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$80,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Hip Soft Tissue Injury

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a chronic hip soft tissue injury.
In last week’s case (Pisani v. Pearce) the Plaintiff was involved in a ‘significant‘ head on collision.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant.   The crash resulted in a non-specific soft tissue injury to the Plaintiff’s hip.  The symptoms interfered with the Plaintiff’s physical lifestyle and were expected to linger indefinitely.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $80,000 Madam Justice Loo provided the following reasons:

[73] Ms. Pisani was injured in a significant head on collision. Her 2009 Mercedes C300 4Matic was written off. She sustained soft tissue injuries to her shoulder, neck, and back. She will likely suffer flare ups from time to time for the rest of her life. She now has problems with her hip that prevent her from enjoying activities she used to enjoy. There is no diagnosis for the problem with her hip, and there is little or no evidence that it will improve. Her relationship with her boyfriend and her friends has been adversely affected.

[74] Her social life and her extracurricular activities have been adversely affected. She has difficulty attending the mosque because sitting on the floor causes her pain. She cannot dance, play soccer, hike, ride her bicycle, or ski. Dancing has always played a big and important part of her life. Hopefully by carrying out Dr. Anton’s recommendations, she will improve her postural muscles and core stabilizers and may be able to resume most of her activities…

[87] In this case, Dr. Anton suggests that Ms. Pisani’s neck, shoulder, and lower back symptoms should hopefully improve with one on one training with a qualified kinesiologist. Dr. Anton also suggests that if Ms. Pisani fails to have a good response to the training, she may not be able to resume dancing. She will probably suffer flare ups of her injuries for the rest of her life. She is still only 23 years old. There is also no evidence that her hip problem will resolve.

[88] I conclude that a fair and reasonable award of non-pecuniary damages is $80,000.

In addition to the above, paragraphs 96-104 are worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of damages for the Plaintiff’s delayed entry into the workforce as a result of her injuries.

LVI Defence Rejected Again; Damages Awarded for Modest Injuries


In an all too familiar development reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Surpeme Corut, New Westminster Registry, considering and rejecting ICBC’s “Low Velocity Impact” defence.
In last week’s case (Hoy v. Harvey) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 rear-end collision.  The impact resulted very minor vehicle damage.  The defendant argued that the Plaintiff “could not have sustained his claimed injuries from such a minor impact“.  Madam Justice Fitzpatrick rejected this logic and provided the following reasons:

[46] As in most motor vehicle injury cases involving soft tissue injuries, the defence cites the oft quoted decision in Price v. Kostryba (1982), 70 B.C.L.R. 397, where Chief Justice McEachern, as he then was, stated that the Court must exercise caution in respect of subjective complaints of pain in respect of those soft tissue injuries (at 399).

[47] I agree that the extent of this collision is relatively minor and that this is a factor to be considered when assessing Mr. Hoy’s claims of injury. However, it is equally clear that even low impact collisions may cause injuries. In Lubick v. Mei and another, 2008 BCSC 555, Mr. Justice Macaulay stated:

[5]        The Courts have long debunked as myth the suggestion that low impact can be directly correlated with lack of compensable injury. In Gordon v. Palmer, [1993] B.C.J. No. 474 (S.C.), Thackray J., as he then was, made the following comments that are still apposite today:

I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is a philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. It is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.

He goes on to point out that the presence and extent of injuries are determined on the evidence, not with “extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process”. In particular, he noted that there was no evidence to substantiate the defence theory in the case before him. Similarly, there is no evidence to substantiate the defence contention that Lubick could not have sustained any injury here because the vehicle impact was slight.

[6]        I am satisfied that Lubick sustained an injury in the collision in spite of the low impact.

[48] Generally speaking, I found Mr. Hoy to have given his evidence in a straightforward and direct manner. His subjective complaints of pain were confirmed by objective testing by both his family physician, Dr. Yong, and his physiotherapist, Ms. Mattiello. It is accepted that prior to the accident, Mr. Hoy was in good health and was suffering none of the complaints that arose just after the accident.

[49] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the injuries suffered by Mr. Hoy in the accident were caused by the accident and that accordingly, causation has been proven.

The Court went on to note that the Plaintiff suffered minor soft tissue injuries which went on to make full recovery.  In awarding $7,000 for non-pecuniary damages the Court provided the following reasons:
[71] In this case, Mr. Hoy’s most significant injuries can be said to have been resolved fairly quickly. His neck injury was only significant for a period of approximately two months which coincided with his last treatment by his physiotherapist, Ms. Mattiello. Thereafter, he would have pain only once per month for four further episodes. His back pain persisted to the point of affecting his lifestyle only for a period of approximately three months, when he returned to work full-time and began to resume his sporting activities. All symptoms were completely resolved by May 2011, or within 11 months…
[77] I award the sum of $7,000 for non-pecuniary damages.
Lastly, paragraphs 93-104 of the reasons for judgement are worth reviewing for the Court’s analysis in declining to award the Plaintiff costs finding there was no sufficient reason to bring this modest claim in Supreme Court.  You can click here to read other decisions addressing this discretionary issue.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Frozen Shoulder and Chronic Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Wepryk v. Juraschka) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  She was a passenger and the driver of her vehicle lost control resulting in a roll over collision.  Liability was admitted.  The 43 year old Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries and while she was able to continue working as a hairdresser these injuries limited her abilities to do so.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Ehrcke provided the following reasons:

[9] All of the doctors are agreed that Ms. Wepryk suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, left shoulder, and upper back as a result of the accident, and that she continues to experience pain, discomfort and occasional headaches from these injuries at the time of trial, three and one-half years after the accident.

[10] In addition, Dr. Chan was of the opinion that Ms. Wepryk suffered adhesive capsulitis or frozen shoulder as a result of the accident. Dr. Loomer did not agree with that conclusion. Dr. Chu had no opinion on the causation of the adhesive capsulitis. Dr. Smith agreed with the opinion of Dr. Chan. On a balance of probabilities, I accept the opinion of Dr. Chan, although not a great deal turns on this, since, as Dr. Chu expressed it, the left adhesive capsulitis is “the least of her problems”.

[11] There was also a disagreement between Dr. Smith and Dr. Tessler regarding the causation of left C-8 sensory neuropathy. Again, I find that nothing of significance turns on this, as these symptoms were minor and transient.

[12] The important fact is that the defendants accept that Ms. Wepryk suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, her left shoulder, and between her shoulder blades, and that she continues to experience pain to this day. As Dr. Smith put it in his report dated February 26, 2012:

More than three years have passed since Ms. Wepryk’s motor vehicle accident of December 5, 2008. In terms of prognosis, Ms. Wepryk unfortunately has fallen into the 10% of patients still with symptoms more than two years after their motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Ms. Wepryk’s prognosis to return to pre motor vehicle accident levels of functioning is poor, and Ms. Wepryk must now learn to cope with what I believe is a permanent functional impairment.

[13] I accept that conclusion, notwithstanding that Dr. Loomer expressed a “hope” of improvement. In cross-examination, even he agreed that there is no definite evidence that she will get better.

[14] It is likely, therefore, that Ms. Wepryk will continue to suffer from the pain to her neck, left shoulder and upper back, along with occasional headaches. Her symptoms are aggravated when she has to perform activities that require her to raise her arms, or to use her left shoulder. This has an impact on her work as a hairdresser, which requires such activities. It also has an impact on her recreational activities and activities of daily life….

[35] While reference to previous cases provides useful guidance, every case must be assessed on its own particular facts. Here, the plaintiff, who was 43-years-old at the time of the accident and who enjoyed an active lifestyle, suffered soft-tissue injuries to her neck, left shoulder, and upper back. Now, more than three and one-half years after the accident, her pain and discomfort have not fully resolved, and she is likely to have some residual effects for the indefinite future. She continues to have headaches three or four times a month, and she cannot engage in vigorous physical activities, particularly those that require her to raise her left arm above her shoulder-level, without experiencing pain. She therefore finds it difficult to be as physically active as she was before the accident. She says that she has gained some weight as a result, although the medical evidence suggests that any weight gain has been modest.

[36] In the circumstances of this case, on the facts as I have found them, and considering the factors set out in Stapley v. Hejslet, I find the proper assessment of non-pecuniary damages to be $50,000.

LVI Defence Rejected, $27,500 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Soft Tissue Injuries

In my continued effort to highlight the judicial treatment of the Low Velocity Impact defence, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing such a strategy.
In last week’s case (Guzman Gonzalez v. Dueck) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear-end collision.  The Defendant admitted fault for the crash but denied the Plaintiff suffered injury arguing the the crash occurred at “about one kilometre per hour” and that if felt like “a little love tap“.
Mr. Justice Burnyeat rejected this evidence finding as follows:
[6] The damage to the respective vehicles was $1,270.80 to the vehicle of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez and $1,001.52 to the vehicle of Mr. Dueck.  Mr. Dueck described the damage to his vehicle as being “a little damage to the front-end bumper”, “it got pushed down”.  I do not accept the evidence of Mr. Dueck that his vehicle was only going one kilometre per hour and that the collision only involved “a little love tap”.  Although the damage to the vehicles was not extensive and although I can conclude that this was a low impact collision, I cannot reach the conclusion that the respective damage to the vehicles could have been caused by the collision described by Mr. Dueck.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $27,500 the Court made the following findings:

[28] On the basis of the testimony of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez, the expert opinions of Drs. Tong and O’Connor, and the testimony and reports of Mr. Snip, I can conclude as follows regarding the extent and the duration of the pain and suffering of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez caused by the accident:

(a) Regarding the low back pain experienced by Mr. Guzman Gonzalez, I conclude that he had fairly constant pain for the first month or so, but that his complaints had resolved by the time Mr. Guzman Gonzalez saw Dr. Tong on October 21, 2009.

(b) Regarding the headaches suffered by Mr. Guzman Gonzalez, while Mr. Guzman Gonzalez testified at his Discovery that he had his last headache in December 2010, I am satisfied on the basis of the medical legal opinion of Dr. O’Connor that any headaches associated with the accident were common daily for the first three months, but had largely resolved within three to four months so that Mr. Guzman Gonzalez now only experiences headaches every so often.

(c) Regarding the pain experienced in his shoulder, Mr. Guzman Gonzalez confirmed that there is only pain when he lifts his arm above his head or when he sleeps on that particular shoulder.  I take into account the following evidence to come to the conclusion that the neck and shoulder pain caused by the accident lasted in the neighbourhood of six to eight months, although it was particularly acute during the first two months after the accident:  (i) by December 5, 2009, Mr. Guzman Gonzalez was reporting to Dr. Tong that there was only “occasional flareup” associated with the “tightening up of the muscles”; (ii) the clinical notes of Dr. Tong did not record any complaint by Mr. Guzman Gonzalez about neck and shoulder pain for the December 5, 2009 through February 20, 2012 visits; (iii) in his February 20, 2012 medical legal opinion, Dr. Tong noted that there was neither “residual neck musculo-ligament tenderness” on palpation, that the left shoulder exhibited “slight decreased external rotation and abduction”, and that there was “no tenderness on the anterior aspect of the left shoulder”; (iv) neck pain and left shoulder pain was described by Dr. O’Connor in his December 16, 2011 legal opinion as being “about 50% better”; and (v) in his December 16, 2011 opinion, Dr. O’Connor states that the neck pain was “initially triggered by musculoligamentous strain to the neck, and likely aggravation of the cervical facet joints at the mid-cervical spine”.

[29] The x-ray arranged by Dr. Tong in late 2009 indicated “moderate osteoarthritis of the  acromio-clavicular joint” and that this “may cause impingement”.  There is no medical evidence which would allow me to conclude that the accident caused an acceleration of the osteoarthritis or that this would not have developed but for the accident.  In the circumstances, I find that the condition described by Dr. O’Connor was the result of a degenerative condition in the AC joint which had previously not caused pain to Mr. Guzman Gonzalez but is presently causing pain during or after what Dr. O’Connor described as “overhead reaching”.  The prognosis of Dr. O’Connor is that there is an increased risk of injury or aggravation of the left shoulder with any heavy lifting or overhead reaching or carrying required in the occupation of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez.  I find that this ongoing problem is attributable to the osteoarthritis and not to injuries caused by the negligence of Mr. Dueck.

[30] As a result of the injuries caused by the negligence of Mr. Dueck, I find that Mr. Guzman Gonzalez was not able to play tennis for about six months, that he had limited ability to play soccer, that he was less active on the dance floor for six to eight months, but that, after about eight months, he was fully able to carry on with all of his previous recreational activities.  I find that any further limitations regarding his recreational activities can be attributed to a problem that Mr. Guzman Gonzalez has with his knee which is in no way associated with the results of the injuries he suffered as a result of the accident.

[31] Taking into account the injuries suffered by Mr. Guzman Gonzalez as a result of the accident and the duration of the pain and suffering of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez, I assess the non-pecuniary damages of Mr. Guzman Gonzalez at $27,500.

LVI Defence Rejected; Costs Awarded Despite Small Claims Quantum Judgement

In my continued effort to document judicial treatment of the LVI Defence, I summarize reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, yet again addressing and rejecting submissions based on this defence.
In last week’s case (Johnson v. Keats) the Plaintiff was injured in a low-speed rear end crash in Burnaby, BC.  The collision resulted in little vehicle damage.  The Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries of a relatively minor nature and claimed damages.
At trial the Defendant argued that the injuries were not connected to this low velocity collision.  Madam Justice Wedge disagreed and found the Plaintiff proved his case and awarded $16,000 in non-pecuniary damages.  In dismissing the LVI Defence the Court provided the following reasons:

[24] The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not established causation between the accident and his alleged injuries. The gist of the defendant’s position on causation was that it did not follow that the plaintiff, a strapping young man in reasonable physical shape, could suffer the alleged soft tissue injuries from such a low velocity impact.

[25] The difficulty with this argument is that there is simply no evidence to support it. The defendant did not have the plaintiff examined by a physician or call any evidence to suggest that low velocity impacts could not cause the kind of soft tissue injuries that the plaintiff claimed to suffer as a result of the accident.

[26] Moreover, the defendant did not put that theory to Dr. Lim when she testified. It was not suggested in cross-examination of Dr. Lim that Mr. Johnson was malingering or exaggerating his injuries.

[27] The defendant attempted to attack the plaintiff’s credibility by pointing to what I can only describe as minuscule discrepancies in his evidence.

[28] The plaintiff was a credible and even a quite remarkably low-key witness. He did not attempt to exaggerate his symptoms. His evidence was straightforward and matter of fact. He readily acknowledged he was sufficiently recovered after three weeks to return to light duties and in slightly less than three months was fit to take on the more strenuous labouring tasks of a longshoreman.

[29] Dr. Lim, too, gave forthright and factual evidence. She did not attempt to advocate on her patient’s behalf.

[30] In summary, I am satisfied the accident of March 12, 2009, caused the soft tissue injuries described by the plaintiff and his physician Dr. Lim.

The global damages awarded were below $25,000.  Despite this the Court awarded the Plaintiff costs finding there was sufficient reason to bring the claim in Supreme Court.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

…I am cognizant that the amount of the award falls within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court. However, the case law establishes that if there is sufficient basis for the plaintiff’s proceeding in this Court, this Court has discretion to depart from the provisions of the Rules limiting costs.

[50] I have considered the issue of costs carefully given the range of non-pecuniary damages for injuries of the nature suffered by the plaintiff. It was reasonable for him to bring his claim in this Court. Accordingly, it is reasonable and fair that the plaintiff receive his costs pursuant to Rule 15-1.

$40,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for "Longstanding" Soft Tissue Injuries Caused by Impaired Driver

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, assessing damages for long standing soft tissue injuries.
In this week’s case (Hahn v. Barnes) the Plaintiff was injured in a 1998 collision.  He was 5 years old at the time sitting as a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-ended by the Defendant.  The Defendant was found fully at fault with the Court noting that she was “under the influence of alcohol and not paying attention to her driving“.
The Plaintiff was 19 by the time of trial and testified that he sustained injuries to his neck and back and that his symptoms carried on since the collision.  The Court accepted this evidence and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $40,000.  In doing so Mr. Justice Tindale provided the following reasons:

[71] Credibility is the central issue in this case. I have had an opportunity to view the plaintiff, his mother, his father and his soccer coach Mr. Pohl give evidence. I accept that they are all honest witnesses. There are no notations regarding the back problems of the plaintiff in the clinical records of Dr. McKinley. Unfortunately, Dr. McKinley is not here to give evidence regarding the accuracy of his clinical records. I accept the evidence of the plaintiff, Sharon Hahn, and Keith Hahn regarding the plaintiff’s back symptoms. I find the plaintiff’s back symptoms are from the motor vehicle accident on June 16, 1998.

[72] I also accept the plaintiff’s, Sharon Hahn’s and Keith Hahn’s evidence relating to the neck symptoms. The plaintiff clearly had neck pain after the accident and there was some radiographs suggesting pre-cervical soft tissue swelling at the time of the accident. I find that the plaintiff’s neck symptoms are from the motor vehicle accident of June 16, 1998. I also find, given the evidence of doctors Dommisse and Travlos, the plaintiff’s neck and back symptoms can be defined as chronic in nature…

[76] In this case, the plaintiff is young, and has a long standing neck and back injury. However, the plaintiff’s injuries are not severe or disabling. I do not have any evidence that the injuries have caused the plaintiff any emotional suffering…

[78] An appropriate award for Non-Pecuniary damages, given the length of the plaintiff’s symptoms and the nature of the neck and back strain, is $40,000.

Defence Expert Opinion Rejected for "Compromised Objectivity"

As previously discussed, the law in BC provides expert witnesses with immunity when they provide negligent opinions in the medico-legal context.  This gap in the law is unfortunate and has been done away with in the UK.  Unless BC follows suit, the only meaningful avenue in discouraging “advocate” expert evidence is judicial rebuke.
To this end I have been highlighting judicial criticism when it arises with respect to expert opinion evidence.  Adding to this collection are reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an expert’s opinion concluding it would be “unsafe for the Court to put any stock in his opinion“.
In this week’s case (Sooch v. Snell) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision in Kelowna, BC.   He sustained soft tissue injuries to his neck and shoulder and was awarded $45,000 for his non-pecuniary damages.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant had the Plaintiff examined by a retired orthopaedic surgeon.  This doctor testified at trial and provided an opinion that it was “unlikely that there was any direct injury to the cervical spine or shoulder at the time of the injury“.
After cross examination the Court was unimpressed with this experts opinion.  In rejecting this expert’s evidence Madam Justice Ballance provided the following criticism:

54] Dr. Christian retired from his practice as an orthopaedic surgeon in 2005.  Since then, he has focussed his practice on disability evaluation.

[55] Dr. Christian conducted an independent medical examination of Mr. Sooch on March 18, 2010.  He spent between 45 and 55 minutes assessing Mr. Sooch.  He did not keep detailed notes, preferring instead to occasionally jot down a point or two and then dictate his findings and opinion immediately after the examination…

[60] It is obvious on the face of Dr. Christian’s report that in reaching his conclusion on causation, he relied heavily on this misconception as to the timing of Mr. Sooch’s medical appointment on the day of the Accident.  Yet, after he became aware that Mr. Sooch had actually gone to the medical clinic some hours before the Accident had taken place, he denied placing any importance on his mistaken belief.  He insisted that it was not in his “consciousness”, and was of marginal importance, if any, and maintained that knowledge of the true state of affairs would not have changed his opinion one way or another.

[61] The unfolding of Dr. Christian’s cross-examination on that and related matters was uncomfortable to observe.  At times, his demeanour was combative and the entire exchange on the issue of causation called his impartiality into question.  Dr. Christian’s responses to other lines of questioning were also sometimes argumentative and displayed a compromised objectivity.

[62] I am not able to credit Dr. Christian’s assertion that his mistaken impression about the timing of Mr. Sooch’s appointment on the day of the Accident did not impact his opinion on causation.  It plainly did…

[73] Based on the criticisms I have already expressed about the lack of balance in Dr. Christian’s assessment of Mr. Sooch’s pre-Accident soft tissue complaints, and his refusal to concede that his opinion on causation was partially fastened to his misunderstanding about the timing of Mr. Sooch’s medical appointment on the day of the Accident and other troubling aspects of his testimony, I consider it unsafe for the Court to put any stock in his opinion…

Facebook Photos Fail to Thwart ICBC Injury Claim


As previously discussed, Facebook photo production is becoming a common occurrence in personal injury litigation.   Despite the undesirable consequences on privacy expectations it is worth remembering that such photos, much like more conventional surveillance evidence, are not necessarily harmful in and of themselves.  Surveillance evidence is only damaging to a personal injury claim when it depicts activities inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s evidence.  Photographic evidence that does not reach this threshold is really of little value.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In today’s case (Guthrie v. Narayan) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 rear-end collision.  She suffered from chronic soft tissue injuries which were expected to cause on-going problems into the future.  At trial the Defence introduced Facebook photos depicting the Plaintiff on a trip to Las Vegas.  Mr. Justice Goepel found these to be of little value and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $65,000.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[27] I accept the testimony of Dr. Cordoni and Dr. Badii. I find that Ms. Guthrie sustained soft tissue injuries to the neck and back as a result of the motor vehicle accident. These soft tissue injuries have led to chronic neck and shoulder pain. I find that it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in her condition for the foreseeable future.

[28] I further find that Ms. Guthrie has aggressively attempted to deal with her injuries. She has followed the medical recommendations made to her. She has attended physiotherapy and message therapy. She took a series of painful IMS treatments. She works out regularly. She has done all she can to assist in her recovery.

[29] Unfortunately, however, Ms. Guthrie’s injuries have not resolved. They continue to seriously impact her daily life and will likely do so for the foreseeable future. The injuries have affected all facets of her life. She needs accommodation at work, cannot partake in some sports she formerly enjoyed, must avoid certain social events and even has difficulty when she attempts to cuddle with her boyfriend. She is no longer suited for many occupations and requires accommodation to carry out many of the occupations that are still available to her.

[30] In making these findings, I have not overlooked the pictures posted on Ms. Guthrie’s Facebook page concerning her trip to Las Vegas. Those pictures are of limited usefulness. Ms. Guthrie is seeking compensation for what she has lost, not what she can still do. The fact that she can spend a weekend with her friends in Las Vegas does not gainsay her evidence that she continues to suffer from the aftermath of the accident. She should not be punished for trying to get on with her life and enjoying it the best she can regardless of the limitations imposed on her as result of the accident…

[35] While the subject cases are of general assistance and provide a guideline as to the range of damages awarded in cases with some similarities to the case at bar, each case must be decided on its own facts. Of primary importance in this case is the age of the plaintiff, the manner in which the injuries have impacted on her life, and the medical evidence which suggests that any future improvement is unlikely. I note in the cases cited by the defendant the prognosis for the plaintiffs was much more favourable than that concerning Ms. Guthrie. I award $65,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Soft Tissue Injuries "Superimposed on Other Problems"

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Sharifi v. Chaklader) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision in Vancouver BC.  She was a passenger in a van travelling through an intersection when it was struck by a left hand turning driver.  The Defendant was found fully liable for the crash.  The Plaintiff had some pre-existing problems and the collision superimposed soft tissue injuries on these.  These remained symptomatic at the time of trial.  Despite some concerns with the Plaintiff’s evidence the Court assessed non-pecuniary damages at $50,000.  In doing so Mr. Justice Willcock provided the following reasons:

[99]Weighing the evidence as a whole, I find that Ms. Sharifi suffered a musculoligamentous soft tissue injury to her cervical spine, upper back and shoulders on July 10, 2008.  Those injuries were superimposed on a pre-existent left shoulder injury and on some pre-existent neck pain.  Additional pain and suffering following the motor vehicle accident did not cause, but must have contributed to, the level of her ongoing stress and anxiety, and contributed to her tendency to suffer from migraine headaches.  The injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident has continued to trouble her since; it has affected her capacity to enjoy life, and caused her to suffer an income loss.

[100]On a balance of probability I cannot find Ms. Sharifi suffered a concussion or an injury to her low back.  Nor am I satisfied on the evidence that she has established she has suffered or is likely to suffer from post-traumatic degenerative osteoarthritis as a result of the soft tissue injury sustained in the July 2008 accident…

[103]Damages must be assessed on the basis that the plaintiff has suffered a soft tissue injury superimposed on the other problems documented in the records: a history of some neck pain, a left recurrent shoulder injury that limited her ability to lift, occasional migraine type headaches, stress, anxiety, fatigue and depression-like symptoms (but not clinical depression).  Damages must be assessed on the basis some continuing recovery is probable.  The functional impact of the injury is overstated by Ms. Sharifi.  She is capable of most activities of daily living. I am not satisfied she has established that she is disabled from clerical employment…

[119]I assess non-pecuniary damages in this case at $50,000.

The Other Side of the "Low Velocity Impact" Coin


I’ve written many times about the so-called “low velocity impact” defence where Defendants argue that a crash with little vehicle damage can create only minimal (or perhaps no) injuries and compensation should be accordingly modest.  These arguments have been soundly defeated many times in Court.
The other side of the equation, however, holds equally true.  Just because a collision results in severe vehicle damage does not mean that a severe injury occurred.  It is the severity of injury, not the severity of impact, that really matters.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court addressing this.
In this week’s case (Currie v. McKinnon) the Plaintiff was involved in a fairly significant collision.  He was injured in the crash.  In support of his submissions for damages the Plaintiff stressed that this was “a very serious accident” involving “high speed”.  The Court noted that these facts are of little consequence.  In addressing the ‘serious accident’ submissions Madam Justice Adair provided the following comments:

[67] There is no dispute that Mr. Currie suffered some injuries in the accident.  Mr. Currie’s position is that he continues as of trial to suffer the effects of those injuries.  The defendants’ position is that the injuries suffered in the accident were relatively minor and had resolved within a short period.  The defendants say that, to the extent Mr. Currie continues to experience symptoms – particularly neck and back pain – as of trial, those symptoms are unrelated to the accident and are not caused by injuries suffered in the accident.

[68] Mr. Dahlgren, on behalf of Mr. Currie, argues that I should conclude Mr. Currie was seriously injured because he was involved in a “very serious accident,” involving a “high speed” collision and that resulted in substantial property damage.  However, these facts are not necessarily connected in any logical way to the nature and extent of Mr. Currie’s injuries, as Thackray J. (as he then was) pointed out (in a slightly different context) in Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236, at para. 5:

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls.  Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed.  The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court.  Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.

The Court went on to conclude that the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which “substantially recovered” in one year and awarded non-pecuniary damages of $22,000.