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ICBC Claims and Medical Treatment; How Often Should I See My Doctor?


One common question I’m asked by people advancing ICBC injury claims is “how often should I see my doctor?“.  The short answer is “as often as necessary to properly diagnose and treat your injuries“.  Recovery should always be the main reason behind physicians visits, not litigation.
There is no magic number of times you need to see a doctor in order to be properly compensated for your injuries.  A person who sees their doctor 100 times prior to settling may receive less than a person who only receives medical attention a handful of times.  The severity and duration of injuries are some of the most important factors when valuing loss, not the number of medical treatments.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, highlighting this.
In today’s case (Co v. Watson) the Plaintiff was involved in a “T-Bone” collision in 2006.  Fault was admitted by the offending motorist.  The trial focused on the value of the Plaintiff’s ICBC claim.   Mr. Justice Burnyeat found that the Plaintiff suffered from shoulder pain, back pain, neck pain and some sleep disturbance.  Some of the injuries improved prior to trial while other symptoms continued to bother the Plaintiff.
The Defendant argued that since the Plaintiff did not “regularly” attend to be treated by her GP that the Court should be weary of the Plaintiff’s credibility.  Mr. Justice Burnyeat rejected this argument and went on to award the Plaintiff $27,500 for her non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  In addressing the topic of frequency of medical treatment the Court stated as follows:

[26]         Ms. Co did not regularly attend to be treated by Dr. Porten.  The credibility of Ms. Co was put in questions by Mr. Watson as a result.  In this regard, I adopt the following statement made in Mayenburg, supra, where Myers J. stated:

The defendants challenge the credibility of Ms. Mayenburg. They point to the limited number of times she visited physicians to complain about her pain. They also refer to the fact that she did not raise the issue of her injuries when she visited Dr. Ducholke on several occasions for other unrelated matters.

I do not accept those submissions, which have been made and rejected in several other cases: see Myers v. Leng, 2006 BCSC 1582 and Travis v. Kwon, 2009 BCSC 63. Ms. Mayenburg is to be commended for getting on with her life, rather than seeing physicians in an attempt to build a record for this litigation. Furthermore, I fail to see how a plaintiff-patient who sees a doctor for something unrelated to an accident can be faulted for not complaining about the accident-related injuries at the same time. Dr. Ducholke testified how her time with patients was limited.

In summary, Ms. Mayenburg’s complaints to her doctors were not so minimal as to cast doubt on her credibility.

(at paras. 36-38).

[27]         Taking into account the injuries suffered by Ms. Co as a result of the accident and the duration of the suffering relating to those injuries, I assess the general damages of Ms. Co at $27,500.00.

Can Interest on Unpaid Special Damages be Recovered in a Personal Injury Claim?


Special damages are out of pocket expenses incurred as a result of the intentional or negligent actions of others.  In personal injury lawsuits the most common special damages relate to medical treatments such as physiotherapy, massage therapy, medications and similar expenses.
When a Plaintiff pays their own special damages and succeeds at trial they are entitled to be reimbursed for these expenses along with a modest amount of interest under the Court Order Interest Act.  What about expenses that were not paid before trial where the medical providers charge interest on the unpaid accounts?  Can a plaintiff recover damages for these additional expenses?  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court considering this issue.
In today’s case (Bortnik v. Gutierrez) the Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained as a result of a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.  Mr. Justice Myers found that the Plaintiff had “exaggerated his injuries“.  Despite this finding the Court concluded that the Plaintiff suffered “some minor whiplash injuries as a result of the accident” and awarded the Plaintiff $20,000 for his non-pecuniary damages.
The Plaintiff also was awarded damages to account for the expenses related to some of his post accident chiropractic treatments.  The plaintiff did not pay these accounts before trial and the chiropractor charged interest on the unpaid accounts.  The Plaintiff asked the court to award damages to account for this interest.
Mr. Justice Myers refused to make this award finding as follows:

[54]    It appears to me that the plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking chiropractic treatment.  I would allow the expenses until December 31, 2009, when he was largely recovered.

[55]    With respect to interest, while counsel have found some authority dealing with interest on disbursements, counsel advise they have not found any case dealing with interest on special damages.  I therefore approach the matter on first principles.

[56]    If the plaintiff had paid the chiropractor, he would have been limited to interest as provided by the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.  Assuming that interest on special costs may in some instances be recoverable as damages – something which I need not decide – it follows from my finding that the plaintiff has not proved a past wage loss that he cannot hold the defendants responsible for his inability or failure to pay the bills as they became due and owing.  He therefore is not entitled to claim interest as damages.

The BC Supreme Court has recently allowed interest on disbursements levied by service providers to be recovered in a personal injury case.  In that decision the Plaintiff’s ability to pay for the disbursement was also a relevant factor.  Today’s case leaves the door open for a similar result in appropriate circumstances for unpaid special damages.

More on ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Claims and Plaintiff Credibility


As I’ve previously posted, when Plaintiff’s sue for damages from soft tissue injuries sustained in so-called “Low Velocity Impacts” their credibility often plays a crucial role at trial.  The simple reason for this is that without objectively verified injuries a Court must make a favourable finding to accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that they experienced pain following the collision.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the relationship between soft tissue injuries and plaintiff credibility.
In today’s case (Chandra v. Chen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.   The claim was defended with the argument that “the Plaintiff did not suffer an injury in the accident which was so slight that the other driver involved  in the accident could not even recall an impact to the front of his vehicle“.
This defence was rejected with the Court finding that the Plaintiff did indeed sustain “some minor injuries…which have merged into a continuum with stresses that have arisen at work“.  Mr. Justice McEwan went on to award the Plaintiff $20,000 for her non-pecuniary damages.  Prior to doing so the Court made the following useful comments about the significance of Plaintiff credibility in soft tissue injury cases and the relationship of the collision to her injuries:

[21]         It is often difficult to assess injuries where the mechanism of injury is not obvious – as is often the case in low damage accidents – and there is little other than the plaintiff’s own evidence to support a claim of ongoing pain. Because “credibility” is crucial, much is often made of inconsistencies in medical records that ostensibly record the impressions of physicians of the plaintiff’s remarks under circumstances that are themselves difficult to assess. The court is often left with making what it can of the impression given by the plaintiff in the witness box.

[22]         The plaintiff did not appear to be exaggerating. She gave her evidence in a straightforward manner. I accept that she suffered some pain associated with the accident and I accept that she is sincere in her effort to recall the pain she has suffered since that time. To the extent that she has been unspecific, and at times somewhat inconsistent, I do not think she has been motivated to mislead. I think her attempt to recall all of the pain she attributes to the accident somewhat at odds with her actual experience, which appears to have been of some aches and pains that would come and go over time. I also think that the stresses of a physical occupation have at times been assigned to the accident when they have actually arisen independently.

$45,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Chronic Mild-Moderate Soft Tissue Injury

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, awarding a Plaintiff $85,000 in total damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Fennell v. Hiebert) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision when she was 10 years old.  She was a passenger in a van that was rearended by a pickup truck.  The collision was “sharp, sudden and unexpected” and was forceful enough to send the van off the road and into a ditch.
Fault was admitted.  The focus was the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.   The Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck and shoulder and these continued to bother her by the time of trial (12 years after the collision).
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $45,000 Mr. Justice Rogers made the following findings:

[20]         On the whole, the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that it was more likely than not that the motor vehicle accident caused the plaintiff to suffer a mild to moderate soft?tissue injury to her neck and right shoulder. That injury continued to be symptomatic in the two or three years after the accident. The symptoms were not particularly acute, as evidenced by the fact that experiencing them has faded from the plaintiff’s memory, but they were severe enough to prompt her to make complaints and to seek treatment from her chiropractor and family physician. Those symptoms began to be aggravated on a more regular basis when the plaintiff became old enough to participate in heavier chores around the family farm. They were also regularly aggravated by her work in the country feed store.

[21]         Dr. Vallentyne opined that the plaintiff is one of the 7 percent or so of soft tissue injury sufferers whose symptoms simply do not disappear with time. Given the persistence of the plaintiff’s symptoms since the accident, I am persuaded that Dr. Vallentyne’s opinion accurately describes the plaintiff’s situation. She does, in fact, have a soft tissue injury which does and will continue to cause pain in her neck and right shoulder. That pain comes on with heavy physical activity or when the plaintiff sits hunched over a desk for more than an hour or two…

[25]         In the plaintiff’s case, the injuries are permanent. They may become somewhat more tolerable if the plaintiff adheres to a structured exercise regimen, but they will nevertheless plague the plaintiff for the rest of her days. The injuries will bother her when she does particularly heavy work with her arms and shoulders, or when she sits for a prolonged period. The plaintiff will, however, be able to enjoy the vast majority of what life has to offer her.

[26]         In my view the proper award for non?pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.

How Can the Same Injury Have Different Values in an ICBC Claim?


As I’ve previously written, the exact same injuries can be valued differently by a Court when ICBC Claims go to trial.  When a judge or jury awards money for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) the award isn’t made by following a chart or a mathematical calculation, instead the award is made by ‘assessing‘ damages.
An assessment is just as flexible as it sounds.  There is no right award for pain and suffering.  While past cases (what lawyers call precedents) are instructive, they only serve to provide a ‘range‘ of acceptable awards.  So long as a trial award falls within the acceptable range of damages it will not be interefered with if challenged on appeal.
In practice this means that two people with similar injuries can be awarded different amounts for their claims and both outcomes can be correct in law.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, discussing the ranges of damages in BC personal injury lawsuits.
In today’s case (Anderson v. Cejka) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 rear-end crash in Parksville, BC.  Fault for the crash was admitted.  The Court was asked to value the Plaintiff’s claim for pain and suffering.
Mr. Justice Halfyard found that the Plaintiff suffered from a Grade 2 Whiplash Disorder which took a long time to recover.  The Plaintiff sought an award between $40,000 – $50,000, ICBC submitted that an award of $15,000 – $25,000 was more appropriate.  The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $20,000 for his non-pecuniary damages and in doing so the Mr. Justice Halfyard made the following comments about ranges of damages:

[84]         In my opinion, previously-decided cases, even where there are some similarities with the case at bar, can only assist in establishing a general range of damages which may apply to a particular case. This is because no two plaintiffs will ever be the same in age, previous state of strength and health, occupation and other activities. Moreover, the injuries (or combination of injuries) sustained by one plaintiff will never be the same as those incurred by another, in kind or severity. Additionally, the reaction of any two persons to the pain of a similar injury or to particular treatments will rarely if ever be the same. Other differentiating features may be the apparent length of the recovery period and, if the plaintiff has not recovered, the kind and extent of residual effects remaining from the injury at the time of trial, and whether any of the effects will be permanent.

[85]         I have reviewed the cases cited by counsel, in light of the facts which I have found. Due to significant differences, I see no useful purpose in discussing them. There is no legal formula which can be used to measure the amount of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life that a plaintiff has experienced as a result of an injury caused by the defendant. In my opinion, the range of damages for non-pecuniary loss in this case is the range suggested by Mr. Dreyer, namely, $15,000 to $25,000.

[86]         The pain suffered by the plaintiff was never serious. He himself consistently described its severity as being one or two on a scale of ten. Within a few months after the accident, the symptoms became intermittent. Eventually, they became few and far between. The plaintiff was never disabled by the pain, to any significant extent. I must be careful not to penalize the plaintiff for being stoical in the face of pain. But I do not find that this is the case here. I award $20,000 for this head of damages.

When trying to determine how much your personal injury claim is worth the best thing you can do is read as many cases as you can dealing with similar injuries so you can determine a realistic range for your injuries.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Shoulder Impingement in ICBC Claim


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing damages for accident related soft tissue injuries and shoulder impingement.
In last week’s case (Dial v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 BC motor vehicle collision.   Fault for the crash was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.  The Plaintiff faced some credibility challenges at trial and the Court found that she “exaggerated” some of her testimony about the extent of her symptoms however Associate Chief Justice MacKenzie found that the plaintiff did suffer real injuries including traumatic right shoulder impingement.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 the Court made the following findings:
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find on the evidence as a whole that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $50,000 for the injuries the plaintiff sustained to her neck and right shoulder, the aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition and headaches, and more minor injuries to her ribs, and dizziness…
[190] The purpose of a non-pecuniary damage award is to compensate a plaintiff for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities. While each award must be made with reference to the particular facts of the case, other decisions may assist the court in arriving at an award that is fair to both parties: Smaill v. Williams, 2010 BCSC 73 at para. 78…

[194]     The plaintiff relies on the following cases in support of her submission that $80,000 is the appropriate quantum for non-pecuniary damages: Kasic v. Leyh, 2009 BCSC 649;Predinchuk v. Spencer, 2009 BCSC 1396; Thomas v. Bounds, 2009 BCSC 462; and Lee v. Metheral, 2006 BCSC 1841.

[195]     I find, conversely, that these cases support higher awards than is fair in this case because the defendants have no obligation to compensate the plaintiff for symptoms attributable to her pre-accident low back condition.  That said, I find that an award that is just and fair to both parties is $50,000.

[196]     As I have already discussed, the plaintiff’s testimony about her symptoms and pain was at times vague and at others, exaggerated. Nevertheless, I accept that she suffered substantial pain for months after the accident, as is supported by the medical evidence in this case. Her pain gradually improved, and she was able to substitute for her husband at work about 14 to 18 months after the accident, albeit primarily for a few hours at a time but also with a few full-time shifts. By that time, her neck and shoulder pain were manageable. The aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition had also resolved such that her back had returned to its pre-accident condition.

You can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC Court cases awarding non-pecuniary damages for shoulder injuries.

BC Court Rejects ICBC's "LVI" Defence

One principle that has become clear in BC injury lawsuits is that ICBC’s LVI Policy of denying tort compensation in minimal vehicle damage accidents has no legal merit.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, demonstrating this.
In today’s case (Mendoza-Flores v. Haigh) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 separate motor vehicle collisions.  She was injured in both.   ICBC accepted that the second accident caused some injuries but argued that the first crash “was incapable of causing the injuries complained of (by) the Plaintiff“.  Mr. Justice Harvey rejected this argument with the following useful comments:
[54] Regarding as the relationship between the damage to the two vehicles and the resultant claim for injuries suffered by one of the occupants, it is trite law that the fact that the damage to the plaintiff’s vehicle was minor does not lead to a conclusion that the resultant injuries are also minor: Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.).
The Court went on to award the Plaintiff damages for her injuries and loss including $40,000 for her non-pecuniary damages.   In reaching this figure Mr. Justice Harvey made the following findings:

[61]        In the result, I find that the plaintiff has experienced a moderate soft tissue injury which continues to cause both discomfort and poses problems in her employment to the present time.

[62]        The plaintiff never fully recovered from the effects of the first accident although it would seem, from the evidence, she was heading toward a complete resolution of her symptoms. Her symptoms just before the second accident were appreciably better than they are presently…

[67]        While unresolved to some extent, I do not view the evidence as proving the plaintiff’s injuries as permanent. Both from an investigative and treatment standpoint it appears there were, and are, further steps available to the plaintiff.

[68]        Reviewing her injuries and comparing them to the authorities I have been referred to, I conclude that $40,000 represents a proper global assessment of the plaintiff’s general damages arising from the two accidents.

You can click here to read my archived posts discussing other BC Court cases dealing with so-called Low Velocity Impacts.

Pain and Suffering Awards for Year Long Soft Tissue Injuries Discussed

Reasons for judgement were released today addressing the value of non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for 2 plaintiffs who suffered soft tissue injuries in a 2006 BC car crash.  I summarize the Court’s key findings in my continued effort to grow this public data base of damage awards in BC injury claims
In today’s case (Morrison v. Peng) the Plaintiffs (husband and wife) were rear-ended by a vehicle driven by the Defendant.  Fault was admitted leaving the Court to value the Plaintiffs’ injury claims.  Both suffered soft tissue injuries which lasted approximately one year.  In assessing the Plaintiffs non-pecuniary damages at $9,000 and $18,000 respectively Mr. Justice Masuhara summarized the injuries as follows:
[23] Having considered the evidence, I am of the view that Mr. Morrison suffered soft tissue injuries to his neck and back which can be characterized as mild, and that his symptoms resolved within a year.  Given my assessment of Mr. Morrison and the facts, my view is that he was able to do more than what he stated…
[26] Recognizing that the aforementioned cases are for guidance and that each case is to be determined on its own unique circumstances, I find a fair and reasonable non-pecuniary award to be $9,000.
________________________________________________________________________
[42] Ms. Jabs’ condition is somewhat complicated by the several conditions that she has identified in the report.  Based on the foregoing medical opinion, I find that that she suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper and lower back and that the symptoms she experienced resulting from the accident had a duration somewhat beyond one year of the accident.  Her chiropractic and massage treatments end at this point for about one year.  I would characterize her injuries as mild to moderate in severity. ..
[46] Recognizing that the aforementioned cases are for guidance and that each case is to be determined on its own unique circumstances, I find a fair and reasonable non-pecuniary award to be $18,000.
Feel free to visit the soft-tissue injury archives of this site to review other BC cases addressing non-pecuniary damages for soft tissue injuries.

The "Crumbling Skull" Doctrine: BC Injury Claims and Pre-Existing Degenerative Conditions


When a Plaintiff suffers injuries by the fault of another but the evidence establishes that the person would have likely suffered the same symptoms of pain because of a pre-existing condition the Plaintiff’s award of damages can be reduced to reflect this reality.  This principle of personal injury law is known as the “crumbling skull” doctrine.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In this week’s case (Booth v. Gartner) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC car crash.  The Defendant struck the Plaintiff’s vehicle when he entered an intersection against a red light.  ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the Defendant but disputed the extent of the accident related injuries.
At trial Mr. Justice Cole found that the accident caused a variety of injuries.  One of the most significant was low back pain which continued to the time of trial.  The Plaintiff did not have back pain before the car crash however she had severe pre-existing (although asymptomatic) facet arthritis in her low back.  The accident caused this condition to become painful.  The Court was persuaded that this condition had a likelihood of developing pain in the future even without the accident.  As a result of this finding the Court reduced the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages by 25%.  In reaching this result Mr. Justice Cole reasoned as follows:
[23] I accept Dr. Vallentyne’s opinion that the degeneration in her lower back is severe at two levels and it is likely she would have been troubled by lower back pain and stiffness at some time in the future, absent Accident #2. However, I am also satisfied that although the degeneration is pre-existing, there was symptomatic acceleration of the facet arthritis as a result of Accident #2…

[26] The CT scan of September 20, 2008, according to Dr. Vallentyne, “showed severe bilateral degeneration of the facet joints at the L4-5-S1 levels in addition to a minor 3 mm L4-5 degenerative anterolisthesis”.

[27] According to Dr. Vallentyne, degenerative changes take years to develop and he found it was probable that the plaintiff had degenerative changes of her lower lumbar facet joints prior to the 2007 motor vehicle accident. He concluded that “[g]iven that the degeneration is severe at two levels, it is likely that Ms. Booth would have been troubled by low back pain and stiffness at sometime in the future absent the 2007 MVA.”

[28] I am satisfied that there is a measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, and I must take that into account in reducing the overall award.

[29] The principle to be applied is found in Zaruk v. Simpson et al., 2003 BCSC 1748, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 43 [Zaruk]. There the plaintiff had suffered a soft-tissue injury but some of her symptoms by the time of trial were consistent with degenerative changes. The Court was not satisfied that the general condition would have become symptomatic between the date of the accident and the date of trial, but concluded at para. 40, that there was a measurable risk that it would have become symptomatic in the future:

[40]   However, application of the crumbling skull doctrine may not result in the same reduction for past losses as future losses. Past losses must be assessed on the basis of a balance of probabilities. “Once the burden of proof is met, causation must be accepted as a certainty,” [Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458] ¶ 30). But for the assessment of future losses, “[a] future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation,” (Athey ¶ 27)

[30] The Court then reduced non-pecuniary damages by 15% and future care damages by 20%.

[31] Because the plaintiff’s degenerative condition was described by Dr. Vallentyne as “severe bilateral degeneration”, I am of the view that a large deduction is appropriate in this case and I find an appropriate deduction for non-pecuniary damages is 25% and for future care damages, 30%.

As I previously wrote,  a great discussion of this area of the law was also provided in a recent case (Gohringer v. Hernandez-Lazo) where Madam Justice Russell summarized the law as follows:

[92] In a crumbling skull situation, as in this case, the plaintiff has a pre-existing condition which is active, or likely to become active.  The pre-existing condition “does not have to be manifest or disabling at the time of the tort to be within the ambit of the crumbling skull rule”: Barnes at para. 89, citing A. (T.W.N.) v. Clarke, 2003 BCCA 670, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 62. In crumbling skull situations, the defendant is only liable for damages caused by the accident and responsible for returning the plaintiff to their original position.  As Major J. stated in Athey: the defendant is liable for the additional damage but not the pre-existing damage: at para. 35.   The defendant is therefore not liable for the effects of the pre-existing condition that the plaintiff would have experienced in any event: A. (T.W.N.) at para. 52.  If there is a “measurable risk” that the pre-existing condition would have impacted the plaintiff in the future then, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, a court can take this into account in awarding damages: at para. 35.

[93] In addition, the defendant claims an independent intervening event, subsequent to the Accident, also had significant impact on the plaintiff.  An independent intervening event is an unrelated event, such as disease or a non-tortious accident, that occurs after the plaintiff is injured.  The impact of such events is taken into account in the same manner as pre-existing conditions: Barnes at para. 96.  Thus, the plaintiff is only entitled to damages which flow from the difference between his or her original position and their “injured position”: Athey at para. 32.  If the unrelated event would have impacted the plaintiff’s original position adversely, the “net loss” attributable to the accident at issue will not be as great and damages will be reduced proportionately: Barnes at para. 96.

[94] I note that our Court of Appeal has stated that a reduction in damages to reflect the impact of independent intervening events or pre-existing conditions applies equally to non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages: A. (T.W.N.) at paras. 36-37; Barnes at para. 90.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Low Back Pain With Poor Prognosis

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $64,000 in total damages as a result of BC car crash.
In this week’s case (Elgood v. Ellison) the Plaintiff was injured in 2006 when he was struck by a vehicle in Langley, BC.  The Plaintiff was walking in a marked cross-walk with the right of way when the Defendant driver made a left hand turn and struck the Plaintiff.  Fault was admitted and the trial focused solely on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Plaintiff suffered minor injuries to his legs and neck which quickly and fully recovered.  His most serious symptom was low back pain which persisted from the time of the accident through trial.   The evidence accepted by the Court was that the Plaintiff had mechanical pain around the lumbar spine and that these symptoms may be an ongoing problem for the Plaintiff.
(highlighted portion of illustration depicts the lumbar spine)
In awarding the 65 year old Plaintiff $35,000 for his non-pecuniary damages Mr. Justice Bracken made the following notable findings:

[39]        Dr. Hirsch concluded that the plaintiff has made a full recovery with respect to his legs and that he had a relatively minor neck injury that has now essentially resolved.

[40]        The more difficult problem is the lower lumbar spine area and Dr. Hirsch said that this condition was likely caused by the accident.  He described it as likely mechanical in nature and that it is exacerbated by stress or loading on the back.  He believes that the plaintiff should continue his home-based exercise program and perhaps attend for structured appointments with a kinesiologist or physiotherapist.  He also thought that some exercise such as tai chi, yoga, pilates or water-based exercises would be helpful.

[41]        He concluded that the plaintiff’s restrictions were attributable to chronic low back pain that was caused by the accident and that the prognosis for complete recovery was guarded given the plaintiff’s age and the duration of the symptoms.

[42]        He did believe that the plaintiff should be capable of performing his domestic chores but that he may have to pace himself and that he will have ongoing problems with more strenuous activities such as lifting, snow shovelling or completing significant household repairs.  He did not foresee any need for future care or for any surgery.

[43]        In summary, it appears that the plaintiff’s leg and shoulder injuries resolved very quickly and his neck pain diminished gradually over time, to the point where it is now only occasional pain and of a non-debilitating nature.  He had some early headaches which have now become occasional.

[44]        The significant pain that the plaintiff suffers is chronic low back pain that Dr. Hirsch predicts will likely be with him for the foreseeable future.  No doubt the low back pain will prevent him from doing many jobs, particularly those that require long periods of sitting.  Given his age and background, it is most likely that sedentary jobs will most likely be what are available to him.  He has sharply reduced his recreation, although some of the intense recreational and physical activities engaged in by the plaintiff would likely diminish in intensity over time due to the normal aging process regardless of his injury.  He will likely still have the ability to engage in mild recreational activities. The plaintiff says that even mild recreation or physical activity is too painful for him.

[45]        As Dr. Hirsch pointed out at p. 6 of his January 20, 2009 report:

Three years have elapsed since Mr. Elgood suffered his low back injury in the subject motor vehicle accident.  Given the duration of his symptoms, the prognosis regarding complete resolution of his low back pain has to be viewed as guarded at this juncture.  Given the temporal profile to date, I would consider it more likely than not that Mr. Elgood will experience low back pain indefinitely.  Low back symptoms of sufficient intensity will probably limit his ability to perform tasks which biomechanically stress his low back…

[51] While the plaintiff has been able to carry on with work, he and his wife both said that he has only been able to do so by enduring a level of chronic pain.  Based on the opinion of Dr. Hirsch, which I accept, his condition is not likely to be alleviated over time.  Bearing in mind his age and the impact of his injuries on his personal life and work life since the accident, in my view, the range of damages is between that of the plaintiff and defendant and I assess general damages at $35,000.