for which he is entitled to some compensation.  I fix those damages at $25,000.

[38]            The plaintiff is entitled to special claimed damages for sums expended to date, which I gather are agreed at $5193.  I do not think the plaintiff can be faulted for the amounts spent in trying to obtain relief from the consequences of the accident to the date of trial.  I am not satisfied that the $1200 for the Taiwan airplane ticket is justified and deny that claim.  I accept that the plaintiff will require occasional prescriptions and therapy in the future, although such an award should be modest.  I allow $1000 for this.  I reject, as speculative, the pulse therapy suggested by Dr. Condon.

$115,000 Awarded in ICBC Low Velocity Impact (LVI) Claim

(Please note the case discussed in this post was overturned by the BC Court of Appeal in reasons for judgment released on September 21, 2010.  You can go to my September 2010 archives to read my summary of the BC Court of Appeal Decision)
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Mariano v. Campbell) awarding a Plaintiff just over $115,000 as a result of injuries sustained in a 2006 rear end collision.
This was an ICBC Claim that apparently fit into ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact (LVI) Program.  The vehicles sustained modest damage and the ICBC Claims Lawyer defending the Claim argued the Low Velocity Impact defence.  The details of this are set out in paragraphs 33-41 of the judgment.

[33] The defendant says the accident was a low velocity impact claim.  The cost of repair for the Ms. Mariano’s 2005 Ford Escape was $1,712.96.  The cost of repair to Ms. Campbell’s 2000 Honda Civic was $3,714.07.

[34] The defendant argues that Ms. Mariano’s injuries should be consistent with a modest low impact accident and anything more than modest injuries from the accident are an unreasonable consequence.  Relying on Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27 at paras. 11-18, the defence argues that the injuries alleged are not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the minor motor vehicle accident.

[35] Ms. Campbell was called by the defence presumably to testify that the collision was only a minor one.  However even Ms. Campbell admitted to sustaining whiplash injuries.

[36] Ms. Campbell was stopped in gridlocked traffic waiting for the traffic light to change.  When she saw the light turn green and traffic ahead of her starting to move, Ms. Campbell starting moving her vehicle.  When Ms. Mariano’s vehicle suddenly stopped, Ms. Campbell did not apply her brakes before she rear-ended the Ford.  When she got out of her vehicle, Ms. Campbell saw a stalled vehicle, one or two vehicles in front of her.

[37] Ms. Campbell could not estimate the speed of her vehicle at the time of impact but defence relies on her evidence that another car could not have fitted in between her vehicle and Ms. Mariano’s vehicle.  However, Ms. Campbell said that on the impact, she immediately felt pain in her neck, the middle of her back, and her right arm.  She went into shock and her whiplash injuries took three months to resolve.

[38] The defendant tried unsuccessfully to attack Ms. Mariano’s credibility and argues that because of the minimal impact, Ms. Mariano can only have suffered minimal injuries.  However I find Ms. Mariano a very credible witness.  She continues to work despite her symptoms.  The pain in her neck and shoulders prevents her from working the way she used to work, and from doing the things she used to enjoy doing.  She was unable to buy her sons a big pumpkin for Halloween as she had always done before because she is now unable to carry a big pumpkin.  Ms. Mariano became quite visibly distressed when she described the activities she can no longer participate in with her children because of her injuries or because she is now simply too tired at the end of the work day to do anything else.

[39] The defendant points to Ms. Mariano’s application for mortgage life and disability insurance where she filled in “March 2006” as the “date of the last episode” of neck pain and that Dr. Darby wrote a note to the insurance company indicating that Ms. Mariano had fully recovered from the accident with no complications or sequelae.

[40] The statements may not have been entirely accurate but it was understandable.  Ms. Mariano tried to put herself in the best light she could so that she could obtain, as she did before the accident, mortgage disability insurance with no exclusions.  The defendant’s negligence caused the insurance company to dramatically limit the mortgage disability insurance available to Ms. Mariano through no fault of her own.  The defendant should not be heard to be complaining too loudly.

[41] Terry Watson, an estimator for the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, testified that neither Ms. Mariano’s vehicle nor Ms. Campbell’s vehicle sustained structural damage.  However, the hood of Ms. Campbell’s vehicle collapsed and slid under the Ford Escape, striking the spare tire underneath.  Mr. Watson agreed that that the impact of the collision was likely not absorbed by the bumpers.

The Defendants ICBC Claims Lawyer went on to argue that minimal damages should be paid because more severe injuries are not reasonably foreseeable from a minor or modest collision.
Madame Justice Loo rejected the defence arguments and accepted that the Plaintiff was indeed injured in this collision.  The court found that the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which have resulted in chronic pain and that there was a chance that these symptoms would linger in the future.
Damages were awarded as follows:
1.  Non Pecuniary Damages: $30,000
2.  Past Wage Loss: $45,428.91
3.  Loss of Earning Capacity: $15,000
4.  Special Damages: $574.16
5.  Cost of future care: $1,000
6.  cost of re-training: $23,307

ICBC Expert Rejected in Injury Claim, $100,000 Awarded for Myofacial Pain

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court awarding a 22 year old Plaintiff $50,000 for pain and suffering and a further $50,000 for loss of earning capacity as a result of soft tissue injuries.
The court’s findings of injuries are summarized at paragraphs 45-46 which stated as follows:

[45]            In the final analysis, I am unable to place much weight to Dr. Schweigel’s report.  I accept Dr. Anton’s evidence that as a result of the accident, the plaintiff has suffered soft tissue injuries of the cervical and thoracic spine and shoulder girdle, which in turn have given rise to a myofascial pain syndrome. 

[46]            I accept his evidence that while there is some room for improvement, the plaintiff will likely suffer intermittent headaches and neck and upper back pain indefinitely.  She must be careful to modify her activities and avoid bending, leaning, heavy lifting or repetitive lifting—particularly those involving sustained postures of the neck and upper arms or repetitive use of the upper arms—which will exacerbate her pain. 

What interested me most in this judgement was the judges discussion weighing the Plaintiff’s medical evidence against the evidence tendered by the Defendant.  The Defendant relied on Dr. Schweigel, a senior orthopaedic surgeon who is often retained by ICBC to review injury claims and often disagrees with Plaintiff’s physicians regarding the long term prognosis of soft tissue injuries.  In today’s case the court largely rejected his opinion and offered the following analysis:

[36]            The defence relies heavily on the evidence of Dr. Schweigel, an orthopaedic surgeon who examined the plaintiff in January 2008.  Dr. Schweigel concluded the plaintiff suffered no more than a very minor soft tissue injury to the cervical and upper back area. 

[37]            In Dr. Schweigel’s opinion, cervical soft tissue injuries may be classified as either minor, moderate or severe, depending on the presence of various findings and complaints.  In his opinion, a cervical soft tissue injury must be in the moderate to severe category before it will give rise to a chronic myofascial pain syndrome. 

[38]            In his opinion, before being diagnosed with a moderate to severe soft tissue injury the patient must present with a constellation of at least three complaints including:  moderate to severe spasm, moderate to severe deformity, and a moderate loss of motion.  Sometimes the patient will also present with neurological findings and/or x-ray changes and sometimes the patient will require strong pain medication for a few days. 

[39]            Based on his review of Dr. Fahim’s clinical records, including the CL-19 report, which he understood was completed on March 3, 2003, Dr. Schweigel concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer a moderate to severe soft tissue injury.  In his view, since the CL-19 report reflects pain and tenderness of the neck and upper back, a good range of motion of the neck and upper back and mild tenderness of the neck and upper back, the physical abnormalities noted at this time were “extremely minimal”.  He noted that “(s)he had mild tenderness of the neck muscles with good range of motion”. 

[40]            The difficulty here is that the CL-19 report relied upon by Dr. Schweigel was actually authored on March 3, 2004 rather than March 3, 2003.  At that time the plaintiff was in Grade 12, she was dancing regularly and the intensive final examination study period had not begun.  She was in fact doing quite well. 

[41]            This is in contrast to her condition just over a year earlier when Dr. Fahim examined her on February 15, 2003.  At that point he noted her complaints of pain and tenderness in both the trapezius and upper back areas, and the decreased range of motion of her neck in all directions.  There is no recording of “mild” tenderness with a good range of motion as Dr. Schweigel suggests in his report of January 14, 2008. 

[42]            While Dr. Fahim’s clinical records were available for review, Dr. Schweigel made no reference to them in his report.  Nor did he refer to the records of the physiotherapist, Dawn Stevens, who, three weeks post accident, noted that the plaintiff’s neck was “very stiff” and that it was “very hard to mobilize (her) neck”.  

[43]            Quite apart from his erroneous reliance on the March 3, 2004 CL-19 report, I am not persuaded that Dr. Schweigel’s rigid classification of soft tissue injuries and his insistence that a myofascial pain syndrome may only arise in the case of a moderate to severe soft tissue injury case are reliable. 

[44]            While I accept that Dr. Schweigel is a very senior and experienced orthopaedic surgeon, with a long career focused particularly on spinal cord injury, in my view he did not demonstrate the same degree of expertise as Dr. Anton in the diagnosis and treatment of soft tissue injury.  His categorization of soft tissue injuries struck me as both rigid and simplistic.  No peer reviewed journals or other medical literature were produced to support his analysis.  Nor did he demonstrate any in depth appreciation of the characteristics of a “trigger point”, as described by Dr. Anton. 

[45]            In the final analysis, I am unable to place much weight to Dr. Schweigel’s report.  I accept Dr. Anton’s evidence that as a result of the accident, the plaintiff has suffered soft tissue injuries of the cervical and thoracic spine and shoulder girdle, which in turn have given rise to a myofascial pain syndrome. 

[46]            I accept his evidence that while there is some room for improvement, the plaintiff will likely suffer intermittent headaches and neck and upper back pain indefinitely.  She must be careful to modify her activities and avoid bending, leaning, heavy lifting or repetitive lifting—particularly those involving sustained postures of the neck and upper arms or repetitive use of the upper arms—which will exacerbate her pain.  

Brain Injury Claim Dismissed, $55,000 Pain and Suffering for STI's and Hearing Loss

The first released judgment by the BC Supreme Court in 2009 dealing with an ICBC Injury Claim was handed down today.
The Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  It was an intersection collision where the Defendant turned left in front of the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  The Plaintiff had a green light and a significant impact occurred.
The Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained ‘considerable’ damage and her vehicle was written off.  Liability (fault) was admitted on behalf of the defendants on the morning of trial.  The trial focused on the Plaintiff’s injuries and their value.
The most contentious claimed injury was a concussive injury affecting cognitive abilities.   The court dismissed the alleged brain injury stating that “The plaintiff bears the onus of proving that it is more probable than not that she suffered each of the injuries she alleges.  In my opinion, it has been shown that there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff sustained a mild brain injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident.  But I am not persuaded that it is more probable than not that this occurred.”
Mr. Justice Halfyard did a great job addressing the competing medical evidence and the discussion at paragraphs 30 – 58 of this judgement is worth reviewing for anyone advancing an ICBC brain injury claim to see some of the issues that often come into play during litigation.
In valuing the Plaintiff’s Pain and Suffering at $55,000 the court summarized her injuries and their effect on her life as follows:

[89]            I conclude that the plaintiff sustained injuries to the soft tissues of her neck and upper back, the rotator cuff muscles in her left shoulder and the soft tissues in her chest wall.  I would describe the severity of these injuries as being moderate.

[90]            I find that the plaintiff sustained a loss of her hearing ability (much more pronounced in her left ear), as a result of a mild labyrinthine concussion caused by the accident.  Not all of this loss of hearing was caused by the injury.  Some of it was attributable to the normal aging process.  I accept Dr. van Rooy’s description of the overall loss of hearing ability as being mild.

[91]            I am not satisfied that the plaintiff sustained injury to her brain.  Nor am I satisfied that any injury she sustained in the accident caused a loss of her ability to maintain proper balance or equilibrium. 

[92]            The plaintiff has substantially recovered from all of her injuries except for the injury to her left shoulder.  Three years have elapsed since the accident, and the plaintiff’s symptoms may persist for another two years into the future.  These symptoms will be troublesome and sometimes painful, when she is working with her hands while holding her arms in certain positions.  To some degree, these effects will affect the plaintiff’s ability to make and repair costumes, and to work in her daughter’s shop.  But her hip and her low back problem are probably as much or more a hindrance to the plaintiff, than is the residual problem with her left shoulder.  The depression and anxiety that has plagued the plaintiff for some years is the most likely cause of her loss of motivation.  But I accept that the plaintiff’s emotional reaction to her injuries from the motor vehicle accident did aggravate her pre-existing psychological condition, to some extent.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and Low Velocity Impacts

Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff $21,500 for pain and suffering plus ‘special damages’ (accident related out of pocket expenses) as a result of a 2005 motor vehicle collision.
While the judgement does not mention ICBC directly (BC personal injury tort judgements rarely mention who the insurer for the defendant is) this case appears to me to be one which was defended on the basis of ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact (LVI) program.  The reason why I reach this conclusion is because the defence lawyer argued that “this was such a minor motor vehicle accident that no damages should be awarded”.  This is a standard argument behind ICBC’s LVI program.
The accident did not occur at a significant rate of speed and resulted in little vehicle damage.  The Plaintiff’s vehicle cost approximately $1,500 to repair.
The Plaintiff’s injuries are discussed at paragraphs 5-16 of the reasons for judgement which I reproduce below:

[6]                She described her symptoms as significant pain in her wrist, pain in her neck, shoulders, lower back, and a small amount of pain in her jaw. 

[7]                The doctor told her to “take it easy”.  She went home and put an ice pack on her wrist and shoulders. 

[8]                The pain in her wrist resolved within a month of the accident.  The pain in her neck lasted for approximately a year and a half.  Massage therapy helped with the pain in her neck; she developed better range of motion.

[9]                She also began to experience headaches which resolved within a year and a half of the accident.

[10]            The muscles in her jaw tightened and she experienced pain.  She described the jaw pain starting after the accident as minor, though it continued to get worse.  She still has some symptoms of jaw pain but it has improved with the use of a night guard.

[11]            Three weeks after the accident she developed chest pains.  She first noted the chest pains when she was jogging.  She did not have this pain prior to the accident.  When she developed the pain she stopped jogging.  She has gradually built up her jogging and she can now jog for 6 km before the chest pain sets in.

[12]            Her back pain first developed approximately an hour after she left work and it got worse the next day, but it resolved itself within a month of the accident.

[13]            She did not play tennis for almost a year and a half because the right side of her body was sore.

[14]            She attended the drop-in clinic on three occasions and saw her family doctor, Dr. Sewell, on three occasions.  She had difficulty making appointments with Dr. Sewell because he did not work on Saturdays.  Initially, however, she did not think her symptoms would last very long and therefore did not see him sooner.

[15]            She has had massage therapy, physiotherapy, chiropractic treatment, attended her dentist for a night guard, and attended Pilates, and has incurred special damages in the amount of $3,982.

[16]            The massage therapy was commenced shortly after the accident and a friend of hers did some initial massage therapy on her until she saw Ms. Chung who provided massage treatments for her from approximately December 2005 to April 2007, a total of 22 treatments.  She had approximately 10 physiotherapy treatments between June and November 2006.  She also had chiropractic treatments on 6 occasions in February and March 2006.

The court, in awarding damages, made the following findings:
[26]            Here, however, I am satisfied that the plaintiff is a credible witness.  She did not exaggerate any of her claims and the massage therapy provided by her friend Ms. Chung was done on a professional basis and she paid somewhat less than the going rate.  Nevertheless, the massage therapy was beneficial and she should be reimbursed for those disbursements….
[28]            I have no difficulty accepting those principles, but as stated above I found the plaintiff to be a credible witness.  There is a lack of objective evidence and that has made me exceedingly careful in weighing the evidence, but at the end of the day I am satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered the injuries over the periods of time referred to in this judgment.  I am of the view that this is a mild to moderate soft-tissue type injury and I am satisfied that the range of damages is between $20,000 to $25,000, as set out in Reyes v. Pascual, 2008 BCSC 1324, Pardanyi v. Wilson, 2004 BCSC 1804, and Walker v. Webb, 2001 BCSC 216.  I am satisfied that she is entitled to non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $21,500 and special damages in the amount of $3,982.  The plaintiff is also entitled to her costs.

Small Claims Court Awards $10,000 for 4 month Soft Tissue Injury ICBC Claim

 (Image created by and used with permission of High Impact)
I usually focus my ICBC case law reports on cases from the BC Supreme Court and BC Court of Appeal but reasons for judgement were recently released from the Provincial Court of BC (commonly referred to as Small Claims Court) which caught my eye.
The Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end crash in May 2005.  From the judgement it appears to me to be a claim that fit ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact criteria (LVI) where ICBC takes the position that no compensable tort claim exists. 
The Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained little damage.  The evidence presented by the Plaintiff, her husband and her doctor was ‘fairly consistent’ and the court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered a ‘whiplash injury’ to her neck and back.
The court made the following findings “I accept that there is a four month injury from start to finish with approximately two months off work.  On those facts, it is my standard view and backed up by a number of cases, which oddly enough comes in directly between what the claimant puts forward way up at the upper end and what the defendant puts forward way down at the lower end, my view of this has been throughout coming towards the figure of $10,000 and that is the figure that I do award“.
The Plaintiff was also awarded her lost wages and special damages (out of pocket accident related expenses).
This judgement was only 3 pages long which is unusual for an ICBC personal injury case and makes for very easy reading.  I can’t find this judgment on the BC Provincial Court website but will post a link to the judgement if it becomes published.  This case shows how well suited the Provincial Court can be in some circumstances in dealing with ICBC injury claims involving minimal injuries which resolve quickly.

$60,000 Pain and Suffering for Chronic Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgment were released today awarding a Plaintiff just over $73,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss sustained in a 2005 BC vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended.  The collision was significant with enough force to brake the seat assembly in her vehicle.  She was 59 years old at the time of impact. The Plaintiff suffered injuries to her neck, shoulder, wrists, knee and elbow. Most of her injuries healed in short order.  The Plaintiff’s neck and shoulder injuries did not and she testified that those areas were painful everyday  some 3 years after the collision.
The Plaintiff’s injuries and their effect are summarized well at paragraph 14 of the judgment which I reproduce below:
[14]            The main complaints of the plaintiff are that she has suffered significant, ongoing, chronic and permanent left neck and shoulder pain, and continuing anxiety, all caused by the motor vehicle accident.  She has kept working throughout, for the most part.  She has continued to work long hours, and at the same time has, on the advice of her doctor, tried a number of different kinds of therapy.  She has gone for two different kinds of physiotherapy, massage therapy, acupuncture, and has sought the services of a kinesiologist, a certified personal trainer.  She also went once for counselling to a psychologist with regard to her anxiety.  She applies ice and heat to alleviate her pain, and uses medications, with apparently limited results.
The Plaintiff called her husband to give ‘before and after’ evidence along with her treating chiropractor and family physician.  The defence called no evidence which is somewhat unusual in a contested injury claim.  In most ICBC injury claims that proceed to trial the court hears from both Plaintiff and Defence expert medical witnesses who provide opinion evidence as to the extent of injury and its relationship to the trauma in question.  It appears here that the defence was content to simply rely on their cross examination of the Plaintiff’s physicians.
The court found that the Plaintiff and her husband were ‘extremely credible’.   The court accepted that the Plaintiff’s ongoing complaints were caused by the collision.  In justifying an award of $60,000 for pain and suffering Madam Justice Morrison made the following comments:
[58]            In my view, there has been a significant loss of enjoyment of life for this plaintiff.  She suffers the pain and discomfort that she has described while working, and particularly while sitting at a computer, which involves much of her day.  She will continue to work.  Perhaps even more significantly, she has and will continue to suffer the loss of enjoyment of life that has occurred in her life beyond work.  There has been a significant and negative change in the lifestyle of Mrs. Larlee, ranging from her day-to-day household activities, her passion for gardening, her lifelong involvement with the piano and the accordion, and an active lifestyle which involved vacations and other activities.  Her pain is chronic and ongoing.